Opportunities, Challenges and Limits of European Journalism

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Abstract

Low public participation, absence of strong mechanisms of exercising control to the EU authority and the fact that EU political leaders do not regard it necessary to justify their decisions to the people “compose” the core body of arguments supporting the existence of democratic deficit in the EU. It is suggested that the emergence of European Public Sphere sounds as the only solution to overcome this problem. European Public Sphere could emerge by two ways: a) as a pan European Public Sphere independent of individual states and b) as a European Public Sphere emerging from the Europeanization of national public spheres via the Europeanization of the context of national media. Journalism contributes to the Europeanization by using European rather national filters when reporting on EU issues and presenting the EU news as matters of common concern; this is called European Journalism. Thus, in the present essay there has been made an effort to present with a simple –but not simplistic– way the views regarding the EU legitimacy deficit, to investigate the emergence of European public sphere and underline the significance of media in the construction of such a sphere. In order to find out if European journalism and by extent European mentality has been established or not, I conducted comparative newspapers’ research examining if the Brexit referendum is covered from European or national perspective in the British and Greek press.

Key words: democratic deficit; European public sphere; identity; media; European journalism.
Introduction

After World War II and the catastrophe it caused, European politicians determined that they should create an alliance which would prevent future conflicts among the countries of Europe. Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman had the inspiration to tie countries and especially France and Germany together by forging closer industrial and economic cooperation. The European Steel and Coal Community was the first step to the unity of European countries. Later, the Treaty of Rome in 1957 established a common market, meaning a market without charging custom duties in the trade between the members of the Community. From that point, the character of the entity changed from bulwark preventing a future war to an organization aiming to the boost of economy of its members. Consequently, more and more European countries were wishing to be part of this entity and this led to the Maastricht Treaty (1992) which opened the way to political integration, established European Union, introduced European citizenship, launched economic and monetary union and in general aimed to even closer cooperation among the countries which wanted to be part of this entity. The pick of the whole idea of the European Union is signing the Lisbon Treaty (2007) which amends the two treaties forming the constitutional basis of the EU, Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty of Rome. During this process of formation of the organization, Member States have conferred a number of state competencies and responsibilities to EU without the previous direct consensus of the citizens.

European Union has never been a static organization and is the result of a gradual integration process; in the beginning the integration project had economic character and later political. European Union is a unique organizational hybrid (Zweifel, 2003); as Wallace (1983) stated it is less than a federation, more than a regime. More precisely European Union is not a nation-state neither just an international organization; as Delors (cited in Schmitter, 1996) characterized it, is an unidentified political object. Indeed, European Union has moved beyond any international organization; it evolved from an intergovernmental treaty to an increasingly unified entity with many features of a state: currency, flag, territory, central bank, executive, legislature and court. However, compared to national states, EU has more decision-making centers, less authoritative control over its territory (Peterson 1995).
All these years till recently the Union due to the fact that economic growth was achieved, security and peace were established enjoyed the acceptance of its authority by the majority of the citizens who were in favor of the institution. Nevertheless, we should not oversee that there have been various moments in EU’s history where citizens showed their disapproval regarding European integration project; Danish rejected the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, Irish said “no” to the Nice Treaty in 2001, in 2005 Dutch and French said “no” to the Constitutional Treaty and the Irish rejected the Reform Treaty in 2008. The big wave of mistrust to the European Union came out of the closet when the economic crisis broke out, it increased because of the migration crisis and its pick was the recent referendum (2016) which took place in the UK regarding the membership of the later in EU. The legitimacy of the EU especially now- after the referendum’s results were announced- is irreversibly called into question. Merely, all these rejections are due to the failure of political leaders to communicate with citizens, present the benefits of EU actions and institutions and convince them about the European integration project. The way all the common European problems (financial crisis, migration crisis etc) are communicated to the public plays a crucial role in the formation of citizens’ opinion regarding the ability of EU to protect them. The majority of citizens treat European Union as an enemy threatening their national benefits and they feel separated both from the institution and from the other member states also. In general, there is a deep split between the elites and the citizens in reference to the EU because of the existence of a communication deficit at EU level. Although, public discourse between citizens and European representatives is condition sine qua non for the democratic decision making in European Union level, EU’s political actors fail to call European citizens to a public discourse where policies are debated, explained and justified to the people. Consequently, the underdevelopment of an arena of exchange of ideas between citizens and EU (the assumed absence of a European public sphere) leads to the so called democratic deficit of European Union. Questions like “Are EU institutions democratic?” or “Does EU work as a democracy in its policy-making processes?” pop out stressing out the dispute about the democratic or not character of the Union and questioning its authority.
It is well common that the existence of a European public sphere contributes to the democratization and legitimization of the EU. Furthermore, in the emergence of a European public sphere, the role of the mass media is pivotal as they are used as tool for the exchange of information and ideas. Indeed, the academic interest in European Journalism and its relationship to the development of a European public sphere started to grow during the 2000s. As Ornebring (2009) pointed out this particular surge of interest was influenced by both the increase of interest in comparative studies of journalism in general and by the increased interest which EU institutions have in the role of mediated communication.

This paper attempts to a) explore the nature and the problems, examine the theoretical debate, analyze the empirical research results regarding the role of the media in the emergence of a European public sphere and assess the ways in which the media could contribute to the decline of the EU democratic deficit b) to define what European journalism is and to explain how and why EU news coverage is still characterized by its persistence in national logic.

The structure of the paper is as follows: First, I outline the theoretical framework based on the literature on the so called democratic deficit in the EU and its relationship on the one hand with European collective identity and on the other hand with the assumed absence of European Public Sphere and then I present previous research regarding the Europeanization of national public spheres through media. Following, I introduce the methodology and the data of the research which I have conducted about the coverage of Brexit referendum in three Greek newspapers. Subsequently, I present and comment the results of the analysis. Finally, I present the conclusions.
Chapter One: EU legitimacy deficit as impediment to European integration project

The birth of the idea of Europe went hand in hand with the emergence of the first schemes for European integration. Indeed, the conception of Europe as a distinct entity presupposed or implied a potential basis for European cohesion and integration. Integration means different things to different people; for Europe's bankers it may represents the return to the Europe of cosmopolitan capital cities, relatively free trade and unrestricted travel, for European-minded socialists and technocrats may represent an opportunity to build on a scale that would transcend national boundaries (Bideleux, 1996).

Some writers define European integration as condition and others as a process. For example, Deutsch (1957) suggests that integration refers to the probability that conflicts will be resolved without violence. According to Lindberg’s view (1963), integration is the process whereby nations seek to make joint decisions (interdependence) or to delegate the decision making process to new central organs and the national political actors shift their political actions and expectations to a new center. Furthermore, Haas (1976) points out that political integration should be considered as process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the preexisting national states and the result of this process is a new political community superimposed over the existing ones.

In general, the two most important integration theories are intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism; the first relies on the assumptions based on the pursuit of state interests and implies that member states are more important to the Union than the EU institutions themselves, while the second theory relies on conceptualizing the interests of participating actors and the end result of political integration's process is a new
political community superimposed over the preexisting ones (Miles et al, 1995). Eriksen and Fossum (2002) on the other hand, distinguish three types of integration: a) integration through functional adaptation b) integration through interest-accommodation and c) integration through deliberation (convincing opponents of the correct course of action) and they further suggest that a viable public sphere is an essential prerequisite for the third mode of integration because it forces the decision makers to justify the decisions to the ones affected by them.

At this point, we should underline that the integration is multilevel; political, economic, social. In fact, the biggest steps forward have been done in the economic level where the integration is more feasible and visible. On the contrary, the slowest progress has been noted at social-cultural integration terms, merely because the whole project was based on bureaucratic elite’s decisions rather was based on citizens’ participation, thus in the mind of citizens the process lacks consensus and by extent legitimacy. As Trenz (2013) puts it, the advance of taking political decisions in a supranational level was not followed by a parallel effort of achieving socio-cultural integration. Hoffman (1966), extended this idea and analyzing the paradox of European integration explained that parallel to European integration, in low politics, the nation State, national civilizations and all other national domains that construct the political anthropology not only remained intact but also were owing to the benefits of economic cooperation strengthened.

The slow development of socio-political integration could be accounted to the fact that citizens question the legitimacy of the EU decision-making authority and indeed the so-called democratic deficit is the cause and simultaneously the result of the low levels of integration as democracy demands active participation in integration process. At this part, the main issue regarding democratic deficit in the EU arises and its connection with the slow integration process becomes clear. Before, however, delineating the existing theories about democratic deficit in the EU, I will try to explain which political system is considered democratic.

The word democracy derives from the word “demos” which refers to the entire electorate body and “kratos” meaning rule. At a glance, democracy is the system where the citizens participate in governance with multiple ways. In particular, there
are some essential requirements for a political system to be considered as democratic: 1) a demos, 2) institutionally established procedures that regulate, 3) equal citizen participation in an electoral mechanism where citizens’ preferences determine the outcomes, 4) an effective legislative body filled directly or indirectly by free, fair and competitive elections, 5) an executive body (government) authorized by demos, 6) decisions corresponding to the interests of demos and 7) an accountable executive body responsible to demos (Avarez et al. 1996; Follesdal & Hix, 2006; Lord 1998, as cited in Yalcin 2014). In fact, referring to the EU we are able to recognize multiple points of EU’s legitimacy; Lord and Magnette (2004), introduce their “vectors” of legitimacy which are a) indirect (EU’s legitimacy is a derivative of its member states’ legitimacy, its respect for their sovereignty and its ability to serve its member states) b) parliamentary (EU’s chief source of legitimacy is a combination of a directly elected parliamentary body and the member states’ representation in the Council), c) technocratic and d) procedural legitimacy (which refers to transparency, proportionality, legal certainty and the consultation of stakeholders in the decision-making process). Heretier (2003), introduces as elements of democratic legitimacy in the EU: a) parliamentary representation, b) executive representation in the Council of Ministers, c) mutual control among member states d) associative and expert representation in policy networks and e) individual rights-based legitimacy. In any case when we characterize a political system as democratic we accept that it respects at least the principles of access and participation of citizens in decision making, representativeness, transparency and accountability of political actors and the EU could not be an exception from this general “rule”.

Although EU is based on democratic elements of governance as described above, it often created doubts and fails to inspire trust to citizens because of its unique character which significantly differs from the dominant state-model of democracy. Moreover, the increasing effect of EU policies in the lives of European citizens has been nowadays more than ever been realized by the people especially because of the various crises EU faces (migration, financial) and the strict response measures taken by EU. This “new” reality and the fact that the abovementioned democratic elements are not so easily visible in the complex architecture of the EU lead people to the questioning of the institution’s legitimacy. When the first difficulties appeared European citizens begun to dream their “return” to the nation-State before even the
realization of European vision has taken place. Although the European Union was found on the basis of democracy – as perceived and practiced within nation-States – it is often questioned regarding its democratic legitimacy and whether it complies with the abovementioned characteristics. This highly controversial issue of democratic deficit of the EU divides scholars in two camps; those who argue that the EU lacks democratic legitimization and those who support that the Union is already “enough” and fully democratic.

**Analysis and theories on EU democratic deficit**

The term democratic deficit in the EU was first coined by David Marquand in 1979 in his book “Parliament for Europe” and as defined in Eur-Lex is a term used by people who argue that the EU institutions and their decision-making procedures seem inaccessible to the ordinary citizen due to their complexity and suffer from a lack of democracy. Thus, the democratic deficit in European Union has to do with the fact that EU citizens do not feel they influence EU policy and consequently they do not find it legitimate.

Some authors like Fritz Scharpf (1970), divide democratic legitimacy into output, judged in terms of the effectiveness of the EU’s policy outcomes for the people, and input, judged in terms of the EU’s responsiveness to citizen concerns because of participation by the people. On the other hand, the majority of authors recognize two dimensions of democratic deficit; a) institutional – structural (lack of accountability, weak European Parliament, non-elected decision making institutions, lack of proper control over EU institutions) and b) socio-psychological (Chryshchoou, Stavridis & Tsinisizelis 1998 as cited in Yancin 2014) which is related to the absence of European demos and citizens’ perspective regarding the sense of having common shared interests, problems and future and that they can impact on the EU relationship between governors and governed. Finally, Jakubowicz et al (2011) argue that there are five different and interrelated deficits in the EU which are related to communicative processes, mass media and public opinion: 1) media deficit which has to do with the limited representation of European project in issue agendas, information provision and content of media organizations in national media systems, 2) communication deficit meaning that representatives of EU seem to be incapable to explain, justify and
promote EU policies to the citizens, 3) media policy deficit, 4) democratic deficit referring to gap between decision making powers and participation of the citizens, and 5) identity deficit, all of which contribute to the legitimacy deficit. This view is closer to the perception of the author of this dissertation about the EU deficit and thus it will be analyzed further down.

As noted above there is no unanimity among scholars regarding the democratic legitimacy of the EU. In particular, there are three groups of scholars supporting either the existence or not of democratic deficit in the EU. The first group claims that we cannot compare the nation-State model of democracy to that implemented in the unique system of governance in EU. Thus, we cannot measure the democratic legitimacy of the EU using the criteria applied in nation-State democracy to define if EU lacks it or not. The second group underlines that even Member States suffer democratic deficit and one cannot find complete fulfillment of democratic requirements as the perfect democracy is ideal. Therefore, the EU cannot be an exception in terms of lacking full compliance with democratic standards; democratic deficit is acceptable and expected. Finally, the third view followed by the majority of scholars supports that EU indeed lacks democratic legitimacy.

\textit{a. Perception of “democracy” in EU and in nation-States}

According to the first view, the unique character of the institution makes it difficult to apply the usual democratic standards and mechanisms applied in nation-states. The basic principles of democracy such as representativeness, accountability, participation of the citizens exist at European level but are less visible due to the size and character of this supranational organization. Although, European Union is like any other democratic organization of government with three separate branches of government— the legislature, the executive and the judiciary (Barnes et al, 1995), it is certainly not a nation-State and therefore it should not be compared to the democratic deficit found in nation-States.

Indeed, it seems that the democratic structures of the Member States cannot be implemented at EU level of democracy. The question is whether the nation-state democratic model is appropriate for being the criterion for democratic decision
making beyond nation-states. Since the EU is sui generis, it has its own understanding of democracy which is does not conform exactly to the classic nation-state democratic formation. Majone (1993, 1999, 2002, 2004) supports also this argument and rejects many democratic deficit claims stressing that the analogy with national institutions is false because a) of the sui generis institutional architecture of the Community and b) the standards of legitimacy and accountability which cannot be directly applied to a system of limited competences and resources such as the EU. Another parameter we should take also into consideration is that national parliaments and the European Parliament differ within the scope of the structure, election and wielded entitlements (Zakewsk et al, 2013). Thus, it is difficult to compare in terms of legitimacy the two different kinds of parliaments and decide on the issue of EU democratic legitimacy.

Moravcsik, on the other hand, (2007), argues there is no democratic and legitimization deficit in EU as national governments are elected by the electorate at national level and therefore have the competence and the mandate for making decisions on behalf of their electorates.

b. “Mythic” dimension of democracy

The group of scholars claiming that the EU is as democratic as it needs to be, supports that the democratic characteristics of the EU should not be compared in the light of requirements for an ideal parliamentary democracy which no modern state can meet (Yancin,2014). Actually, history has shown that democracy continuously evolves; representative democracy took the place of Athenian direct democracy showing that the democratic system of governance continuously advances and is adjusted to the sociological, cultural and economic factors of each era and of each locus. Although, its core characteristics remain the same, its practice and form have a fluid than a compact character and therefore we could never reach the ideal state of democracy.

In general, it is accepted by many scholars (Zweifel 2002, Crombez 2003, Moravcsik 2002) that there is not a per se democratic deficit in the EU and that the deficit does not vary significantly from the democratic deficit existing at member states level as democracy all over the democratic nations suffers deficiencies and is far away from
the ideal democratic model. Zweiffel (2002) conducted a study comparing the EU, Switzerland and the USA on a number of democracy scales and he found that the EU does not deviate significantly from the other two cases he examined. Democracy is not a static situation but a perpetual process of establishing a system where the ideal could meet the continuously changing socio-economic conditions; however, this pursuit of ideal democracy is unsuccessful both within the nation state and further within the EU.

c. Democratic Deficit

According to Schmidt (2003), there is compelling evidence that citizens in EU member states have become increasingly aware of how much of an impact EU legislation has on their everyday lives, and that they consider the EU to be secretive, remote, unintelligible and unaccountable. Briefly, the EU seems distant for three reasons. First of all geographically, as the centers of decision-making are located mainly in Brussels. EU citizens do not feel part of what is “going on”, affects them and takes place to another country. Moreover, the technocratic language used by the EU leaders is difficultly understood by the majority of citizens; EU representatives mainly refer to complicated issues briefly using technical terms, without giving further explanations or without “having time to answer to more questions”. Finally, there is “emotional” distance between governors and governed as the later do not understand and therefore accept and recognize the EU authority and simultaneously the EU leaders do not behave as being accountable to EU citizens. For those reasons it seems that the citizens are discouraged to participate in the decision-making processes and the EU integration project.

Much ink has been spilled for the causes of the absence of democratic legitimacy in the EU. Generally speaking, low public participation, absence of strong mechanisms of exercising control to the EU authority and the fact that EU political leaders do not regard it necessary to justify their decisions to the people “compose” the core body of arguments supporting the existence of democratic deficit in the EU and they will be analyzed further down by reviewing the relevant literature.

Azman (2011) argues that here are three main arguments which support the idea of democratic deficit in the EU; a) the “loss of democratic control via the EU “vertical”
argument, b) the “horizontal” argument which draws on the fact that “European Parliament has too little power with respect to domestic systems” and c) the “no demos” argument according to which EU lacks democratic legitimization because there is no demos. There are many scholars following the same approach. Furthermore, according to Follesdal and Hix (2006), the standard version of democratic deficit includes the following five claims: a) the EU executive power has been increased while the national parliamentary control has been decreased, b) the role of European parliament is weak, c) European elections are second order national contests, d) the EU is distant from voters and e) EU policy outcomes are more in the interest of the owners of capital because of private interest groups do not have to compete with democratic party politics.

Moravcsik (2002), explains the existence of the democratic deficit in aspect of the characteristics of the institutions; the European Parliament is the only direct elected body mainly on the basis of national issues, the Commission is perceived as technocracy, he further finds the European Court of Justice unusually powerful and the Council of Ministers only indirectly accountable. Moravesik’s view – who finds that the structure of decision-making institutions is part of the democratic deficit problem, is adopted by many other scholars. The majority of issues of great importance (except taxation, security etc) are regulated at EU level. The EU takes initiatives for law-making and thus a big portion of legislature power has been transferred from nation-States to the Union. This is described by Azman (2011) as Europeanization of policy making. However, the complex architecture of EU discourages average citizen to understand the way and the reason why the political decisions are made. Citizens are unwilling to pool national sovereignty to an institution its complex function cannot understand. It seems that opposite to their will and belief to their idea of Nation-State, EU is trying to highjack national state’s competencies. This fog covering the issue of sovereignty creates a bigger gap between EU and the citizens. Moreover, the foundation of the EU and agreement for pooling competences which belong to nation-States to a supranational entity was made by political elite and did not constitute a demand of and a necessity for citizens. This “theory” is confirmed by a study conducted by Rosenthal on decision making in the early years of the European Economic Community following Allison’s competing models of decision making and he distinguished: a) intergovernmentalism –member
states control decision making-, b) pressure politics –decisions determined by grass roots, interest group and parliamentary pressures and c) elite networks. According to Rosenthal the elite networks model which describes decisions as product of subtle, behind the scenes lobbying dominates. The function of the EU seems to be a process of “taking decisions for us without us”.

What else it is supported by the authors following the “put the blame on institutions’ structure approach” is that they find the role of European Parliament underestimated. As the majority of laws adopted are directly binding for EU citizens, citizens should be able to scrutinize the decisions made by EU institutions through their representatives in the European Parliament in order to feel that EU is a democratic “organization” and not an elite’s club. More precisely, the federalist view maintains that as legitimacy rests first and foremost upon European citizens the European Parliament is the main legitimizing source of the EU system. Therefore the democratic deficit of the European Union is mainly caused by the undervalued role of the EP, the democratic element of representation (Diedrichs & Wessel 1997). Decisions are mostly made at EU Commission level meaning that the decisions are made by the governments (executive power) and less by EU citizens’ representatives. Although, the Commission and the Council of Ministers are the ultimate decision-makers having both legislature and executive competences, the Commission does not enjoy democratic credentials as it is not an elected institution and its work lacks transparency. Therefore, the powers conferred by the member states are exercised by other institutions than the elected European Parliament resulting to decisions which are reached by experts, not accountable to elected representatives and laws which are passed without due hearings and with little transparency and publicity- it is an elite game (Middlemas, 1995). It is crucial, that elected representatives would have to be able to exercise control over international bureaucracies (including EU) just as effectively as in (most) democratic countries (Dahl 1999) as this is the essence of democracy. On the other hand, strengthening the European Parliament should not be the only way to fill the democratic gap as that could result according to Abromeit (2002), to alliances of dominant groups and marginalization of minorities not fulfilling the minimum requirements for democratic legitimacy, those of accessibility and participation.
Even the complex structure- “character” of the institution which deepens the chasm between EU and its people could be diminished and by extent democratic deficit would be reduced if a European public sphere would emerge and a European collective identity would be adopted by EU people. In my personal view these two factors – absence of a strong European public sphere and lack of European collective identity- are the main factor which cause the so called democratic deficit. Thus I will attempt to shed light on them further down.

4. *European identity and the no-demos thesis*

Another issue which accompanies the problem of democratic deficit is that of the concept of European identity. People in this complicated and innovative system of governance should identify themselves to other people from other member states living beyond their national borders; identification seems important for supporting the integration project. As Deirdre (2003) puts it, this does not imply a cultural 'harmonization' but rather a growing understanding of the cultural and political traditions that are shared between Europeans.

Indeed it has been alleged that one reason why the European public sphere has not been yet established and by extent the democratic deficit has not been reduced is the lack of European demos and the failure of EU politicians and media to contribute to the construction of European identity. According to Cederman’s (2001) definition, a demos is “a group of people, the majority of whom feel sufficiently connected to each other to voluntarily commit to a democratic discourse and to a related decision-making process”. The no demos thesis was stressed at Maastricht decision of the German Constitutional Court (Bundesvefassunggerich case). The decision holds inter alia that “turning to Europe, it is argued as a matter of empirical observation, based on these organic cultural -national criteria, that there is no European demos - not a people not a nation. Neither the subjective element (the sense of shared collective identity and loyalty) nor the objective conditions which could produce these (the kind of homogeneity of the organic national-cultural conditions on which peoplehood depend) exist. Long term peaceful relations with thickening economic and social intercourse should not be confused with the bonds of peoplehood and nationality
forged by language, history, ethnicity and all the rest. The "soft" version of the Court itself is the not yet version: Although there is no demos now the possibility for the future is not precluded a-priori”. The argument of the no- demos thesis is the absence of a collective identity shared by Europeans. What takes wrong the Court, is that restrains the notion of identity within national borders and links it with ethnos. At this point we should clarify what is identity, what composes a (European) collective identity and how it is related to the democratic deficit issue.

Every social actor needs an identity in order to be able to act in a coherent way (Mead 1934, Eriksen 1980, Sceff 1990, Jenkins 1996, Haller 2003). Identities are constructed not in nature but in specific cultural contexts where sameness and otherness belonging and difference are produced and reproduced and where the markings of us/ them are first structured, then policed. Identity includes firstly all those self perceptions and evaluations which are central for a person and which determine his/ her behaviors and actions within his/her social context ( Haller, 2008) and then the basic values from which specific goals of action follow ( Taylor, 1992) ; it is not something static, is a constant process of self- categorization.

Moving to the term “collective identities”, scholars (Thernborn, 1995, Brubaker and cooper 2000) suggest that the term refers to the idea that a group of people accept a fundamental and consequential similarity that causes them to feel solidarity amongst themselves. Van de Steeg (2010b) further continues that in accordance with collective action theory, identity discourse is considered to be present when the following three ingredients are explicitly mentioned: a community that suffers from an injustice bestowed upon it, but whose situation can improve if the members of the community undertake action. Moreover, identity refers to the construction of a “we”- group as well as to the construction of an adversarial “they”- group (Van de Steeg, 2010b). Identity is related with the perception of self in relation to the others- it’s a matter of comparison. For instance the “us against them” feeling becomes more obvious in the case of Russia, Turkey, Islam or the USA, which as Morozon and Rumelili point, are perceived for centuries as strong European identity builders.

It is supported that European identity should be fostered to establish solidarity among citizens and achieve integration which in its turn would lead to the decrease of democratic deficit. Having the sense of belonging in the same group and sharing the
same objectives for a common good facilitates the cooperation among citizens to deal with matters of mutual concern. European identity does not mean that all citizens need to be in favor of European Union project because excluding the opposite voices is not democratic. European identity is rather the acceptance of sharing a common present and future under the auspices of European Union and the understanding of the power which all citizens have, to intervene, influence and shape the future of this organization. Following this respective notion, identity could serve as resource of citizens’ participation and finally could lead to the realization of European public sphere.

However we should underline that common identity in no case means homogeneity. Indeed, diversity is essential for public discourse as differences and commonalities of individuals and groups should be expressed and represented in public debate. Identity, in fact is the organization of differences in order citizens to enter to a public democratic debate. People may have several identities at the same time linked to several levels of loyalty and felt community roots any one of which is capable of being activated depending on the particular social occasion. (Corcoran, 2000). As abovementioned is wiser to speak for many public spheres instead of one pan-European, the same stands for the identity which can consist by many mere identities. After all, as Checkel and Katzenstein (2009) put it identities do not wax or wane at each other’s expense. Even in nation state, demos is composed by people with many and different identities (i.e. sex, religious, political, professional identity etc), but what they have in common is that they share a common history and recognize and respect the same fundamental values. Thus, European collective identity could be an additional characteristic to the already existed national or religious identity. European identity has the character of demotic identity, meaning identity which is not rooted in the belief in a common ancestry and history but by a subjective declaration of values and principles (Kohn 2005 as cited in Bachofer 2014). We must admit at this point that Europeans share indeed common values and a common cultural heritage and all Member States respect the principles of democracy the rule of law and human rights. The “European ideals” such as the values of democracy, respect and protection of human rights, rule of law could form the basis of common political cultural ideals. As the Article 1a of the Treaty of Lisbon states “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect
for human rights including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail."

Though we fulfill the objective criteria of sharing common values and setting common goals to construct common identity what is missing is the subjective criterion of willingness to engage to the European project, identifying ourselves as Europeans withdrawing national stereotypes which hold us back from recognizing each other as equal participants of our common political future. Though Europeans share all those fundamental characteristics, citizens across EU Member States do not feel that they share their fate with the rest Europeans. As Fligstein (2008) puts it, the citizens still view the nation and their own state as the appropriate unit to be defended against external forces, whether they are political enemies or forces of neoliberal globalization. He further continues that it is more likely for them to see the EU as a distant place where the nation gets undermined. A large number of Europeans remain mainly attached to their national identity and this attachment is a strong predictor of their attitudes toward European integration, regardless of other social characteristics. (Hooghe and Marks 2005). Moreover, Medrano (Diez Medrano, 2003), showed that European identity is nested in national and regional identities and that European identity tends to mean different things to people in different countries.

More precisely, two main pre-requisites to allow European collective identity construction are not fulfilled: a) the willingness of the European people to belong to a supra-political entity and b) the possession of identity forming instruments by a central authority. What also deprives us from adopting a common identity is the lack of a common field of communication meaning as analyzed in details above the absence of European public discourse which takes place in European public sphere and also the fact that the media neither national politicians do not put efforts on shaping our European identity rather they persist on the separation between national we and European they. More precisely, Michael Billig (1995), argues that the formation of supranational identities, such as that of the “European” are limited by the national or sub-national character of the most influential mass media; national-level television and newspapers: That is to say, they take the national context for
granted. (Billig 1995, as cited in Barenreuter et al 2009). Thus, journalists report within the national framework in reference to national interests even when they do report about foreign or European issues. They tend to describe every event focusing on its consequences regarding their home State. As analyzed above, media play a crucial role in the emergence of public sphere and by extent in the building of identity; the more they cover European issues the most audience becomes familiar with Europe and can easier identify themselves as Europeans. Moreover, the way the European issues are presented, framed and filtered also contributes to the formation of European identity. As Entman (1993) argues the media select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text in such a way to promote a particular problem, definition, casual interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation. Obviously, the way that media present the news influences the perspective and the opinion of the audience regarding this particular issue. Therefore, the Europeanization of media content brings Europeanization of identity as the differentiations (national we and European they) are eliminated and identification with other Europeans arises.

Nevertheless, in most cases, in our minds the link between ethnos and identity is strongly established and by extent though we realize the necessity of a common European identity it is difficult to imagine one outside the nation-ethnos frame. In order to overcome the problem posed by the ethnos-identity concept, constitutional patriotism is the answer. Constitutional patriotism is patriotism of constitutional principles and the way they have been institutionalized in political institutions and rights. It is patriotism of the demos rather than the ethnos and through it one can create a common ‘we’ whilst preserving the differences (Thomassen 2010). More precisely, constitutional patriotism emphasizes that democratic citizenship should be rooted in the principles of legal, moral and political concepts rather than the national identity of the people. The federalists argue that the institutional structure of the EU should be reconstructed within the framework of a federal constitution. More precisely, Habermas (2001) proposed that a European public sphere is a central element of an imagined post-national form of social integration that no longer relies on national identity, but on the civic identity of “constitutional patriotism”. A common civic identity is not based in common culture, history, language but requires
citizens to be socialized into a common political culture based on liberal constitutional liberties (Baumeister, 2007). Constitutional patriotism presupposes three elements: a) strong commitment to democratic procedures which help create a common civic identity b) strong commitment to equality (same rights and freedoms - respect to each other), c) universalistic membership which fully includes those who tend to be excluded in a world of nation states (refugees, minorities etc) (Fernandez, 2012).

Chapter two: European public sphere and the Media

The strongest proof of the existence of democratic deficit is the unawareness of citizens about the EU institutions, the lack of their participation in the policy making procedures and citizens’ feeling that they are not represented in the EU. Indeed, Eurobarometer polls (2013), show that people tend to believe that their voices do not count in the EU, thus they are not represented at EU level. Moreover, Weiler et al (1995), argue that the European Parliament elections are mere second-order elections or effectively national popularity contests. Most of the citizens do not even know the EP parties elected and the ideas the parties represent, they do not feel that they are represented within the EU nor that they can influence EU policies. Thus the basic democratic principle of citizens’ representation, participation and access in the decision making is inadequately fulfilled at EU level; merely, due to fact that EU citizens are unsatisfying educated regarding EU and mostly because of the lack of communication and exchange of information between EU governors and citizens.

More precisely, following the deliberative democracy approach, Eriksen and Fossum (2002) portray politics as governed by public discussion and that opinions are shaped in public debate where people can change their opinions when faced with qualitative arguments; they further distinguish between strong (a sphere of institutionalized deliberation and decision making) and general (sphere of opinion formation) publics. Furthermore, as Conrad (2010) puts it, political choices are legitimate if they are based on and supported by an inclusive and open public debate. Only if citizens know
what is going on, they could efficiently participate in the European integration project; they can question and scrutinize political decisions and ask for public justification. However, this opportunity for public debate is not given to citizens regarding EU policies as the institutions are not visible and the political decisions are not communicated to the public therefore citizens are excluded from the policy formation process. The absence of democratic legitimacy and the lack of European public sphere are indications of a problematic communication between EU actors (citizens and officials). Analyzing this approach, I follow the civic republican political philosophy and political Habermasian theory which insist in the deliberative participatory dimension of democracy. The main argument (which derives from Aristotle’s philosophy) is that the only true liberty is the freedom of energetic self determination, meaning people’s autonomy, our ability to govern ourselves according to the laws that we ourselves vote for and this can only happen if the laws are produced through a democratic procedure, open and accessible to all citizens equally which results in the formation of rules through public debate. Thus, according to that view, “public sphere” is the “regulator” of political life. Considering that citizens in democratic societies may have different educational and economic backgrounds but desire to live together, regulation demands wide knowledge of issues which is acquired through education and continuous juxtaposition of different perceptions and opinions in public debate (Papadopoulos, 2013). In other words and as supported by many scholars, democratic deficit mainly is the result of European public sphere deficit, absence of a realm where discussion on European issues can actually take place. Indeed, it hasn’t yet been formed an arena where EU leaders will justify their decisions to citizens and where public debate can take place with citizens being involved to EU politics expressing and exchanging opinions and information on their shared common European future. This realm - which is called public sphere-, is the key for ensuring citizens’ influence and participation in the EU policy making procedures.

The definition of public sphere is not fixed and the criteria for its emergence are rather negotiable, thus there is a variety of angles it could be seen. At this point, I will try to delineate the term “public sphere” in order to define the way I perceive it and I use it in this text based on literature. The term “public sphere” has sparked a long debate about the appropriate translation and implied meaning of “Offentlichkeit”
(term introduced by J. Habermas, 1989). Some have argued that “openness” or “openicity” are more accurate terms. Implicitly the term refers to events that are open and accessible to all and has a meaning of making something public or discussing something in public. The word public is related to what is common, open to the community, to every issue it can be anyone’s concern, to political life as opposed to private matters. Dewey (1954) suggests that public consists of all those who are affected by the indirect consequences of transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences systematically cared for.

A public sphere in a democratic society should be populated by leaders and individuals. The ideal of the civic public sphere is based on commonality, on a universal form of rationality which makes it possible to decide unequivocally which issues have to be dealt with in the public sphere and which processes can lead to rational decisions (Bareneuter et al, 2009). According to Muller (2007), in the public sphere citizens could recognize each other as free and equal engage in democratic learning processes and subject each other’s claims to the very universal principles which they endorsed patriotically; nevertheless we should not in any way disregard that there are constraints and limits to any version of a public sphere. At this point, we must notice that Habermas’ original work was not concerned with collaboration in Europe across nation states. His writing pertained to localities defined by the nation state such as France and Germany (De Vreese, 2007). The other constraint when implying the Habermasian public sphere scheme in the EU democratic deficit issue is that according to the original thesis of Habermas (1989), public sphere was an arena constituting mainly if not exclusively by males, educated, who lived in the city and had good financial situation (bourgeois) and de facto was made from elite excluding the majority of population (women, working class, etc); actually Habermas was criticized by leftists because of the exclusion of proletarian public sphere. (Calhoun, 1996). However, since then, public sphere expanded to include more and more participants (i.e. from other class, women etc) (Calhoun, 1996) thus the Habermasian model of a public sphere can be also applied at the EU level.

Nevertheless, we cannot ignore that there are different conceptualizations of the role and function of public sphere. Calhoun (2005), recognizes the political and social
character of public sphere and he considers public sphere as a) a crucial dimension of civil society as it gives opportunities for participation in collective choice whether about specific policy issues or basic institutions (political dimension) and b) a medium of social integration, a form of social solidarity and an arena of debating social arrangements (social dimension). Moreover, public sphere is defined as the public of private individuals who join in debate of issues bearing on state authority. The private realm is understood as one of the freedom that has to be defended against the domination of the State (Calhoun, 1996). Within the public sphere people started to use critical reasoning on political matters- and as the “father” (Habermas, 1989) of the term states “public sphere provoked the critical judgment of a public making use of its reason”. As we can see, the public sphere is connected with the organized power which is one of the actors within it and, at the same time, its legal guarantor (Sukosd, 2011). Inside the public sphere where citizens can participate to political dialogues, the administrative power is questioned and consequently controlled and exactly this is the essence of democracy, the opportunity of citizens to express their opinion about political acts and be taken into consideration. The public sphere is a precondition for realizing popular sovereignty because it entitles everybody to speak without any limitations, whether on themes, participants, questions, time or resources; it is a common space for free communication where every participant can enjoy freedom of expression and assembly (Eriksen & Fossum, 2002). In this perspective, public sphere is considered as a space where citizens deliberate about their common affairs and hence an institutionalized arena of discursive interaction distinct from the state. Within this context, public space is not seen agonistically as a space of competition but democratically as an arena where people contribute to the formulation and adoption of political decisions that affect them. (Benhabib, 1996). People tended to consider public sphere within national border especially this period during which European Union is more divided than ever we have to imagine a public sphere shaped beyond national identities and borders. Although, it is hard to distinguish European public sphere from the concept of national public sphere as the notion of public sphere was developed within the context of nation State it is essential to apply the same principles and rules of public sphere within EU in order to consider it democratic; one of the most important democratic principle is the ability for all citizen to participate in political life. Taken as granted that the public sphere offers the space where people
can participate in political life we should focus on how this public sphere with European character may emerge.

The role of the media

A has been analyzed and emphasized before, a prerequisite for citizens’ participation in policy making and by extent to the democratization of European integration project is knowledge. Indeed, we realize that the vast majority of literature regarding EU democratic deficit is structured around the existence or not of a European public sphere- emerged with the “help” of media- where citizens could properly participate in the decision-making processes; therefore we should further examine how the media and especially European Journalism could contribute to the realization of European Public Sphere.

According to Kaitatzi–Whitlock (2005), information has not been sufficiently provided for people to understand EU politics, nor do the citizens have the means to participate effectively in political developments. In order for someone to get involved in European political life, he/she has to have access to information about the way EU works and the decisions it takes; only with knowledge citizens can actually engage to a dialogue, form opinion and influence policies. This low flow of information to the citizens- called communication deficit- causes democratic deficit in the EU as European policies are not performed to citizens in an understandable way in order to facilitate the openness of a public debate. Information about EU structure and decision making mechanism can be obtained through EU studies incorporated into the school curricula and by official European Union’s websites which provide on daily basis detailed information in all European Union’s languages about the work of the institutions. However, this way of communicating EU’s work isn’t efficient and sufficient enough for the “briefing” of citizens as the language used is complicated often technical and on the other hand not everyone has access to internet.

Nevertheless, given the fact that the public has the right to be informed and be listened through a genuine dialogue between citizens and policy- makers, the role of
the media in the establishment of (European) public sphere is beyond any doubt pivotal. In contemporary societies for the vast majority of population the mass media are the one and only source of information on EU political processes (Oberhuber et al, 2005). The most immediate way of communication which addresses to the majority of citizens and is easily accessible to all is media (print and TV). Another advantage is that media also offer a space where debates can take place and different opinions can be expressed, thus citizens are able to gain comprehensive knowledge on a European Union issue. Therefore, media offer to EU citizens the opportunity for them to be informed and they make them able to participate actively and contribute to the policy making offering to people ground to be listened by authority. This way -taking part in political debates on EU issues- is more likely for EU political leaders to really listen and pay attention to the citizens’ opinions and demands.

Moreover, Habermas (1989) highlighted the role of the media as consistent for the existence of public sphere. Media raise awareness and mobilize citizens, politically active Mass media control the flow of information, facilitate the exchange between power and citizens (Demers & Viswanath 1999), define citizens’ identities thus facilitating democracy (Anderson 1991, Hardt 2004, McQuail 2010). Furthermore, Meijers (2013) notes that democratic legitimacy does not solely depend on a legitimate governing process but also depends on the medial transmission of these governing processes, thus the locus of responsibility lies also with the news media and political communication. Mass media as Gutmann et al (2004) put it are arenas where “citizens or their representatives actually seek to give one another mutually accepted reasons to justify the laws they adopt”; media help stimulate debate on European issues, guarantee free access and participation in public discourse and contribute to the improvement of people’s knowledge of the EU. Thus, in order to democratize the EU, media have to act as active players of the democratization process distributing information, commenting EU policies, representing popular opinion, evaluating the work of EU. Regarding the multidimensional role of the media in order to reduce the EU democratic deficit, it has been supported (Trenz et al, 2007) a) mass media communication should be increased to promote EU legitimacy, b) that the mass media are an impartial transmitter of knowledge, rational arguments and information to enhance the understanding and participation of European citizens, and c) that the mass
media are a fair player that can be committed to supporting the EU on its way to deeper integration.

As Livingstone (2014) argues, the media constitute the major form of political communication. More precisely, journalists play the role of mediators between political elites and people providing information on political decisions and events, explaining and analyzing policies to citizens, "making" complicated messages simple and understandable by as many as possible people; their mediating role is two way as they transfer the voices and the expectations of citizens to political power and vice versa. For instance, journalists do not only present the positions of the EU but also the reactions of the citizens to EU policies by reporting protests, petition letters etc. Moreover, journalists play also the role of watchdogs questioning authority's decisions and protecting individuals' rights from authoritarian interventions. Media do not only “record” political behavior of political leaders but also from citizens facilitating communication and interaction between “elite” and citizens. In addition, the selection of the news covered shape and even define the political debate. Media is a forum where political arguments and information gathered are presented and interpreted to the citizens, public debates take place, public awareness is raised, and opinion formation is motivated.

All these elements characterize media as political actors which influence both citizens and political power. The contribution of media to the emergence of European public sphere was not overseen by the EU itself. More precisely in 2005, European Commission launched “Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate aiming at the “emergence of a European public sphere, where citizens are given information and the tools to actively participate in the decision making process. Summarizing, media have all these characteristics of a public sphere as mentioned in the beginning of this chapter and this is the reason why the majority of scholars correlates public sphere and by extent EU democratic deficit with the way that media in European Union function. According to that perspective that Europeanization of reporting means Europeanization of public spheres – adopted also by the author of this thesis-, the key question we have to answer in order to confirm the existence or not of EU democratic deficit is how European are the media in European Union countries. Do actually media alienate or bring closer their audience to European Union?
The connection between media and realization of the European public sphere is unambiguous and there are two main views about the ways in which a European public sphere is conceivable: 1. as a pan-European public sphere independent of individual states or 2. as a European public sphere which emerges because of the Europeanization of the national public spheres (Machill et al, 2009).

Regarding the first view, scholars tend to accept that the creation of pan-European public sphere is unfeasible because of the lack of common language, absence of mass media with European perspective and lack of uniform journalistic and media culture in the EU States (Machill et al, 2009). Moreover, as Gerhards (1993) argues, a pan-European public sphere is rather impracticable to be formulated because of the language differences, differing habits in media perception and the costs for translations and distributions. Indeed, 44% of EU citizens do not know any other language than their own mother tongue (Special Eurobarometer, February 2006). The linguistic barrier results to the absence of a shared communication medium and to a different way of perceiving reality if we accept that language is strongly connected to identity. Taken as granted that the variety of languages seem to be an obstacle, for the emergence of European public sphere people cannot communicate and understand each other and democracy within the context of the EU cannot be established. However, it is strongly supported that we can overcome the obstacle of linguistic differences if the media cover the news beyond national boundaries, through European lens and the flow of information and communication throughout Europe can be achieved.

Overseeing the variety of languages barrier for the creation of a pan-European public sphere, there have been made attempts to create a transnational European media (The European, Voice of Europe, Euro News) to fill the communication gap. However, they have not been successful in terms of reaching large audiences or creating a pan-European debate. On the other hand, some papers and magazines with a European emphasis, especially in relevance to financial news are addressed mostly to the elites and have technical content (for example, financial news), thus they do not achieve the free access and equal participation for all which public sphere guarantees. Therefore, the idea of a single European public sphere has been abandoned for reasons of
theoretical critique and empirical barriers, thus it is common place to speak for many public spheres. The paradox is that the basic characteristic of the public which is plurality is ignored by the theorists supporting the necessity of a single European Public Sphere and actually there has been an effort to establish the idea that Europeans should “ostracize” the advantage of social pluralism, to adopt a harmonized, homogenized culture in order to achieve “common good”. Actually, the later position apart of being unrealistic it is a far cry from the essence of democracy which is based upon the respect to inequalities - pluralism.

Regarding the second view, which has more followers, scholars tend to imagine European public sphere as the result of the process of Europeanization of national public spheres. More precisely, European public sphere is the result of a process of structural transformation of the existing national public spheres (Gerhards 2001, cited in Let’s talk about Europe” Bruggemann et al, 2009). According to this view, national public spheres are not replaced by European ones, but they keep on existing in and beside each other (Weessler and Bruggemann, 2012). Following this approach, Karppinen (2009), suggests that we have to rely radical pluralist theories of democracy which typically maintain that civil society is neither harmonized nor unitary but rather characterized by conflicts of interest and an irreducible pluralism of values. Pluralized publics are seen as vehicles of democratization because more publics increase the viewpoints and the debates, less voices excluded. Hegedus (2011) proposes that instead of one single sphere it seems to be better to talk about different spheres of publics in order to avoid the impression of one homogenous spatial and cultural entity on the European level. More specific, according to Conrad (2010), even national public sphere has not a uniform character rather encompasses many layers (national, regional, local) thus we should consider Europe as another layer we have to add to this multi- level phenomenon. Thus the Europeanization of public spheres is understood as the extension of public sphere beyond national borders (Calhoun, 2004).

As analyzed previously, the role attributed to media for the emergence of public sphere is pivotal and the same stands for their role in the Europeanization of national public spheres as they are the main tool for the realization of European public discourse. In particular, when we refer to the Europeanization of national public
spheres we focus on the Europeanization of the context of national media, as media 1) are the primary source of information for citizens 2) they address to large audience 3) may provide information for events taking place beyond national borders i.e. in Brussels. The grade of transparency and democratic legitimacy of EU is measured in terms of visibility of European decision making procedures via media coverage. Indeed European Union officials dressed in dark colored suits and discussing behind closed doors taking decisions about our future without giving explanations about those policies cultivates even more the climate of secrecy and conspiracy. The full of technical details press releases and the laconic comments of the officials do not give the opportunity to citizens to understand what exactly is going on and this is why via European journalism we could shed light to the work of the EU and decrease the communication deficit which discourages citizens to participate in European political life. More precisely, the role attributed to the media in relation to the Europeanization of national public spheres is either that of the political actor which contributes to and comment on European policy- making either that of the observer or mediator (Van de Steef et all, 2010a).

Koopmans and Erbe (2004) suggest three ways of Europeanization of national public spheres a) emergence of supranational European public sphere by the interaction among European-level institutions and collective actors around European themes b) vertical and c) horizontal. More precisely, Deutsch (1953) introduced the idea of horizontal Europeanization that is exchanging information about what happens in other Member States, In horizontal Europeanization, media coverage would not only mention other European countries but actually focus more strongly on the events and debates in other Member States (Bruggemann et al, 2009). According to Bruggemann’s view (2009), there are four patterns of Europeanization: a) comprehensive (high level of vertical and horizontal Europeanization), b) segmented (only vertical Europeanization), c) aloof from the EU (only horizontal) and d) parochial public sphere (neither vertical nor horizontal). Furthermore, according to Van de Steeg and Risse’s (2010a) stance on the issue, public spheres in Europe are Europeanized if and when a) the same European themes are discussed at the same time with the same criteria of relevance and b) transnational community of communication emergence in which i) participants not only observe each other across national spaces, but also ii) contribute regularly to cross- border debates as legitimate
speakers thereby recognizing that iii) Europe constitutes a question of common concern. Gerhards (2000), distinguished two types of European publicness a) that which transcends individual countries and b) that which integrates or Europeanizes national publics and involves thematization of European themes and actors in the national public spheres and assessment of themes and actors in a non- nation state perspective on the other. Sift et al (2007), distinguish two dimensions of Europeanization: monitoring governance and discursive integration. Monitoring governance is determined by a growing attention of public discourse to European institutions and policies. In contrast, discursive integration covers the extent to which the scope of public discourse enlarges vertically and horizontally into a wider European public space. More precisely, discursive integration has two aspects: discursive exchange- degree of communicative exchange across national borders- and collective identification – meaning that communicative exchange across national borders acknowledged by its participants as common discourse.

Where we should focus is that most analysts, give great significance to if, how and in what degree media cover European issues in order to decide the “Europeanization” or not of the public spheres. Public debate on European issues at national level is not enough for Europeanization of national public spheres; rather particular importance should be attributed to the way European issues are presented. For instance, in the first years of EU, the EU correspondents based on Brussels were few and they had more the role of EU ambassadors; however when EU started facing great challenges (financial crisis, migration crisis etc) and imposing measures of austerity to EU people the later started to get more and more interested to the organization asking for more information and coverage thus the journalists took the role of interpreters between EU and citizens. Journalists contribute to the Europeanization of public spheres not only by covering EU issues in national media from a European angle but also by giving the opportunity to EU political actors to interact with the citizens, explain and promote their ideas and decisions. Media relate EU to the public, allowing EU officials and experts to provide with inside information the citizens in order the latter to form their opinions. When journalism is moved to European mode the procedures are more transparent and the EU political leaders tend to be accountable as they are “exhibited” to citizens’ eyes and are at the disposal of people
to scrutinize them. This way European journalism – which means in few words covering European issues from a European rather than national perspective - reduces democratic deficit. By reporting on the same European topics media contribute to the emergence of a European public sphere where citizens from all European countries are able to debate on European issues having a common frame of reference. Thus, journalists should devote more resources and space to the coverage of European affairs approaching the news from a European angle.

Public spheres are about questioning public authority, compelling decision makers to legitimize their policies in front of citizens. European perspective cannot and should not mean that speakers adopt a neutral position above partisanship (Van de Steeg, 2010). The purpose of European journalism is not to make propaganda for EU promoting Europhilia but to present the facts concerning EU correctly and to promote debate on EU issues. To be more precise, journalists should avoid a national reading of the European issues, which strengthens the division between the European Union and each Member State. In any case, the quantitative increase in the reporting on European topics in national media is not enough in order to characterize media as European; rather the way the European issues are presented has to be examined in order to characterize journalism as European. It is also accepted that apart of covering European issues from a European point of view and having a European frame of reference, paying attention to public debates on EU themes in other member States leads also to democratization of the EU as the emergence of the European Public Sphere takes a more comprehensive and compact form. In general, “European” journalism seems to be a system of national news agendas -rather than some kind of pan-European entity- of the same themes and similar frames of reference, meaning structures, and patterns of interpretation (Mora).

Biaisnee (2002) distinguishes three approaches to the politicization of EU news coverage: a) institutional journalism; b) investigative journalism; c) politicization through national politics. More precisely he describes a) “institutional” journalists as the veterans of the press corps, self-assimilated to the institution and more concerned with policies than politics; b) “investigative” journalists as those who do not think that they EU news coverage is technical, expert-like and biased but rather they are able to disclose scandals and analyze EU events in a political way; c) nationalization of the news as the practice of linking EU news to the national political debate. The third
approach is more popular among journalists, while investigative journalism has not been developed sufficiently regarding EU and the journalists are confined to reproduce press release and comments made by officials. In regard with the “nature” of the profession of EU journalists, there are two prevailing images: a) reporters who translate EU policies to national and b) ambassadors who struggle to understand the logic and language of EU governance endorsing the goals of European integration. The first role of journalists as mediators between EU and European citizens includes not only their task to provide information about EU policies and mechanisms, but also exercising critique, creating a forum where public debate can take place, presenting different opinions and generating visibility. The latter category- ambassadors- are often questioned by EU institutions for being too nationalistic and from their news organizations for being too interested in EU (Heikkila et al, 2008).

As there are different “types” of EU journalists and below, the table [as cited in Heikkila et al (2008)], helps us to get familiar with the characteristics of each of the professional journalists’ identities constructed in relation to EU news:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Classical professionalism</th>
<th>Secularization</th>
<th>Cosmopolitanism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Locus</td>
<td>nation State, realm of politics</td>
<td>everyday life, realm of meanings</td>
<td>independent world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News Frame</td>
<td>national interest and historical fate</td>
<td>utility, public opinion</td>
<td>understanding others, future orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists vis-a-vis audience</td>
<td>neutral mediator, critical commentator</td>
<td>service consultant, whistle-blower</td>
<td>expert, educator, citizen of the world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied reader</td>
<td>informed citizen, national communities</td>
<td>unpolitical individual, consumer</td>
<td>multiculturalist and educated elites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political problems within the EU</td>
<td>lack of efficacy and popular support</td>
<td>lack of tangible substance in the input and output of EU policies</td>
<td>lack of political dynamism, relations to the rest of the world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication problems within the EU</td>
<td>lack of transparency, manipulation</td>
<td>alienation of EU elites</td>
<td>Incapacity to communicate European values.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, several studies have shown that European journalists cover European affairs as being foreign affairs different from the national- domestic news and thus the gap between nationals and the EU is increased. Indeed, journalists tend to report
through national lens and also tend to adjust the content of news coverage to the interests and demands of their national audience. It seems that the dominant nation-centered journalistic culture alienates European political life from the national one though the two are strongly connected and great part of the national political life is European political life. In fact, journalists are tuned to national reality; however this phenomenon -called domestication of the news- is universal and not only European. The term “domestication” appears in the study of Gurevitch et al (1991) who studied news production and audience reception in several European countries and the concluded that in order an event to be characterized as newsworthy it has to be anchored in a narrative framework that is already familiar to and recognizable by newsmen as well by audiences. According to Clausen (2004), domestication is “bringing information home” and thus is ingrained in the professional strategies of news producers in their efforts to reframe and recontextualize news output to target their local audiences. Till a point we can easily understand that it is difficult for journalists to cast off the national perspective given the fact that they address to national audience and what is considered priority for a European country may not be priority for journalist’s country.

Indeed, journalists tend to approach facts only in relation to the concrete nation state of their origin without referring on how other people from the rest Member states are affected by the same events. Using this approach -the dominant style of foreign news coverage- journalist describe events as something happening in other countries which does not affect at all his audience’s lives (Frangonikolopoulos, 2012). Media usually are interested in EU matters if they have concrete affect on national political life, thus, nationally- based and locally- financed media focus on European affairs from a national and often nationalistic perspective. Moreover, journalists tend to carry their national identity when they are reporting European issues, describing and analyzing European acts from a national perspective filtering them as positive or negative with the criterion of whether the measures decided by the EU are in favor or against the interests of their own country. In addition, national political leaders restrict the debate mostly to EU policies that affect domestic issues negatively. This persistence in national logic leads to the fact that if public discourse including issues regarding EU is restrained to “take place” in national level then feedback and criticism will also address to national parliaments and not to EU and following it will have little or not at
all affect to the supranational institutions. (Fraser, 1996). Thus, the purpose of the elimination of democratic deficit cannot be achieved; Europe is presented as separated from the nation and this distinction creates two camps: us (the nation) against them (EU) increasing the distance between EU and people setting barriers in solidarity.

Heikkila et al (2008), recognize three challenges posed by the EU for professional journalism: political, cultural and economic. Firstly, EU’s institutional system is different from the national type of political power organization. Thus, the way decisions are taken seems to the citizens unclear and remote; it is quite difficult to accept or suffer the consequences of decisions taken by “unknown” political actors. In economic turns the challenge appears in the ways that media organizations lack resources due to economic crisis; in order to report immediately, accurate and fast journalists need to stay in the heart of EU (Brussels, Luxembourg, Strasbourg) where the EU political actors reside, but this requires resources. Though journalism is not subordinated to nation-States, it has been developed within the context of nation state, democracy and capitalist economy, thus journalists pay attention mainly to national affairs and governmental statements. (Heikkila et al, 2008)

This national perspective perhaps is due to the insufficient knowledge of journalists regarding EU’s function and decision making processes, (lack of picture- there are only images of closed doors of buildings and offices where private meetings are held and make news look dull) due to the lack of resources as there are few correspondents staying in Brussels where the decisions and political discussions take place and maybe due to the lack of strong opposition inside the European Parliament. It is taken as granted that citizens are influenced negatively or positively depending on the media framing of European issues as they lack firsthand experience regarding those matters; their opinion is mostly shaped on the basis of the information received by media. Moreover, Bruggeman (2009) recognizes that when there are more correspondents in Brussels, the coverage of EU issues is increased and similarly when there are more correspondents in other member states horizontal Europeanization is stronger. Therefore, due to lack of economic resources, few journalists (especially now that the economic crisis forced further cuts) are sent to Brussels in order to cover EU news from the heart of EU decision making centers and the Europeanization is slow
developed. EU information is depended much more on freelancers and fixers a less expensive workforce which replaces the established correspondents.

However, increasing the number of correspondents in Brussels or increasing the time and space dedicated to EU news coverage are not enough in order to achieve the transition from national centered journalism to European journalism. Brussels-based correspondents tend to have difficulties in linking adequately European events to the needs of their audiences at home (Golding et al., 2007). Moreover, the foreign and EU correspondents, who develop a more specialized and instrumental knowledge in the field are used mainly as information providers (Trenz et al, 2009). On the other hand, journalists are mostly informed by EU public relations staff informs the journalists and due to insufficient knowledge about EU function and absence of other information sources they rely almost exclusively to the press releases. The fact that journalists when reporting refer to the words said by European officials (whose names are usually unknown to the citizens) gives a character of secrecy, opacity and conspiracism. Thus EU correspondents are a distinct class from “home” journalists as their role is mainly to select the information which will provide and not to present their opinion and influence the formation of public opinion, which is “work” mainly of the home journalists. Therefore, from one side we have Brussels based correspondents who “own” the knowledge regarding the function of EU policy making mechanisms but who nevertheless are constrained to just provide information not influencing public opinion and on the other side we have “home” based journalists who are not so well informed regarding EU and thus they tend to cover EU news and express their opinion “bringing” often national(istic) bias.

Another issue we have to bear in mind is that EU is not attractive to the people in respect of that they tend to show attention to scandals and conflicts; EU is based on compromise and this is not convenient for the media. More precisely, the two governing political parties in the European Parliament cooperate and share their main positions, thus it doesn’t take place a strong debate which will attract the interest of the media and by extent of the people. On the other hand European Commission is a collective institution and makes it hard to personalize the power and connect political views to certain people. If there is no personalization, scandals and details about personal lives are not covered and the media and by extent audience’s attention is not attracted. While EU is based on compromise and the media’s success is based on
presenting contradictions and scandals, it is more than expected that journalists will not focus on news which do not “sell”.

Furthermore, we cannot ignore that the context of national media is affected and formed depending on the political, social, economic and cultural conditions of each State. The coverage of all European matters on national level differs in each country reflecting both the historical- cultural heritage and lessons learned from the past in the respective member state as well as in internal cleavages and the logic of partisan competition (Hegedus, 2011). Obviously, there are differences in Europeanization among countries due to political and media factors. The more the citizens are open to other cultures beyond those inside in their national borders the easier it is for media to focus on other countries. For example, Western countries tend to cover issues from other countries due to the “Western” mentality of openness opposed to the narrow perspective of ex Soviet European countries. When a country is skeptical about European integration then it is more likely that the media coverage of EU issues will emphasize on negative impacts of European policies. In addition, countries that became EU members earlier had more time to elaborate EU coverage. Moreover weaker countries pay more attention to what is happening in the stronger ones, as they are more dependent of them. Then, the more citizens identify themselves with other countries, the more the coverage of issues from these countries will be. Thus, the historical packages, including the specifics in the development of national identity and in the process of state- building, the socio- cultural experiences of citizens and the domestic party political contexts, result in divergent issue framing and agenda setting mechanisms in the national media of the member states (Hegedus, 2011).

Chapter three: Case study
Research in the field of European journalism is rather underdeveloped. The results of empirical research regarding the field of EU news coverage, show that media tend to dedicate little space to EU issues. Moreover, researchers and analysts have developed rather empirical than theoretical work concerning the study and perspectives of European journalism. Such studies serve to highlight the similarities and differences between editorial policies, exemplify the extent to which globalization takes place, point at the themes and problems that are shared between different cultures (or allocated equal ‘news value’), and identify issues and concerns that are unique in every culture (Fiddick, 1990).

Empirical studies of the Europeanization of national public spheres use as indicators for the emergence of EPS 1) the attention of national media for EU politics, 2) similarities between media coverage of EU issues in different member states 3) communicative exchange between national public spheres and 4) European identity constructions (Barenreuter et al, 2009).

Vidra (2007) in her article, analyzed the discourse of 25 newspapers of six post-communist countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) during their accession negotiations to the EU and concluded that the strongest similarity was that pro-European stance in each country dominated, the fact that the EU issues were domesticated for national use and purposes and that pro-European discourses were mainly found in left wing or/ and liberal oriented quality newspapers.

Sievert (2008), based on the results of the research he conducted, he concluded that “there is no single type of journalism in Europe or in the European Union in terms of formal or structural uniformity” and he further suggested that the journalistic system does not require a uniform communicative region but the competent Europeanization of a nationally differentiated public/ publishing sector while maintaining fundamental national differences.

Van de Steeg (2010) conducted a two case studies analysis; the first was Haider case which refers to the agreement of EU member States to impose sanctions against Austria because of the participation in the government of a right-wing xenophobic party and the second was Eastern Enlargement case. Regarding the Haider case, 2160 articles from 15 newspapers published in 5 EU countries (France, Germany,
Netherlands, Italy and Austria) and the US between October 1999 and September 2000, were coded while in regard with the Eastern Enlargement case 1322 articles from newspapers published in four EU member states (Germany, Netherlands, Spain and the UK) and a Swiss newspaper for the time period between 1989 and 1998 were coded. The researchers concluded that EU media report differently as compared to non-EU media; the non-EU media report from the perspective of an outside observer while EU media concentrate on the issues of concern for the European Union from the perspective of insiders and a common discourse and horizon of reference emerge. Therefore, there was little evidence that media reporting about Europe changes dramatically from one member state to the other. Moreover, the research indicates that communities of communication with strong identity components emerged during the public debates in both cases. Speakers within a public sphere are presupposed that recognize each other as legitimate voices.

The research question posed by Trenz et al (2009) in their study was whether and how elite journalists influence the debate of European integration. Thus, they chose to analyze the content of opinion articles on the ratification period of constitutional Treaty published in six European countries representing different degree of involvement of parliamentary ratification (France, Denmark, UK, Germany, and Sweden). The content analysis includes 12 opinion articles per newspaper from a sample of 144, which can be grouped centre-right and centre-left. The results showed that 1) the debates were still taken place in national public spheres and had national character and content, 2) the commenting style was more complex than abiding to the biased yes-no scheme and the journalists did not enter into a practice of reason and justification, 3) the newspaper tended to be more critical in evaluating the results of the negotiations mainly due to the fact that journalists understand themselves as fourth estate/watchdog of governments. Furthermore, the findings point to the possibility of a non-linear relationship between the mediatization and politicization of the EU.

Brugemann et al (2009), conducted a study which aimed to a) identify different patterns of Europeanization through content analysis of quality dailies of five European countries (Austria, Germany, Great Britain, France, Denmark) and b) to test the influence factors in order to explain different patterns of Europeanization through regression analysis. The findings point that 1) the more a newspaper perceives itself as European the more coverage dedicated to the coverage of EU issues, 2) is more
likely that a quality newspaper of a small country will debate other EU countries than a newspaper of a big country and moreover more foreign correspondents also lead to an increased level of horizontal Europeanization and 3) long standing EU membership leads to a higher level of coverage of EU politics. (Brugemman et al, 2009)

Machill et al (2006) in their meta-analysis of 17 comparative studies on how the national media between 1994-2003 dealt with the European Union, concluded that 1) the media in the individual states examined name protagonists from home much more frequently than players on the EU stage 2) EU reporting accounts for a small part of reporting. German, Danish and Netherlands media devote themselves more to Europe than the media in other countries. The UK represents a special case because media's attention focus on Europe's currency policy issues and only a small number of reporting is devoted to other EU topics and states. This meta-analysis showed that EU topics account for an extremely small share of reporting in the particular national media and national media and national public spheres are slightly Europeanized.

Statham (2007) interviewed 102 journalists from newspapers from 7 European countries in order to examine the nature of journalists’ advocacy through commentating Europe. The findings of his research were that journalists find themselves sufficiently independent to be active and engage in advocacy over Europe merely because they do not feel pressured by established national politics. However, it is likely, that the type of advocacy over Europe is that of journalists promoting opinions which defend national interest, persisting in the national interpretative frameworks over Europe. Another finding was that European correspondents seem to be a distinct group among journalists. Moreover, journalists need to be more explanatory when reporting Europe than national issues.

Alarcon, analyzes the role of newspapers in defining the EU and therefore in contributing to the production and reproduction of social representations of the EU. Two research methods which allow us to assess the extent to which the EU is covered and the positive/ negative nature of the coverage were employed: content analysis and interviews. A sample of 147 online issues of each newspaper from June 1, 2005 to February 28, 2007 was analyzed. There were selected two of the most influential
publications which represent the two major mainstream political tendencies in France, Spain and the UK. The results showed that 1) most stories were presented as foreign affairs, 2) there is more negative coverage of the EU, 3) newspaper coverage contributes slightly to the real debates on the process of European integration as negative stereotypes are reinforced and 4) the coverage of EU tends to reinforce traditional news on economics, politics, society and the relation among citizens the nationals and the EU and particularly reinforces the belief that a national government is better than the EU for solving society's problems. Furthermore the different coverage's approach does not help to create some type of discourse that frames EU issues as common EU problems.

Finally, during the AIM project 290 journalists (148 worked at home offices and the rest 142 were correspondents in Brussels) were interviewed about how their news organizations deal with EU news. The reports of journalists were analyzed and produced the categorization of journalists in 3 discourses: classical professionalism, secularization and cosmopolitanism. Journalists belonging to the category of classical professionalism use a national perspective when framing EU news; in the secular discourse journalists regard themselves as mediators who translate political decisions, taking a position between elites and ordinary citizens; in cosmopolitanism journalists adopt a transnational approach and emphasize in the citizens’ right to know and understand political problems of the EU (Heikkila et al, 2008)

By the results of the researches presented we can conclude that European Journalism seems to be rather underdeveloped or in a more optimistic view slightly seems to emerge. What we should also notice is that the studies do not propose ways on how could the journalists adopt a European perspective in news coverage.

Case Study: Brexit

The case study presented attempts in a comparative way to glean an idea about the practice of European media in covering European news. It looks in particular at the
impact of EU referendum (Brexit) on national news and the Europeanization of the national agenda.

Cross-national comparison of media coverage and representation of political issues is an extremely useful exercise when dealing with transnational issues. The general value of comparative research is well established. There is a debate taken place in social sciences whether the comparative research is a method (Lijphart, 1971) or a subfield of social sciences on its own (Sartori, 1991). Pickhard (2007), among other scholars, states that there are two basic forms of comparative research: quantitative and qualitative. In the recent years, there is a pluralism of methods in comparative research, meaning that quantitative and qualitative methods are mixed. Many-countries studies are also referred to in the literature as survey studies, cross-sectional studies, cross-case research or large-N studies (Lor, 2011). Given that comparisons are central for assessing how universal certain findings are and for discovering relationships between social phenomena. Therefore, I chose to conduct an event-oriented approach linking the period of my analysis with the event of the “Brexit” referendum which took place on 23rd of June 2016 as an issue of high public involvement.

Being inspired by two studies: a) the article of Lees (2016) with the title “Proceed with caution: how three UK newspapers covered the Brexit result” as published in en.ejo.ch. and b) the “UK press coverage of the EU referendum” (Levy et al, 2016) study for the Reuters Institute for the study of journalism, I decided to follow authors’ approach, make use of their researches’ results, take into consideration their key findings and expand their research in one more country Greece in order to conduct a cross national comparative research. I must notice that I do not accurately follow the methodology of the above researches, rather I combine them.

I chose to examine the press coverage in Greece because of my language abilities and personal interest.

Moreover, the two countries (UK and Greece) were chosen because they represent different characteristics in terms of their history in relation to the EU. Great Britain, from the beginning was Eurosceptic. The UK joined European Economic Community in 1973 and only 10 years later in 1983 Michael Foot (leader of the Labour party)
pledged that a Labour government would leave the European Community. In 1988 Thatcher sets face against united Europe in her speech which took place in Bruges declaring” we have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them reimposed at a European level, with a European superstate exercising a new dominance from Brussels”. In 1992, British government was forced to withdraw the pound sterling from European Exchange Rate Mechanism after failing to fend off intense currency speculation; this is referred as black Wednesday and cost around 3.3 billion sterling. As described in The Telegraph (16/6/2016) the euro crisis has put paid to any prospect of Britain adopting the single currency. In December 2011, as EU leaders tried to tackle their problems through a treaty setting new budget rules, David Cameron demanded exemptions and then vetoed the pact. On January 23, David Cameron made his highly anticipated “big” Europe speech, where he outlined the three challenges the EU faced, and made a commitment to renegotiate the UK’s membership. Finally, in 2014 the Prime Minister Cameron said he was ready to lead Britain out of the EU over the issue of migration.

Greece on the other hand submitted application for full accession to the EEC on July 12, 1975. As presented in the official site of Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greece had many reasons to desire EEC membership; Greece considered that EEC would bring political stability, reinforce State’s independence and position and finally that EEC would contribute to the modernization and development of Greek economy and society. Till today, Greece still regards EU as the only way to ensure stability, peace and development which explains why Greece still wishes to remain part of European Union project but in different conditions. Greece’s relationship with the EU nowadays seems to be complex comparing to the first years of its membership in the EU. In particular, Greeks have become more Eurosceptic as a result of the EU’s response to the Greek economic crisis. As Kyris notices in his article posted in Guardian with the title “Greece has its problems with the EU but it is no hurry to leave”(2016), unlike the UK, most Greeks are not frustrated with the EU in general but, rather, with the austerity measures that are seen as “imposed” by Brussels. -a country which suffers economic crisis and strongly depends on the support of EU in order to recover economically- shows special interest on EU issues lately.
Regarding the first research (Lees, 2016), the European Journalism Observatory conducted a content analysis of the print editions of three daily newspapers in each of 13 European countries (EU and non EU countries) and also in the US between 25 June 2016 and 1 July 2016. Each article was judged negative (anti-Brexit), positive (pro-Brexit) or neutral on questions regarding the impact of Brexit upon the EU and on the national interests of member and non-member States.

According to the study, 56% of articles in European and US newspapers were judged anti-Brexit, 36% were neutral and 8% pro-Brexit. What else is noteworthy is that left-wing newspapers were more strongly in favor of the EU and critical of the referendum’s result and right-wing papers were generally negative towards Brexit although their analysis tended to be more understanding towards the reason behind leave vote.

More precisely, in the British press, where 489 articles were analyzed, 39% were negative towards the leave vote, 27% were positive and 34% neutral. The results concerning the impact of Brexit were the following:

Articles that argue Brexit would be good for Britain

- Daily Mail: 30% of total number of Brexit articles (50 articles)
- The Telegraph: 38% (52 articles)
- The Guardian: 3% (6 articles)

Articles that argue Brexit would be bad for Britain

- Daily Mail: 19% (25 articles)
- The Telegraph: 10% (18 articles)
- The Guardian: 56% (113 articles)

Articles focusing on the impact of Brexit on EU

- Daily Mail: 0
- The Telegraph: 2% (4 articles)
- The Guardian: 10%

The second report has the title “UK press coverage of EU referendum” (Levy et al, 2016) and it was based on monitoring two sample days per week (Tuesday and...
Saturday) of press coverage in the London editions of nine national newspapers during the four month period of the referendum campaign from David Cameron’s post-summit Cabinet meeting on 20 February to 23 June, a total of 36 days. On the total of 2378 articles which were explicitly focused on the EU referendum and used for the bulk of the analysis of the report 41% were pro-Leave, while 27% were pro-Remain. Moreover, six out of the nine newspapers followed the pro-Leave dominance. Two other interesting findings are that the economy was the most cited referendum issue covered in articles and that almost half of the spokespeople cited in articles were UK politicians, 5% foreign politicians and 2% academics.

In my case study it is examined whether the G. Britain’s referendum and by extent the exit of Britain from EU is approached-covered in newspapers as a national or European issue (visibility). More precisely, it looks at what the key arguments, spokespeople, tone of articles and areas of focus were in the week following the EU referendum over the period of 25th of June 2016 till 1st of July 2016 as presented in three Greek national newspapers Kathimerini, Vima and Avgi (Greece). In order to identify the “Brexit” related news I used the keyword “Brexit”.

I chose the specific period of time following Lee’s study. Moreover, the research addresses national press, as newspapers have a long tradition in political partisanship. More precisely, newspapers are the most important source of information about EU for European citizens (Eurobarometer, 56 & 162) and that quality newspapers are considered as the central source of political news (Eurobarometer, 2005). Furthermore, as Page (1996), notices a large number of studies reveals that the way readers think and what they think about is influenced by what appears in the newspapers. Apart of that, press strongly sets the agenda for the other media too.

Kathimerini is a daily morning newspaper published in Athens, Greece and it is perceived as one of the main conservative newspaper and it is affiliated to centre-right. To Vima, is also a Greek daily newspaper, considered center-left and is politically aligned with the centrist (reformist) wing of the Greek social-democratic party PASOK. Finally, Avgi another daily newspaper published also in Athens, is politically aligned to left wing, echoing many times the thoughts of the governing (left) party Syriza. I chose three newspapers representing three different party politics (right wing, centre and left wing), because this choice allows us to gain
a broader comprehensive knowledge regarding the Brexit referendum coverage in Greek press.

In total 79 articles from all newspapers were examined. The analysis was conducted both at the article level and through close examination of the content of the messages within the articles.

Firstly, I categorized the articles in the following three categories: 1) articles which focus on the impact of Brexit in GB - using national prism 2) articles which focus on the Brexit’s impact in other EU or non-EU countries – national perspective and 3) articles focusing on the Brexit’s consequences in EU form European perspective. I should underline at this point that by no means, articles with European character does not mean that they are pro-European - rather they use European filters dealing with the issue as a matter of common concern not alienated from the daily life of Europe’s people.

My sample consisted of 79 articles discussing the referendum. 42 articles belong to category 3, meaning they cover the issue from European perspective focusing on the impact which the referendum has in EU. 22 articles focus on how EU or non EU States are influenced by the referendum, presenting the EU through national prism (category 2) and 15 articles focus on the impact referendum has in GB again covering the issue from national perspective (category 3)
From the 33 articles published in Kathimerini, 13 covered the issue from national perspective referring to the Brexit’s impact on EU Member States and non-EU countries, the same amount of articles (13) used European filters focusing on the Brexit’s impact on EU while 7 articles were about how referendum’s results would affect Great Britain. It seems that Kathimerini covers the issue from the three perspectives (impact on GB, EU and EU/ non-EU countries) equally. Following, in The Vima, most articles (10) focused on how Brexit influences the future of the EU (European perspective), 6 articles focused on the impact on other EU and non-EU counties using national filters and the coverage of the consequences of Britain’s leave in the UK was limited to 2 articles. As we notice, from the three Greek newspapers Avgi – leftist - dedicated more articles to the impact of Brexit in EU covering the issue from European perspective (19 articles), while 6 articles published in the newspaper were about the impact on UK and 3 presented through national lens the Brexit’s impact on other EU/ non-EU countries. It is noteworthy, that the leftist newspaper which usually expresses anti-European ideas, contrary to the more conservative newspapers, dedicated so many articles on the future of EU in the after-Brexit era, while we would expect the opposite. What we should also underline is that in the three newspapers the majority of articles published regarding the UK leave were about how Brexit would affect the course of EU.

It is evident, that the three Greek newspapers dedicate more articles to the impact Brexit has on EU, covering the issue from European perspective and less articles
regarding the impact of Brexit on Britain. Greek press seems to take into consideration the future of EU and of other Member States in the post EU referendum era and does not only examine the impact through national lens. On the opposite, British press according to Lees’s report focused on the impact of Brexit on Britain rather on the EU or other countries, as expected. Although, we cannot draw safe conclusion we could attribute this difference in perspectives to the nature of the issue reported; when the issue covered has special national interest, the national centered approach cannot be avoided while when the issue does not immediate affect the future of a special Member State rather the EU as a single entity European perspective is preferred.

Another way to assess the nature of the coverage is to what extent each category of spokespeople was quoted by each newspaper. The most quoted group in Greek press was that of EU politicians (32) which is followed by that of journalists (27) while the less cited is the group of academics (5).

Comparing my results with the data of the Levy’s report (2016), we notice that in both Greek and UK press, national politicians are most quoted in the articles relevant to Brexit. Both the Greek and the UK coverage was politicized and very little space was given to other groups such as experts business leaders, academic, foreign politicians. We notice that there was a narrow range of information and voices; perhaps this is
due to the fact that people are mostly attached to nation-state model of governance meaning that they tend to give greater importance to national politicians than European ones and they also have the sense that only people who share the same national identity with them can effectively promote their national interests. This confirms the argument that there is distance between citizens and European representatives.

Analyzing further the content of the articles I decided to find out which issues were covered.

In total of 79 articles, 50 were dedicated to the issue of stability and security of the EU, while 29 referred to how Brexit affects economy.

![Topic analysis](image)

Brexit news in UK press was mostly centered on the issue of economy/business (45%), sovereignty (25%), migration (16%), regulations (10%) and terrorism/security (4%) while in Greek press the issue which prevailed was that of the future of European Union in the post-referendum era. Greek press was rather focused on how EU could continue exist after the referendum’s results which shakes the status and threatens the stability of EU. The majority of the articles examined in Greek newspapers underlined that is necessary for EU citizens to work harder, reshape EU
and rebuild the breached trust between EU and people in order to ensure security all over Europe.

Though we cannot draw safe conclusions, since the research is restricted to two countries, we can ascertain that the results reveal that in Greece clearly European perspective in news coverage is developed; the issue is approached as a common concern matter seen through European prism. What else we should notice is that British press approaches the issue from a national perspective maybe because it is a matter that directly and strongly influences citizens’ daily life, while Greek press is more distanced. I find likely that the different approaches and framing are due to the subject examined rather the different journalistic cultures as in most cases the news coverage is based on issues of national costs and benefits.

- **Qualitative analysis**

In the three newspapers examined, there were found articles which focus on the impact (either negative or positive) of Brexit in Greece. It is reasonable that Brexit raise concerns about a possible Grexit or in general the future of Greek economy. However, Member of Eurowork group, Tomas Viser, as reported in Avgi, stated that **Greece will be the country less affected by Brexit.** Rapanos-CEO of Alpha Bank-stated that referendum’s result will bring negative but not significant consequences to Greek economy. Kouskounis, writing for Kathimerini, stresses the possibility that Brexit and the reduction of sterling will cause shock to Greek tourism as Britain is the second strongest market for Greek tourism. The same view, that Brexit will negatively affect tourism is shared by the President of Greek Tourism Confederation, Andreadis Andreas. Regarding the Greeks who live in UK, as Giannarou reports for Kathimerini, Brexit caused uncertainty and insecurity to the Greek students and employees living in Britain as the environment seem hostile to foreigners. In general there were not many articles dedicated to analyzing the negative consequences of referendum in Greece.

The famous quote of Einstein according to which “in the midst of every crisis, lies great opportunity” applies in the Brexit case also and this is not overseen by Greek
journalists. In particular, journalist Ilias Bellos, finds that Brexit is an exceptional opportunity for Greece to attract Greek and foreign shipping companies to Greece provided that “Athens will institutionalize the appropriate measures”.

Impact in international relations, EU institutions and Britain was an issue also approached by the three newspapers. Commissioner Moskovisi, did not see a strong crisis caused by Brexit despite the uncertainty it brought EU has all the means to ensure economic stability. According to a New York Times article as cited in Kathimerini, Brexit will not only have economic impact but also will negatively affect international security as Western alliances are now weakened. Omer Celik (Turkish Minister designated for EU affairs) considers that Brexit opens the gates for Turkey’s membership in the EU. According to International Monetary Fund, the uncertainty caused by the referendum is dangerous for global economy. Papakonstantinou Petros, researcher in Physics and journalist of Kathimerini, suggests that Brexit will lead to a more vulnerable Europe while Euroscepticism will rise. In his view Euroatlantic relations will be shaken and the EU political establishment will be questioned by left and right political parties. Praet, member of executive board of European Central Bank, admits that Economic Recovery in Eurozone will slow down.

As aforementioned, the majority of the articles tend to have a European perspective, focusing on the roots of the leave vote and to the future of Europe as an issue of common concern. President of European Commission, Juncker, noticed that when Britain for many years publicly accuses EU for being too bureaucratic, it should not impress us the referendum’s result. On the other hand, Dimitris Athinakis reporting for Kathimerini points out that the day after referendum, analysts and publicists started heavily criticizing Brussels and its bureaucracy. However, he continues no one considered that British people voted by reference to the “bad Southern countries which waste money”. For him, exactly the bureaucracy and the complexity of EU decision making mechanisms is what prevented the phenomenon of political panic. Babis Papadimitriou, editor of Kathimerini, sees as cause of the Brexit vote populism and he regards that populism can bring unexpected and heavy disaster and that UK’s losses will be other countries losses too. Moreover, columnist of To Vima, Polimilis Sifis, admitted that populism and depreciation of European vision made EU loose something of its glow; insecurity is established while populism dominates. However, he added, we should not forget that despite of the crisis EU remains an oasis of
democracy. Sorros George, investor, puts the blame on the *delayed response to the migration crisis as the main reason for British referendum results; the insufficient control of migration flow lead to the rise of xenophobic anti European political parties.* Finally, Greek academic and member of the Greek Parliament, Douzinas Kostas, characterized vote to leave as the uprising of working class which suffered financially against EU. He also notes that every time citizens were given the opportunity to decide on European issues they reject the way EU exercises its power. In brief, as presented in the articles the main arguments (which are common in three newspapers) which justify why people vote “leave” are bureaucracy, populism and hard measures taken as response to economic crisis.

What else were chosen to be presented in the newspapers is the solutions given mostly by national and European politicians regarding the course of Europe from now and beyond. Polish Sociologist Sierakowski Slawomir writing for To Vima, suggests that Britain could survive without being member of the EU, while the opposite could not occur; Great Britain is an island with nuclear weapons and its habitants speak a language understandable from all over the world, thus UK could be turned to a new Switzerland. On the other hand, Germany is now the only leading country whether it likes it or not. However, the problem is that the rest Member States would not tolerate Germany playing the role of the leader. The only solution according to him (but not feasible) would be for EU to build upon the crisis and foster European integration. Greek political parties concern about the future of Europe. Kathimerini, To Vima and Avgi cited the statements of political parties’ leaders regarding the future of Europe after the referendum’s result. Alexis Tsipras, the Greek prime-minister, in his speech which took place in Strasbourg, made clear that we need more Europe, a new social contract, a change in Europe’s direction and to act collectively. The Greek Prime- Minister found that referendum’s result has its roots in the inefficacy of the EU leadership to deal with the crisis; a crisis which begun as economic and turned to be political. Tsakalotos, Greek Finance Minister, stated that Brexit raises concerns about European economy but what we need is not more or less Europe but rather a better and more democratic one. Fofi Genimata (president of PASOK) declared that referendum’s result is a particular negative situation for Europe; however “*European project, our common home is the only prospect for all of*
us”. She further, highlighted the necessity of a new European Treaty and put the blame on conservative politics which gave rise to social inequalities among M. States and disappointed people leading to the depreciation of EU. From different point of view, representative of Greek Communist Party, estimates that the results prove people’s disapproval of EU. The leader of the main opposition party, Nea Dimokratia, Kyriakos Mitsotakis stressed the necessity of a new European plan which could inspire citizens beyond ideological dogmatism. Tousk, President of the European Council, as cited in Avgi, underlined that it is necessary for the 27 Member States to remain united. While German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Steinmeier confirmed that the 6 founding Member States will never “let anyone take our Europe”. Schauble Wolfgang, as cited in the newspaper To Vima, underlined that European leaders should face popular discontent and that it should be ensured that people understand what the EU does. Hellenic Federation of Enterprises characterizes referendum’s result as serious impediment to European integration and considers that EU should address the issue of social coherence and create a new environment of security especially for the more vulnerable people. Moreover, Merkel highlighted that we should act in order other Member State not to leave Europe and that is not appropriate time to deepen the integration in Eurozone Member States. The significance of respecting the democratic principles in EU is underlined by Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, who pointed out that the social and democratic character of EU should be supported and (in contrary with Angela Merkel) integration should be fostered. Moreover, Douzinas Kostas in Avgi suggests that the only solution seems to be Greek lefts in order EU to restart and establish direct democracy in regional, national and European level. Michael Giorgos, columnist in Avgi, apportions responsibility for the leave of Britain to the way EU responded to the issues of solidarity and equality and to the fact that people of European regions without being adequately informed, accepted a “hard” currency which increased dramatically the cost of living and the only way to regain people’s trust is to insist on solidarity and cooperation. The same opinion is shared by Portuguese vice president of European Left Democrats Matis, EMP Gonzales, EMP and vice president of European Parliament Papadimoulis who focus on the respect to human rights, coherence, and transparency for overcoming the mistrust of citizens to EU. As we can conclude, politicians address the need for revising the role and the way EU works without even thinking about abandoning European project.
Regarding the impact of Brexit in Britain, the articles focused on the negative economic consequences. Draghi, head of European Central Bank, as cited in Kathimerini explained the financial aftermath of Brexit stressing that Britain will face 2-4% decrease of development the next 3 years. Because of the uncertainty and deceleration of development investment in Great Britain will decrease and many firms will seek to relocate their head offices from Brexit to other EU countries according to international ratings agency Fitch. Moreover, according to Fancer’s view – real estate consultant based in UK - real estate sales will suffer and many construction works have been postponed or even cancelled because of the doubts on the future of the after EU British economy. Kostas Karkagiannis, who served as correspondent in Brussels for Kathimerini, finds that Brexit will cause losses to British economy as well as in European because Britain will no more have access to European markets. Thus, it is important for UK, how will negotiate with the EU for the after leave era, which fiscal policy will follow, which measures will take against migration and which will be the position of British Central Bank. Apart of economic consequences Brexit has social negative consequences also. According to international news agency Reuters, racism against EU citizens and citizens from third non- EU countries living in UK rises in Britain during the post referendum period as for many voters “vote Leave” meant not only withdrawing from EU but also it was a request to foreign people to leave the country. Cameron, ex Prime- Minister of Britain, drew attention to the fact that the ultimate national interest is to ensure that UK will remain united.

From the qualitative analysis we can draw some conclusions: a) The three newspapers though affiliated in different political parties, 1) approached and reported the same issues mainly by citing statements of politicians and experts, 2) they mostly presented articles focusing on Europe as an issue of mutual concern using rather European filters, 3) insisted on the fact that we should not in any way abandon EU but we should revise its role and give another direction to European project, b) Avgi focused more on the issue of social disparities and the discontent of European people as the result of capitalism and the policies adopted by the EU and this fact can be merely explained by the left character of the newspaper. We can admit that till some degree, Greek media have Europeanized the national agenda as they approach the Brexit issue- a topic discussed in various national public spheres at the same time –
presenting the views of transnational and not only national actors (such as foreign and EU officials) as legitimate contributors within the national public sphere’s discourse.

In this essay, I could not proceed to the qualitative analysis of the articles used in the two British researches because on the one hand I had no access to the data and on the other hand I chose to focus on Greek press as British press regarding Brexit has been analyzed several times by various researches. It is important to get an impression about the coverage of the issue by the press of a country which fears a possible Grexit and its future is strongly connected and depended on the EU institutions. Indeed, it should be noted that one year later than the Greek referendum took place -where the people openly and clearly disapproved the EU- it seems that has been established in citizens and politicians conscience that the only way to achieve development, peace and security is to strengthen European Union.

Conclusion

Till recently, it was easy for EU citizens to consider EU self evident, as a passport which permits them to travel, study and work easily in other countries (Erasmus, Euro). However, lately, citizens’ trust to European project was undermined by various crises (economic, migration etc), when Europeans stopped enjoying only benefits but started facing challenges and often deal with the cruel side of the EU. Citizens feel now mistrust, disaffection and disempowered and it is difficult for them to embrace European project.

Moreover, citizens often find it complicated to understand a governance model which is different than their national one. As Conrad (2010) underlines while the decisions are taken at the supranational level, opinion formation remains at the national level and thus we can speak of a mismatch between administrative and communicative power. This mismatch creates the so called EU democratic deficit; the heart of which
is located in the inadequate communication between EU and citizens. More precisely, Meijers (2013), notes that democratic legitimacy does not solely depend on a legitimate governing process but also on the medial transmission of these governing processes, thus the locus of responsibility lies also with the news media and political communication. Only if citizens can access information about EU policy-making mechanisms they can actually engage to an interactive dialogue and contribute to the shape of European policies and formation of decision making. Therefore, it is important to consider EU as a peace project not granted and work towards a common European future by building strong European identity and establishing European public sphere were citizens would be able to engage to a productive European dialogue.

According to Delanty and Rumford (2005), the European public sphere differs from conventional public spheres, national or transnational, in that it is polyvocal, articulated in different languages and through different cultural models and repertoires of justifications and occurs in very different institutional contexts.

Instead of one single European Public Sphere we should rather talk about the Europeanization of national public spheres. The gradual Europeanization of public sphere could be achieved via media coverage of European issues with European rather national perspective. The recent theoretical approach has to do with the Europeanization of national public spheres through the type of attention given to European issues from national media. Journalism plays a leading role in the European integration project and to the efforts to overcome the distance between citizens and EU; media play the role of mediator describing and explaining EU decision making mechanisms.

A simple definition for European journalism is covering news from a European rather national/local perspective considering European news as issues of common concern. We cannot oversee that media attention to European issues is low in comparison with the global, national, regional or local issues (Risse 2003) and on the other hand the European issues are often presented through national filters, however this practice is expectable in a degree as national media report Europe aiming at national audience (often unaware of the way EU functions) rather at a European one.
But which way European Journalism could be evolved towards the emergence of European publics sphere? As Berglez (2007) suggests, a) we should overcome the stereotypes of images of EU officials on grey suits entering and exiting rooms and “see” beyond that- the actual significance of the issues discussed inside these rooms, b) journalists should resort to information sources coming from different political backgrounds (nationalists, leftist etc) and other Member States and c) journalists should cover European Union as an arena of debate between different ideological and political parties and not as a space of conflict of interests of Member States.

In the present dissertation, I tried to illustrate through literature review and empirical research my arguments and to shed light to the role of European journalism in regard with the European democratic deficit in a simple but not simplistic – I hope- way. It is beyond any doubt that research on the field should be continued in depth, that citizens should cultivate a European mentality strengthening their European identity and Europe’s very idea for itself should be reimagined too. However, we should not forget that EU project is on progress and only history will show what happens in the end…
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