Master dissertation: *Comparative Candidate Survey: a comparative approach regarding the views of the candidate MPs and the voters about democracy and representation, before and after the crisis for both Greece and Portugal (2009-2012).*

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To: A.T., E.K., P.S. and to the Influence Lisbon had on me.
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1-Introduction

The main objective of this thesis is the comparative study of prospective MPs’ attitudes and their perceptions in Greece and Portugal, before and after the economic crisis (2009-2012). In other words, this study aims to show the changes of political personnel’s behavior, induced by this period of crisis. At the same time, this study is also interested in public opinion and more specifically how the crisis affected the attitudes of the voters in both countries.

As has already become apparent, the study is structured in a comparative perspective. According to Arend Lijphart, comparative method is defined as one of the basic methods of establishing general empirical propositions and it can be a highly useful instrument in scientific political inquiry. For most sciences, the best way to test theory is experimentation, however for political science, the principal method is comparison. Comparison is essential for the development of generalizations about politics and government, because comparisons of countries can help us understand the larger political world. That is what Keman argues, by saying that, “we view the ‘art of comparing’, or what is generally called ‘the comparative approach to political and social science’ not as an art in itself but as one of the most adequate ways to connect ideas about society and politics with what is actually going on in the world in which we live.”

Comparative Politics is one of the oldest fields of political analysis, forming the basis for many of the writings of political philosophers throughout the ages. Through the study of the most important political similarities and differences among different countries, comparative politics has four main objectives that also constitute reasons for comparison or advantages of comparison. Briefly, comparative approach broadens the comprehension of political world, allowing political scientists to know what other countries are like, as the world becomes more and more interdependent. Moreover, comparison can ameliorate the political classifications, which make the world of politics less complex, providing the researcher with “data containers”, as Sartori mentions, into which empirical evidence can be

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1The present introduction is common for two dissertations. This one and the one that was written by Evangelia Katsounidou entitled "Views on political issues in Greece and in Portugal before and after the crisis: a comparative perspective".
3“The real world of comparative government is therefore the laboratory for political scientists to determine what works and what does not, as well as to demonstrate important theoretical relationships among variables. It is a laboratory in which the experiments are designed by other people—politicians, civil servants, interest groups leaders for their own purposes and not those of social scientists.”
organized. Another important advantage is possibility of interpretation. The hypothesis-testing, between variables or factors, help researchers to come closer to the explanation of the particular (events, actors, structures etc.) and through this to build more general theories, as the explanation of the specific brings forth the general. Finally, comparison of countries and the valid generalizations that result from comparison allow prediction, useful for other future political outcomes.

Nevertheless, two are the necessary elements that a comparative research should have in order to be complete and successful - an extensive theoretical argument to underlie it and a methodologically adequate research design to undertake it. In other words, “without a proper Research Question (RQ) and Research Design (RD), the ‘art of comparing’ becomes meaningless and – which is worse - may lead to dubious evidence on which existing policies may be changed that affect much in society”. Only then is it proper to choose and select the correct techniques to perform the analysis in order to reach correct research results. In short, “substance comes before method, questions come before answers, and theory always precedes comparative analysis”.

As to this research, it is supposed the candidate MPs’ and voters’ views and perceptions have been shifted, between 2009 and 2012, under the new circumstances of the economic crisis, both in Greece and in Portugal. Around this leading hypothesis, plenty of other hypotheses have been developed – to which will refer in detail later in the main part of the thesis - that have to do with different attitudes depending on variables as the kind of the issues, the country, the political party, the different ideological background. So, mainly, the comparison is conducted across time, before and after crisis, and at the same time across countries (Greece and Portugal).

1.1- Why compare Greece and Portugal.

Greece and Portugal - the two Euro-zone countries that have been most affected by the crisis - were selected as the ideal candidates for a cross-national comparison. Apart from the similar recessionary experience, the two countries have a lot of things in common, thus eligible for comparative analysis. Broadly speaking, are approximately the same size, have the same population and they are both located at the same geographical area of Southern Europe. Moreover, an important number of common cultural, social, economic, historical and political characteristics have led analysts to treat them – together with Spain and often with

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8 Arend Lijphart argues that “comparison allows testing hypothesized empirical relationships among variables”.
10 Pennings, Keman, Kleinnijenhuis, Doing Research in Political Science: An Introduction to Comparative Methods and Statistics, p. 4
11 Penning, Keman, Kleinnijenhuis, Doing Research in Political Science: An Introduction to Comparative Methods and Statistics, p. 8
Italy- as a basically similar and cohesive group\textsuperscript{11}. Even though, the analysts that argue that “the democratic regimes of Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece are neither sufficiently similar to each other nor sufficiently different from other democratic regimes to fit a distinctive model of democracy”, they cannot disagree with the proposition that “these four countries have many other characteristics in common and they are therefore a particularly inviting set of cases for comparative analysis”\textsuperscript{12}.

More specifically, both Greece and Portugal –together with Spain- are new democracies of Southern Europe. They both suffered major failures in sustaining stable democratic politics in the past, mostly because of the inherent party system instability. As a result, they had the relatively experience of dictatorship, as an authoritarian heritage. They are called new democracies because the transition from dictatorship to democracy took place in the mid-1970s, in comparison with the old democracies of Western Europe.

In short, Greece experienced a seven year dictatorship (Junta) imposed on the 21st of April in 1967, by the colonels G. Papadopoulos, N. Makarezos and St. Patakos. The dictatorship occurred after a long unstable democratic regime, 1960-1967\textsuperscript{13}, where the social cleavages in the Greek society were very deep and they divided the society in the nationalist and the non-nationalists\textsuperscript{14,15}. After, a short termed dictatorship-in comparison with the Portuguese one- in early 1973 started the first serious manifestations in the Law University of Athens against the dictatorship leading to the serious events of the 17\textsuperscript{th} of November 1973\textsuperscript{16}, which also caused the overthrowing of Papadopoulos, by brigadier Ioannidis, almost a week later\textsuperscript{17}. At the summer of 1974 a few mal handlings with the Cypriot issue forced the regime to call-back of one of the former Prime ministers- K. Karamanlis- of the previous democratic regime into duty. Upon with his return in July, he formed a provincial government, resolved the crisis and declared the first free elections on November\textsuperscript{18}. So the dictatorship was over

\textsuperscript{11}See, for instance, Herz H. J., From Dictatorship to Democracy: Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism, CT: Greenwood Press, Westport, 1982


\textsuperscript{15}Regarding the above mentioned division there are two remarks that must be made. The first one is about the translation of the terms; more specifically it is about the division between those who “care” about the wellbeing of the country and those who do not “care”. Leading to the second remark, this is about the composition of those two groups. In the first one belong all the right wing, expressing the winners of the civil war, and the second group contained all the rest, including the arch enemy of the state, the communists. (G. Mosxonas, The Greek Political Culture, p.164-65)

\textsuperscript{16}At the events of the November the Junta’s armed forces attempted to break off the manifestation by invading to the Polytechnic University Campus, where the students were concerted, thus overthrowing the university asylum and leaving behind dead and wounded people.

\textsuperscript{17} Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannides, leader of a junta within the junta, was opposed to the policies and opinions of Papadopoulos. Thus wanted to overthrow Papadopoulos staging a military coup within the coup. So, he seized the opportunity, on 25 November 1973 when he used the students’ uprising as a pretext to stage a counter coup that overthrew Papadopoulos and the attempt at transition to democratic rule.

\textsuperscript{18}Boulgaris, Nikolakopoulos, Rizas, Sakelaropoulos, Stefanidis, Greek Political History 1950-2004, p. 73.
and on that new census a new democracy on Greece was founded, inaugurating the period of “metapolitevsi”, which is translated as polity or regime change.

Portugal’s transition to democracy was, on the contrary to Greece, a bloodless coup against the dictatorship, which lasted almost fifty years, from 1926 to 1974. Actually, Portugal with this coup, which is also known as Carnation Revolution of 25 April 1974, initiated the so-called “third wave” of worldwide democratization\(^1\). At this point it has to be mentioned that on the last years of the dictatorship in Portugal Salazar, due to a severe injury, was unable to fulfil his duties and was replaced by Marcello Caetano from the summer of 1968 till the fall of the dictatorship. Even thought Caetano tried to “soften” and “liberate” the regime, it was not enough. The colonial war was an important factor of the overthrowing of the regime. The war had brought great resentment not only to the people but also to those who fought the war on three different fronts. Thus leading the creation of the Movimento das Forças Armadas (the Armed Forces Movement), which was manned from junior officers who tended to the left. The MFA, leaded by the captains, overthrew the regime on the 25th of April. The transition to democracy occurred in a period where the Cold war was at the peak and the pressures for decolonisation were heavy. Prior to revolution, “free and fair elections with universal suffrage and competitive party system were unheard of in Portugal”\(^2\). The first constitutional parliamentary elections took place, on 25 April 1976.

In addition, after the transition from dictatorship to democracy was achieved, the two new established democracies also followed a parallel route in the following years. The parliamentary political system, with unitary and centralized government, with proportional electoral law, with unicameral parliament, with completely rigid constitution, with obvious bipartisan elements, where two large centrist parties alternately in government, with strong Popular and Socialist Parties and divided left, the experience of incorporation into Europe once democracy had been consolidated –Greece and Portugal joined the EEC(now EU) respectively in 1981 and 1986 - are only some of the common features of the two democratic regimes that can confirm that. Moreover, the economic situation of the two countries, the fact that they were always economically less developed than most other European countries, with economy based on agriculture and tourism and little or not at all on industrial sector, is another fact that can support the above mentioned allegation.

At this point, we will present the basic features of the political systems in the two countries under examination in order to underline the similarities and at the same time to examine the possible differences. Greece’s transition to democracy occurred shortly after the events of the 17th November of 1973. Still the key role-player of the transition remained the conservative wing, thus restraining the people to the role of the “audience”\(^{21}\). As mentioned above, with the return of the former Prime Minister K. Karamanlis, on the summer of 1974, democratic and transparent elections were scheduled on the 17th of November 1974. After the elections on the 8th of December of the same year, a referendum occurred in order to decide the new head of the democratic regime. More specifically, the question that was bestowed upon the Greek people was whether or not the former king of Greece should return or not. The result was negative, meaning that the Greek people’s verdict was not in favour of the return of the king\(^{22}\). So, in the new democratic constitution that was formed on 1975, the political system of Greece was presidential parliamentary democracy\(^{23,24}\). Now, the prime minister is the head of the government and the President of democracy is the regulator of the regime\(^{25,26}\). The government and the parliament are formed after direct, private and transparent elections\(^{27}\). The latter are scheduled every four year, except where there are implications that order for elections to be done sooner or later than the scheduled program\(^{28}\).

The party system of Greece can be considered as bipartisan, meaning that even though there is a wide spectrum of parties, and only two have realistic opportunities to become government and usually those two parties alternate with each other on the matter of governance\(^{29}\). The rest of the parties are playing the role of opposition\(^{30}\). The Greek spectrum of parties covers both of the left-right scale. The most recent parties that are active within the Greek political life and parliament are, from right to left: Golden Dawn, La.O.S, Aneksartitoi Ellines, New Democracy, PASOK, Democratic Left, Sy.Riz.A. and the Greek Communistic Party\(^{31}\). In addition, it has to be mentioned that the first democratic government’s goals were


\(^{22}\)Close, Greece 1945-2004, politics- society- economy, p. 225


\(^{24}\)Article no 1 paragraph the 1st of the Greek Constitution

\(^{25}\)It has to be mentioned that even thought the status and the obligations of the President have not changed that much during the constitutional revision that occurred during the democratic years, at this essay we do consider the obligations and the status of the President as they are described in the last revision of the constituency on the 27th of May of 2008 according to the resolution of the 8th Revisionary Greek Parliament.

\(^{26}\)Site of the Greek Presidency: http://www.presidency.gr/?page_id=26

\(^{27}\)Article 51 paragraph the 3rd of the Greek Constitution.

\(^{28}\)Regarding the “exceptional” situations the article 53 paragraph the 3rd of the Greek Constitution.

\(^{29}\)All those years, from the first elections of 1974 to 2009 the two parties that alternate positions in the governance were the centre-right ND and the centre-left PASOK. The big surprise was in that last elections of 2012, where

\(^{30}\)Heywood A., Εισαγωγή στην Πολιτική Επιστήμη (eng. Introduction to Politics), Εκδόσεις Πόλις, Athens 2006, p. 364

\(^{31}\)The later it has to be said that is the oldest party in Greece, founded on 1924, it was outlawed between 1936 and 1974. With the restoration of democracy that party became legal again. The rest of the parties are a product of the early and present democratic years.
about the reconciliation of the country with her past, like legalising the communistic party and give amnesty to people that were restricted in the previous periods. Also, to eliminate the USA influence on the country, to promote the socioeconomic conditions of Greece and of course to coordinate the country’s attempt to join the EC/EU\textsuperscript{32}. Progression was slow and rough, but in 1981 the country made it into the EU.

Portugal’s transition to democracy included the creation of a new, stable democratic regime, decolonization and the aspect of the EU membership and the modernisation of the country. Portugal’s political system is semi-presidential, and the only institutions with national electoral legitimacy and the responsibility for forming government are the President and the Parliament. The head of the State is the directly elected president, although this person must share power with the Prime Minister, who is the head of government and of a multi-party system\textsuperscript{33}. Executive power is exercised by the Council of Ministers, while legislative power is vested in both the government and the Assembly of the Republic\textsuperscript{34}. National legislative elections ultimately determine which party shall form the Government, who will become Prime Minister, and thus, who will share executive power with the president.

As Portugal became democratic, it also developed a political party system with a full spectrum of parties that ranged from the far left to the far right; nevertheless, four parties represented almost 90 percent of the electorate. A stable party system quickly emerged\textsuperscript{35}, and since 1976, it is dominated by the social democratic Socialist Party (PS) and the liberal conservative Social Democratic Party (PSD)\textsuperscript{36}. Access to government has been more restricted limited to only the PS and PSD and the main competition has always been between those two parties\textsuperscript{37}. This domination was mirrored by a long-term decline of the smaller parties on the flanks of the party system, namely, the conservative CDS-PP and the Communist PCP\textsuperscript{38}.

Given these basic similarities between Greece and Portugal there are, however, some –from the analytical point of view enriching- differences. These differences can make

\textsuperscript{32}Close, Greece 1945-2004, politics- society- economy, p. 221-226.
\textsuperscript{33}Until the revision of the Constitution in 1982, the president’s powers were fairly significant, since the revision however, these powers have been substantially reduced in Freire A., The party system of Portugal, p. 376
\textsuperscript{34}A single chamber of 230 deputies (reduced from 250 in 1987) who are elected in 22 multi-member constituencies constitutes the legislative branch of government.
\textsuperscript{35}Apart from a brief period during the mid-1980s, when the centre-left Democratic Renewal Party (PRD) emerged and disappeared, the party system remained relatively stable.
\textsuperscript{36}Alongside the PS and PSD, the Communist Party (PCP) and the Conservative Popular Party (CDS-PP) have become the system’s main parties. However, during the democratic period some smaller parties have obtained seats in parliament among these parties the worth mentioning left-libertarian organization, Left Block (Bloco do Esquerda-BE) in Freire A., The party system of Portugal, p. 373
\textsuperscript{37}The general tendency is for the vote to concentrate with the two centrist catch-all parties: the centre-left (PS) and the centre-right (PSD) in Freire A., The party system of Portugal, p. 373-393
\textsuperscript{38}Lobo, Pinto, Magalhaes, The Political Institutions of Portuguese Democracy, p. 36
comparison particularly interesting. Firstly, when we examine the two countries under a comparative approach we should bear in mind that Portugal was a colonial empire and used to be a global power with a lot of colonies all over the world. Actually, it was the first global empire in history and besides this, the longest-lived of the modern European colonial empires, spanning almost six centuries, from the capture of Ceuta in 1415 to the handover of Macau in 1999 or the grant of sovereignty to Timor-Leste in 2002. Portugal’s glorious past and its relationship with some of its former colonies, allow us to speculate that it faces the various problems and issues of the country with more extroversion, compared to Greece that does not have such an experience.

Another difference is the years of dictatorship. Greece was chronologically the first of the Southern European new democracies; however it experienced a much shorter authoritarian interlude –seven years, compared with almost half a century in Portugal, which was Europe’s longest right-wing dictatorship\textsuperscript{39}. A proof of long dictatorship’s legacy in Portugal is the role of the army and its involvement in the new political scene after the military revolt and the transition to democracy\textsuperscript{40}. It needed almost a decade to pass in order for the military presence in the politics to be dismissed\textsuperscript{41}. Comparing the two cases, it can be easily understood that both countries experienced the democratic transition in different ways, even though the starting point was the overthrowing of a totalitarian regime.

Regarding the differences between the political systems of the two countries, the first one could be the different role of president. We characterize Portugal’s political system as semi-presidential, while the Greek is parliamentary democracy\textsuperscript{42}. In Portugal, the president of the Republic is the senior figure of the state hierarchy and he is directly elected by all Portuguese citizens, while in Greece he is elected indirectly by parliamentary deputies and despite the fact that he is considered the head of the State, his powers are limited. Nevertheless, we argue that this difference will not affect our comparative study, as we will

\textsuperscript{39} Lijphart, Bruneau, Diamandouros, Gunther, “A mediterranean model of democracy? The Southern European democracies in comparative perspective”, p. 19

\textsuperscript{40} The new civil and military authorities were fighting one another in a battle in which anti-fascist credentials were an essential asset in order to participate in the new political scene. Consequently, no-one wanted to taint their symbolic democratic capital by associating themselves with the remnants of a ‘fascist’ police. After the revolution, previous resistance to the ‘fascist regime’ became a legitimating factor. The Constitution of 1976 reflected a left-wing nature of military revolt, although later was revised in order to become more ‘neutral’, stating the MFA overthrew the regime as a culmination of the Portuguese people’s resistance to fascism”, in Cerezales Palacios D., “‘Fascist lackeys’? Dealing with the police’s past during Portugal’s transition to democracy (1974-1980)”, Portuguese Journal of Social Science, 6(3):155-169, (2007),p. 160


\textsuperscript{42} According to Duverger’s definition, this model of government has two main characteristics: a directly elected president by universal suffrage that has considerable powers and a prime minister and minister council possessing executive and governmental powers that are responsible to parliament. However, in Duverger’s definition it is unclear what “considerable presidential power” means. Therefore, more recently, Elgie reformulated that definition, with a more eliminating approach. Elgie consider a regime as semi-presidential, when the president is popularly elected on a fixed mandate and co-exists with a prime minister and a government which are responsible to parliament, in Duverger M., “A New Political System Model: Semi-presidential Government”, European Journal of Political Research, 8(2):165-187, (1980); Elgie R., Semi-Presidentialism in Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, p. 280-299.
focus our interest only in parliamentary elections and taking into account that the 1982 constitutional revision decreased the constitutional powers of the president considerably, placing it below the average presidential powers in semi-presidential regimes. Nowadays, his functions are to guarantee national independence and unity and the operation of Portugal’s democratic institutions, and to command the Armed Forces.

In addition, although both of them have a similar electoral system of proportional representation (PR) using D’Hondt method in the conversion of votes into seats, Greek electoral law is more disproportionate than the Portuguese. Only the large parties can benefit from the supplementary seats (50), and according to electoral law only the winning party takes all, so proportionality is effectively decreased. Apart from this, there are no thresholds in Portuguese electoral law, while in Greek it is 3%. Moreover in Portugal there is a closed-list system, in which “voters merely choose between parties which present a list of candidates for all seats available in the district, and seats are attributed to candidates in proportion to voters obtained and in other established in the proposed list”. In case of Greece, voters vote with cross of preference in the party’s ballot, emphasizing more the candidates of the preference party.

Moreover, regarding the spectrum of political parties, it is important to be mentioned that in Portugal there is not a strong far-right wing, let alone with parliamentary presence. On the other hand, in Greece, especially after the last elections of 2012 with the entrance in the parliament of Golden Dawn, there are a lot of representatives of far-right in the Greek parliament. In general, there are a lot of parties that can be placed more right to ND and two of them with seats in parliament—the most important are Golden Dawn(XA), Aneksartitoi

43In the Portuguese case, the choice of a semi-presidential system is central to understanding how executive power was conceived and how it developed”. “After 1982, Portuguese president is more an interested and even active observer, than the locus of executive power, which rested firmly with the prime minister and his government”, in Lobo, Pinto, Magalhaes, *The Political Institutions of Portuguese Democracy*, p. 28-32
45We should notice that “constitutional powers still allow great presidential power at times of government instability and caution against a minimalist interpretation of the president’s role in the political system”, as the experience of political instability from 2002-2004 suggests. In Greece in equivalent circumstances of crisis, emergency or instability, the first responsible to intervene is the parliament and the government; president has more the role of regulator and he will intervene only in case that the parliament or government are not able to do it. In Lobo, Pinto, Magalhaes, *The Political Institutions of Portuguese Democracy*, p. 31; and the site of the Hellenic Parliament [http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/To-Politevma/Syntagma/article-50/](http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/To-Politevma/Syntagma/article-50/)
46"This system is called 'reinforced PR', but what is being reinforced is the large parties rather than proportionality". Lijphart., Bruneau, Diamandourou, Gunther, "A mediterranean model of democracy? The Southern European democracies in comparative perspective", p. 21
47Lobo, Pinto, Magalhaes, *The Political Institutions of Portuguese Democracy*, p. 32
48 Voters firstly choose the ballot that correspond to their preference, and then they are entitles to use a cross next to the name(s) they prefer to vote for. The number of the crosses each voter has at his/her disposal depends on the magnitude of each constituency. More specifically, the ministry of internal affairs of Greece has created an explanatory table where indicates the number of crosses does the voter has according to his/her constituency. In addition 288 MPs are elected from this procedure, the rest 12 MPs are elected by a "bounded" combinations for the whole territory of Greece. Those MPs are the MPs of the State (Vouleftes Epikrateias). See: [http://www.ypes.gr/el/Elections/NationalElections/DeputyElections/InterestCitizen/#a6](http://www.ypes.gr/el/Elections/NationalElections/DeputyElections/InterestCitizen/#a6)
Ellines(ANEL) and LAOS, although it is not longer represented in the parliament. Finally, it should be underlined a Greek uniqueness; the rise of SYRIZA, as second party and at the same time, the decline of PASOK in the last elections and as a result, the widespread belief that that was the end of bipartisan model or the beginning of a new political system in Greece.

In conclusion, taking everything into account, both differences and similarities between the two countries under examination, there are a few differences, but all those historical, social and political characteristics have common ground, that allow a comparative analysis between the two countries.

1.2- The economic recession in Greece and Portugal and its impact.

Before outlining the methods and techniques that were used in this thesis, we have to refer, briefly, to the crisis and more specifically, to the experiences of the two countries under examination. The interest of this thesis is focused on the period of 2009-2012, where significant changes have occurred in the economic world, thus influencing the political world. Actually, it is considered by many economists to be one of worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. To be more specific, in mid-2007 as the Wall Street financial crisis occurred and instantaneously “contaminated” the rest of the globe through “the virus of its toxic debt instruments”49. Among its severe results were the threat of total collapse of large financial institutions, the bailout of banks by national governments, and recession in stock markets around the world.

In 2008, it was evident that the crisis had also, hit Europe. World political leaders, national ministers of finance and central bank directors coordinated their efforts to reduce fears, but the crisis continued. At the end of October 2008 a currency crisis developed, with investors transferring vast capital resources into stronger currencies such as the yen, the Dollar and the Swiss Franc, leading many emergent economies to seek aid from the International Monetary Fund. Among others, the first victims of that crisis were the weakest EU partners, including Greece and Portugal. The measurements that the governments took, in both countries, in order to “prevent” the crisis were widely unpopular, rough and austere. That had, as an outcome, not only to worsen people’s lives in those countries, but also to make people distrust, avoid and withdraw from politics. That fact is evident not only from the huge-scale demonstrations that occurred in the past years in the countries, but also from the percentages of the turnouts in the latest elections.

49Dourakis G., Doomed to failure: The EU’s role in the Greek Debt crisis, in Bulent Temel (ed.) The great catalyst: European Union Project and lessons from Greece and Turkey, Lexington Books, Plymouth 2013
In that period, 2009-2012, in both countries two parliamentary elections took place – conducted at the early period of the crisis (2009) and at the peak of the crisis (2011-12) - and they had as a common point, the Troika Bailout. In these elections, it was evident that the crisis had affected the parties, the candidates and the voters, as it will be further analysed in this thesis. At that point, it is important to mention some highlights in the timeline of crisis and the austerity measurements, taken by national government of both countries.

In the case of Greece, in the early-mid-2000s, the government took advantage of the country's strong economy by running a large deficit. As the world economy cooled in the late 2000s, Greece was hit hard as it was always among the EU's weakest partners and its main industries – like shipping and tourism - were sensitive to changes in the business cycle. As a result, the country's debt began to pile up rapidly. Shortly after the elections of 2009 (December), Greece’s credit rating was downgraded by one of the world's three leading rating agencies, amid fears that the government could default on its ballooning debt. So, the country’s Prime Minister, G. Papandreou, announced a programme of tough public spending cuts.

Through the next three months, January to March, the government took another two rounds of austerity measures, thus worsening the economic conditions of the citizens. In April/May of 2010, fears of a possible default on Greece's debts prompted Euro-zone countries to approve a 110 billion Euros rescue package for the country. As part of the bailout deal the Prime Minister announced a new round of even more severe austerity measures. These measures and cuts were in line with the EU and International Monetary Fund loan proposals, including more public sector pay cuts, pension reductions, new taxes on company profits, an increase on luxury and sin taxes, and an increase of the value added tax. In separate votes on 29 and 30 June, Parliament approved the austerity measures.

The situation worsened in October of 2010, when the government announced new stricter, austerity measures in the 2011 draft budget. Later in February of 2011, Greece’s international lenders were not satisfied with the results, thus proposing that new reforms and sacrifices must be made. In July of 2011 The EU lenders agreed a major bailout for Greece over its debt crisis by channelling a 109 billion Euros through the European Financial Stability Facility. Two months later, Moody’s credit rating agency, downgraded eight Greek Banks due to concerns over Greece’s ability to pay back its debts. The next month, October, the Euro-zone leaders agree a 50% debt write-off for Greece in return for further austerity

50 Actually, in case of Greece there were conducted three elections, taking into account the repeat elections on June 17, 2012.
51 New Democracy, the conservative minority party, vowed to vote against the bill, but the bill was expected to pass due to the Panhellenic Socialist Movement's large 160-seat advantage in Parliament.
measures. Due to the pressure of those new measurements and the citizens’ indignation, G. Papandreou proposed a referendum on the issue of the rescue package. That referendum never occurred, and due to the criticisms it got, he withdrew it and he announced his resignation in November 2011.

After Papandreou’s resignation, a coalition government is formed with an extra parliamentary technocrat Prime Minister, L. Papadimos. The new extra parliamentary prime minister was appointed to face the previous-agreed economic agreements and to lead the country to new elections. In the meantime, in January of 2012 debt rescheduling talks with Greece’s private creditors falter, endangering the 130 billion Euro EU/IMF rescue package that Greece needed to meet its next debt repayment deadline in March. So, again, in February the Greek parliament approved a new package of tough austerity measures agreed with the EU as the price of a 130 billion Euro bailout\textsuperscript{52}. The elections occurred on the 6\textsuperscript{th} of May of 2012, but due to lack of coherence no new government was formed, thus leading to new elections on the 17\textsuperscript{th} of June of the same year. The result of the election was similar to the previous elections, but this time a sustainable coalition government was formed, including PASOK, New Democracy and DIMAR\textsuperscript{53}.

Regarding Portugal, the economic crisis occurred a few years after the Greek, in 2010\textsuperscript{54}. However, it began as part of the world financial crisis of 2007–08 and continues as part of the European sovereign debt crisis, which has affected primarily the southern European states and Ireland. Actually in the early 2010, renewed anxiety about the excessive levels of debt in some EU countries and, more generally, about the health of the Euro spread from Ireland and Greece to Portugal, Spain, and Italy or in brief, the PIIGS\textsuperscript{55}.

In addition, in March of the same year, Government announced a package of austerity measures, including cuts in public spending and tax increases, to reduce Portugal's budget deficit. At the same time, many civil servants held one-day strike in protest against plans to freeze public sector workers' pay. In the summer of 2010, due to spending on economic stimuli, Portugal’s debt had increased sharply compared to the gross domestic product and as

\textsuperscript{52} BBC News: \url{http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17373216}
\textsuperscript{53} DIMAR left the coalition on 21 June 2013 in protest at the closure of the nation’s public broadcaster ERT, leaving A. Samaras with a slim majority of 153 ND and PASOK MPs combined. The two remaining parties proceeded to negotiate a cabinet reshuffle that resulted in a significantly expanded role for PASOK in the new coalition government.
\textsuperscript{54} Although European officials have insisted that Greece is unique, a lot of specialists note that Portugal is the “next Greece”. Nevertheless, Portuguese macro fundamentals are superior to Greece and the Debt/GDP is lower at about 112% when it is almost 190% for Greece.
\textsuperscript{55} PIIGS and PIGS acronyms were widely used by international bond analysts, academics, and the international economic press when referring to these underperforming economies. In a lot of cases, the PIIGS or PIGS acronym is largely responsible for the loss of trust of investors in those countries, and so in Portugal.
Euro-zone debt crisis mounts, several leading credit rating agencies downgrade Portugal’s government debt, further undermining confidence in the Portuguese economy56.

Moreover, international financial markets forced the Portuguese Government, led by Prime Minister José Sócrates, to make radical changes in economic policy, promoting the aforementioned austerity policy. Therefore, in September 2010, the Portuguese Government announced a fresh austerity package (4th Stability and Growth Programme - PEC IV- Programa de Estabilidade e Crescimento) following other Eurozone partners. In addition, the Parliament passes austerity budget, aimed at reducing high public debt levels, in November. Finally, on 23 March 2011, José Sócrates and his Government resigned after parliament rejected the new proposed austerity package57.

On the 6th of April, Portugal became the third European Union country after Greece and Ireland to apply for EU financial assistance to help it cope with its budget deficit58. On 16 May 2011, the European Union and International Monetary Fund agreed a 78bn-Euro bailout for Portugal, on condition of sweeping spending cuts59. In order to accomplish the European Union/IMF-led rescue plan for Portugal’s sovereign debt crisis, in July and August 2011 the new government led by Pedro Passos Coelho announced it was going to make cuts on state spending and increase austerity measures, including public servant wage cuts and additional tax increases. In the Parliamentary elections of 5 June 2011, the ruling Socialist Party lost and the winning Social Democratic Party formed a governing coalition with the Popular Party.

In August, the government announced the country’s biggest spending cuts in 50 years. In order to accomplish the European Union/IMF-led rescue plan for Portugal’s sovereign debt crisis the new government led by Pedro Passos Coelho announced it was going to increase austerity measures, even if this includes a decrease in public servants’ wage or tax increases. The cuts are intended to reduce public spending from 44.2% of GDP to 43.5% by 2015. However, in October, Portugal’s government submitted another package of spending cuts and tax increases to parliament in an effort to meet the terms of the country’s 78bn-Euro bailout.

58Despite the memorandum between the government and the Troika having been signed at the beginning of May 2011, in reality it was negotiated and agreed by the PS, PSD and CDS-PP.
Ferreira A., “The condition of Portuguese democracy during Troika’s intervention”, paper presented in the conference Crisis politics in Southern Europe: Challenges to Democratic Governance, University of Nicosia, Cyprus, 24/05/2014
59As part of the deal, the country agreed to cut its budget deficit from 9.8 percent of GDP in 2010 to 5.9 percent in 2011, 4.5 percent in 2012 and 3 percent in 2013. Reuters: http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/12/13/portugal-deficit-idUKL6E7ND40320111213
In the following months, a lot of general strikes took place in Portugal. For example, in November, hundreds of thousands of workers go on strike a week before Parliament is due to vote on the government's programme of spending cuts and tax rises - it was only the third general strike since Portugal became a democracy in the 1970s. In December 2011, it was reported that Portugal's estimated budget deficit of 4.5 percent in 2011 would be substantially lower than expected, due to a one-off transfer of pension funds. The country would therefore meet its 2012 target a year earlier than expected. In the following months the country started to be seen as moving on the right track. However, the unemployment rate exceeded 15 percent in the second quarter of 2012 and there was evidence to rise even further in the near future.

Portugal’s debt was, in September 2012 forecast by the Troika to peak at around 124% of GDP in 2014, followed by a firm downward trajectory after 2014. Previously the Troika had predicted it would peak at 118.5% of GDP in 2013, so the developments proved to be a bit worse than first anticipated, but the situation was described as fully sustainable and progressing well. As a result from the slightly worse economic circumstances, the EU, IMF and European Central Bank gave Portugal another year to reduce its deficit below the EU target of 3% of GDP, after noting progress in rebalancing the economy and two months after, Parliament passed a budget promising another year of austerity measures. The recession in the economy was expected to last until 2013, with 3% decrease in GDP in 2012 and 1% in 2013; while the growth of the economy was expected to begin in 2014. In effect those predictions became true, as in May of 2014, the bailout was officially over. Of course, this should be translated carefully, since the effects of the bailout on the society will linger, long after the termination of the bailout.

All things considered, despite the different economic backgrounds or the different starting points, the financial bailout and the harsh restrictive measures imposed by Troika, constitute definitely a common point between Greece and Portugal and their current economic situation.

1.3- Data and methodology.

60 Reuters: http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/12/13/portugal-deficit-idUKL6E7ND40120111213
61 “Portugal_Q2_Unemployment_Rate_Rises_To_Record_High”, RTT News, August 14, 2012, Retrieved 23/10/2013
62 "Portugal seeks market access with $5 bln bond exchange". Kathimerini Newspaper, 3 October 2012, Retrieved 11/10/2013
http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/ w_articles_wsite2_1_03/10/2012_464362
63 NY Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/06/business/international/bailout-is-over-for-portugal-but-side-effects-will-linger.html?smid=b-share&smv1&_r=2
As mentioned above, the main goal of this thesis is to study and analyse the views of the MP candidates of the major parties of Portugal and Greece throughout the past two elections, or in other words before and after the crisis. Furthermore, the thesis takes into consideration and the public opinion, and more specifically how the crisis affected the attitudes of the voters in both countries. The study takes place into two levels. The first is dedicated to the theoretical approach of that issue and the second to the statistical analysis. Those two are analyzed and commented in parallel. The empirical data which allows us to proceed in this analysis, come from the Comparative Candidate Survey (CCS) and public opinion surveys for candidate MPs and voters respectively, conducted in Portugal and Greece, after the elections of 2009 and the elections of 2011 (for Portugal) and 2012 (for Greece)\(^{64}\).

Regarding Comparative Candidate Survey (CCS), the latter is a product of an international coordinated effort to accumulate data from the candidates, who participate at each country’s national elections, which participates at the survey. The survey is conducted via a questionnaire that is handed to the MP candidates. The questionnaire includes a variety of questions that cover a broad spectrum of politics. Matters like relationships between the candidate, the party and the voters, campaigning, recruitment and carrier patterns, issues and ideology, and democracy and representation are located at the core of the questionnaire\(^ {65} \).

CCS tries through a sample research of parliamentary candidates' opinions and characteristics for the election period, to illustrate similarities and differences compared on demographic and social characteristics of the candidates and on the quality and the way of conducting their campaign. Moreover, the project aims to add more empirical data to political issues like the decline of the parties, the ideological depolarisation, the political representation, the background and the career of the potential MPs. And, secondly, it aims to identify the political-structural correlates of individual attitudes and behaviors of party elites in order to add ‘political’ explanations to the ubiquitous ‘sociological’ explanation of variations over time and across countries\(^ {66} \).

In Greece, both in 2009\(^ {67} \) and in 2012\(^ {68} \) the research took place by the laboratory of Applied Political Research of the department of Political Science of Aristotle University of

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\(^{65}\)From the official site of CCS: [http://www.comparativecandidates.org/node/1](http://www.comparativecandidates.org/node/1)

\(^{66}\)From the official site of CCS: [http://www.comparativecandidates.org/node/2](http://www.comparativecandidates.org/node/2)

Thessaloniki (A.U.TH) coordinated by professor Theodore Chadipadelis with professors Ioannis Andreadis and Eftichia Teperoglou. The method that was used was a web survey via epolls.gr. Portuguese Candidate survey of 2012 was a part of the following research project: “Elections, Leadership and Accountability: Political representation in Portugal, a longitudinal and comparative perspective” (FCT: P. TDC/CPJ-CPO/119307/2010) directed by professor André Freire with professors José Manuel Leite Viegas and Ana Belchior at CIES-IUL. The method that was used was mail questionnaires and some face-to-face interviews. The CCS survey of 2009 in Portugal was also part of a larger research project titled “Portuguese Deputies in Comparative Perspective: Elections, Leadership and Political Representation”, coordinated by Andre Freire and Jose Manuel Leite Viegas at CIES-ISCTE IUL and the fieldwork was carried out between 12th February and 31st July 2010.

The number of the respondent candidates, in 2012 survey, was 308 for the Greek candidates and 257 for the Portuguese. In addition, in the survey took part candidates of the following political parties (from the left to the right): SYRIZA, DIMAR, PASOK, ND, ANEL, XA for Greece and BE, PCP/CDU, PS, PSD, CDS-PP for Portugal. In 2009 the survey was answered by 232 candidates in Greece from the two major parties (PASOK, ND) and 203 candidates in Portugal from the 5 major parties/coalitions with representation in the Parliament (BE, PCP/CDU, PS, PSD, CDS-PP).

Regarding the public opinion surveys, in Greece took place the First Greek National Election Study (ELNES) in 2012 by the Laboratory of Applied Political Research, department of Political Science of Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. It was a mixed-mode survey in which 531 participants responded to the web survey and 500 participants to the face-to-face interviews. In 2009 population survey the respondents were 1350. The Portuguese voter study took place in 2012 as one of the components of the research project “Elections, Leadership and Accountability: Political representation in Portugal, a longitudinal

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69 It is noticed a difference in the aggregate number of the Greek respondents in 2012, since the data used in this thesis were collected before the integration of the web survey. Candidate MPs and MPs received an initial invitation at the beginning of October 2012 and two reminders until November 2012. However, there was a second phase which lasted until May 2013 and involved face to face interviews, where 10 more cases were added. That is how a sample of 337 respondents is reached, instead of 308 that is used in this research.

70 It has to be mentioned that in the case of Greece they did not participate to the research the candidates of the communist party (KKE) and in addition the sample of respondent candidates of ANEL and XA is not adequate.


and comparative perspective”; in total, 1209 voters took part in this survey through face to face interviews. In 2009 the voters survey was part of a major project developed by CIES – ISCTE entitled “The Portuguese Members of Parliament in Comparative Perspective: Elections, Leadership and Political Representation” and the participants were 1350.

Finally to conclude with the introduction the methodology should be mentioned. More specifically, the data analytical tool that is used is correspondence analysis. The latter is a method which is used to detect the structure of responses and to describe how the response categories of different items (including the “no opinion” responses) are related to each other and how they are related to additional information such as socio-demographic characteristics. The main objective of this method is to display rows and columns of contingency tables in two-dimensional spaces. Furthermore, correspondence analysis translates deviations from the independence model in the contingency table into distances\(^73\). Consequently, correspondence allows the comparison of variables of the questionnaires across countries, time, prospective MPs and voters, simultaneously. The software that was used for the analysis is M.A.D. (Méthodes d'Analyses Données)\(^74\). Furthermore, in the preliminary stages of the analysis and in some cases, where correspondence analysis was not an option, the SPSS software was used. Regarding the correspondence analysis it has to be mentioned that in order to define whether the dimensions of analysis will be one or two, at each one of the cases it will be examined the gravity of the dimensions. Gravity of dimension means, which percentage of the answers are explained in the first, second etc dimension of the correspondence. If the gravity of the first dimension is over 90%, then the hypothesis is tested in a one dimensional correspondence, since the plethora of the answers are explained in the first dimension. But if the gravity of the first dimension is under 90%, then the analysis is two dimensional. Furthermore, in the cases where the answer was bilateral, simple exploratory procedure were used.

1.4- Structure and Research Hypotheses.

In the introduction some basic facts about the content of this thesis were cited. It became apparent that the comparison of those two countries is feasible, since they share an abundance of similarities. There are also differences, but the latter are interesting in analytical terms. This unit is about the structure of the thesis and the research hypothesis that are going to be put under examination. The main frame of the thesis is democracy and representation,

\(^{73}\) Blasius J. and Thiesen V., Methodological artefacts in measures of political efficacy and trust: a multiple correspondence analysis, Political Analysis, 9:1, 2001, p. 4-5.

\(^{74}\) Καραπιστόλης Δ., Μέθοδοι επεξεργασίας και ανάλυσης δεδομένων: με τη χρήση του Στατιστικού πακέτου Mad for Windows, Εκδόσεις Αθανάσιος Αλιντζής, Θεσσαλονίκη, 2010
along with those two thematic, other issues that are affiliated with democracy and representation will be examined. More specifically, parties, elections governance, citizens' participation and voting behavior are issues that, either directly or indirectly, are correlated with democracy and representation. Along with the structure of the theoretical framework the statistical analysis is located in parallel. To elaborate with this, each unit or sub-unit, that is theoretically examined, is followed by the equivalent statistical analysis.

The sources that this thesis is based on are primarily the surveys-as fully cited in the introduction. Those surveys provide the necessary ground to define the frame of the theoretical part. More specifically, there was a careful selection of the variables under analysis. Those variables provided the issues that the theoretical frame was based. The theoretical frame was enriched and written based on bibliographical sources ie books, articles and journal. Also, vital information, especially on the current events, was accumulated via the internet. The internet sources were carefully chosen for their validity and their liability.

The thesis is structured in seven main units: 1- Introduction, 2-Democracy and Representation, 3- Parties, Elections and Governance, 4-Citizens' participation and direct democracy, 5- Executive Summary and 6- Conclusion. Those are followed by the appendix (7) and the bibliography (8).

In this unit there shall be an overview of the research hypotheses in the order and the categorization, they are examined throughout the thesis.

**About democracy:**

1- The levels of satisfaction with democracy deteriorated between the first and the second survey at both national and EU level, in term of the whole sample.

2- The second hypothesis, that is revolving the party id of the prospective MPs, is that the opinions of the socialistic candidates deteriorate while the right wing candidates hold a stable position, regarding their satisfaction with democracy at both national and EU level has deteriorated, despite their party id.

**About representation:**

1- Both the Greek and the Portuguese MPs consider that representing their own voters in the constituency is less important in both cases.

2- It is equally less important to represent their party voters in their constituency in both of the surveys.

3- The fourth hypotheses is that the Greek MPs tend to believe that is not that important to represent all the citizens in their constituency, while their Portuguese colleagues think that is very important, across 2009 to 2012.
4- Representing the party electorate at large is among the most important things to represent for the Greek candidates and least important for the Portuguese ones.
5- The sixth hypothesis regards the representation of the members of social groups; the candidates at both countries believe that representing members of social groups is not important in both 2009-12.
6- Finally, it is less of importance to primarily represent nation's citizens for the prospective MPs for both of the countries.
7- The Greek candidates, despite their party identification consider that elections do not ensure the views of the MPs reflect the views of the voters, while the Portuguese ones believe that the election ensure fairly that the views of MPs reflect the voter's opinion.
8- The candidates from the socialistic parties from both of the countries consider as more important to represent the party electorate at large, while the right wing parties (New Democracy, PSD) consider it as less important.
9- The Greek candidates consider that it is least of importance to represent the nation's citizens, while their Portuguese colleagues think otherwise, despite their party id.

**How to vote:**
1- If the candidates in a parliamentary election had to vote either according to the opinion of the voters of their constituency or according to their party guideline, they would support the opinion of their constituency voters, in both of the countries and in both surveys.
2- The second hypothesis supports that in a case of a parliamentary election where the candidates have to vote either according to their opinion or the opinion of their voters in the constituency, they would rather vote according to their own mind, at all times in both of the countries.
3- The final hypothesis assumes that the responders as MPs, they would support their opinion and stand against their party guideline; in case they had to choose from one of those two in a hypothetical scenario.

**Parties:**
1- To begin with, the fact that parties are the essential linkage between the citizens and the state; it is undeniable that all the responders, including the voters support that stance.
2- The first hypothesis that emerges is that all the candidates from both the countries consider their decision making process in their parties is too top down, through time.
3- Continuing to the second hypothesis, and taking into consideration the above results, the party leader is too powerful in the case of the general sample of Greek parties, while in the
Portuguese parties the party leader is considered as an equal among the members of the parties
4- When the same hypothesis is tested within the party identification of the responders the image has a few differences but the general image remains the same

Elections:
1-The first hypothesis that can be made here is that the Portuguese voters believe that the elections do not ensure that the views of the MPs reflect the views of the voters, while the Greek and the Portuguese MPs believe otherwise, across time.
2- In that frame, the hypothesis assumes that, the sample supports that the goal of the electoral system is to correspond proportionally the votes with the parliamentary seats.
3- The hypothesis supports that the sample is fully in favor of the modification of the electoral system

Governance:
1- In order for a government to be stable and well consolidated is more preferable, from both the voter and candidates, and to be a single party government rather than a coalition, at all times.
2- A minority government is not a preferable option by both the candidates and the voters in the second period while in 2009 it was a preferable option.

Citizens' participation:
1- Both of the candidate MPs and the voters of the examined countries agree that citizens have ample opportunities to participate in political decisions.
2- The hypothesis on that case can be stipulated as such: Both the candidates MPs and the voters agree that a certain number of citizens can initiate a referendum, throughout the examined period.
3- More specifically, the right wing parties of Greece and Portugal (New Democracy and PSD) agree that a certain number of citizens can initiate a referendum, while the two socialist parties (PASOK and PS) hold a neutral position on that matter.
4- The Greek and the Portuguese candidates agree that indeed the referendums help to stimulate political interest.
2- Democracy and representation.

The two main theoretical concepts of this thesis are democracy and representation. Both of those terms will be thoroughly examined. Also, will be examined the parliamentary representative democracy, the Mediterranean model of democracy, the democratic transition and consolidation and finally the impact of the economic crises in democracies. Furthermore those theories will be examined in correlation with the two examined countries. In parallel with the theoretical part, the variables that are affiliated with it- where applicable- will be examined.

2.1- Democracy a theoretical approach.

The literature of “what democracy is about” is vastly huge and covers from the ancient Greek period till today. At this point, the text will be focused on the contemporary ages and the situations of Greece and Portugal. In general when people refer to democracy they tend to refer to a broad spectrum, from a system of power of the masses and a form of government based on the direct and continuous popular participation to the power of majority and a system of partisan competition that works via regular and popular elections. Others tend to summarise democracy as “people power”. The latter term is generally ambiguous and heavily criticised. Furthermore, democracy can be expanded into various categorisations, ie representative democracy, direct, deliberate, liberal, illiberal and representative. Moreover, other academics and political philosophers classify democracy, as parliamentary, classic, protective, developmental and popular. All those types have their own specifications and criteria. But this essay will be focused on parliamentary representative democracy. Furthermore, since this essay focuses on Greece and Portugal, it is essential to have a statement on Mediterranean model of democracy.

Another parameter that needs to be examined, besides the classification of democracy, is date. In the democratic literature, the spread of democracy was done in three waves from the 19th century to the 20th, as it is mentioned by Huntington. Briefly, the first wave occurred between 1828 and 1926. During this time around 30 countries established some kind of democratic national institutions. Between those countries lie Argentina, Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Scandinavian Countries and United States. In those cases some backsliding occurs and democracy was dismissed by

Heywood, Εισαγωγή στη Πολιτική, p. 128
Heywood, Εισαγωγή στη Πολιτική, p. 106
Hague, Harrop, Συγκριτική πολιτική και διακυβέρνηση, p. 79-104
Heywood, Εισαγωγή στη Πολιτική, p. 111
fascist, communist and military dictatorships. The second wave occurred during the 2nd World War and continued until the 1960s. Some democracies were introduced but did not consolidate. Democracies were established from the ruins of the defeated dictatorships, not only in Western Germany, but also in Japan, Austria and Italy. These democracies were introduced by the victorious allies, led by USA, acting with the support of partners in the countries concerned. Those democracies did establish firm roots assisted by an economic recovery which itself was nourished by American aid. The main differences between the first and the second waves of democracy are: a- the representations through the parties were stronger in second wave than the liberal traditions and b- parties in the second wave were promoted to the main democratic instrument. Lastly, the third wave emerged from 1974 to 1991. The main elements of the third wave are: the end of the right-wing dictatorships in Southern Europe in the 1970s, the retreat of the generals in most of Latin America in the 1980s and the collapse of the communism in Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, at the end of the 1980s. The new situation provided an inhospitable environment for non-democratic regimes that survived. In that period the EU and USA were more encouraging to democratic transitions. The democracies that were established in the Southern Europe were more consolidated, the EU factor helped towards that consolidation and also it was a very strong influence to the other Eastern European countries to join the EU. In that final case, the third wave, belong Greece and Portugal, where their historical route lead those countries to be democratic in the mid 70s as is it mentioned in the introduction79.

**2.2- Parliamentary representative democracy.**

As mentioned above the two examined countries coincide in the case of parliamentary representative democracy. In order, the context of that term, to be fully understood we will break that term into the two substances that form it, “parliamentary” and “representative”.

Parliamentary democracy is a form of democracy that works via a deliberative assembly, which is elected by the electorate. That deliberate assembly installs an indirect bond between rulers and ruled. Democracy, in that case, means a responsible and representative government. Thus, parliamentary democracy balances popular participation and government by the elite. So, the government is accountable not directly to the people but to the elected representatives80.

The other element of the above mentioned type of democracy is “representative”. Representative democracy is the most common and widespread type of democracy in the

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79Ηαγγ, Ηαγγο, Σύγκριτη πολιτική και δημοκρατία, p. 79-104
80Heywood, Εισαγωγή στη Πολιτική, p. 117
“western countries”, thus ended up to as “western democracy.” This kind of democracy is distant of in comparison to what ancient Greeks thought about democracy. In this case, two factors must be taken into account. The first one is that modern states nowadays contain a large number of people and the citizenship ceases to be an elite status but is extended to the majority of the population. Taking into consideration the above, Tom Paine, supports that scalability is the strength of the representative institutions, because there is no limit to the number of people who are going to exercise some popular control over their superiors. On that frame but in an opposite way, J. Schumpeter supported that democracy is nothing more than a competition and he wanted to limit the contribution of the ordinary voters because he was sceptical of their political capacity. He also argued that elections should not be interpreted as a mechanism where voters elect a representative to carry out their will, but elections should be interpreted as a mechanism to produce governments. Thus, representative democracy is only a means to decide who shall decide. Representative democracy is a form of indirect and limited form of democracy. It can be described as limited whereas popular participation in the government is rare and short-termed, because it is restricted to the act of voting over frequent periods. It is indirect because the people do not actually participate in the government, but their elected representatives do. This type of democracy can be considered democratic, as long as the representation installs a trustworthy and functional bond between rulers and ruled, as it is in the parliamentary type. The most distinct characteristics of representative democracy are: 1- it provides an applicable form of democracy, where the electorate can participate at some point at least, 2- it relieves the “common” people from the “weight” of the decision making process, thus formatting the share of work in politics, 3-it allows the assignment of government to people who have all the necessary knowledge, experience and qualifications to perform such a task and 4- it preserves the government in a stable and balanced situation, keeping common people distant from the politics and encourages them to learn and accept the compromise.

2.3- Mediterranean Model of democracy.

When mentioning the countries around the Mediterranean, there is distinct talk about the Mediterranean model of democracy. Many scholars talk about a Mediterranean model of democracy. The latter can be considered a virtual construction, which embodies and shares some common characteristics. When referring to this model of democracy, the four Mediterranean countries which experienced the spread of democracy in the third wave are

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81 Hague, Ηαρρο, Συγκριτική πολιτική και διακυβέρνηση, p. 79-104
82 Heywood, Εισαγωγή στη Πολιτική, p. 109
implied. The countries which are included in the above term are Greece, Spain, Portugal and to some extent, Italy.

More specifically, those countries share some common characteristics. Those are, besides their common geographical location, the cultural, social, economic and historical development. Also, their late transition to democratic regimes in the mid-seventies, after a long unstable political situation and dictatorial regimes, their economic development is slower and their agricultural reform was stalled for several decades, make them a cohesive group. Although, the above mentioned theory seems to have a logical train of thought and application, scholars argue that those countries do not make a cohesive group of countries within the EU, that need to be examined as a separate group regarding democracy\textsuperscript{83}.

Given that this essay focuses on Greece and Portugal, the above mentioned theory will be dismantled for only those two cases. Sure, Greece and Portugal share a great deal of common elements, historically, culturally and economically. They also experienced the transition to democracy at the same time 1973-1974. But aside from that, they followed a very distinct way to democracy and at some levels they reached the European standards, thus they cannot be considered as a different group within the European democracies.

To elaborate this stance, more factual elements from those two countries will be taken into consideration. A vary basic categorisation to understand the political institutions in the examined countries and the type of democracy that exists is the distinction is between majoritarian and consensual political systems. This categorisation includes two dimensions of analysis, the executives-parties dimension and the federal-unitary one. According to A. Lijphart both the categories have some distinct characteristics. Regarding majoritarian political systems, in the first dimension, the executive power is concentrated in single party majority cabinets (bare majority cabinets); there is executive dominance and is measured by the durability of the cabinets. The party system is usually a two party system. In that case where the party system is one dimensional, meaning that the two major parties differ from each other programmatically in one dimension, the socioeconomic. The electoral system is typically the first past the post (FPTP) and it can be weighed by the (dis)proportionality. The above mentioned characteristics apply to the majoritarian model. While in the second dimension, there is a centralised government, unicameral and constitutional flexibility\textsuperscript{84}.

\textsuperscript{83}Lijphart, Bruneau, Diamandouros, Gunther, "A mediterranean model of democracy? The Southern European democracies in comparative perspective", p. 7

\textsuperscript{84}Lijphart, Bruneau, Diamandouros, Gunther, "A mediterranean model of democracy? The Southern European democracies in comparative perspective", p. 9-11
On the other hand, the characteristics that constitute the consensus model are the following. With regard to the first dimension there is the share of the executive power in broad coalitions (inclusive “oversized” cabinet), the relation between the executive-legislative bodies is balanced; there exists a multiparty system and consequently a multidimensional party system. The latter means that the differences between the parties are not only on the left-right scale, but also there are some extra elements that are picked from the following cleavages: the religious, cultural-ethnic, rural-urban, regime support and foreign policies. Lastly on the first dimension the electoral system seems to be some kind of proportional representation (PR). On the second dimension, the federal-unitary, where there is a decentralised government, there might be two legislative bodies (bicameral) and the constitution can be altered more easily. Of course, the above mentioned models are just ideal types on how democracy might work and how the power is distributed\textsuperscript{85}. So, after the analysis of the models, there will be estimation of where the two examined countries stand. More specifically, there will be used data from a previous research\textsuperscript{86} to place Greece and Portugal in one of those two models and explain why Greece and Portugal, along with the two counties (Spain/Italy) do not form a separate model of democracy within the EU democracy.

Starting with Portugal, the research classifies this country as consensual and unitary. In the first dimension, in three out five elements this country scores below the average of the study provide the consensual characterization of Portugal democracy. Those characteristic are: 1- the cabinet durability where the average\textsuperscript{87} for the study is 52 and for Portugal is 30, 2- the effective number of parties (avg. =3.3, Pt.=3.2) and 3- the electoral disproportionally (avg.= 3.9, Pt.= 3.3). The other two characteristics refer to the majoritarian elements of Portugal’s democracy: 1- the concentration of the executive power in a single-party minority-minimal winning cabinet, whereas Portugal scores 88 (the average is 68) and 2- the number of issue dimensions where the country scores 3.5 (average= 2.6). In the second dimension, Portugal’s governments can be highly considered as centralised, thus reaching 95% where the average is 78%, it is also unicameral and also there is constitutional rigidity\textsuperscript{88}.

\textsuperscript{85} Lijphart, Bruneau, Diamandouros, Gunther, “A mediterranean model of democracy? The Southern European democracies in comparative perspective”, p. 9-11
\textsuperscript{86} The data that is used to rule out the existence of a separate model of democracy within the EU and its is used to classify the Mediterranean countries either into the consensus or the majoritarian models are provided by A. Lijphat, T. C. Bruneu, N. Diamandouros, R. Gunther the the article “A mediterranean model of democracy? The Southern European democracies in comparative perspective”.
\textsuperscript{87} The average regaraged the 25 EU countries and that average is used to all the indicators of this sub-unit.
\textsuperscript{88} Lijphat, Bruneau, Diamandouros, Gunther, “A mediterranean model of democracy? The Southern European democracies in comparative perspective”, p. 9.
Similarly, Greece can be placed as a majoritarian unitary democracy. More specifically, in the first dimension four out of five indicators point to the majoritarian model of democracy: 1- the concentration of the government in a single party reaches a 100%, thus confirming the majoritarian characterisation. 2- the cabinet durability is 70 where the average is 52, 3- the number of issue dimensions reach 3.0 where the average is 2.6 and 4- there is high electoral disproportionally, a fair characteristic of the majoritarian electoral systems (Gr.=7.6, avg.=3.9). Only one indicator points to some consensual characteristics, the effective number of parties is 2.1 and the average is 2.6. On the second dimension Greece is fairly characterised as unitary because the government centralisation reaches 96%, the country is unicameral and the constitution is very difficult to be altered.89

The above-mentioned analysis proves two points. The first one is, that both Greece and Portugal, as far as we are concerned, do apply the conditions to be categorised among the EU models of democracy. The second one is, that both of the countries are close enough to the EU averages, meaning that their democracies do not form a separate category of democracy and that those two countries despite their late democratisation can be considered institutionally equal peers with their EU ones, thus proving that the Mediterranean model of democracy does not really exists. The only common aspects of those countries are mainly historical, cultural and socio-economical.

2.4- Democratic consolidation, legitimacy and transition.

2.4.1- Democratic transition.

After having laid out some basic theories in terms of democracy were laid out, it is time to move on some concrete facts about democratic consolidation, legitimacy and transitions to democracy for Greece and Portugal. It was mentioned that both Greece and Portugal suffered from dictatorial regimes up until the mid-seventies, for Greece it was a short-term dictatorship, around seven years, but for Portugal the dictatorship lasted almost half a century. The duration of the dictatorship is salient, because as a phenomenon it penetrates through the state structures and the society and therefore it shapes the ground of the change of regime, thus dictating the type of democracy the country will follow, the transition and the consolidation of democracy.

The fall of the authoritarian regimes that led to the transition and consolidation of democracy must be stated in order to understand the roots of the new founded democracies. The erosion of legitimacy of the authoritarian system, the consequences of the economic

89 Lijphart, Bruneau, Diamandouros, Gunther, “A mediterranean model of democracy? The Southern European democracies in comparative perspective”, p. 9
development and the contribution to democratisation by some of the political forces inside the structure of the political power are some of the factors that led to the overthrow of the totalitarian regimes. It can be said, for the examined cases, that the authoritarian rule was "exhausted" and unable to resolve the basic political challenges of legitimization and institutionalisation at a time when there was a crisis. Usually there is a force that sparks the impetus towards the transition of the regime, which is located -most of the times- within the circles of power. It can either be located in the state or in the regime. Academics argue that the weak point of the authoritarian regimes is found not in the relations between the state and the civil society but within the structure of the authoritarian rule (regime), and more specifically within the apparatus of the state. That stipulation fits perfectly in the Portuguese case, since the leaders of the revolution were middle-ranked military personnel. In Greece the military (regime) was withdrawn voluntarily. A clarification regarding the terms of the regime and state must be made. The former determines who has access to the political power, and how those who are in power deal with those who are not. Regimes are a more permanent form of political organisations, but less permanent from the state. The latter is a more permanent structure of domination and coordination and includes the apparatus to administer a society and extract resources from it. A state may remain in place, while regimes come and go. But those two terms are in tandem in some political formulations, like the Greek case. So a transition can be either state or regime initiated.

More analytically, in the Portuguese case, the military (regime) was facing various problems - they were mentioned in the introduction- and incapable of reforming itself in order to maintain its powers, even though there was the change of leader from Salazar to Caetano in 1968. Also, the political actors of the regime, due to the above situation, lost their ability to shape the political events, thus to participate in the transition, instead the middle ranked military officers were the ones that shaped the transition and the political change and initiated a leftist popular mobilization. The Greek case is considered as rather complicated because of the military character of the regime where there is no clear distinction between state and regime. Briefly, when the military crisis of Turkey over Cyprus emerged in the summer of 1974, the armed forces' highest leadership was re instituted the institutional and military control over the political hierarchy of the Junta, who handed the power to K. Karamnalists.

Fishman R. M., "Rethinking state and regime: Southern Europe's transition to democracy.", World Politics, 42(3) (1990), p. 425
Fishman, "Rethinking state and regime: Southern Europe's transition to democracy.", p. 426
Fishman, "Rethinking state and regime: Southern Europe's transition to democracy.", p. 428
former democratic PM. Thus automatically, the military returned the power back to the
democratic politicians. However, the actors who initiated the transition behaved as state\textsuperscript{93}. Both of the cases can be broadly categorised as state initiated transitions\textsuperscript{94} and caused by the failure of the military in times of crises\textsuperscript{95}.

With the exposition of the theoretical frame it is necessary to see in detail how the authoritarian regimes in Greece and Portugal failed, opening the way towards democracy. Briefly, in the Portuguese case, there are several reasons that led to the fall of the dictatorship. First of all, the regime proved incapable or unwilling to reform itself, even though several problems had occurred. More specifically, it was a regime based on the personality of Salazar, and after 1968 where Salazar was replaced by Caetanno, the latter could not bring the essential status that Salazar had\textsuperscript{96}. Also, the issue of the Portuguese colonies was a burning one. The colonial war was the determining factor in that specific way which the Portuguese dictatorship was overthrown\textsuperscript{97}. In addition, there were both external and internal pressures to give up the colonies and liberalise the regime\textsuperscript{98}. Portugal’s way towards democratisation was a rather complicated process in which the EU prospect of membership played an important role\textsuperscript{99}. The significance of the MFA in regard to the revolution of the 25th of April is mentioned above.

In Greece’s case there were two main incidents that led to the overthrowing of the regime. The first one initiated the beginning of the end of the regime. More specifically, in early 1973 the first serious manifestations started in the Law University of Athens against the dictatorship leading to the serious events of the 17\textsuperscript{th} of November 1973. At the events of the November the Junta’s armed forces attempted to break off the manifestation by invading the Polytechnic University Campus -where the students were gathered, protesting against the regime- thus overthrowing the university asylum and leaving behind dead and wounded people. Almost a week later Papaodpoulos is overthrown from the brigadier Ionannidis and as a president of the republic is replaced by F. Gkizikis. But the final event that lead to the end of the dictatorship occurred on the summer of 1974, where a few mal handlings with the Cypriot issue forced the regime to the call-back of one of the former prime ministers- K. Karamnlis- of the previous democratic regime- to duty and consequently extricated the governance to democratic personnel/institutions. Upon the return of Karamanlis in July, he

\textsuperscript{93}Fishman, “Rethinking state and regime: Southern Europe’s transition to democracy.”, p. 427-433
\textsuperscript{94}Fishman, “Rethinking state and regime: Southern Europe’s transition to democracy.”, p. 432
\textsuperscript{95}Fishman, “Rethinking state and regime: Southern Europe’s transition to democracy.”, p. 435
\textsuperscript{96}Fishman, “Rethinking state and regime: Southern Europe’s transition to democracy.”, p. p. 427, 430
\textsuperscript{97}Pinto, Twentieth-Century Portugal: in introduction, p. 50.
\textsuperscript{98}Pinto, Twentieth-Century Portugal: in introduction. p. 49-50.
\textsuperscript{99}Pinto, Twentieth-Century Portugal: in introduction, p. 50.
formed a provincial government, resolved the crisis and declared the first free elections in November of the same year\textsuperscript{100}. So the dictatorship was over and with the new democratic census, democracy on Greece was founded/ restored.

2.4.2- Democratic legitimacy and consolidation.

Two of the main characteristics of democracy are legitimacy and consolidation\textsuperscript{101}. In order to proceed, those two characteristics need to be defined. Regarding legitimacy a multidimensional term which describes the positive attitudes and behaviours of society towards the democratic institutions considered as the most appropriate forms of government. This definition is used by Lispset, Almond and Verba, and Linz and Stepan\textsuperscript{102}. At this point it is vital to understand and explain how legitimacy is measured. More specifically, there are three dimensions to measure legitimacy. The first one contains the general attitudes towards the democratic regime and is encapsulated in the question of whether democracy is preferable to any other regime. The second dimension is about the efficacy of the democratic regime, meaning that a positive evaluation of the performance of the regime recognises the democratic- institutions as the most appropriate forms of government. And the third dimension is about detecting positive attitudes or behaviours as to whether there are other forms of political alternatives that are conceived by and widespread by civil society\textsuperscript{103}.

In the cases of Greece and Portugal we can safely use the results of Morlino and Monteiro’s case study of 1985\textsuperscript{104}. In order to be more accurate with the explanation, it must be mentioned briefly that by using the two first dimensions (diffuse legitimacy, perceived efficacy) a typology is established. According to that four types are emerging: full democrats, critics, satisfied and antidemocrats. The results indicate that Greece and Portugal belong to the full democrat type\textsuperscript{105}. Given the fact that this research is from 1985, we can safely assume that democratic consolidation took part effectively in those countries during the first decade past the authoritarian regimes.

As for consolidation, the latter is used to describe the period following democratic installation during the above mentioned, positive attitudes are built or emerged. So this means that at the beginning of the democratic regime, positives attitudes and behaviours in the civil society are not necessarily found. These attitudes are basically built and strengthened during

\textsuperscript{100}Boulgaris, Nikolakopoulos, Rizas, Sakellaropoulos, Stefanidis, Greek Political History 1950-2004, p. 73.
\textsuperscript{102}Morlino, Monteiro, Legitimacy and Democracy in Southern Europe, LASA, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{103}Morlino, Monteiro, Legitimacy and Democracy in Southern Europe, LASA, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{105}Morlino, Monteiro, Legitimacy and democracy in Southern Europe, p. 239.
the consolidation period. Consequently, a democratic regime is fully consolidated when a large legitimacy is achieved\textsuperscript{106}.

Regarding consolidation, there is another definition that was made by Geoffrey Pridham\textsuperscript{107}, the latter defines democratic consolidation as process that diminishes the probability of reversal of democratisation. More specifically, basic political structures and procedures that are established during transition become institutionalised and eventually are legitimized. In this case consolidation has two connotations, a negative and a positive one. More analytical, negative consolidation is about the effective or final removal of the prospects of nondemocratic system alternatives. This type of consolidation is achieved, when the presence and impact of the “nondemocratic threats” are numerically or politically insignificant, are neutralised and opted out from the political system. On the other hand, positive consolidation is when the democratic system becomes operationally settled and gains credibility. It emphasizes attitudinal patterns and refers to wider or deeper levels of the overall process. It includes the establishment of democratic values at both elite and mass level, thus shaping the political culture to be more a system supportive to a new democratic regime. Positive consolidation is a long-term change while negative consolidation can be achieved in a shorter time\textsuperscript{108}. Furthermore, a distinction between consolidation and transition must be made. Transition is the procedure where questions regarding one country’s future are answered and choices are made regarding the preceding regime, while consolidation, as aforementioned, is a rather more complicated process.

There is a key factor that needs to be taken into account about consolidation, the international context. The international context includes socio-economic and political conditions that exist outside the country that is under consolidation and influence some of the main “decisions” that the country must make in order to be fully consolidated. In the seventies, Greece’s stance in the international context was rather complicated. More specifically, Greece being on the edge of Eastern Europe, had to deal with matters that had emerged regarding Turkey/Cyprus, and also had to try to keep up with the West. Portugal was under pressure to give up her remaining colonies. Also, the cold war climate and the prospect of joining the EU played a catalytic role in the decision making process of those two countries. The EU perspective offered the credentials for a thorough consolidation of a

\textsuperscript{106}Morlino, Monteiro, *Legitimacy and Democracy in Southern Europe*, LASA, p. 3


democratic regime. Furthermore, the re-legalisation of the communist parties that were banned from the previous regimes consisted of an important choice towards democracy.

The relationship between the consolidation process and the international context is two-dimensional. The linkages may be inner-directed or outer-directed. Regarding the first type, we need to clarify that inner-directed linkages occur where the international system has an impact on domestic structures. The outer-directed linkages occur, when the domestic structures have an impact on the international system.

In this case, as inner directed linkages we can consider the EU membership. At this point it needs to be highlighted that the promise of the EU membership is a qualification towards democratic consolidation. Also, a member state of the EU can benefit from the union, meaning that besides the “extra” layer that guarantees democracy, civil rights and freedoms, the member states can benefit economically. It is important to mention, that two countries with late modernisation and industrialisation can benefit more with their entry in the union. Portugal and Greece could develop more easily within the EU status, with the loans, the low trade rates and the grant of the EU. Thus, by those means, the countries are obligated to establish structures and institutions in order to be integrated to the EU and function alongside the other member states. Through the passage of years and as proven by reality, the entry and integration of those two countries in the EU, was a road both hard and promising. The countries struggled to adapt to the EU reality which involved dangers that, sadly appeared with the outbreak of the 2008 crisis.

The outer-related linkages, as mentioned above, occur when the domestic structures have an impact on the international context. The policy consensus and the system consolidation of the countries is one of those “linkages”. More specifically, Portugal with the regime transition shifted from an extra- European stance to a more pro-European one. The consensus towards a democratic and liberal regime was high. On that mater, Greece’s case, when the dictatorship was over two main parties emerged, New Democracy and PASOK. The former was a great supporter of Greece’s EU integration. The latter, at first was not supporting that action, however in the early 80s when it came to power, shifted its position and completed the steps to integrate Greece into the EU. Also, both the parties followed a strategy to stabilize and amend the relations with the neighbours. With all that achieved, the governments gained the necessary consensus to move towards EU consideration.

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110 It needs to be mentioned that the PCP was opposed to EC and NATO membership, but its opposition neutralised by the domestic isolation and the subsequent decline that the PCP experienced.
111 Pridham, *The international context of democratic consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative perspective*, p. 188-90
change of the governmental and bureaucratic structures was necessary. More specifically, the new regimes had to re-invent themselves, in order to function according to the west European standards. The governmental structures had to be democratic to ensure the best government performance. Also, the bureaucracies had to be altered and be integrated to a democratic frame. Pressures from the EU towards the alteration of those two issues were evident in Greece and Portugal, especially in the early 80s. The alterations do not stop here. The spectrum of democratic consolidation is very broad and covers almost all of the aspects of country. To this spectrum, parties and elite groups are included. Parties are the essential linkage between the citizens and the state. In order for democratic consolidation to be achieved, the parties have to be democratic. Also, parties are the key actors of the shaping of policies, either domestic or external. In, Portugal, as mentioned before, all the new parties that emerged after the revolution had pro-EU stances, with the exception of the PCP, which considered that with the country’s participation with the EU, all the gains of the revolution would be undermined. Further, the same situation was noted in Greece. The majority of the parties, eventually, embraced a pro-EU stance. Here the exception is the KKE, the Greek communistic party, which eventually in the late 80s adopted a more flexible stance on the EU issue. The military was a key actor of the dictatorial regimes in both Greece and Portugal. Within the new regime, the military had to be kept out of domestic politics and accept their original role, as a country’s defence force. The governments had to find a way to keep the military involved in an international context but without being a dangerous element for the democracy. The solution for Portugal, at first, was to keep the army through the Revolutionary Council. The latter in 1982 was abolished by the constitutional revision. In Greece the army was occupied with the tension with Turkey over the Aegean, so it did not intervene with Greece’s domestic politics. The internationalisation of the countries’ armies was achieved by their involvement in NATO. Besides the army, other non political, elite groups (economic, business) had to find their place in the new regimes. Luckily the EU environment offered a fertile soil to integrate them and their interests. Final but equally important is the domestic environment. More specifically, this is about public opinion and how well received was the consolidation of the regime. At this point the contribution of the parties and the elite groups is crucial, since they are among the powers that influence public opinion, especially in issues that concern external relations. Portugal’s dualistic environment made the country display a weaker awareness towards external issues. On the

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113 There were huge differences between the rural–urban areas, the north and the south, centre/ periphery,
other hand Greece had displayed a strong inclination to mobilize on external issues. This happened due to Greece’s anti-American feeling, plus the historical fact of the penetration of third countries to its policy. However, as the year passes its stances became less reluctant and flexible.\textsuperscript{114}

The development of positive attitudes towards democracy is crucial for the democratic consolidation. Greece and Portugal had to overcome the consequences of their authoritarian legacies in a rather unfortunate economic conjecture, the economic crises of the mid-seventies. Positive attitudes towards the new regime (democracy) increase the legitimacy of the latter.

Speaking of legitimacy, it is essential to examine the theories of legitimacy crises. The latter are inherent in transition to modern social structures. Besides, a crucial factor of the overthrow of the regimes is the abolition of legitimisation, as examined above. There are three theories on that subject. The first one is centred on the economic contradictions of the modern state. To elaborate, the state (first) must create the favourable conditions in order to accumulate capital and make various investments. Then the state, in order to lay the grounds for legitimacy, must increase its expenditures for welfare state provisions like education, health, infrastructures etc. In the attempt of making those ends meet the state faces a fundamental contradiction. On the one hand, the state cannot reduce the welfare spending without causing dissatisfaction to the general population and face electoral defeat. On the other hand, if the state spends too much on expenditures then it endangers the capital accumulation. Consequently, the state by seeking ways to meet those two demands runs into increasing fiscal crisis. The second group of theories about legitimacy crisis is about the contradictions of the political system. The common feature between them, points to the loss of trust in policy of state and the increasing conflicts between interests of various subjects like classes, region and economical sectors. The political unrests are provoked by erosion of loyalty to welfare capitalism among masses. Governments must protect the interests of the capitalist and the private sector, but acting like that the state is overloaded and cannot afford to pay. The legitimacy crisis emerges from the new social movements and protest behaviours, demonstrations, marches etc which express their demands, which came to rival traditional forms of politics. The third aspect of legitimacy is located in the area of values and norms. In this case the loss of legitimacy is found in two conflicting sets of values. The first set is about the values that emerge from the Puritan ethics (hard work, sobriety, thriftiness), on which

\textsuperscript{114}Pridham, \textit{The international context o democratic consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative perspective}, p. 198-99
capitalism was built. The second set of values is the ones of hedonism (immediate gratification, personal pleasure). The latter values clash with the former ones, thus undermining the ones which are associated with capitalism\textsuperscript{115}.

Within this frame of analysis the Greek and the Portuguese can presumably fit in the second type of legitimacy crisis. From the timeline of the economic recession as it was presented in the introduction, it is evident that the legitimacy crises in those two countries have the characteristics of the political system crisis, since the states are trying to protect the interests of the capitalists, the banks and the private sector at the expense of the welfare state. The result is protests, manifestations and distrust of the political system.

2.5- Democracy in the times of crises\textsuperscript{116}.

From the facts that were discussed up until now, it is considered that the way towards democracy in those two cases is linear till 2008/9. In 2008, with the outbreak of the financial crisis, the known balances changed. In a sense that with hard economic conditions, come hard times for the democracies. Democracy is the intellectual trademark of the advanced western societies. When the crisis emerged in 2008, it shattered the confidence of the western countries, showing that they are vulnerable. Along with the challenge of the western way of life, there is an underpinning of the ideas which constitute the western world, such ideas also include democracy. There are two main approaches for what is democracy nowadays, the input-oriented and the output-oriented approach. The former considers democracy as morally superior to autocratic regimes because the democratic institutions respect the autonomy of the individual. The latter stipulates that democracy and the individual liberties that go with it are believed to render better results, afford greater welfare to a larger number of people\textsuperscript{117}. With the outbreak of the crisis there are speculations that all the greater goods of democracy and democracy itself are at stake.

Adam Przeworski and his colleagues found a relationship between economic performances and the survival of the regime, and consequently of democracies. By analysing data from 1950 to 1990, Przeworski and his colleagues found that when democracies face a decline in income, they are three times more likely to disappear, rather than when they are facing economic growth\textsuperscript{118}. Given this blunt assumption, it should be worrisome news for the

\textsuperscript{115} Domanski H., Determinants of legitimation in Europe: an empirical analysis for 21 countries. EMPIRIA, Revista de Methodologia de Ciencias Social., no. 9 enero junio, 2005, p. 62-63.

\textsuperscript{116}This part of the thesis is also found in the paper "Comparing Greek and Portuguese prospective MPs' evaluation of democratic functioning through the period of crisis (2009-2012)", written by A. Konstantinidou(me) and E. Kartsounidou, the paper was presented first in the conference of the Portuguese Association of Political Science in Coimbra between 14-16 of April of 2014.

\textsuperscript{117}Goldman M., “The financial crisis as a crisis of democracy: Towards prudential regulation through public reasoning”, Social Science Research Network, July of 2011, p. 1

countries that are currently hit from the financial crisis and facing economic downturn. This thesis provides the necessary facts to ensure that democracy is not in danger as it seems it is spoken form the citizens and the media. To elaborate, the statistics show that even though the crisis has struck Greece and Portugal, democracy is still functioning as good as it is expected to in those situations and the main problem is not the regime but the governmental measures, and subsequently the governments, that cause discomfort to the citizens.

It will be later indicated by the statistical analysis, that there is no danger for the democracy since the responders do not reject the fact that democracy in their country is so unbearable and unsatisfactory, but that there is an evident trend that indicates that the crisis had a small effect with the way democracy works. That is so for mainly three reasons. 1- The countries that are hit by the crisis have either been wealthy and industrialised democracies or they are economies dependent and protected by the EU. Those countries have experienced democratic consolidation that is very hard to reverse, or their regimes are protected by democratic structures such as the EU. 2- In newer or weaker democracies, where their economies can be considered as mediocre, the crisis did not cause the abolition of the regime as such but the defeats of the governments. 3- Finally, the recent breakdown of democracies around the world is due more to the bad internal governance rather than the global recession itself. So it is more likely that political factors hold the key role of the fate of the regimes and not the economic factors.\(^{119}\)

Abuse of power is the main factor in the demise of democracy in many cases. But still, in countries where a democratic regime is consolidated and protected, abuse of power is not a danger to the regime but to the government of the regime. In the two examined cases, due to the poor economic conditions, it was hard to form a one party government that could carry on with the “repair” of the economics. It has been observed that the democratically elected governments of Greece and Portugal of 2009 could not sustain the pressure and the effect of the crisis thus failing. But even though elections occurred in 2011 for Portugal, and in 2012 for Greece, a formulation of a cohesive one party government was not possible thus forming coalitions.\(^{120}\) Electoral punishment and not a demolition of the democratic regime is the effect of the crisis. Sure, coalition governments become unstable to the changes of the political and economical “winds”, but still they are serving a democratic regime. The earlier stated elections will be thoroughly analysed in a following unit.


\(^{120}\) For Greece a coalition of Pasok/ND/Dimar emerged after the second round of parliamentary election on June of 2012. For Portugal the coalition occurred in 2011 between PSD and CDS-PP.
Regarding the above mentioned fact about coalition governments in both of the countries there has to be mentioned that a general trend of the politicians towards consensus is evident from the past years on the verge of crisis. The term consensus in politics can be defined as an “operation characterised by reliance upon compromise and a search for some accommodation of divergent interests”\(^\text{121}\). Quite simply, consensus is when different or opposing interests, trying to find a common/neutral ground to pursue a common goal. In the cases of Greece and Portugal, the common goal can be considered the achievement of some kind of political stability to lead the country through this difficult economic situation. The economic crisis formulated a new landscape in the world of politics in the two countries under examination. Coalitions between traditional rival parties and parties that represent different ideology and belonging to different poles are now cooperating in order to guide the countries away from the consequences of the crisis.

The latter, in combination with the aforementioned about the fall of the governments and not the regimes, clearly shows that even in the worst economic conditions- so far- the democratic regime is fully consolidated and not in peril. In accordance with the main question of this thesis about the satisfaction of the candidates MPS with the way democracy functions in the examined countries, it can be said that it is natural for the candidates to drop their satisfaction percentages with the way democracy works due to the recent economic events and the pressure they are under; but they are not undermining the full sense of democracy, and they are working towards maintaining that very idea and institution.

Overall, democracy is accepted in general as a “good” type of regime, but still there are a few characteristics which make democracy prone to financial crises. Greater freedom, executive accountability and turnover, openness, transparency, and the ability to credibly commit, are some attributes of democracy that produce greater good but make her vulnerable to financial crises\(^\text{122}\). However, this is a big issue in itself which cannot be included in this analysis as it will move the thematic of the research away from the main point.

2.6- Statistical analysis regarding democracy.

In the previous pages the most important facts in terms of democracy have been laid out in the two examined countries, thus shaping the contemporary framework of democracy. Within this framework will be examined how satisfied both the candidate MPs and the voters (where applicable) are across country and time; first for the whole sample and then by party

\(^\text{121}\)Andreadis I, Teperoglou E., “Investigating consensus versus conflict between Greek and Portuguese political elites during the economic crisis: a matter of ideology?”; Paper prepared for the 2\(^\text{nd}\) Plenary Conference of the CCS, MZES, University of Manheim, January 2012, p. 2.

id of the prospective MPs. Regarding the latter, it will be taken into consideration the responses of PASOK, New Democracy, PS and PSD. The available answers are very, enough, a little and not at all satisfied. The first hypothesis is that the levels of satisfaction with democracy deteriorated between the first and the second surveys at both national and EU levels, in terms of the whole sample. The second hypothesis revolves around the party id of the prospective MPs, is that the opinions of the socialistic candidates deteriorate while the right wing candidates hold a stable position, in regards to their satisfaction with democracy at both national and EU levels have deteriorated, despite their party id.

The first hypothesis is partially confirmed\textsuperscript{123}\textsuperscript{124}. Regarding the levels of satisfaction within the nation, the Greek candidates in the first survey declared that they are enough satisfied; in the second survey they are a little satisfied. In the same perspective both Greek and the Portuguese voters shifted their opinion from a little satisfied to not at all satisfied. However the Portuguese candidates held a stable stance declaring that they are enough satisfied it both surveys, thus proving partially the hypothesis. At the EU level, the Greek candidates remained stable to a little satisfied, while the Portuguese candidates, from a rather neutral position shifted to not at all satisfied, and the Portuguese voters changed their stance from enough to a little. The analysis of those results takes part in two correspondence analyses, one about the levels of satisfaction at national level and one for the EU level. In both of the cases the gravity of the first dimension is over 90% (91.92 and 93.20), thus the answers are explained in the first dimension and the correspondences are in one dimension.

In terms of the second hypothesis\textsuperscript{125}\textsuperscript{126}, yet again, it is partially confirmed. The two socialistic parties (PASOK, PS) share the same opinion, while in the first period they were enough satisfied and in the second a little with the way democracy function in their countries. The two right-ish parties (New Democracy PSD) on both of the occasions are enough satisfied, thus keeping a stable stance. In terms of satisfaction about the democratic functioning in the EU, again by taking the responder by political groups, the socialists shift their opinion to a little satisfied, from very and enough for PASOK and PSD in respect. The PSD responders are enough satisfied at all times, while the New Democracy candidates present a rather opposite stance because in the second survey they are enough satisfied while previously they were a little satisfied. This last case proves the hypothesis as partially true, since while the right wing parties held a stable stance at all times (either enough or little), the

\textsuperscript{123} Table 1, p. 86
\textsuperscript{124} Table 2, p. 86
\textsuperscript{125} Table 3, p. 86
\textsuperscript{126} Table 4, p. 87
position of the New Democracy candidates is totally adverse since its is opinion is improved. The results here are a product of two two-dimentional correspondence analyses for national and EU level, respectively. The gravity of the first dimension of the question about satisfaction with democracy at national level is 74.60% and for the second dimension is 19.24%. For the second question, about the satisfaction levels on the EU, the gravity is 79.33% and 14.81%, for the first and second dimension in respect. As foretasted, the usage of one dimensional correspondence occurs only if over 90% of the results are explained in the first dimension.

The statistics show a general trend of dissatisfaction regarding democracy at both national and EU level, despite the small deviations. It is rather interesting that the parties share the same positions according their ideology. That shows, that parties which share a common and consistent ideology and shared opinion despite the fact that they belong to two different countries. The results indicate that the economic recession has influenced the responders, shifting their opinions negatively.

2.7- Representation.

The second main issue of this thesis is representation. The latter, as a political principle, can be generally described as a relationship, in which a person or a group of people represents or acts on behalf of a larger group of people. Representation differs from democracy since it (representation) identifies the difference between the rulers and the ruled. Although democracy may not assure representation, democracy is more conducive to representation than alternative regimes.

There are many theories regarding representation, which cannot be covered in this thesis, but Edmund Burke’s is the most accepted. In the democratic frame, representatives are the ones that are legitimately elected by the citizens. According to the theory there are three types of representation. The first one is the trustee. There are two interpretations of this type, a moralistic and a rational. The former is when the representative is a free agent and he/she follows what she/he considers right or what his/her conscious dictates to do. The latter, the rational interpretation, the representative follows his/her own judgement based on an assessment of the facts of each case, his/her understanding of the problems involved, and his/her thoughtful appraisal of the sides at issue. It can be said that this type of representative, acts more or less according to his/her own opinion or judgement. In this case the represented

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127 Heywood, Εισαγωγή στη Πολιτική, p 314.
may not have the information to give intelligent instructions, and the representative is unable to discover what his clienteles want\textsuperscript{129}.

The second type is the delegate, regarding this type there is number of conceptions. The main idea is that the delegates are finding themselves in a middle ground. More specifically, they should not use their independent judgement or convictions as criteria of decision-making, but they are not bound to follow instructions from whichever clientele. That means they can obviously seek for consults among their clienteles, but it is their choice to choose whether they follow their opinion or the instructions of their “clients”\textsuperscript{130}.

Finally, the third type is the politico. This type is the classical dichotomization in the concepts of representation in terms of free agency and mandate. In accordance with the circumstances the politico may behave as a trustee on the one hand, the on the other as a delegate, or act as both in terms of a third\textsuperscript{131}.

By using the empirical data from the CCS for both Greece and Portugal, in 2009 and 2012, there can be made a classification of the representatives within these three types. The main analysis and the tables are written later on this unit, but up to this point a few remarks can be made. To elaborate the candidate MPs were asked to give answers to three questions. Those questions were simulating, a hypothetical voting in the Parliament and how they would vote, would they vote according to their opinion, would they vote according to their voters opinion or according to their party. The findings that are analysed in this unit show that in case they had to choose to vote (represent) either their voters or their party guideline, they would choose the first. In cases where they had to choose between their party guideline and their own opinion the majority answered that they would choose their own opinion. Similar, in cases where they had to choose between their own opinion and the opinion of their voters, they would follow their opinion. According to those findings, the representatives of Greece and Portugal can be categorised under the type of trustee.

Besides the above mentioned theory, another theory is worth mentioning. In this theory\textsuperscript{132} political representation is viewed as a delegation of power from a constituency or a group of voters to particular party or MP.

\textsuperscript{130}Eulau, Wahlke, Buchanan, Ferguson, “The role of the Representative: Some empirical observations on the theory of Edmund Burke”, p. 750
\textsuperscript{131}Eulau, Wahlke, Buchanan, Ferguson, “The role of the Representative: Some empirical observations on the theory of Edmund Burke”, p. 750
A more recent theory notes that the representatives emerge, either from below (electorate) or from the above (elite). Also there are some instruments that prevent the representatives from diverging from their role. That kind of control can happen either ex post or ex ante. All the above consists of the agency theory. That theory produces four types of representatives; those types are resulting from the combination of the four characteristics discussed before. Those types are: Delegation: is about the emergence of representatives from the above and ex ante control. In that case the voters have already had preferences that are both exogenous and stable and the agenda must be predictable. Also, that type is ideal for representative democracy. Responsiveness: this type is about the election of representatives from below and ex post. In that kind of representation voters have exogenous preferences, but neither these preferences nor the political agenda need to be stable. Furthermore, this type of representation is best illustrated in the USA. Authorisation: in that case the representatives are raised from above and ex ante. The voters are not required to have exogenous preferences, but if they lack from those preferences, they are assumed to be able to develop them in reaction to the campaign. Moreover in that case, cohesive political parties present distinct programs to the voters and so they vote according to their preferences. And the last type of this theory is about Accountability: ay that final type, representations comes from above and ex-post, whereas the representative is like a political entrepreneur. Moreover, voter preferences may be exogenous or endogenous, stable or changing, and the agenda is not always predictable.

2.7.1- Statistics for representation.

In terms of representation, must be examined the issues of who the prospective MPs primarily represent, and how the MPs vote in Parliament. Those questions are answered only by the candidate MPs of both countries for the examined period of 2009-2012/3. The analysis is conducted for the whole sample and for some cases; the party id is taken into consideration.

Regarding with, "who the MPs mainly represent", both the Greek and the Portuguese MPs consider that representing their own voters in the constituency is of less importance in both cases. Furthermore, it is also less important to represent their party voters in their constituency in both of the surveys. The third hypotheses is that the Greek MPs tend to believe that it is not that important to represent all the citizens in their constituency, while their Portuguese colleagues think that is very important, across 2009 to 2012. On the other
hand, representing the party electorate at large is among the most important things to represent for the Greek candidates and least important for the Portuguese ones. The fifth hypothesis regards the representation of the members of social groups; the candidates in both countries believe that representing members of social groups is not important in both 2009-12. Finally, it is of most importance to primarily represent the nations' citizens for the prospective MPs for both of the countries.

Regarding whom the MPs mainly represent, this string of questions ask the candidates to evaluate each answer starting from most important, 2, 3, 4, 5 and least important. The first hypothesis stipulate that both the Greek and the Portuguese MPs consider that representing their own voters in the constituency is of less importance in both cases. The results of the analysis though reveal that for the Greek candidates of 2009/2012 and Portuguese ones of 2009, the hypothesis is valid, but the Portuguese candidates of the second survey are the exception of the rule. The analysis is laid out in one dimension since 97.74% of the answers are concentrated in the first dimension. The next hypothesis refers that, it is also less important to represent their party voters in their constituency in both of the surveys. But, in this case the reality is different, since the Greek MPs (2009/12) proved the rule but their Portuguese colleagues disproved it, the latter considered representing the their own party voters in the constituency is important. Also, this analysis is one dimensional, since 92.83% of the answers are met in the first dimension. In terms of representing all the citizens of the constituency, the Greek candidates believe that is not important, while the Portuguese ones think the opposite, throughout the examined period. In this case, the results fit the hypothesis, thus prove it correct. It needs to be commented, that 98% of the answers are met in the first dimension, hence it is analysed in one dimension. When the question focuses on the party electorate at large, it's hypothesized that the Greek prospective MPs consider that to represent the party electorate at large is most important, while the Portuguese prospective MPs, think otherwise, in both of 2009-12. After the analysis, which is also one dimensional- 91.97% the gravity of the first dimension- it is apparent that the hypothesis is true for the majority of the sample. The Greek case proves the hypothesis right, but the Portuguese sample while on 2009 and 2012 considers representing the party electorate as lesser of importance. The fifth hypothesis was about the representation of the members of social groups and stated that the candidates on both countries believe that representing

135 Table 5, p. 87
136 Table 6, p. 87
137 Table 7, p. 88
138 Table 8, p. 88
members of social groups is not important in both 2009-12. This is also a case that the hypothesis is quasi-verified\(^{139}\). On the one hand the Portuguese candidates verify the hypothesis, but the Greek ones consider that representing members of social groups is important. Once again, the correspondence is one dimensional, since 96.09\% of the cases are explained in the first dimension. Finally, another crucial hypothesis is that the candidates at all times consider that representing the nation’s citizens in the most important. This hypothesis is totally disqualified across the sample, since all the candidates categorise the citizen’s representation as a less important\(^{140}\). This case is carried out in a two-dimensional correspondence, where 87.79\% of the answers is explained by the first dimension and 12.86\% on the second one.

The above questions produced an abundance of results that need to be commented on. Firstly, there is a wide trend that the representatives are more interested in the representation of their party electorate at large, and the citizens of their constituency. The representation of social groups’ members, or the representation of small portion of citizens like their own voters, or the party voters in their constituency is not that important to them. Also, the non-representation of the nation’s citizens can be considered as natural, since the MPs are elected at a constitutional level and not at a national one, thus it is natural for them to consider representing their constitution is important. Furthermore, since at the elections the candidates compete under the flag of their party, it is also natural to consider that it is most important to represent their party electorate at large since the well-being of the party is dependent to the well-being of the voters.

Some of the questions, as far now examined, present great interest to be examined with the added factor of party identification. More specifically, the ones about the representation of the party electorate at large and about the representation of the nation’s citizens, noted that again both of the surveys are taken into account. The hypotheses that emerge are: 1- The candidates from the socialistic parties from both of the countries consider as most important to represent the party electorate at large, while the right wing parties (New Democracy, PSD) consider it as less important and 2- The Greek candidates consider that is of least importance to represent the nation’s citizens, while their Portuguese colleagues think otherwise, despite their party id.

The hypothesis that stipulates that the candidates from the socialistic parties from both of the countries consider as most important to represent the party electorate at large, while the

\(^{139}\) Table 9, p. 88
\(^{140}\) Table 10, p. 89
right wing parties (New Democracy, PSD) consider it as less important. Indeed the analysis shows that both PASOK and PS (2009-12) consider that representing their party electorate at large is more important for them (places 2 and most important), but the analysis also shows that the New Democracy candidates consider it important (place 3). The PSD on the other hand believes that representing the electorate at large is lesser important. The exception that is made from new democracy disqualifies the hypothesis. Finally, the last under examination hypothesis supports that the Greek candidates consider that is least of importance to represent the nation's citizens, while their Portuguese colleagues think otherwise, despite their party id. This hypothesis is verified to its full extent. The above results mainly indicate that the parties, with the same ideology but from different countries, do not necessarily share the same opinion. They may share some common features but their stances on political issues are influenced by the national characteristics and political culture of the countries they compete. The results for both of the hypotheses are a product of two-dimensional correspondence analyses. For the first hypothesis the gravity for the first dimension is 75.07% and for the second 13.73%. As for the second hypothesis the gravities are 71.74% and 17.47%.

Another group of questions that is examined under representation is the "how to vote" questions. More specifically, those question present to the prospective MPs virtual situation that they may face in a crucial vote in the parliament. Those questions are linked to the issue of representation, due to results they produce, since they show the type of representation Greek and Portugal have, according to the above analyzed framework.

As mentioned the questions are about hypothetical situation in the parliament and how the MPs would vote. There are three questions under analysis: a-How should an MP vote in he Parliament, if the voters of the his/her constituency have a different opoinion and the party takes a different stance?, b- How should an MP vote if his/her opinion on an issue is not in complinace with the opinion of the voter in his/her constituency? and c- How should an MP vote in the parliament if his/her opinion is not in compliance with the party guidelines?. Each of those questions has different answers. It must also be taken into consideration that the questions are examined, across time and across country.

The research hypotheses are shaped as such: If the candidates in a parliamentary election had to vote either according to the opinion of the voters of their constituency or according to their party guideline, they would support the opinion of their constituency.

141 Table 11, p. 89
142 Table 12, p. 90
voters, in both countries and in both surveys. The results that are produced by the analysis indicate that the hypothesis is partially true\textsuperscript{143}. That is because, the Portuguese candidates at all times and the Greek ones from 2009, supported the hypothesis, but the Greek candidates of 2012, shifted their position and supported their party guideline, instead of their voter's opinion.

The second hypothesis supports that in a case of a parliamentary election where the candidates have to vote either according to their opinion or the opinion of their voters in the constituency, they would rather vote according to their own mind, at all times in both of the countries. In this case, the hypothesis is fully verified\textsuperscript{144}. The candidates show a stance that indicates they prefer to follow their own mind, than the opinion of the people who elected them.

The final hypothesis assumes that the responders as MPs they would support their opinion and stand against their party guideline, in case they had to choose from one of those two in a hypothetical scenario. Once again, the hypothesis is not fully verified\textsuperscript{145}. While the Portuguese prospective MPs, in both 2009 and 2012, and the Greek candidates of 2012 would follow their own opinion, the Greek one of 2009 present a rather neutral stance. The latter is translated as the sample has an exact 50-50 division, thus not indicating a clear position.

The above results show that the candidates most of the times prefer to follow their own opinion rather their party guideline or their voters' opinion. The latter is a selectable answer only in the case where they have to choose between that and the party guideline. In all cases it is evident that the party guideline is not a selectable option. Those conclusions verify the above mentioned theoretical framework about the type of representation in Greece and Portugal.

\textsuperscript{143} Table 13, p. 90-91
\textsuperscript{144} Table 14, p. 91-92
\textsuperscript{145} Table 15, p. 92-93
3- Parties, elections and governance.

In this chapter, the issues that will be under examination are about the parties, the elections and the governance. More specifically, the functions of a party in correlation with democracy are one of the main concerns; also a short overview of the Greek and Portuguese parties is in order. Furthermore, the functioning of elections in a democracy is a cornerstone of the essence if democracy as we know it, plus the two latest parliamentary elections of Greece and Portugal set the time frame of this thesis and it should be analyzed. The issue of governance is important to be mentioned; more specifically the issues of minority and coalition governments are pertinent issues.

3.1- Parties

Parties, in a very strict theoretical sense can be defined as, a group of people that s gathered and organized for the purpose of winning government power, via elections or other means. There are four main characteristics that define parties as such in comparison with other groups. First of all, the parties are aiming to exercise government power by conquering political positions. The next attribute is that parties are organized bodies with members that are officially enlisted in it and have party identification. Also parties usually have a huge spectrum of goals that correspond to major areas of governmental politics. Finally, parties are joined in the base of common political preferences and a general ideological identification. The type of parties varies across country and across time. More specifically, parties can be authoritarian or democratic, they may aim to conquest the government via elections or revolution, they might be left or right or even apolitical. The existence of parties is not sine-qua non. Parties, as we know them today, emerged throughout the 19th century, with the progressive expansion of the voting rights\textsuperscript{146}.

In the contemporary sense of parties, there are several functions that a party performs. In the core of the function of a party is representation. The latter is about the response of the parties to express the various views of its voters. More scientifically, parties are input mechanisms that ensure that the government is taking into account the needs and the wishes of the society at large. Also, the creation and the recruitment of the elites, is among the parties’ functions. To elaborate, parties are charged to procure, to the states, political leaders. And it is most common that people, who hold public positions, usually gain that position due because they hold a position in a party. The formulation of targets is, also, a function of the

\textsuperscript{146}Heywood, Εισαγωγή στη Πολιτική, p. 346 347
parties. Parties are the ones that while they are aiming to conquest the governments, they are setting an agenda of goals, via those goals they are aiming to gain the support of the voters. Another function is the expression and the representation of interests. During the process of the formulation of goals, parties contribute to the expression and representation of interests that already exist in the society. More specifically, parties can express territorial, religious, labor, business and other types of interests. The last two functions of parties are the socialization and mobilization of people and the organization of government. Regarding the latter, it is the great responsibility of the party that, after succeeding in its primary goal to conquer the government, is to organize it. Where the parties are the main providers of stability in the country, they make the decision for the future of the country and also ensure that the democratic regime is to stay intact\textsuperscript{147}.

Continuing with the main connection of the parties with democracy, it has to be said that parties are considered as key actors in contemporary democracies, up to the point that contemporary democracy cannot be conceived without parties. However, there is an ambiguity revolving around the position of parties in contemporary democracies. To elaborate with this stance, this ambiguity emerges from the tension between the increasing centrality of parties as a key institution in central democracies and their increasing failure to fulfill the functions that are essential to a democratic regime\textsuperscript{148}. The notion that parties are central and essential element of democracies received a logical impulse with the establishment of mass democracy, which made the direct link between the citizens and the state unrealistic, thus legitimizing the existence of intermediary institutions to provide those links. \textit{Nevertheless, democracies are unthinkable save in term of political parties}\textsuperscript{149}.

The parties were not "accepted" and constitutionalized with the dawn in politics. In post war Europe, parties started to be conceived as a sine qua non of a modern democratic polity. The fact that parties are a central actor in politics comes with a two-fold recognition of the relevance of parties, representing not only an acknowledgement of the inevitability of parties as durable and permanent institutions in democratic political systems, but also an appreciation of their positive contribution, as a result of which they have to come to be valued as key political institutions in contemporary democracies\textsuperscript{150}. As every theory has its supports and its rival critiques, this stance also have both sides. The critiques focus mainly on the failures of parties' performance and the clientistic networks that emerge around them.

\textsuperscript{147} Heywood, Εισαγωγή στη Πολιτική, p. 352-57
\textsuperscript{148} Van Biezen I., "The place of parties in contemporary democracies", West European Politics, 26(3), (2003), p. 174
\textsuperscript{149} Van Biezen, "The place of parties in contemporary democracies", p. 171
\textsuperscript{150} Van Biezen, "The place of parties in contemporary democracies", p. 175
Nevertheless, it is difficult to oversee the fact that parties have a positive contribution in democracies and its consolidation, especially in the newfound ones. The importance of parties in the process of democratic consolidation, most of the times is assumed, rather than examining the way parties aided the consolidation. Regarding the democratic consolidation, it has been explained in the above section, however at this point those two things should be connected. More specifically, throughout the consolidation process key political institutions emerge and become accepted as the only legitimate framework for political. In the most recent years, just by empirically observing the current events, citizens tend to dismiss the importance of parties as means of representation, canalization of interests and instruments of citizens mobilization in politics. Nevertheless, parties retain their importance as main actors in politics, in organization of the Parliament and candidate recruitment mechanisms. Regarding the above mentioned position of the parties in contemporary democracies, Bartolini and Mair argue that one the one hand the "representative" functions of the parties have declined, but their procedural role is still intact.\(^{151}\)

Focusing on the cases that are examined in this analysis, we will start with Greece. Parties are the key factors in the democratic consolidation in Greece, since they function as a two way channel to legitimize the new regime. More specifically, the citizens via the parties entrust their believe to the new system by supporting them, but also the parties ensure not only to the citizens but also to the international network that this fragile newfound regime is capable to be consolidated as a sturdy one at an international level. After the collapse of the Junta and the rush return of K. Karamanlis- the exiled ex- prime minister of Greece, it was evident that a revitalization of the previous party and political system was not a viable option. The civil society in Greece was very weak and suppressed to act by its own powers. Thus the main responsibility of the democratization process fall on the shoulders of K. Karamanlis, who had the consensus from the political elites both in and out of the Greek borders. Also, the reduction of the meaning of the cleavages that divided the society the previous period aided the transition towards democracy and provided the country with a new ground and horizons to plan the new political system. Almost every political aspect had to reinvent itself with a new identity that fitted with the perspectives on a democratic country that wants to resemble the Western Europe.\(^{152}\) The Greek case shows a certain rapture with the past but also a continuity of it. This ambiguity can be easily explained, on the one hand the rapture with the previous era can be seen in the new features the new system has, like the ideology,

\(^{151}\) Van Biezen, "The place of parties in contemporary democracies", p. 182

the lack of strong cleavages and the moderation of polarization, but on the other hand some traits remained the same, such as the clientelism. The latter is a deeply rooted element of the Greek society. In the new period, clientelism was just transformed to be fitted in the new system. To elaborate, party membership and not attachment to the individual, is a vehicle to guarantee the fulfillments of the individualized demands. Every social expression was caused or classified by party labels and was either delegitimized or controlled by the parties themselves\textsuperscript{153}. Thus, continuing an old habit of the Greek society into the new democratic institutions. It would be a mistake not to take into account the heritage of the country, when trying to explain and understand this new period, since the previous period is a catalyst to the transition to the new one. Also, the successful headlining of the very first government are the ones that made possible the democratic consolidation. Karamnlis handled the situation with the best possible way to ensure that Greece was ready to be integrated as an equal democratic country along with the rest of Europe. Since the late seventies - early 80s, the party spectrum in Greece was crystallized, and the two dominant parties that emerged was New Democracy and the Panhellenic Socialistic Party. Those two were the main actors that seized the power from each other in the elections up until 2009.

In the elections of 2012, two unprecedented facts occurred. Firstly, Both Pasok and New Democracy saw their percentages so low, as never before. Secondly, Pasok ceased to be one of the two main competitors of the power falling back into the third place, as the Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza) had risen to the second in power party. Briefly, Syriza can be understood as a coalition of small radical left parties and drafts that their traces can vaguely lead back to the Greek Communistic Party- Interior (KKE- esoterikou). Ever since, the political scenery of the Greek parties had radically changed. The two main parties are suffering from looses of elites, executives and supporters, which either formulate new parties or move in other parties. In this case it has to be mentioned that the Independent Greeks are mainly formulated by ex- New Democracy executives, the same goes for the Democratic Left with former Pasok executives. Also, there is the emergence of the Golden Dawn, a radical, quasi fascist far right party. With the new lights of the Euro- Elections of 2014, there are even more parties that prove the fragmentation of the party- system. The newfound party called The River (to potami) is competing as the third power, whereas the Olive Tree (elia), which actually consisted from the remains of the Pasok and other quasi-Pasok currents, is struggling to keep itself on the fourth place and barely above the electoral threshold\textsuperscript{154}.

\textsuperscript{153} Spourdalakis, Securing democracy in post-authoritarian Greece, p. 172 176
\textsuperscript{154} Metapolls: http://metapolls.net/2014/05/04/greek-parliamentary-election-4-may-2014-metron/#.U2a23O9eHwo
In the Portuguese case, parties also play an important role towards the transition and the democratic consolidation. The Portuguese case differs from the Greek, mainly on one different characteristic. While in Greece there was the reappearance of politicians of the previous democratic regime, in Portugal there was a total rapture with every element that existed in the previous periods. That move was called "saneamento". This meant that no elements, politicians and groups that had a connections with the previous authoritarian regime, were automatically expelled from politics and consequently, the newfound democratic regime. The starting point of Portuguese democracy was the attempt to install a radical, socialist regime. The constitution and the legislation of 1976 and 1977 respectively, created a large public sector, where the state had the monopoly in banking, insurance mass communications media, agriculture and all the basic and infrastructural industries. Although, the state’s monopoly loosened on the 1983 legislation, it was 1989, when this was fully reversed. Due to this fact and the saneamento, business elites, trade unions and groups had to adapt to the new status and forsake all their previous affiliations with the authoritarian regime and keep close links with the parties. The Portuguese party system had a role as a gatekeeper to the transition and consolidation of democracy, despite the moments of crisis and instability. Since the democratic consolidation was state-centered and the parties’ penetration into the civil society was immense, it can be safely deducted that a state consolidation took place in Portugal. Up to this point, it should be mentioned that Greece’s consolidation can be considered as state-centered but not as much as Portugal’s.

Four main parties emerged into the newfound political horizon of the early seventies. All of them can be considered brand new, with no connections to the previous regime and with democratic-compliant ideologies. The exception can be found only in the Portugal Communist Party (PCP) where the latter was not new, but was re-legitimized, after its prohibition in the mid twenties. The other three parties are the Centro Democratico Social-CDS, the Partido Socialista (PS) and the Partido Socialista Democrata (PSD). The first one can be filled as a conservative and the other two are filled on the socialist pole. Those parties were found either shortly before or after the coup of 1974. The main idea that is embodied in these parties is that all of them wanted to express themselves as fresh parties, with

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156 Morlino, Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe, 10-361

157 According to Morlino’s study there are four types of democratic consolidation: party, state, elite, maintenance consolidation. Greece and Portugal’s cases are identified as state consolidations and not party consolidations. But still the importance of the parties in the consolidation process cannot be ignored or underestimated. In Morlino, Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe

158 Lobo, Pinto, Magalhaes, The Political Institutions of Portuguese Democracy, p. 34
democratic ideas, which can be a direct link between the citizens and the state. The PS and the PSD are the two main competitors for the laurel of power, even though the poor decisions regarding the handling of the economic crisis, have cost them valuable "points", they are still the centre of the party system. Besides those parties, also other parties made their appearance in the scene, the most notable from them can be considered the Greens (the latter takes part in the elections as a coalition with the PCP, under the name CDU) and the Bloco de Esquerda159 (BE), which derived from the association of extreme left parties and movements, in 1999.

3.1.1- Statistics for political parties.

The working framework of this unit about party theories is that the latter are essential for the proper functioning of democracy since they are the linkage between the citizens and the state. In that stipulation is based on the examined question that derives from the CCS questionnaires. Furthermore, this question is examined for both the general sample and the party identification of the responders. Thus two working hypotheses are examined.

To begin with, the fact that parties are the essential link between the citizens and the state, it is undeniable that all the responders, including the voters support that stance. The results seem to support that, however with a closer glance, some deviations are evident160. The candidates from Greece and Portugal share a rather positive attitude and consider that the parties are the essential link between the parties and the state. This stance is more than justified, since all the candidates have a clear party identification, and parties are the vehicle through which the candidates become the citizens' representatives. Furthermore, in the case of Greece as the years progress that stance becomes even stronger (strongly agree), while the Portuguese stance remain unchanged but positive (agree). The above mentioned deviation is located in the opinion of the Portuguese voters. The latter, while in 2009 have a rather neutral position, which cannot be classified either as positive or negative, in the second survey they disagree with the main stance. The analysis here is two-dimensional, where the first dimension explains 68.20% of the answers and 28.41% on the second. The results show that the voters' opinion has shifted negatively, thus considering that the parties do not represent their opinion and they are not the medium to represent them in the state. Taking into consideration the general discomfort that the financial recession has caused and the role of the parties in that climate, that stance is justified. Furthermore, the citizens, as current events indicate, have taken the issue upon their hands and vindicate their opinion via mass demonstrations and protests.

159 Lobo, Pinto, Magalhaes, *The Political Institutions of Portuguese Democracy*, p. 36
160 Table 16, p. 93
As aforementioned, this question is also examined in correspondence with the party id of the candidates. It can be assumed that all the candidates despite party identification, nationality or time, consider that the parties are the essential link between the citizens and the state. Curiously enough, the analysis produce ambiguous results that cannot be categorized neither according the country nor the party ideology\textsuperscript{161}. Starting from Greece the socialist party candidates, while in 2009 were strongly disagreeing with the examined stance on 2012, they neutralized their position. The candidates of New Democracy, starting in 2009 from a neutral position, in 2012 they raised their opinion to strongly agree. On the other hand the Portuguese socialist candidates have a stable and positive - trough time - position placing themselves in agreement with the question. Their social democrat colleagues also have a stable position but in the middle of the response spectrum (neither agree nor disagree). The main comment that it can be done here in terms of trends is that the Portuguese candidates have a stable position through time, in contrast with their Greek colleagues. Furthermore, the Greek data presents an upstream trend in terms that from negativity to neutrality for PASOK and form neutrality to positivity for New Democracy. Nevertheless, definite conclusions cannot be made. The results are interpreted by a two-dimensional correspondence analysis, where 63.10\% is explained on the first dimension and 22.07\% on the second.

Taking into consideration the analysis for the whole sample and the sample in correspondence the party identification of the responders there are some deviations. Those can be explained in terms that the data for the whole sample included parties that are not examined for their ideology, thus by keeping a positive stance they help to the rise of the positive general trend.

\textbf{3.1.2- Intraparty democracy.}

As it has been discussed above, parties are the essential link between the citizens and the state and they are the core of democracies. Thus, parties as democratic institutions need to function democratically, hence the term of intra-party democracy. Regarding the latter, in this essay two issues are discussed, one is whether the partly leader is too powerful and the other concerns, whether the decision- making process in the party is too top down. The results of those two questions are further analyzed later in this section. At this point, there is just going to be a short mention regarding intraparty democracy and the choices that derive from the latter, such as the definition of policy positions, the selection of the party's leader and the candidate selection methods.

\textsuperscript{161} Table 17, p. 94
To begin with intraparty democracy, democracies and parties are in tandem. More specifically, besides the function of the parties that were analyzed above, the cohesiveness of the parties in legislation produce an efficient government and attributes to the accountability of the politicians. Thus parties require channels for their members to participate in the internal decision making process, deliberate and express their ideas. The above string of thoughts is recapitulated in a simple sentence: if parties do not allow for broad and inclusive participation, democracy at large is elusive\textsuperscript{162}. Taking a step back, it can be seen that the degree of intraparty democracy in a party is clearly related with the organization of the party. The party organization differs from party to party, across countries and time. In that case there are parties with loose structure and informal organization and parties with a clear, tight, professional organization and dense networks. Those two cases represent the extremes, thus there is also a middle way between those two.

In order to gain a clearer perspective in terms of organization three terms to describe party structures can be used as guidelines: inclusiveness, centralization and institutionalization\textsuperscript{163}. To elaborate with the first one, inclusiveness, defines how wide the circle of the decision-makers in a party is. In other words it is about the opportunities of the open deliberation on issues prior to the final decision. On the other hand, centralization is restraining the open deliberation process to a strict circle that includes a single group of people or decision body. In that case all the decision are final and they ought to be accepted from all the levels of the party. In the centralization type there is a "middle" way, the stratarchical. That means that the decision-making process is decentralized among geographic layers of organization, but tightly controlled by party elites at each of those different levels. The third term is institutionalization, which includes a wide range of features from the party’s autonomy from other actors, the extent of its internal organizational development, and the extent to which supporters identify with the party and view it as an important actor. In the main, newly founded parties tend to have low institutionalization, without that fact being an absolute rule. With high levels of intraparty democratization comes high levels of institutionalization, cause with levels of intraparty democracy, the existence of rules is essential. But, once again the other way round is not necessary (high institutionalization is not an evidence of high levels of intraparty democracy). In general, high institutionalization of the organization of a party is considered a positive attribute\textsuperscript{164}.

\textsuperscript{162}Wollkenstein F., Towards a deliberative model of intraparty democracy p. 3
\textsuperscript{163}Scarrow S, Political Parties and Democracy in theoretical and practical perspectives: Implementing intra-party democracy, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Washington DC 2005, p. 6
\textsuperscript{164}Scarrow, Political Parties and Democracy in theoretical and practical perspectives: Implementing intra-party democracy, p. 6
Those three terms of party organization can be evaluated in action, when the parties follow procedures to select candidates, select leaders and to define policy positions.

To begin with, candidate selection is a process by which political parties decide who will be on their ballot paper as their recommended candidate(s). The main concept that those parties should democratically select their candidates, this concept is rather vague and it leaves a vast space for interpretation. There are two main concepts that are revolving around the issue of candidate selection, centralization and participation.

To elaborate with the concept of centralization, there are two extremes in this case. The first one is that all decisions are taken at the national level of the party without the involvement of any other local branches of the party. The second case is where the local branches are those that decide for the candidates without the approval or participation of the national level. Nevertheless, there are also practices that are found elsewhere between those two extremes. In the case that the decision is taken at a local level, most of the times the national level of the party has a saying on the candidate selection by either encouraging or dictating the local level to choose a specific candidate or by vetoing the choices of the local branches. In participation is situation is as such: on the one hand the party leader solemnly decides for the candidates, on the other hand the ordinary members of the party would decide without any involvement from the party leader(s). The latter case is proved in the USA’s primary elections. Moreover, there are on the side other factors that a party takes into account in terms of which of the candidate selection method will use. Those factors can be considered by the electoral system, the ideology of the party and the political culture. For example, in multi member district systems the national party agencies play a key role, whereas in single member districts the local party branches would be more powerful165. Similarly, plurality systems with single member districts tend to acquire decentralized methods of selection, whereas large multi member districts tend to use more centralized methods166.

The process of candidate selection is rather complicated and at the same time is very important since those who are selected must be the representatives of a party's ideology, policies and a reflection of the party's image. Also, candidate selection methods can be distinguished between the mixed candidate selection system and the multi-stage candidate selection method. The former is a method in which different potential candidates face different restrictions, or different candidates are selected by different selectorates, in different locations, or according to different nomination systems. This method can be addressed in two

165Ace Electoral Knowledge Network: http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/p/pch/pch02/pch02a
steps, first there should be a separate analysis of each selectorate (its location and its nomination system) and then the relative impact of each procedure should be weighed by calculating the ratio of safe position that are filled by the particular selectorates. In the multi-stage candidate selection method the (same) candidates have to face more than one selectorate during the selection process. These selectorates may be defined differently in territorial and functional terms and may use different nomination systems. This method is also rather complicated and it is implemented in two stages. First there should be a separate analysis of each stage, defining the selectorate, its location and its nomination system, and then the relative importance of each stage should be estimated. If certain stages are found to be mere formalities, then they should be removed from consideration. When more than one stage has a real impact on the composition of the list, then these stages should be weighed to produce results

Besides the aforementioned, there are four other dimensions to be taken into account regarding the candidate selection methods, such us the candidacy, the party selectorates, the decentralization and the voting/appointment systems. A short analysis of those four dimensions should take place. The candidacy is about the restrictions which apply to the potential candidates and they are (the restrictions) in a spectrum according to the level of inclusiveness or exclusiveness, where every voter can stand as a party candidate and where there are some criteria of eligibility in order for someone to be a candidate, respectively. The selectorate is the body that selects candidates; it can be composed by one person or several people. The selectorates are as well classified in the continuum of inclusiveness/exclusiveness, meaning that the selection is either restricted to the will of one person (exclusiveness) or the electorate has the right to vote in the general elections. This spectrum can be further subcategorized moving from one side of the spectrum to the other (from inclusiveness to exclusiveness), there are the "electorate zone"(every registered voter can vote for candidates), the "party members"(where condition and restrictions in accordance to the party rules apply), the "selected party agency", the "non selected party agencies" and finally the party leader. Decentralization is about the locus of control and finally the voting/appointment systems. The latter is about how candidates are nominated. More specifically in the voting system the votes determine where someone will be on the list and in which position of list, in the appointment system in which the candidates are appointed


Those four dimensions are a product of the theories of Rahat G. and Hazan R. Y. in Candidate selection methods, an analytical framework.
without the use of any kind of suffrage\textsuperscript{169}. Finally, the ideology, the size, the age of the party, the magnitude of the districts, the area, the region, the territorial organization and the existence or not of preferential voting, are essential parameters in the candidate selection methods\textsuperscript{170}.

The party leader is mainly the leader candidate of a ballot paper. The importance of the party leader is significant, since he/she is the one who dictates and ensures the maintenance of the party guidelines. The main concept of this unit is intra-party democracy; is the organization of the party, where there was the mention of the candidate selection methods but equally important is the selection method of the party leader. A party depending on its ideology and organization can have either a general secretary or a president. This part aims to analyze the procedures that a party follows in order to select a leader. To begin with, by empirical observation, when a party is founded, the founder is naturally the leader. Within the foundation of a party in its founding manifesto there should be an article regarding the procedures that will be followed in order to elect a leader in cases that the leader quits the party, dies or he or she has no longer the support of the party members. This case, pretty much follows the aforementioned pattern. There must be rules where it is stipulated whether the leader is elected or appointed, and the equivalent procedures. The procedures may vary from a party assembly which decides on that matter, to a membership ballot or even a combination of both. Moreover, the arena that determines the party leader may vary from the parliamentary caucus, to the party congress up to the entire membership. All of the above must be provided by the party guidelines and abide by the party and the democratic rules in general\textsuperscript{171}. Thus, in this case it is also evident that intraparty democracy is based on the rules of the organization of the party.

Finally, one way to evaluate the level of internal democracy within a party is to ask who sets the party policies and execute the electoral promises. This is a very crucial matter, since many times the issue of disagreement over an issue erodes the cohesiveness of the party. To highlight the importance of the matter, in the examined cases in Greece the disagreement of some party members with the decisions the leader has taken, lead to the deletion of MPs from the party. Moreover, one of the examined question of this thesis is the evaluation of the candidate MPs over the decision making process in the party.

In the most inclusive cases, individual party members may be asked to vote on specific policy positions. In the less inclusive cases, party conference delegates are asked to

\textsuperscript{169}Rahat, Hazan, "Candidate selection methods, an analytical framework", p. 300-309
\textsuperscript{170}Lundell, "Determinants of candidate selection- the degree of centralisation in comparative perspective", p. 32-35
\textsuperscript{171}Scarrow, Political Parties and Democracy in theoretical and practical perspectives: Implementing intra-party democracy, p. 10
endorse a set of commitments prepared by a platform committee. In those cases the deliberation process is more open than the actual vote. The point of the open deliberation is to show that the party follows open and democratic mannerisms, and that the final decisions are a product of deliberation across the party. Of course there are the cases where some of the elite party members will find themselves in agreement with some policy issues. In that case, it is the party leader's duty to handle the situation as gracefully and democratically they can, in order to prevent not only an intraparty crisis, but also not to confuse and alienate the voters\textsuperscript{172}.

Before concluding with this unit, some final remarks should be made. Firstly, parties should have democratic procedures to enroll new members; it also should aim not only to gain the support of the voter but also to encourage them to enroll in the party.

3.1.3- \textbf{Statistics for intraparty democracy.}

As previously stipulated the questions for intraparty democracy are two: decision making in the party is too top-down so the grassroots cannot be heard and the party leader is too powerful. Given the above it is vital to examine what the prospective Mps think about those issues with their party. The question will be examined for both the whole sample of the candidates and their party identification across time and country.

The first hypothesis that emerges is that all the candidates from both the countries consider their decision making process in their parties is too top-down, through time. However, that hypothesis is true for the only for the Portuguese candidates, whose results indicate that they disagree with that stipulation at both of the examined periods, while, their Greek colleagues agree with the stipulation (strongly agree on 2009 and agree on 2012)\textsuperscript{173}. Furthermore, examining the same hypothesis taking into consideration the party identification of the candidates, the results are almost similar\textsuperscript{174}. The candidates from PASOK and New Democracy are agreeing that the decision making processes in their parties are too top-down. Their Portuguese colleagues from PS and PSD hold a rather neutral stance at the same times. The results indicate that the decision making process in the parties is not something that is directly correlated with the ideology of the party but with the political culture of their country. That is evident since the socialist and the right parties do not share the same opinion, but the opinion is shared amongst the parties from the same county. Those two hypotheses

\textsuperscript{172} Scarrow, Political Parties and Democracy in theoretical and practical perspectives: Implementing intra-party democracy, p. 10-11
\textsuperscript{173} Table 18, p. 94
\textsuperscript{174} Table 19, p. 95
were examined by a one dimensional correspondence for the first one and a two-dimensional for the second hypothesis\textsuperscript{175}.

Continuing with the hypotheses, and taking into consideration the above results, the party leader is too powerful in the case of the general sample of Greek parties, while in the Portuguese parties the party leader is considered as an equal among the members of the parties. With a careful examination of the results, the hypothesis is confirmed\textsuperscript{176}. The Greek candidates agree that their party leader is too powerful, across time, and the Portuguese ones, while in the first examined period have a neutral stance (neither agree or disagree), later their stance shifts to disagree. When the same hypothesis is tested within the party identification of the responders this presents a few differences but the general image remains the same\textsuperscript{177}. To elaborate, the candidates of the Greek parties respond that their party leader is too powerful despite their party orientation. Only the candidates from PASOK on 2012 shift their position from agree to neither agree nor disagree. The latter is due to the fact that after the resignation of G. Papandreou- as mentioned earlier- the party went under some internal crisis and a change of leader. The events occurred so close before the election of 2012, thus the responders of PASOK were still not adapted to the new reality and functioning of the party. On the other side of Europe, in Portugal the candidates of PS and PSD share the exact same stance, meaning that both of the parties in 2009 held a neutral position regarding how powerful were their leaders, and in the second survey, both disagree that their leaders are too powerful. Again there is no evidence that the party identification plays an important role on that issue since the main grouping that emerges is national and not ideological. Finally, for the last two hypotheses they are unveiled by two two-dimensional correspondences. For the first one the gravities are 89.96 and 6.44, for the first and second dimension. For the second hypothesis, 75.28\% of the answers are explained on the first dimension and 15.96\% on the second dimension.

3.2- Elections.

At this point of the thesis, there will be a short mention of elections as a fundamental function of democracy. The very definition of elections specifies the latter as a procedure for the filling of a public office or a position, via the choice of a competent body: the electorate\textsuperscript{178}. The relation of elections and democracy is tied and strong. More specifically, elections are a procedure where, if all democratic conditions apply, the outcome is a

\textsuperscript{175}For the first analysis 93.30\% of the results are explained on the first dimension. For the second hypothesis, 68.70\% are explained on the first dimension and 20.32\% on the second.
\textsuperscript{176}Table 20, p. 96
\textsuperscript{177}Table 21, p. 96
\textsuperscript{178}Heywood, Εισαγωγή στη Πολιτική, p. 588
formulation of the parliament and a government at a national level and a city/district council at a local level. Furthermore, democratic accountability is supposed to work through elections. The link between democracy and accountability passes via elections. More specifically, if the rulers are elected and if facing elections they anticipate the reactions of voters to the outcomes their policies have generated, then they will be accountable\textsuperscript{179}. Also, intellectuals have argued that democracy and elections are in tandem. The most concrete stipulation regarding that issue was by J. Schumpeter, "Democracy means only one thing, that the people have the chance to either accept or refuse the men, which will govern him"\textsuperscript{180}.

The main data for this analysis is sourced from pre and post electoral surveys. Also the time borders of this thesis are posed by elections. As mentioned from the beginning the electoral periods that are under examination are the 2009 and 2012 Parliamentary elections for Greece and the equivalent elections of 2009 and 2011 for Portugal. So, a short mention about those elections should be made in order to connect this part of the thesis with the theoretical frame. Also, due to the latest events\textsuperscript{181}, the 2014 Euro-elections shall be mentioned, as a remark of the general trend of the politics, the parties and the elections themselves.

To begin with Greece, in the time frame that this thesis is about, three rounds of elections occurred. The first one is on September of 2009; the other two are in the spring-summer of 2012. More specifically, the latter elections happened in two rounds with almost one month difference. That is because the first round of elections, in 6th of May, could not procure a stable government, since none of the competing parties gained the needed majority to form a government or come into an agreement for a coalition\textsuperscript{182}.

Chronologically the analysis starts with the elections of 4th of October of 2009. Those elections, in comparison with, the one of 2012 run smoothly. To elaborate with this argument, in these elections the results lead to the formulation of a government from the first round and its has to be underlined that the first party won more that the absolute majority of the parliamentary seats, 160 out of the 300. The results unveiled PASOK as the absolute winner with 43.93\% of the national votes, New Democracy as the runner up with 33.47\%, third and fourth the Greek Communist Party and Syriza with 7.54\% and 4.60\%, respectively\textsuperscript{183}. Regarding those elections, there has to be mentioned that the signs of the crisis were not yet

\textsuperscript{180}Heywood, Εισαγωγή στη Πολιτική, p. 321
\textsuperscript{181}The time that this part of the dissertation is composed, coincides with the 2014 European Elections.
\textsuperscript{182}Al Jazeera News: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2012/05/201256165643443598.html
\textsuperscript{183}Ministry of Internal Affairs Greece: http://ekloges-prev.singularlogic.eu/v2009/pages/index.html
that evident, and in the electoral campaigns of the two leading parties, there was reassurance that Greece has no major economic problems\textsuperscript{184}.

Continuing with the elections that happed in the "eye" of the crisis, it was mentioned several times in previous parts the economic situation of Greece through the period of 2009-2012 and the reasons that lead to premature election. In the elections of the 6th of May the electoral results, as aforementioned, were as such: New Democracy- 18.85\%, Syriza-16.78\%, Pasok- 13.18\%, Independent Greeks- 10.61\%, Greek Communist Party- 8.48\% Golden Dawn- 6.97\% and Democratic Left- 6.11\%.\textsuperscript{185} According to the Greek electoral law there is a procedure, where the party that came first will be given a chance to negotiate a government formation within three days. Failing that, the second largest party will be given the chance within the next three days, and if this attempt also fails the third ranked party will get a further three days to try and form a government. If none of the three largest parties can succeed in forming a government, the baton will be handed over to the president for a last neutral attempt. If the process fails, then another election will be called\textsuperscript{186}. Given those results and in combination with the above mentioned law, first was New Democracy, then Syriza and then Pasok, who tried to negotiate and form a government, but their attempts failed to make ends meet\textsuperscript{187},\textsuperscript{188},\textsuperscript{189},\textsuperscript{190}, thus proceeding to a second round of elections, on the 17th of June of 2012.

In the elections of June, the parties were clearly divided in two camps, the pro-EU (pro-bailout) and the anti-memorandum. In bold lines, in the first one there was New Democracy, PASOK and Democratic Left, in the second one, Syriza, Independents Greeks and in a way Golden Dawn and the Greek Communist Part were filled. At this point there is no need to mention the concerns that were raised internationally (economic) regarding the unstable political situation in Greece. Even though the results were comparatively better than the previous ones of May- New Democracy- 29.66, Syriza- 26.89, PASOK 12.28\%, Independent Greeks- 7.51\%, Golden Dawn- 6.92\%, Democratic Left 6.25\% and Greek Communist Party 4.50\%\textsuperscript{191} - still the first party did not have the necessary majority to form a government. Nevertheless, this time, it was plausible to form a coalition government with the


\textsuperscript{185}Ministry of Internal Affairs Greece: http://ekloges-prev.singularlogic.eu/v2012a/public/index.html#{"cls":"main","params":{}}

\textsuperscript{186}Article 37, paragraphs the 1st,2nd,3rd and 4th of the Greek Constitution, as it was formed in the 27th of May of 2008, by the 8th Revisionary Parliament of Greece


\textsuperscript{188}The Guardian: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/may/07/greece-leaders-coalition-antonis-samaras

\textsuperscript{189}Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/15/us-greece-idUSBRE84D07X20120515

\textsuperscript{190}Telegraph: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/9261386/Greece-fails-to-form-coalition-government-for-third-time.html

\textsuperscript{191}Ministry of Internal Affairs Greece: http://ekloges-prev.singularlogic.eu/v2012b/public/#{"cls":"main","params":{}}
parties in the pro-EU camp, thus leaving the runner-up party of Syriza as the official opposition\textsuperscript{192}. It was mentioned above, but it is significant to be re-mentioned, the changes in the map of Greek parties. As it is evident from the results, within three years the party of Syriza from the last party that passed the electoral threshold of 3\% in the elections of 2009, now is one of the key-player parties of the Greek political and party system, and the two main parties suffer from significant and underestimation of their images and power. Among the various reasons that this occurred, include the economic crisis. Their presence and role in the political scene, will be further discussed with the analysis of the results of the Euro-elections of 2014.

On the other end of the scale of the analysis is Portugal and the parliamentary elections that were held in 27th of September and 5th of June of 2009 and 2011\textsuperscript{193}, respectively. The two main competing parties in those elections are the PS and the PSD. Regarding the elections of 2009, the socialist party (PS) won the majority of the seats with 36.55\%\textsuperscript{194}, it has to be mentioned that despite the relative high percentage, the PS was unable to form a one party government thus forming a minority government\textsuperscript{195}. The background of the 2011 elections must be mentioned. To elaborate, when the PS tried to introduce the fourth wave of austerity measures the Portuguese government rejected it\textsuperscript{196}. After that, the collapse of the Socrates's minority government occurred on the 23rd of March of 2011\textsuperscript{197}. The president of Portugal after meeting with various parties to resolve the crisis announced the 2011 elections. The PS at the elections of 2011 decreased its appeal, by gathering 28\% and passing into the second position, thus the PSD, the former second party, had now gathered 38.6\% and came first\textsuperscript{198}. The PSD and the CDS-PP are now in office as a coalition\textsuperscript{199}. The electoral results are accepted as a punishment for governments that have the unlucky position to be in charge when crisis hit. Also, it has to be mentioned, that the current government are facing the pressure and the effects of the crisis, and their practices are highly unpopular to the countries’ citizens. The common thread that runs thought these cases is the resilience of democratic politics. The voters punish the leaders and the parties, not the regime. In politics it is called retrospective voting\textsuperscript{200}. A shot mention should be made for the Portuguese coalition of 2011.

\textsuperscript{192}Guardian: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/20/greek-samaras-coalition-pasok-bailout
\textsuperscript{193} Portugal held an early parliamentary election on Sunday, June 5, 2011, following the collapse of Prime Minister José Sócrates’ minority government last March 23. The election were scheduled earlier since
\textsuperscript{197}Election resources: http://electionresources.org/pl/index_en.html#SYSTEM
\textsuperscript{198}Election resources: http://electionresources.org/pl/assembly.php?election=2011
\textsuperscript{199}Guardian: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/05/pedro-passos-coelho-election-portugal?INTCMP=SRCH
\textsuperscript{200}Diamond, “Why democracies Survive”, p. 26
There were several attempts to reject this government, via a no-confidence vote but all the attempts up until now were futile. The latest no confidence notion was initiated by the PEV (Greens) in the summer of 2013\textsuperscript{201}.

A short mention about the Euro-elections must be made, the Euro-elections conducted in the 25th of May in both Greece and Portugal. The results were different in comparison with the results of the last parliamentary elections that were held in both countries. To begin with Portugal\textsuperscript{202}, the PS passed into the first place, by gaining the 31.47% of the votes, while in 2011 its figures were 28.05% for the parliament and 26.53% for the Euro-elections of 2009. In the second place there is the coalition of the PSD and CDS-PP, the latter gathered 27.71%. It is a rather decreased result for the party, which came first in the 2011 parliamentary elections, considering that it competed also in a coalition form. Regarding the 2014 results, third in results the "other" parties altogether concentrate 14.27%. The CDU, the MPT and the BE gather 12.67%, 7.14% and 4.56% respectively. In Greece\textsuperscript{203}, Syriza passed into the first place, whereas in the 2012 election was second, but it maintained almost the same percentage it had on 2012, around 26%. The reverse image was presented by New Democracy, which came second in the Euro-elections by gathering a 22.71%. This result is slightly decreased in comparison with the 2012 elections (29.66%) and significantly reduced in comparison with the 2009 Euro-elections (32.29%). The great looser of the elections is the Olive Tree(8.02%)\textsuperscript{204}. Not only reduced its percentages in comparison with 2012, but in comparison with the 2009 Euro elections (36.15) it lost over 3/4 of its power. The Golden Dawn, the River, the Communist Party and the Independent Greeks were placed third, fifth, sixth and seventh respectively. Nevertheless, a few remarks must be made for Greece, the first of which is, the Euro-elections did not change that much the scenery of Greek politics, since it was predictable that the two first parties will change places, and that the general trend. Secondly, some parties that emerged in 2012, in 2014 declined and reached low levels (Independent Greeks and Democratic Left). Thirdly, there is a concerning increase of the votes of the Golden Dawn. Fourthly, the fact that the Ecologist-Green party concentrated a really low percentage, whereas in 2009 it elected one MEP, means that the time for parties with post-materialist references was put aside. The emergence of the green parties in Europe was a sign of the "advanced" society, where after solving all their problems, they concentrated in post-materialistic ones. Since the crisis has deconstructed that idea, it is

\textsuperscript{204} Formerly known as PASOK. In the Euro-elections competed as a coalition of socialist parties.
natural that its representing parties would follow decline. Alas in the 2009 Euro-elections, the illusion of prosperity there was still evident. Finally, it is significant that a left party, within 5 years managed to climb into first place, all the way up from the bottom. The reasons for all of the above mentioned can be attributed to the factor of economic crisis.

Before ending this unit about elections, a final remark must be made about the turnouts. The latter are an interesting trend to observe. More specifically at the Euro-elections of 2014, in Greece the turnout reached a significant 58.2% and in Portugal 34.5%, whereas the EU28 average is 43.09%. Back in 2009, the turnout for Greece was standing around 52.61% and for Portugal 36.77%. The EU27 average was 43. The Greek turnout increased significantly from 2009 and it was almost fifteen points above the EU average. In Portugal, the image is inverted, since in both elections the turnout is lower than the EU average and in 2014 is also reduced in comparison with 2009.

Speaking of elections, this unit would not be complete unless there is a short mention about the electoral systems of the examined countries. The electoral system is an ensemble of rules that regulate the elections, meaning that the electoral systems are a mechanism which “translates” the voter’s votes into seats for the representative bodies. Their classification is quite complicated and many political scientist have tried to establish a classification scheme. The most predominant one is that which presented on “The New International IDEA Handbook”, published in 2005 and reprinted in 2008. According to that classification there are four main families and in those families are encompassed twelve types of electoral systems, but this thesis in not the place to fully analyze the electoral systems. Briefly the electoral systems of Greece and Portugal were reported in the introduction and they share a similar electoral system of proportional representation (PR) using D’Hondt method in the conversion of votes into seats, Greek electoral law is more disproportional than that of the Portuguese. Only the large parties can benefit from the supplementary seats (50), and according to electoral law only the winner party takes all, so proportionality is effectively decreased. Apart from this, there are no thresholds in Portuguese electoral law, while in Greek it is 3%. Moreover in Portugal there is a closed-list system, in which “voters merely choose between parties who present a list of candidates for all seats available in the district, and seats are attributed to candidates in proportion to voters obtained and in other established rules that regulate the elections, meaning that the electoral systems are a mechanism which “translates” the voter’s votes into seats for the representative bodies. Their classification is quite complicated and many political scientist have tried to establish a classification scheme. The most predominant one is that which presented on “The New International IDEA Handbook”, published in 2005 and reprinted in 2008. According to that classification there are four main families and in those families are encompassed twelve types of electoral systems, but this thesis in not the place to fully analyze the electoral systems. Briefly the electoral systems of Greece and Portugal were reported in the introduction and they share a similar electoral system of proportional representation (PR) using D’Hondt method in the conversion of votes into seats, Greek electoral law is more disproportional than that of the Portuguese. Only the large parties can benefit from the supplementary seats (50), and according to electoral law only the winner party takes all, so proportionality is effectively decreased. Apart from this, there are no thresholds in Portuguese electoral law, while in Greek it is 3%. Moreover in Portugal there is a closed-list system, in which “voters merely choose between parties who present a list of candidates for all seats available in the district, and seats are attributed to candidates in proportion to voters obtained and in other established
in the proposed list\textsuperscript{209}. In the case of Greece, voters vote with a cross of preference in the party’s ballot, choosing candidates instead of a party.

3.2.1- Statistics on the field of elections.

Regarding the elections, there are several questions that emerge, like whether the elections ensure that the views of the MPs reflect the views of the voters, if the goal of the electoral systems is to match as close as possible the votes with the parliamentary seats and if the current electoral system needs modification. Those questions are responded, by the Greek and the Portuguese candidates and the Portuguese voters, where applicable, also the answers are examined across time.

The first hypothesis that can be made here is that the Portuguese voters believe that the elections do not ensure that the views of the MPs reflect the views of the voters, while the Greek and the Portuguese MPs believe otherwise, across time. Before starting with the first hypothesis, there should be mentioned that the available answers to the question were: very well, fairly, not very well and not at all well. Indeed the Portuguese voters keep a rather negative opinion answering not very well and not at all, for 2009 and 2012, respectively. In other words, the Portuguese voters consider that the elections do not ensure that the views of the MPs reflect the views of the voters. On that issue the Portuguese candidates (both of the times) and the Greek ones believe that the elections fairly ensure that the MPs reflect the views of the voters. However, the Greek candidates in 2012 shift their opinion to not very well. With the 2012 stance of the Greek candidates, the hypothesis is partially proved\textsuperscript{210} The trend of those results is justified within the frame of crisis. More specifically, due to the severe measures imposed by the governments the voters feel that their voices cannot be heard by their representatives. Also, the representatives share their part of the blame, thus also believing that the elections do not always produce a reflection of the electorate. The analysis occurs in two dimensions, the first one accumulates 84.61% of the answers and the second 11.90% of the answers.

The above question is also examined under the perspective of party id\textsuperscript{211}. The Greek candidates, despite their party identification consider that elections do not ensure the views of the MPs reflect the views of the voters, while the Portuguese ones believe that the election ensure fairly that the views of MPs reflect the voter's opinion. To elaborate with the results, regarding the first hypothesis the results indicate that, despite the sample is in accordance with the hypothesis, the position of the PSD in 2009 is not. The latter believes that elections

\textsuperscript{209}Lobo, Pinto, Magalhaes, \textit{The Political Institutions of Portuguese Democracy}, p. 32
\textsuperscript{210}Table 22, p. 97
\textsuperscript{211}Table 23, p. 97
do not at all ensure the views of the MPs reflect the views of the voters, while the rest of the Portuguese sample located itself at "fairly"", thus partially verifying the hypothesis. In this question is evident that the party id is not the strong factor to analyze the question but the country. In other words, the national id dictates the way that the representation is seen and not the ideology. The majority of answers of the question are distributed in the two first dimensions, 84.52% and 12.94% respectively.

The question about the goals of the electoral system and more specifically, if the electoral system should match closely the votes with the seats or of the party with the most votes should take the most seats. The question is examined only within the Portuguese sample, both voters and prospective MPs. In that frame, the hypothesis assumes that all the sample support that the goal of the electoral system is to correspond proportionally the votes with the parliamentary seats. The analysis verifies that assumption to the full extent. Also it needs to be mentioned that across time, that opinion becomes even stronger with both the candidates and the voters, thus, making a statement that Portugal is in need of a more proportional electoral system. In order to examine that statement another question is taking into account that directly asks the Portuguese voters and the candidates if the electoral system needs modification. In this case, by walking into the footsteps of the previous question, the hypothesis supports that the sample is fully in favour of the modification of the electoral system. The results produced by the two-dimensional correspondence analysis can be considered rather contradicting. To elaborate, the voters in the first survey have a neutral position which in the second survey shifts to a totally positive one- from neither agree or disagree to strongly agree. On the contrary the prospective MPs hold a negative stance claiming that the electoral system does not need modification. Those stances can be justified within the current events frame. On the one hand the voters, due to the economic recession and the fact that they feel that their opinion is not reflected by the MPs, they shift their stance demanding a modification of the electoral system that is more proportional. On the other hand there are the candidates. The latter believe that their opinion fairly reflects the opinion of the voters and that the electoral systems' goal is to translate proportionally the votes into seats, but they do not support the idea that the electoral system needs modification. It can be understood that in period where the political balances are fragile and the formulation of a stable government is difficult, a potential modification of the electoral system could further disrupt the already fragile balances.

Table 24, p. 98

The first dimension carries 79.20% of the answers and the second dimension 20.42% of the explanations.

Table 25, p. 99
3.3- Governance.

This thesis is also covering two questions that are affiliated with governance. The first one is about the opinion regarding the issue of minority government and the other is about whether a coalition or a single member government is more preferable. Those two questions are considered current and emerged during the past years, since the elections, in the examined cases, stopped to produce parliaments which enjoy a full majority. The current events for both Greece and Portugal were exposed several times in previous pages. Thus, in this section there will be a simple statement of the theoretical frame behind those two issues.

To begin with the minority government. As in the questionnaire that this thesis is based upon, minority government is defined as governments that are in office and relies on less than the half of the votes of the members of the parliament. This definition is adequate, but it needs a further analysis of the theory of minority governments. To elaborate this theory, there is a strong relationship between the executive and the legislative branch in parliamentary democracies. The executive branch naturally is the government. There is accountability, between the legislative and the executive branch, whether there is or not a minority government. So, if the executive branch loses the confidence and the trust of the legislative branch, the former should resign. The main causes of the formulation of a minority government are: 1- political crisis and instability leads to the rise of minority governments, if the necessary majority is not found. 2- Political culture and heritage and 3- cleavage conflict and polarization. More specifically, the more polarized or divided the party system is the greater the likelihood of minority governments and, 4- proximate conditions such as a cabinet crisis. The latter cause of minority government is implicated, when all the available options are exhausted and there is no other available option. The first three reasons are associated with the structure and culture of the political system as a whole. According to Johnson, minority governments tend to be, weak and exposed to the risk of political defeat. Opportunism and occasional exploitation of power are among the cons of the minority governments.

The other issue is the coalition government, in other words, a government can either enjoy a full majority and be a single party government or, in cases where the election does not produce a majority, two or more parties can team up and formulate a coalition government. A coalition is a team of individuals or groups that unite for a common purpose. In many countries, such teams coalesce for the common purpose of running a government.

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215 CCS Questionnaire: question F2 (Portuguese questionnaire of 2012/13)
When this occurs, coalition members share the responsibility of converting a wide range of social demands into a manageable set of state-sanctioned activities\textsuperscript{217}. In order for a coalition government to maintain in office, it needs to satisfy two main requirements. More specifically, it needs to form and maintain agreements with the other parties, and secondly it needs to please the voters. Those requirements are a consequence of democratic competition. Parties must compete with each other for voter support, and at the same time they compete with each other for the legislative control\textsuperscript{218}. All these construct a maze of bargaining between the parties that form the coalition in order to remain in the team. On the bright side, coalitions offer the opportunity to share the power among the governmental stakeholders. The downside is that due to the aforementioned bargaining, coalition governments are unable to implement the needed radical policies that will eventually, "kick-start" recovery in times of economic recession\textsuperscript{219}. As recently proved by the events of Greece, coalition governments are unstable and fragile, especially when a tough policy needs to be implemented.

3.3.1- Statistics for the governance.

The theoretical framework would be incomplete without the support of the empirical analysis. Both the issues of minority governance and coalition governments are examined from an empirical perspective for the Portuguese sample, including both voters and candidates for the period of 2009-2012. Those questions are crucial since in 2009 and 2011 Portugal experience of a minority and a coalition government, respectively.

In order for a government to be stable and well consolidated it is more preferable, from both the voter and candidates, to be a single party government rather than a coalition, at all times. The results indicate rather contrasting scenery\textsuperscript{220}. On the side of the prospective MPs in 2009 they wanted a single party government, on the second survey they moved to the other side and preferred a coalition. For the voters the trend is reversed. More specifically, in the first survey they were in favor of a coalition and in the second survey they were in favor of a single party government. Taken into consideration, the elections that occurred in Portugal- as described in previous pages- in the elections that produced a minority government (2009) the candidates were in favor of a single party, the voters, though, preferred a coalition government. In the second election that occurred within the hotpot of the economic recession's manifestation, the voters shifted their opinion to single party government, thus showing that a one party government is more eligible to handle such a


\textsuperscript{218} Lupia, Strom, \textit{Coalition Governance theory: Bargaining electoral connections and the shadow of the future}, p. 4

\textsuperscript{219} Academia Education: http://www.academia.edu/4954609/The_Least_Worst_Option_The_Pros_and_Cons_of_Coalition_Government

\textsuperscript{220} Table 26, p. 99-100
delicate economic issue. On the other hand the candidates, on the second survey, support a coalition government. Therefore, the results might show that the candidates thought that a collective administration of the issue is preferable, to face the economic recession, since the previous minority government was incapable of managing the crisis.

Turning to the crucial issue of minority government, Portugal in the examined period, had an experience with the minority government of PS, where both the candidates and the voters, when they answered the question about the minority government they practically evaluated their experience. A minority government is not a preferable option by both the candidates and the voters in the second period while in 2009 it was a preferred option. The results indicate that the hypothesis is partially true\textsuperscript{221}. Indeed the Portuguese candidates and the voters in 2011 prefer a government that enjoys its own majority in the parliament. Thus in first survey, the candidates were in favor of a minority government but the voters did not share the same opinion. In retrospect, the stance of the responders in 2011 is fully consolidated, since the previous minority government failed to serve its purpose thus failing and causing an internal crisis. Interestingly enough, in 2009 the candidates were positive to the idea of a minority government. The minority government was formed and proved their expectation faulty. It would be interesting to observe those stances in the next elections and see how the Portuguese people would evaluate their experience with the coalition government and whether this experience would change their stance.

\textsuperscript{221} Table 27, p. 100-101
4- Citizen's participation and direct democracy.

The thematic of the final unit of this thesis is about citizens' participation. In loose terms it is about the opportunities that the citizens have to participate in politics and express their opinion and more specifically about the available options of direct democracy, like the referendum. The questions under analysis here are whether the citizens have ample opportunities to participate in political decisions, if a certain number of citizens should be able to initiate a referendum and referendums help to stimulate political interest. The extent of the variable analysis follows the theoretical framework.

4.1- Direct democracy and referendums.

In the unit about democracy there was mentioned the type of direct democracy which was inspired and applied in ancient Greece. To elaborate briefly with direct democracy it first appeared in ancient Greece, and more specifically in Athens. The meaning of the word democracy comes from the Greek word δημοκρατία (dimokratia), meaning rule of law (kratos) by the people (demos). It refers not to the election of the rulers by the ruled, but to the denial of any separation between the two of them. Moreover, it is a form of self-government. The Greek democracy was founded between 461 and 322 BC in the polis of Athens. Poleis were small independent political systems containing an urban core and a peripheral rural area with approximately 40000 citizens. The small amount of population was the basis of the application of direct democracy.222

Direct democracy is quite simple to explain. Any male citizen aged 20 and above had the right to participate to the assembly sessions, which were like city gatherings, in ekklesia(εκκλησία) and there they can address their peers. The assembly met around 40 times a year, and discussed all kinds of issues. Although the Athenian democracy seems like a utopian example, there were a few drawbacks that should be mentioned. First of all, citizenship was quite limited, meaning that, only males with both parents were themselves considered as citizens of Athens and could participate in the above mentioned institutions, thus excluding slaves, women and foreign people. Secondly, the participation was not as extended as is seems. Most of the citizens were absent from the assembly meetings. Moreover, Athenian democracy was very “expensive” to maintain. It was both time consuming, very complex and expensive for the small society it was applied to. Furthermore, the principle of self-government did not always lead to decisive and coherent policy due to lack of permanent bureaucracy. Also, this type of democracy was doomed to flourish in

poleis with bigger population, due to the bigger number of people who had to participate. However, despite all flaws, the Athenian democracy was a very fine example, showing that direct democracy is plausible in some conditions. Moreover, the Greeks introduced two basic political concepts, citizenship and democracy. Given the description, it is practically impossible to apply this model in the contemporary societies which, beside the fact that they are multitudinous they are highly globalised. The citizen's participation in politics, nowadays, is mostly indirect, meaning that they can participate in unions, syndicates, parties or groups to express their political opinion. From those positions, citizens can influence the course of politics but not decide directly on politics. The most direct act of citizen's participation is the referendum.

Referendum is a vote in which the electorate can express a view on a particular issue of public policy. It differs from an election; the latter is essentially a procedure to fill a public office and does not provide a direct or reliable method of influencing the content of policy. Thus the referendum is a method of direct democracy. It is not used to replace representative institutions, but to supplement them. Referendums can be either advisory or binding. The former just help to express the opinion of the citizens and raise issues of discussion, the latter is used to decide policy questions.

The advantages and the disadvantages of the referendum shall be discussed briefly. Their advantages include: checking up the power of the elected governments, ensuring that they stay in line with public opinion, promoting political participation, thus helping to create a more educated and better informed electorate, strengthening legitimacy by providing the public with a way of expressing their views about specific issues and providing means either of setting major constitutional questions, or of gauging public opinion on issues not raised in an election because major parties agree with them.

On the other hand, regarding the disadvantages of the referendums the list is shaped as such: referendums leave political decision in the hands of those who have the least experience and education on political matters and they are susceptible to the media and other influences, they provide, at best, only a snapshot of public opinion at one point in time. Also, they allow politicians to manipulate the political agenda and absolve themselves of responsibility for making difficult decisions. Finally, referendums tend to simplify and distort political issues, reducing them to question that have a yes/no answer.

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223 Hague, Harrop, *Comparative government and politics: an introduction*, p. 44-46
225 Heywood, *Politics*, p. 226
As stated earlier, the questions under analysis are about direct forms of democracy and how citizens can participate in politics. The questions are answered from both the prospective MPs and the voters (depending on the question). In reality referendums in Greece and Portugal are not that popular. To elaborate with this stance, in Greece, from the time democracy was consolidated in 1974 up until now, there was only one referendum. The latter was cast on the 8th of December in 1974 by K. Karamanlis and it was about the regime of the new founded democracy, whether the Greek citizenry wanted to have a king or not. The result was a massive 69.2% against the King and a 30.82% in favor of the King\textsuperscript{226}. Ever since, no other referendum has occurred in Greece. The only exception is the referendum that "never happened", but it acted as a catalyst to the Greek political life. It is about the announcement of intention of a referendum by G. Papandreou- at the time he was a prime minister- on the last days of October to November of 2011. That incident needs further analysis, because it caused the resignation of the prime minister, which opened the way to the 2012 elections. To elaborate further with the time frame of the incident, on the 27th of October the prime minister was returning from Brussels after a hard negotiation about the restructure of the Greek debt and a new program for the support of the Greek economy, of 172 billion Euros. That program was (mainly) founded by the taxpayers of the Euro zone, thus that money should be approved by the parliaments of the EU member states. The weekend of 29th and 30th of October, the prime minister, with a small group of his consultants, decided to ask for a referendum for the new 172 billion supporting program. On Monday the 31st, the prime minister announces his intentions to initiate a referendum, thus causing an international panic. On the 1st of November the Greek stock market along with those around the world counted significant losses. Within this panic, on the 2nd of November the prime minister is called immediately to Cannes, where he was asked to change the question of the referendum, whether or not the Greeks wanted to stay in Euro zone\textsuperscript{227}. The next day, on the 3rd, Papandreou called off the referendum\textsuperscript{228}. That decision caused a huge turbulence not only in the country and the international market but also within the core of governmental party. On the vote of confidence that was held Papandreou survived gathering the support from 153 of 300 MPs. However, the PM before the vote, pledged to step down and that he would seek for the formulation of a coalition government to deal with the new EU debt agreement\textsuperscript{229}. The rest of the events are known from the introductory narrative.

\textsuperscript{226}Eleftherotipia Newspaper: http://www.enet.gr/?imnews.el.article&id=322401
\textsuperscript{227}Kathimerini Newspaper: http://www.kathimerini.gr/771730/article/oikonomia/ellnikh-oikonomia/apoyh-to-dhmoyfisma-poy-den-egine
\textsuperscript{228}NY Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/04/world/europe/greek-leaders-split-on-euro-referendum.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
Regarding the case of Portugal three major referendums occurred after democracy was found. Two of them had to with the legalization of abortion and the other one was about the creation of administrative regions. The first ever referendum for the Portuguese republic was cast on the 28th of June in 1998 and it was about the decriminalization of the abortion during the first ten weeks of pregnancy. The result was in favor of "no" with a marginal victory (50.07% versus 48.28%). Thus nothing changed. A few months later another referendum occurred about the regionalization of the country. More specifically, it was a two-question referendum, the first question was about the agreement or not of the voters with the implementation of the administrative region, and the second question was about the agreement with the implementation of the administrative region in the area, where each voter lived. In both cases the answer was no with 68.87% and 63.93%. The latest referendum that was cast in Portugal happened in 2007. Practically it was a revote of the 1998 referendum regarding abortion. The new referendum was a promise from the new socialist party leader, Jose Socrates, if he would be elected prime minister. After succeeding in the election and a period of negotiations the referendum occurred on the 11th of February in 2007. The results were different from in comparison with the first time. The votes had shifted towards "yes", which gathered around 59.25% and "no" a 40.75%. The results showed that Portuguese society was more mature to face such a question, parties were more aware of the situation (since abortion was criminalized, there were many incidents of dangerous and illegal abortions) and the church softened her side.

To conclude with this unit, nowadays, in the examined countries, citizens' participation in politics is taking part mainly indirect rather than directly. The only direct way is the referendum, which as seen from the brief democratic period under examination are a rare phenomenon. On the other hand, indirect political participation is more widespread. More specifically, the citizens are expressing their political will in demonstrations, via their participation in unions, syndicates and organizations, and of course via their right to participate in elections either as candidates or as voters.

4.1.1- Statistics on citizens' participation and referendums.

Above there was a mention of the variables that are chosen to be analyzed. Also, there was the framework on the basis of the referendums on Greece and Portugal which allow
elaborating the context of the results. Both the candidate MPs and the voters of the examined countries agree that citizens have ample opportunities to participate in political decisions. The two-dimensional correspondence\textsuperscript{236} indicates that the prospective MPs from Greece and Portugal are in agreement with the stance, but the Portuguese voters support the opposite\textsuperscript{237}. While in the first survey they disagree with the stance, in the second survey their opinion deteriorated to strongly disagree. The results show a contradiction, on the one side there are the candidates who believe that the citizens can actively participate in political decisions, but on the other the voters believe the opposite. It can be explained that while the candidates as active members of the political world consider that the citizens participation in that world, the voters feel that they are not able to relate to that world due to the lack of opportunities in participation. The voters’ stance has moved in the second survey, probably due to the fact that in the period where the crisis was in manifestation they could not react to the austerity measurements.

As afore stated, referendum is a type of direct democracy. Thus it is essential to examine what the candidates and the voters believe about the initiation of referendums. The hypothesis on that case can be stipulated as such: Both the candidates MPs and the voters agree that a certain number of citizens can initiate a referendum, throughout the examined period. That hypothesis is partially verified though, since the Greek candidates and the Portuguese voters across time agree on the above stance, whereas the Portuguese candidates in 2009 appear to have a neutral position (either agree nor disagree) in the second survey which are placed close to disagree\textsuperscript{238}. This question is interesting to analyze in accordance with the party identification of the prospective MPs. More specifically, the right wing parties of Greece and Portugal (New Democracy and PSD) agree that a certain number of citizens can initiate a referendum, while the two socialist parties (PASOK and PS) hold a neutral position on the issue. The findings verify the hypothesis to the extent that the right wing parties, which across time are agreeing that a certain number of citizens can initiate a referendum. In the socialist camp things are different. More specifically, the candidates of PASOK, while in 2009 they strongly agree that a certain number of citizens can initiate a referendum, in 2012 shifted their opinion to a more neutral position\textsuperscript{239}. This stance can be explained by the incident of the referendum of 2011, where the PASOK leader withdrew his proposal about referendum, and is possible that ever since in combination with the economic

\textsuperscript{236}The first dimension explains 73.59% of the answers, and 18.17% is explained by the second dimension.

\textsuperscript{237}Table 28, p. 101

\textsuperscript{238}Table 29, p. 102

\textsuperscript{239}Table 30, p. 102
recession and the citizens' angst on the austerity measures, the idea on a citizens' initiated referendum could not be considered such a good idea at the time, hence and the neutral position. The Portuguese socialistic party disagreed with the stipulation at both of the examined periods. Once again, the correspondence analysis for the whole sample and the party id factor, are two dimensional. Regarding the first hypothesis even thought the first dimension gathers 94.68% of the answers, the rest are scattered in 3 more dimension thus, it is more useful to analyze it within two dimensions. The other hypothesis explains a 70.28% in the first dimension and a 22.15% on the second.

Also in the frame of referendums it is interesting to see whether the candidates believe the referendums help to stimulate political interest. The Greek and the Portuguese candidates agree that indeed the referendums help to stimulate political interest. The results of the analysis show that it is true across time and across countries. There are only the Portuguese candidates who in the first survey have a neutral stance but later it shift to the positive side. In general, as written on the theoretical frame, referendums give to the citizens the opportunity to be actively involved and express their opinion directly on political issues, without the need of representation. The final hypothesis is also unveiled in two dimensions. The first one explains 82.34% of the data and the second 16.50%

4.2- Party identification and voting behavior.

After a long statement about parties, democracy, representation, governance, electoral systems, citizens' participation and the contemporary political frame of the examined countries it is vital to examine the party identification and voting behavior. More specifically, this unit has to do with the way the citizens vote and how they choose their support towards a specific party.

To begin with voting behavior, the latter is clearly shaped from both short-termed and long-termed influences. The short-termed influences have to do mainly with the economy of the country before an election. If a voter is happy with the economic circumstances in his/her country, then it is more likely to vote again for the same party/ government. That is connected with the theories of clarity of responsibility, retrospective and future-oriented voting. To elaborate more on those theories, that of clarity of responsibility has to do with the issue of accountability regarding the economic performance of a government and was introduced by

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240 Table 31, p.103
241 This part of the thesis is also found in the paper "Comparing Greek and Portuguese prospective MPs' evaluation of democratic functioning through the period of crisis (2009-2012)", written by A. Konstantinidou and E. Kartsounidou, the paper was presented first in the conference of the Portuguese Association of Political Science in Coimbra between 14-16 of April of 2014.
Powell and Whitten\textsuperscript{242}. That theory is connected with the theories of retrospective evaluation and economic voting. The responsibility hypothesis, where “voters hold the government responsible for economic events”, constitutes a link between the economy and the vote\textsuperscript{243}. According to Powell and Whitten, national economic performance, especially in the period before an election, is a significant element in the voting decision, as the voter “assigns credit or blame to the incumbent government for that performance and the vote is shifted accordingly”\textsuperscript{244}. The assignment of responsibility “reflects the nature of policymaking in the society and the coherence and control the government can exert over that policy”\textsuperscript{245}. Therefore, the greater the control of policymaking by the government the more likely is the voter to assign responsibility for economic political outcomes to it.

The above-mentioned reasoning brings us back to 1966, when Key in \textit{The Responsible Electorate}, based on simple reward and punishment theory argued that an individual was likely to continue a behavior which had rewarded him/her and abandon a behavior which had not proved rewarding\textsuperscript{246}. That is to say, that voters look retrospectively at the success of governments and they reward or punish them for their decisions and outcomes. It follows then, that the higher the score a voter gives to a government or a party, the more likely he or she is to vote for it. According to Borre, “such result-oriented behavior might be even more sensible than voting on the stands of the government and opposition because it would be based on facts (results) rather than promises (goals)\textsuperscript{247}.

Alongside the retrospective evaluation, it is inevitable not to refer also to prospective or future-oriented voting, as the distinction between those two orientations is considered important mostly because of the credibility which is at stake: “People in general do not vote for parties which they suspect of making unrealistic and empty promises”\textsuperscript{248}. In our case, we are looking for available alternatives to reduce the economic impact of crisis. As mentioned above, voter assignment of responsibility to the government is a main link between economic performance and voting decision. The vote itself can be either retrospective or prospective using the perceived performance of the current government as a way to estimate its future performance\textsuperscript{249}. In general, prospective voting has an interactive relationship with

\begin{itemize}
\item Powell, Whitten, “A Cross-national analysis of economic voting: taking account of the political context”, p. 398
\item Powell, Whitten, “A Cross-national analysis of economic voting: taking account of the political context”, p. 398
\item Key V. O. Jr., \textit{The Responsible Electorate}, Vintage, New York, 1966
\item Borre O., Issue Voting, An Introduction, Aarhus University Press, Aarhus, 2001, p. 110
\item Borre, Issue Voting, An Introduction, p. 18
\end{itemize}
retrospective evaluation as the latter may be viewed as “one way of getting information on the issues of prospective politics on which the voter reacts according to the position model”\textsuperscript{250}.

Another short-term influence the voting behavior is the personality and the public image of the party leaders. This factor is considered important since the media of mass communication present the party leader as the trademark of the party. Counting other factors, the electoral campaigns and the polls of opinion are equally important. Also, the mass media of communication are considered as short-term factor of influence, because parties and party leaders tend to approach the media and promote their selves\textsuperscript{251}. Regarding the long-term influences on the voting behavior, like the social class, the family tradition, the party identification, ideology and the education.

Voting behavior theories occupy a large part of the electoral studies. There are many classification and typologies on that matter, however the theories of the sociological, psychosocial and the rational choice voting models are the most prevalent. Briefly there should be a short mention of those three models. Firstly the sociological model was primarily developed by Lazarsfeld in the 40s. That theory in short, states that the act of voting is an individual act and is affected mainly by the personality of the voter and his/her exposure to the media. However the media exposure in this case is of less significance, since the decision is influenced by the social groups in which the voter belongs, hence the model is called sociological model of voting behavior\textsuperscript{252}. The psychosocial model of behavior was developed during the late 40s to beginnings of the 50s (1948-1952) by Campbell and Kahn. The core of that theory is partisanship which was introduced by Campbell and his colleagues in 1960. The latter is described as a psychological affinity, stable and lasting relationship with a political party that does not necessarily translate into a concrete link, namely registration, or consistently voting and systematic militancy with this party. Partisanship was influenced by the concept of reference group by Hyman and Singer and has similarities with the anticipatory socialization introduced by Metro and Kitt to define situations in which individuals choose a reference group to which they do not belong and begin to act according to what they perceive as the rules of that group. According to these authors, partisanship is acquired through a socialization process, influenced by the values and the attitudes of the family, colleagues and peers. This emotional subject to their political party can be achieved with varying degrees of involvement. In this sense partisanship is a form of social

\textsuperscript{250}Borre, Issue Voting. An Introduction, p. 114
\textsuperscript{251}Heywood, Εισαγωγή στη Πολιτική, p 340
\textsuperscript{252}Antunes R., “Theoretical models of voting behaviour”, Exedra, 4, (2010), p.146
identification\textsuperscript{253}. Furthermore it has to be mentioned that the effect of partisanship on the vote varies considerably across elections, depending largely upon the nature of the candidate pairings and the extent to which current policy issues conflict or coincide with established party cleavages\textsuperscript{254}. The final model is about the rational choice, which was inspired by Antony Downs, who tried to explain voting behavior with economic parameters, supporting that if the assumption of rational choice can explain the market it can also explain voting behavior. The theory establishes an analogy where the voters are the consumers and the parties are the enterprises. Just as an enterprise wants to maximize the profits, so does a party wants to maximize its electoral profits. The model is based on three fundamental premises: 1- all decision, from both the voters and the parties, are rational, 2- the democratic political system implies a level of consistency that supports predictions about the consequences of decisions made by voters and political parties and 3- the democratic system assumes a level of uncertainty, sufficiently important to allow different options\textsuperscript{255}.

Party identification is the subsequent issue to analyze. The latter is defined as a sense of personal, affective attachment to a political party based on feeling of closeness to the social groups associated with the parties. More specifically, people decide which party (if any) they identify with based on how they feel about the social groups that belong to the party base. The above is translated as, social identification and partisan affect are the key conceptual attributes of party identification. Considering that parties are quite stable, the individual-level partisan identities should be stable over time in the minds of the voters. Furthermore, political principles are developed in the early adult life and are reinforced by the broader political culture; they should persist over time and lie beyond the influence of short-termed political forces\textsuperscript{256}.

Besides party identification, there is the party de-alignment. In a sense it is the opposite of party identification. More specifically, party de-alignment is the decrease of the degree that the voters support and identify with a party. As the voters’ lose the loyalty towards a party their voting behavior becomes more unstable, thus leading to the emergence of new parties that are hoping to absorb the iffy voters. The reasons that are causing the party de-alignment are numerous, the main reason, though, is the ever-growing disappointment of the voter towards the party(ies) that failed to respond to their expectations\textsuperscript{257}.

\textsuperscript{253} Antunes, “Theoretical models of voting behaviour”, p. 154
\textsuperscript{255} Antunes, “Theoretical models of voting behaviour”, p. 158
\textsuperscript{257} Heywood, Εστίαση στη Πολιτική, p. 339
5- Executive summary.

As it is insinuated by the title this thesis tries to estimate if there are any changes to the attitudes of the prospective MPs and the voters (where applicable), between 2009 to 2012 for Greece and Portugal, at the field of democracy and representation. The results of the examination indicate some changes in the aforementioned attitudes, but there are still some that have remained almost unchanged. This unit is focused to the overall examination of the results.

Starting with the functionality of democracy at both national and EU level, for both the candidates and the voters (where applicable). The attitudes at the first surveys are located between "enough" and "a little" satisfied for the sample. In the second survey the majority of the attitudes are downgraded to "a little" and "not at all" satisfied with the way democracy function in the national and EU level. Almost the same comments can one made for the same question but within the party perspective of the candidates. In terms of satisfaction with the way democracy works at national level, at the first survey the answers are located at "enough" and "a little", at the second the answers are shifted to "a little" satisfied. Noted, that the answers by the right-wing candidates are "a little" satisfied with the way democracy functions at national level. In terms of EU level in relation with the party identification of the responders, the analysis indicated that some attitudes downgraded, some upgraded and some remained unchanged. More specifically, the attitudes of the socialist candidates remained stable, the ones of the Greek right-wing candidates upgraded to "enough" from "a little", while the ones from the PSD remained unchanged. Overall, it can be commented that the attitudes got downgraded.

About representation, in terms of who the MPs primary represent, the candidates from both countries consider that representing their own voters in their constituency is not important at both times-with a small exception with the Portuguese candidates on the second survey. It is lesser of importance the representation of the nation's citizens, for both countries at all times. When the question is focusing if they represent their party voters in their constituency, the Greek candidates at both of the surveys consider it among their top 3 priority to represent (position 3), while the Portuguese candidates place themselves at 3 and 4, meaning that it not that important to represent their party voters in their constituency. Furthermore, for the Greek candidates it not important at both times not to represent all the citizens of their constituency, while at the same times for the Portuguese candidates it is important. For the Greek candidates it is most important, at both surveys, to represent their
party electorate at large. For the Portuguese candidates the latter is important only at the first survey, since the second survey indicates that it is not important. Finally, regarding representing members of social groups for the Greek prospective MPs is important to do it so, but for the Portuguese in lesser of importance. In general the attitudes towards representation remained stable. For the Greek candidates is important to represent their party electorate at large while for the Portuguese ones is most important to represent all the citizens of their constituency. Taken in consideration the party id of the candidates in terms of representing their party electorate at large and their nation's citizens, the results indicate that in the former issue the candidates from the two socialist parties and the Greek New democracy consider it important at both times, while the PSD consider the opposite at all times. As for the representation of the nation's citizens is lesser of importance for the Greek candidates despite party identification at both of eh surveys, while for the Portuguese ones, it is important at both times.

When examining the reaction of the candidates in various scenarios of parliamentary elections, there must be said that in the majority of the cases they follow their own opinion at all times, thus their stance remains the same. To elaborate, in the scenario where they have to choose, whether to follow the opinion of their constituency voters or the party guideline, the candidates respond that they will follow their voters' opinion, with the exception of the Greek candidates of 2012, who will follow their party guideline. In the other two scenarios, where they have to choose to vote between their own opinion or their voters' opinion, and between their own opinion or their party's guideline, they choose to vote according their own opinion, at both surveys.

In the section where the statistics focus on the party issues more or less the attitudes remained the same. More specifically, in the question that evaluated the parties as the essential linkages between the citizens and the state, at all times the prospective MPs hold a positive stance and the Portuguese voters shift their opinion from a neutral one to a negative one (disagree). When this question is examined in relation with the party id of the candidates, most of the candidates, despite their party id, hold a neutral position; the exceptions are the PASOK candidates of 2009 who tend to strongly disagree with the stipulation and the New Democracy candidates of 2012 who strongly agree with the stipulation. When examining the variables for intra-party democracy, the stances also stay stable at both times. In the cases, which examine whether the decision making process in the party is too top down and if the party leader is too powerful, the Greek candidates agree on the stipulations where the Portuguese candidates disagree. When those two issues are examined with the party
identification perspective, in general lines, the stance remain similar, despite party identification. More specifically, about whether the decision making process is too top-down, the PASOK and New Democracy candidates agree on the stipulation, following the general trend for Greece and the Portuguese candidates of PSD in the second survey disagree with the stance, the rest of the Portuguese candidates hold a neutral position. About, whether the party leader is too powerful or not, the New Democracy candidates (both at 2009 and 2012) and the ones of PASOK of 2009 follow the Greek general trend and agree with the stipulation. The PS and PSD candidates of the second survey disagree with the stipulation, thus following the Portuguese trend of the general sample, but the answers of PS and PSD candidates of the first survey are located more into a neutral stance (either agree nor disagree).

The questions that evaluate if the elections ensure that the views of the MPs reflect the views of the voters present a trend of deterioration for the general sample (Greek/Portuguese candidates and Portuguese voters). The Greek candidates and the Portuguese voters seem to believe that the election do not ensure that the views of the MPs reflect the views of the voters as time passes, the stances shifted from "fairly" to "not very well" and from "not very well" to "not at all", respectively. The Portuguese candidates hold a stable position to "fairly" at all times. When this question is examined under the light of party identification the image is rather liquid because each of examined party presents its own trend. More specifically, the opinion of the PASOK candidates deteriorate from "not very well" to "not at all", the opinion of the New Democracy candidates is ungraded from "not at all" to "not very well", the opinion of the PSD candidates is also upgraded from "not very well" to "fairly well" and the PS candidates remain stable at "fairly well".

Staying in the thematic of the elections two more issues are examined, the first one has to do with the goals of the electoral system and the second has to do with the modification of the electoral system. In this question only the Portuguese candidates and voters respond. For the first question all of the responders, across time, believe that that the goal of the electoral system is to match closely the votes with the parliamentary seat and not the party with the most votes to obtain more seats. As for the second issue, the Portuguese prospective MPs consider that the electoral system does not need modification at both of the surveys, but the Portuguese voters while on the first survey they were indifferent, on the second survey, they agree that the electoral system, indeed, needs modification.

On the thematic of governance, also two questions are examined, the one about whether a single party government or a coalition is more preferable, and the other is whether
a government needs its own parliamentary majority or not (opinion about the minority government). Both of the questions are examined for the Portuguese votes and prospective MPs. In the first question the finding are not stable and present a contradiction, since in the first survey the Portuguese candidates prefer a single party government and in the second survey prefer a coalition, the Portuguese voters prefer the exact opposite. About the second question, opinion about minority government, the Portuguese voters at all times and the Portuguese candidates of the second survey prefer a government that holds its own majority in the Parliament, while the Portuguese candidates of the first survey are in favor of a minority government.

The final groups of questions under examination have to do with citizen's participation and referendums. In the stipulation that citizens have ample opportunities to participate in political decisions, the attitudes remain unchanged, the Greek and the Portuguese candidates are agreeing that, indeed citizens have ample opportunities to participate in political decisions, while the Portuguese voters support the opposite. In the issue that a certain number of citizens can initiate a referendum, also the stances almost remain unchanged across time. Both the Greek candidates and the Portuguese votes agree on that stipulation, while the Portuguese candidates shift from neutrality to disagreement with the stance. When the same question is examined under the perspective of party identification, the results are stable most of the times across time. The New Democracy and the PSD candidates agree on the stipulation, the PS candidates disagree with the stipulation and the PASOK candidates, while on 2009 were in agreement in 2012 they hold a neutral stance. The last question examines if the referendums help to stimulate political interest. The stance of the Greek prospective MPs is stable, thus agreeing with the stipulation at all times. The stance of the Portuguese candidates change from neutrality (either agree not disagree) to agree throughout the examined period.

Taken into consideration the above descriptions, it is evident that some stances changes in the examined period due to the influence of the economic recession and the intra-country facts that occurred the examined period. But, a lot of the stances remained unchanged.
6- Conclusion.

In the previous units several facts and event about Greece and Portugal were laid out. More specifically, there was a brief historical analysis of the countries about their authoritarian regimes and the condition, under which the transition to democracy occurred. Furthermore, there was an analysis of the current situation of the examined countries during the period of the economic recession and the actions that were taken in order to control it. Also, the latest parliamentary elections were discussed, along with the 2014 European Elections. The political institutions and political functions of the countries were in the centre of the analysis. This thesis tries to estimate whether the attitudes of the prospective MPs and the voters made changes under the influence of the economic recession as the current political events have changed.

The verdict is almost affirmative, since it applies for most of the examined cases. In the previous unit there was a thorough examination of the results for all the research hypotheses that were examined. Indeed the impact of the economic crisis has shifted negatively the attitudes of the voters and the candidates in issues like their satisfaction with the democratic function at both national and EU level. Also, there is an evident downgrade of the role of the election, since the responders tend to believe that the election do not ensure that the views of the MPs reflect the views of the voters. But the strength of the democratic institutions in Greece and Portugal are well consolidated. For example the opinion of the responders regarding the place of parties as an intermediate link between the citizens and the state remains unchanged, thus showing that even parties and their representatives are blamed for the poor economic conditions and the austerity measures, they are still considered as a necessary democratic institution. A rather interesting finding regards the Portuguese candidates and voters about the minority governments. The sample after the failed experience of a minority government, their position shifted drastically between the two examined periods, from a pro stance to an anti stance. Finally, in terms of citizens' participation and direct democracy, the findings are very optimistic, since both sides encourage the citizens' initiatives in participation in politics.

Overall, both countries seem to show that the crisis has affected some aspects of the political life in general, but many things remain unchanged since they are deeply rooted in the political culture of their countries. For example the targets of representation, the way the MPs vote in parliamentary elections and the intra-party census do not appear significant differences from time to time. Also, party identification is another factor that needs to be
commented on. In most cases the party factors are of less significance, since the trend shows opinions are shared mainly within national border and not ideological. Of course there are some exceptions where the party identification plays a significant role, especially in issues like representation.

Concluding with this analysis, no general remarks can be made since the time frame is restricted to 2009-2012. Also, the phenomenon of the economic crisis is still under development and the true attitudes are still not apparent. Some time will probably be needed and more surveys and analyses to come in order to obtain a spherical image of the crises’ impact. This thesis just scratches the surface of events and initiates the beginning of a more analytical examination of the situation.
7- Appendix

At this area of the thesis, there are concentrated all the necessary tables from the data that was put under testing, in order to prove or discard the research hypotheses. The charts are placed in order of appearance as they were placed on the main structure of the thesis.

Table 1 - Satisfaction with democracy at national level - whole sample.

Table 2 - Satisfaction with democracy at EU level - whole sample.

Table 3 - Satisfaction with democracy at national level - party id.
Table 4- Satisfaction with democracy at EU level- party id.

Table 5- Who the MPs represent- own voter in the constituency- whole sample.

Table 6- Who the MPs represent- party voters in their constituency- whole sample.
Table 7- Who the MPs represent- all citizens in the constituency- whole sample.

Table 8- Who the MPs represent- the party electorate at large- whole sample.

Table 9- Who the MPs represent- members of social groups- whole sample.
Table 10- Who the MPs represent- all nations' citizens- whole sample.

Table 11- Who the MPs represent- the party electorate at large- party id.
Table 12- Who the MPs represent- the nation's citizens- party id.

Table 13- How to vote: How should an MP vote in Parliament, if the voters of the his/her constituency have a different opinion and the party takes a different stance- Greece/Potugal.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>gr9-How should an MP vote in the Parliament if the voters of the his/her constituency have a different opinion and the party takes a different stance</th>
<th>gr12-E4.1. How to vote if the voters of the MPs constituency have a different opinion from the party</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The MP must vote according to his/her party guideline</td>
<td>The MP should vote according to the opinion of his/her voters</td>
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<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The MP must vote according to his/her voters opinion</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
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Table 14- How should an MP vote if his/her opinion on an issue is not in compliance with the opinion of the voter in his/her constituency- Greece/Potugal.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>53</th>
<th>42</th>
<th>95</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>pt11-E4.1. How to vote if: the voters of the MPs constituency have a different opinion from the party</td>
<td>MP should vote according to his/her party's opinion</td>
<td>MP should vote according to his/her voters opinion</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>gr12E4.2. How to vote if: the MPs opinion does not correspond to the opinion of the voters of his/her constituency</td>
<td>The MP should vote in accordance with his/her opinion</td>
<td>The MP should vote in accordance with the voter's opinion</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>32</td>
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### Table 15 - How should an MP vote in the parliament if his/her opinion is not in compliance with the party guidelines - Greece/Portugal.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>pt11-E4.2</strong>. How to vote if: the MPs opinion does not correspond to the opinion of the voters of his/her constituency</td>
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<td>MP should vote according to his/her own opinion</td>
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<td>MP should vote according to the opinion of the voters in his/her constituency</td>
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<tr>
<td>The MP should vote in accordance with this/her opinion</td>
<td>The MP should vote in accordance with the party’s opinion</td>
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<td>The MP must vote according to his/ her opinion</td>
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<td>The MP must vote according to his/her party opinion</td>
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<td>17</td>
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Table 16- Parties are the essential linkage between the citizen and the state- whole sample.
17- Parties are the essential linkage between the citizens and the state- party id.

18- Decision making processes in the party are too top-down, and the grassroots cannot be heard- whole sample.
19- Decision making processes in the party are too top-down, and the grassroots cannot be heard- party id.
20- The party leader is too powerful- whole sample.

21- The party leader is too powerful- party id.
Table 22: Election ensure that the views of the MPs reflect the views of the voters - whole sample.

Table 23: Election ensure that the views of the MPs reflect the views of the voters - party id.
The preferred goals of the electoral system- Portuguese voters and candidate MPs.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>c12F3. Political goal preferred for the electoral system</th>
<th>Party proportions in votes and seats should closely match</th>
<th>The party which obtains the most votes should surely receive more than half of the seats in parliament</th>
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<td>The party which obtains the most votes should surely receive more than half of the seats in parliament</td>
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<th>v12I.28. Objectivos Políticos</th>
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<tr>
<td>As proporções entre os votos nos partidos e os respectivos lugares no Parlamento devem ser semelhantes (...)</td>
<td>O partido que obtém mais votos deve receber sempre mais de metade dos lugares no Parlamento (...)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As proporções entre votos nos partidos e lugares no</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O partido que obtém mais votos deve receber mais de metade</td>
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<td>484</td>
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25- The electoral system needs modification - Portuguese voters and candidate MPs.

26- What is more preferable: a single party government or a coalition? - Portuguese voters and candidate MPs.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>c9CS_GCS.D1. Preference A government made up of a single party government or a coalition government</th>
<th>c12F1. Preference for a single-party government or a coalition government</th>
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<td>A government made up of a single party</td>
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<td>48</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>88</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Governo formado por um único partido</td>
<td>Governo de coligação</td>
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<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
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<td>v8Pref_governo</td>
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27- Opinion about minority government- Portuguese voters and candidate MPs.

<table>
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<th>c12F2. Opinion about the minority government</th>
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<tr>
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<td>A government needs its own majority in parliament</td>
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<td>An own majority in parliament is less important</td>
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<td>Opinion about the minority</td>
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<table>
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<th>v12I.27. Opinião do Governo Minoritário</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>O Governo necessita de uma maioria própria no Parlamento, seja ela formada por um só partido ou por mais do que um.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uma maioria própria no Parlamento é menos importante.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</table>
Table 28- Citizens have ample opportunities to participate in political decisions- whole sample.
Table 29- A certain number of citizens should be able to initiate a referendum- whole sample.

30- A certain number of citizens should be able to initiate a referendum- party id.
31- Referendums help to stimulate political interest- whole sample.
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