Master Thesis


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This dissertation is dedicated to all the individuals, may it be local or international volunteers, members of NGO’s, IO’s, GO’s, both army personnel and civilians who cooperated in Camp Diavata from Feb 2016 until Feb 2017 in order for approximately 6,000 people who had been hosted until then, to receive some basic relief or comfort.

NOTE: All the opinions in this dissertation express the author’s personal view and not the Hellenic Army’s/Ministry’s of Defense which he works for or the Hellenic Red Cross’s which he is a volunteer member of.
Abstract
There is a wide variety of operations during which military forces, deployed on failed or fragile states may co-exist, interact or cooperate with civil actors, usually on an international environment. The level and the kind of the engagement between the different actors vary depending on the conditions of the operations as well as the mandates of the actors. Studies have identified the main problematic of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) during these operations and have proposed actions to improve it; a certain progress towards which has been made. The past years though, complex environment has increased the crises in the interior of stable countries and/or has affected their ability to intervene. In order to respond effectively states deploy their full power, thus involving all their components, may it be armed forces or civilian bodies at the same time. These crises are different in essence from those who would demand a Civil Emergency Planning response whose procedures and roles have been considered fully established and effective. Thus, it is a field where states may have to innovate and literature concerning interaction between the Army and civilian institutions is lacking studies.

From 2016 and on, such a joint deployment of civilian and military capabilities has been one of the key elements of confronting the refugee influx in Greece. Since Civil-Military Interaction is lacking literature on that field, we conducted research in order to examine, through a case study approach, the civil-military interaction aspects at tactical level of such an operation. By comparing the existing literature of CIMIC experiences in Peace Support and Crisis Response Operations with the conclusions of our own research, we tried to determine which CIMIC problematic and suggestions apply to both fields and overall highlight which elements of this operation could contribute to establish best practices on domestic operations which demand a degree of Civil-Military Interaction (CMI). Despite the fundamental differences between the above mentioned kind of operations, there are common grounds in joint Civil & Military operations, by defining which, we could potentially enhance the capabilities of this interaction where necessary.

Key Words: Civil-Military Interaction (CMI), Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), Army and Refugees Interaction, Refugee Influx, Refugee Camp, Refugee Children Drawings, Refugee Focus Groups.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARA</td>
<td>American Relief Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEP</td>
<td>Civil Emergency Planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
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<td>CMI</td>
<td>Civil-Military Interaction</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRO</td>
<td>Crisis Response Operations</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Danish Refugee Council</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<tr>
<td>HNDGS</td>
<td>Hellenic National Defense General Staff</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Population</td>
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<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Committees</td>
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<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
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<td>LCC</td>
<td>Local Coordination Cell</td>
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<td>MNCG</td>
<td>Multinational CIMIC Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Medecins San Frontieres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NFI</td>
<td>Non Food Items</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NMCG</td>
<td>NGO’s-Military Contact Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>POC</td>
<td>Person Of Concern</td>
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<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSS</td>
<td>Psycho Social Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCHR</td>
<td>Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN DPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water Sanitation Hygiene</td>
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<td>WWI</td>
<td>World War I</td>
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INTRODUCTION

Historically the military forces capacity has always been utilized, apart from combat missions, to support societies in the occurrence of crises may it be natural or human-caused disasters. The first military mission tasked to facilitate the interaction between military forces and civilian actors following military operations, could trace back to World War II, where the British Forces had to face large issues concerning civilians for which public affairs capability was developed. Since then the interaction of the military forces with civilian actors has evolved and been examined under various different circumstances.

In the first chapter of this dissertation we followed the evolution of the interaction of the Army with the humanitarian society, as they both share common roots in war. In the 1990’s together with complex emergencies and an exploding number of humanitarian responders appearing, a new concept emerged as a necessity. Civilian Military Cooperation (CIMIC) came amidst war torn zones to try and facilitate the cooperation of the Armed Forces with the civilian actors. The way they different actors perceive the concept varies, and through a continuous evaluation and certain adaptations it reached today’s form, where certain aspects of it are still under questioning and different actors have incorporated it in their structures according to their perception. Greece as a state member of NATO has adopted its CIMIC doctrine and has based the structure of those elements and the troops’ training upon its provisions.

On the second Chapter we will refer to three key, in terms of CIMIC, crises which have driven the evolution of its concept. Somalia serves as one of the early examples where international actors tried to combine military with peace keeping forces, on a humanitarian mission without the consent of the aided population. Though for many scholars it ended up in failure, in terms of CIMIC it was a first study of the problematic it might bare. Following we will refer to Kosovo crisis which according to some was a successful humanitarian support from the Armed Forces, in terms of providing aid to displaced population in neighboring to the conflict countries. CIMIC though during the operations inside the country received criticism and added more lessons to be learned. Finally we will briefly describe the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT’s) concept applied in the Afghanistan intervention case, which is still under evaluation and opinions vary and thus may set the grounds for future operations. The CIMIC lessons learned as described in literature were then displayed. Which aspects of it rendered it as a necessity, where problematic appeared and which main suggestions have been formed in order to improve it.

In Chapter Three we started focusing on the refugee influx in Greece. We briefly referred to the crisis which caused it and we followed the unfolding of the issue until it reached Greece. We then defined the context in which it took place. In Greece, the Armed Forces were tasked to participate in resolving the issue on a humanitarian mandate. That operation took place in the interior of the country, in assistance of the state and humanitarian actors. It was more of a complex emergency, thus exceeded the capacity of Civil Emergency Planning to confront it and bore some special characteristics which were then defined. Thus the Armed Forces had to step out of their comfort zone of security or capacity utilization and move into close coordination with humanitarian and state actors as well as interaction with the hosted population.

In Chapter Four we focused even more at tactical level in order to provide a first-hand view to the reader about the field of the operation. We attempted to do that by following the evolution of the first refugee camp that opened up in Northern Greece.
referring to the period from construction until the official hand over of the management to the civilian state authorities. A closer view to Camp Diavata, to its actors, tasks, and hosted population statistics was intended to provide the reader with the context within which our research took place.

In Chapter five we analyzed the methodology used in order to identify the aspects of CMI at tactical level in the refugee crisis in Greece. Due to the diversity of actors, language barriers and the sensitivity of the issue for the hosted population, we chose to conduct our research through focus groups. In an effort to minimize the effect of proximity of the researcher with the participants, the discussions were conducted by civilian partners. One discussion was organized with the civilian actors and one with army officers. The hosted population’s view was collected via an initially planned focus group which was then split into two separate discussions with the Arab and Farsi speaking community. The children’s view was approached via a drawing task. All the material was analyzed and the results were presented in the next chapter.

In Chapter six we presented the results of our research. Syrians which were coming from war torn zones even though they expressed remorse feelings towards their home country’s army, managed to develop a relationship of respect towards the Hellenic Armed Forces. For both Syrians and Afghans indications show that they had a very good interaction with the army which was based on mutual respect, personal contact, fairness, accessibility, interest in their needs, dedication in the mission and reliability. For the children which were considered the most vulnerable group, research indicates that even though at the beginning they were afraid of uniformed personnel, due to previous experiences, they perceived the Greek military personnel as non threat figures connecting them with friendly behavior, safety and calmness. The hosted population group also expressed positive feelings towards the Greek population.

Concerning the civilian actors group, research suggests that before the cooperation certain stereotypes existed among the actors, such as the army being inflexible, strict and patronizing creating concerns as to what kind of behavior they would show towards the hosted population. This fact changed though after their contact with the military personnel in the camp. They seemed to accredit to the army a well accepted and functioning coordination role, while its capacity, effectiveness, professionalism and credibility were appreciated. Their cooperation and coordination was based in complementarity, flexibility and mutual respect. CIMIC background of military personnel, resilience skills and eagerness to exchange knowledge, dedication to the mission, and enthusiasm facilitated the cooperation. Factors which could have obstructed it though, but were not met in the specific camp included frequent rotation of military personnel, lack of resilience skills, and indifference for any other issue apart from the strict mission. Suggestions to improve the cooperation included pre-deployment co-training and institutional familiarization and CIMIC training of military personnel.

Research in the military officer’s focus group suggested that they faced certain coordination issues and that they also had stereotyped the humanitarian providers prior their cooperation, especially at the emergency phase, which partially derived from individuals, NGO’s, or volunteer initiatives exploiting the situation for own publicity, fund raising, political or religious purposes. They also received skepticism from certain organizations. Full coordination and trust was achieved after cooperating on the field with the certain, fixed and validated partners and stricter control by the ministry of migration on the access to the camps. One of the main problems they faced was insufficient treatment of misbehaving individuals among the hosted population, which led to a raise of security issues in the camp. Another difficulty was lack of interpreters.
in their team. The factors which facilitated better cooperation with the civil actors was their CIMIC training, trust relationships they built with civil actors, team spirit and effective leadership. In time, they also built a very good cooperation with the hosted community. Suggestions for a more effective response included early planning, CIMIC training, selection of military personnel according to certain criteria, training/co-training with civilian actors and distribution of roles to the civil actors according to their expertise without duplications.

On the last chapter we compared the lessons learned from CIMIC missions with the results of our research in order to determine any similarities and whether certain CIMIC features could support operations in the interior of the country such as refugee influxes. Our conclusions suggest that there are fundamental differences between the two kinds of operations which render the cooperation with civil actors in the second case less problematic. It also suggests though that whenever military forces will have to step out from their comfort zones of security or capacity provision, such as refugee influx, similar problematic will appear in the interaction between civil and military components. We suggest that the experiences of CIMIC in PSO’s and CRO’s can provide the tools to foster this interaction.
SECTION A

CHAPTER ONE

CIMIC Historical Perspective and Current Trends

1.1 Civilian Military Community Through time

The interaction between the armed forces and civilian institutions has been a challenging issue during the 20th century. From ancient times until modern history such an issue of coordinating actions of civil authorities with military forces did not surface as, in most of the cases, the above powers coincided both in terms of policy of the state as well as of the physical leaders themselves. There are cases where even ancient armed forces conducted operations in a holistic approach rather than a sole application of military power. One of the brightest examples of that strategy would be Alexander’s the Great campaigns, whose victories are appointed to a wider perspective of strategy, one which included, apart from the application of military power, a mixture of financial, political, social, cultural, diplomatic and intelligence aspects. (Lonsdale, 2007). Thus you would have military forces, building cities, applying administrative systems, spreading their native culture, and conducting any kind of other-than-war operations.

Through time though and as the roles became distinguishable and spread among different actors a certain amount of coordination and cooperation became an apparent need. There are certain milestones in this evolution which are briefly mentioned below.


The Crimean War (1854-1856) and the witnessed suffering of the soldiers together with the journalistic developments which provided view of the front to the civilians ‘though fought far away in the East, was literally brought to the breakfast tables of Western Europe by the telegraphed reports of journalists in their new role as war correspondents’ (Hutchinson, 1996, p. 26) set the grounds for sensitizing the public and demand actions from governments. Florence Nightingale who witnessed the atrocities of the above war pressed towards the enhancement of medical provisions to soldiers by the armies and states, to whom she accredited the sole responsibility for providing for their own troops (Hutchinson, 1996, p. 41).

On the other hand, Henry Dunant who witnessed the Italian wars (1858-1860), which he depicted in his book ‘A memory of Solferino’, fought for the establishment of a voluntary aid society who would assist the wounded soldiers and civilian alike (Hutchinson, 1996, p. 39). The above conditions led among other factors to the establishment of the Red Cross movement in 1863 and the Geneva Convention of 1864. That fact was important as it formally standardized the ideas of appropriate and desirable conditions for soldiers and civilians during war time. By the Geneva Convention of 1863 the first volunteer national committees were created, distinctive of the Army as described in its first article\(^1\) while the Geneva Convention of 1864 provided among others, the first international agreements for the immunity of civilian aid providers as well as the impartial reception and treatment of wounded.

\(^{1}\) “Article 1: Each country shall have a Committee whose duty it shall be, in time of war and if the need arises, to assist the Army Medical Services by every means in its power. The Committee shall organize itself...”
During the same period the Civil War in the U.S. was unfolding. The underequipped and insufficiently manned medical services of the Army together with the number of military and civilians victims strongly challenged the Army’s capabilities and the public opinion. Civilians, mainly women, across the U.S. appalled by the conditions in the Camps and the suffering of their beloved ones, also probably inspired by the similar movement of British Sanitary Commission who operated in the Crimean War and whose accomplishments were brought to the front pages, formed the United States Sanitary Commission on June 1861. The commission was mainly consisting of civilian women who voluntarily offered their medical services to the Army in order to improve the sanitary conditions and treat the wounded. Though sometimes the movement faced skepticism from certain military ranks it was generally welcomed, “During the next four years of civil war the volunteer work of thousands of women in the U.S. Sanitary Commission would cut the disease rate of the Union Army in half, and raise around twenty-five million dollars in support of the Northern war effort”. This was meant to be the first Military-NGO Partnership in the U.S. (Broome, 2006, pp. 113-125)

1.1.2 World War I (WWI): Formation of Governmental Aid Provision Agencies.

During WWI the United States (U.S.) received criticism over their provision of humanitarian aid towards European countries which contradicted their claim of neutrality. This fact led to the establishment of American Relief Administration (ARA) in 1919 which functioned as an independent agency which sought neutrality by its chart. It coordinated with the Red Cross as well as private organizations to provide relief in several campaigns in Europe. The creation of ARA was a milestone as it was the first governmental agency dedicated to the organized administration of humanitarian assistance to foreign populations, through which the U.S. government could provide foreign assistance without the involvement of the Army. (Broome, 2006, pp. 70-71). In the same time private humanitarian volunteers of the Red Cross, the YMCA, the Salvation Army and the Quakers were under the authority of the military command and had to wear uniforms. (Perouse de Montclos, 2014, p. 233). Simultaneously (1919) NGO “Save the children” was founded in the United Kingdom in support of children of war torn areas and later evolved into an International NGO having separate national diligences in more than 28 countries.

1.1.3 World War II (WWII): Rise of Civil Affairs and Governmental Control of Humanitarian Assistance.

During WWII a Civil-Military Interaction necessity appeared for the British army as a means of dealing with the practical issues which it had to face concerning civilian institutions and populations. That included large scale movements of civilians moving away from fighting zones, restoring sovereignty, maintaining civilian food supplies, reviving civil administration, discharging legal obligations to civilians and maintaining relations with voluntary agencies. The result of such experience was a large allied civil affairs capability comprising over 15,000 troops and dealing with two broad and diverse sets of frequently overlapping issues: civil-military operations and civil administration. (Gordon, 2001)

In the meantime on the other side of the Atlantic, U.S. government was struggling to provide aid to war torn Europe without compromising its neutral status. Thus all the funds were transported and administered through private organizations and the Ameri-
can Red Cross. In an attempt to tie both public and private humanitarian assistance to strategic political and military goals, the government issued the Neutrality Act which passed by Congress on Nov 4th, 1939 and required all relief organizations providing assistance to civilians in nations considered belligerent by the president to register with the State Department. Many of these organizations were devoted to relief in Poland after its fall to invading Germany. The U.S. government established the President’s Committee on War Relief Agencies, later called the War Relief Control Board, to oversee coordination between the hundreds of private organizations involved in war relief efforts. This fact changed dramatically the relationship between the government and NGO’s (Broome, 2006, p. 74)

Though the U.S. military was limited to logistical and security role in its humanitarian missions, close to the end of WWII they were tied to such a degree which could be illustrated by the report from New York Times “The one clear and unanimous promise repeated in every broadcast to Europe by the spokesman for Britain, the United States, all the governments-in-exile, is that the armies of deliverance will bring not only relief from Hitler but immediate relief from famine”. (McCormick, 1943).

The years following the end of WWII, the formation on United Nations (UN) in 1945 and of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 would set the grounds for international military operations and subsequently will dominate the scene of civil-military cooperation.

1.1.4 Post Cold War Era: CIMIC emerges as an Absolute Necessity.

The rapid rise in civil wars and ethnic strife in the decade following the end of the Cold War and the desperate need for action to help the civilian populations who were the targets of ethnic cleansing demonstrated the need for the international community to go beyond peacekeeping and authorize enforcement operations under Chapter VI & VII of the UN Charter in order to compel compliance with international resolutions and sanctions. (Franke, 2006) According to other scholars the rise of the interest of international community to intervene was also due to the fact that the attention of superpowers was strategically driven towards operations abroad, UN Security Council enjoyed more leeway to approve peace operations (Donald, 2002), the ‘CNN effect’ or influence of the media obliged leaders to take action (Allard) as well as due to the fact that western powers perceived threats originating in war torn societies (e.g. terrorism, refugee flows, organized crime, drug production) as security threat of their own. (Ignatieff, 2002) This contention was affirmed in the 2002 National Security Strategy of the U.S. (The National Security of the United States, 2002, p. 3) and the European Union’s A Secure Europe in a Better World (European Security Council, 2003), which both acknowledged failed states as threats to national and international security.

Whatever the reason, the number of conflicts and interventions was unprecedented. Tellingly, of fifty-five peace operations undertaken by the UN in the period 1945-2003, 41 came after 1989. (Vidal, 2003). By the mid-1990’s, the ICRC intimated that the human costs of conflicts and complex emergencies were overwhelming the international community’s ability to respond (Abiew, NGO-Military Relations in Peace Operations, 2003) while simultaneously the UN developed a peace building approach integrating military and humanitarian action into a series of sequential activities proceeding from observing the cease fire and assisting in humanitarian relief and refugee settlement to contributing to economic reconstruction, social reconciliation and the restoration of essential government functions (Boutros, 1995). In order to adapt to the joint Civil Military concept, most major organizations and institutions, both military
and civilian tried to adopt the model of the rising Civil-Military Cooperation while expressing worries about the implications after certain failures to cooperate effectively or ethical dilemmas. For example, a training manual issued by UNHCR in the mid-1990’s, emphasized the benefits of ‘partnership’ with the military while also identifying measures to avoid being compromised by military action (Wolfson & Wright, 1994/5). ICRC was also concerned about the issue trying to reach balance (Studer, The ICRC and Civil-Military Relations in Armed Conflict, 2001). The rise in the number of actors, together with the complexity of the operations led UN in establishing guidelines of coordination (DPKO, 2002) NATO in the issuing of its own CIMIC doctrine (NATO, AJP-9 NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Doctrine, 2003) and EU in forming the Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Concept for EU-led Crisis Management Operations 7106/02 dated 18 Mar 2002.

What followed in the years to come was turmoil of different actors. National armies, NATO forces, UN agencies, International Aid Organizations, National and International NGO’s, local powers and civilians all struggling to make ends meet in a complex environment of operations which led to different perceptions of what Civil-Military Cooperation is, both in essence as well as linguistically. The formation mechanism and the end user of any doctrines and tactics is the field of operations where all the plans were applied and resulted in transformations. Terminology as of today and the CIMIC doctrines of major institutions will be presented on the next paragraph.

1.2 Current CIMIC Perceptions of Major Institutions.

Up to today all the major international actors are in a constant process of updating their doctrines in order to better define the types of interventions, the roles of different actors, the relationship between them as well as the terminology itself.

1.2.1 United Nations

The UN through its departments sets the standards for the coordination and cooperation between the Military and certain civil functions.

Thus the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has issued its policy on Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (UNCIMIC). This policy provides guidance to military staff and contingents in UN Peacekeeping Operations on the role of UN-CIMIC in the operational and tactical coordination between the UN military and civilian partners, among them the civilian components of UN field missions, UN police, UN agencies, funds and programmes, host national government, NGO’s and grass roots organizations. Such coordination encompasses activities undertaken and/or facilitated by military components of UN missions across the full spectrum of UN peacekeeping operations. (UNDPKO, 2010 (Review date 01 Nov 2013)). According to DPKO:

“UN-CIMIC is a military staff function that contributes to facilitating the interface between the military and civilian components of an integrated mission, as well as with the humanitarian and development actors in the mission in order to support UN mission objectives.”

Furthermore the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) through its Civil-Military Coordination Section issued in July 2014 the “Guide for the Military”. The guide is written for operational military commanders and their staff and
aims to explain, in simple terms, the humanitarian community, how it operates and how the military can best interact with, support and complement humanitarian action. According to OCHA (UNOCHA, 2014):

“Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) is the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize in consistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.”

1.2.2 NATO

NATO’s policy on CIMIC is described in MC 411/2 and more extensively in AJP-3.4.9 which, while primarily addresses commanders and their staff at operational and tactical level; it is also relevant to the civil-military interaction at the strategic level. It displays amongst others, relevant factors for effective and efficient civil military interaction within NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach. It fosters the development of CIMIC activities, introducing all necessary principles, planning factors and training requirements. (NATO, AJP-3.4.9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation, 2013). According to NATO:

“CIMIC is the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies.”

The aim and purpose of CIMIC is the interaction between military and civil actors within a comprehensive environment to support the military commander’s plan. Ideally all actors will work to a common goal, but where this is not possible, this interaction will ensure that activities to support each plan are harmonized as far as possible. This will minimize interference or unintended conflict between all actors. This interaction might consist of, but is not limited to, coordination, cooperation, mutual support, coherent joint planning and information exchange, covering the political mandate. It includes NATO military forces, governance and civil actors.

1.2.3 EU

“The development of CIMIC at the EU level has been marked by two conferences. The EU CIMIC Conference held in June 2002 was oriented at political, strategic and conceptual levels and strived to delimit the functions between civilian and military actors in crisis situations, including the formulation of guiding principles. The second EU CIMIC conference from June 2003 was more oriented at the operational and tactical levels.” (Hynek, 2010).

The definition of CIMIC in EU crisis management is:

“The cooperation and coordination, in support of the mission, between the military aspects of EU crisis management operations and the civil actors (outside the EU), including the local population and the local authorities, as well as the international, national and governmental organizations and institutions” (EU Council 7106/2, 2002).

Taking into consideration that many EU state members may operate under the command of either EU or NATO, the concept in which it was formed was to be com-
compatible with the policy and the CIMIC doctrine of NATO, in order to achieve the maximum level of harmonization between EU and NATO. (Μεταξάζ, 2010, σ. 31)

While EU CIMIC is limited to tactical and operational level of command and deals with the practical cooperation among the main actors on the field, European Union Civil -Military Coordination (EU CMCO) is an internal aspect of the EU in order to achieve closer cooperation and coordination among different actors in a strategic level (Μεταξάζ, 2010, σ. 32).

1.2.4 IO’s- NGO’s

The civil humanitarian community followed the developments by revising its own guidelines while expressing its worries in order to determine the position of the aid providing community, depending on several factors concerning the missions and mandate of the armed forces. (SCHR, 2010)²

ICRC has issued its guidance on the relations between the Red Cross community and the military in the resolutions issued after the Council of Delegates met in Seoul in 2005 (Council of Delegates, 2005). Certain issues concerning the relationship are discussed in various annual conferences during which guidance is provided and Principles and Rules for the movement are revised (Guidelines on The Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief-Oslo Guidelines, revised 2007).

Furthermore there are certain coalitions of humanitarian providers who express their opinions like SCHR, SPHERE Project etc. Some aim to foster the dialogue between the military and NGO’s like the neutral NGO-Military Contact Group (NMCG) in UK, a coalition of 70 members which aims to improve communication and understanding between the different organizations to improve humanitarian response (NMCG, 2015). Other organizations like Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) have expressed in several occasions the opinion that it is neither needed, nor possible to cooperate with the military without compromising the organization’s core values and stress that it is important to clearly distinguish between the roles of humanitarian and military organizations (Orbinski, 2000) (Torrente, 2006) (MSF, Medecins sans Frontieres speech at NATO, 2009).

1.2.5 Concept of CIMIC and CMI for the Purposes of the Present Dissertation.

In order to understand the concept, aims and goals of this dissertation we need to clarify the definition and functions of CIMIC under which the term is used throughout this work. In order to do so, we adopt the NATO term, on which the Greek CIMIC doctrine is based upon and by which the Hellenic CIMIC Unit functions. Thus, we need to clarify that Civilian Military Interaction (CMI) is considered a wider term which applies to all kind of operations:

“CMI is a group of activities, founded on communication, planning and coordination, that all NATO military bodies share and conduct with international and local non-military actors, both during NATO operations and in preparation for them, which mutually increases the effectiveness and efficiency of their respective actions in response to crises” (CCOE, 2016, pp. 1-2-2).

² Created in 1972, the SCHR is an alliance for voluntary action of Care International, Caritas Internationalis, ICRC, IFRC, Lutheran World Federation, Oxfam International, Save the Children, World Council of Churches/ACT, and World Vision International.
What varies between different operations and different organizations is the level of interaction between the army and the civil organizations, which may range from mere co-existence to integration. There are several aspects which facilitate CMI like Public Affairs, CIMIC, Civil Emergency Planning, Host Nation Support etc.

![Diagram 1](attachment://diagram1.png)

**Diagram 1**: Possible level of interaction between responders to a crisis (CCOE, 2016, pp. I-3-2).

CIMIC on the other hand, whose definition was provided in paragraph 1.2.2, is a specific tool with which the military facilitates a part of CMI which includes other aspects also. As the exact terminologies and relationships among the different functions are still in process (CCOE, 2016, pp. I-2-1) we will try to explain the relationships among the key terms in simple words, according to the author’s perception, as depicted:

![Diagram 2](attachment://diagram2.png)

**Diagram 2**: Relationship between CA, CMI and CIMIC.

In a very simplistic mode a Comprehensive Approach can be explained as a term describing the context within which the military participates as one of the actors in order to facilitate a holistic reaction to crisis. CMI is the interaction between military and civilian actors which may vary in level and degree, depending on the operation and mandates of the actors, while CIMIC is a specific military function which is used to apply the above. None of them implies hierarchical relationship between civilian and military actors.

To be more specific in Greece, there is a wide range of operations in which the army interacts with civilian bodies. That is to include operations in the interior of the country like Civil Emergency Plans, Host Nation Support, Collective Defense and etc. as well as operations conducted under international bodies like Peace Support, Peace Enforcement, Humanitarian etc. While CMI is a general term that applies to all of the
above, CIMIC is the specific function that applies only in operations which are conducted abroad and is the tool that military forces use in order to (core functions):
a) Support the military forces.
b) Support the civil actors.
c) Liaise the military Commander with the civil environment, and of course aims, as the definition itself suggests, facilitating the mission of the military commander.

1.3 CIMIC in Greece

Generally Greece followed the international evolutions mentioned before. Thus, guided by the above milestones the chronogram for Greece will follow the same pattern. The Hellenic Red Cross which was established in 10th of June 1877 by Queen Olga acted in the same principles of its international inspirer by providing aid to the Greek Army and to victims of natural disasters (History of the Hellenic Red Cross, 2017). Concerning participation in international bodies it has again followed the international tendency. Since Greece became one of the establishing nations of UN in 1945 and joined NATO in 1952 it has participated in a 30 Crisis Response and Peace Keeping Operations held by UN, NATO and EU. While still is active in another 11 (HELLENIC NATIONAL DEFENSE GENERAL STAFF, 2017).

The feedback that was given from the participation in Peace Support Operations of the 1990’s, as well as the international partnerships and obligations of the country, resulted in the adoption of a national CIMIC doctrine in 2003, which was revised in 2008, and the establishment of the Hellenic CIMIC Unit in 2004 according to the SACEUR FORCE GOAL 3782 following NATO and EU standards as well as to the establishment of Joint CIMIC Directorate in the Hellenic National Defense General Staff (HNDGS). (Διεύθυνση Διακλαδικού Δόγματος, 2008).

The above doctrine aims to form a frame of procedures, both at national and international level, in accordance with the established doctrines of NATO and EU, which concern the cooperation, coordination, mutual support, planning procedures and exchange of information at all levels, among the armed forces and the involved civilian actors, in order to support the successful outcome of the operational commander. It is based on NATO and EU documents which have been approved by Greece (AJP-9, EUMC 06/02). The Hellenic CIMIC doctrine applies only for operations outside national territory.

1.3.1 CIMIC Elements

In terms of CIMIC elements in Greece, according to the above mentioned doctrine, the following exist:

a. The CIMIC Directorate of HNDGS whose mission is to keep track of CIMIC developments and coordinate the national policy with those of NATO, EU and other international organizations to which Greece is a member. It is responsible for:

i. Suggesting the establishment of coordinating procedures, as well as the coordination frame of national CIMIC actors.

ii. National representation at the coordination committee of Multinational CIMIC Group (MNCG) – Italy to which Greece, among 5 other nations, is a contributing nation.
iii. Participation in meetings, conferences, seminars, committees and working groups of CIMIC interest in the context of the international organizations to which Greece is a member state.

b. **CIMIC Directorate of Major Operational Army Formations:** CIMIC personnel in the staff of major formations appropriately structured in order to perform joint operations. Furthermore, it is possible depending on the operational planning, to assign CIMIC staff to Units and formations of tactical level.

c. **The Hellenic CIMIC Unit** which is equipped for CIMIC tasks and participates in national and international exercises. In case of a national emergency it will support the staff of engaged national forces.

The HNDGS is supporting the MNCG to which it is a member, with staff and the Hellenic CIMIC Unit.

1.3.2 **CIMIC Training**

The following CIMIC training is available in the Greek Army:

a. The Hellenic CIMIC Unit apart from its annual training schedule for its personnel organizes an annual 3 weeks national CIMIC training course open to all Greek Military personnel. During this course, following the international standards, the attendants receive training upon subjects including (but not limited to):

i. CIMIC staff core functions (Liaison, Civil Assessment, Project Management).

ii. Civil environment in the theater of operations.

iii. Meetings

iv. Negotiations

v. Working with interpreters

vi. Law of Armed Conflict

vii. Humanitarian Concepts and Principles

viii. Cultural awareness

ix. Gender awareness

x. Civilian mass movements- IDP’s

xi. IO’s-NGO’s etc.

Different civil organizations and NGO’s participate in the training by providing lectures or volunteers during simulation scenarios.

b. The Hellenic Multinational Peace Support Operations Training Center, among other trainings concerning the interaction with civilian actors, provides a CIMIC course, with similar training. The course is open to national and international English speaking military personnel and civilians (MPSOTC, 2017).
CHAPTER TWO
CIMIC in Peace Support & Crisis Response Operations

In the previous chapter we defined CIMIC and CMI and examined the evolution of these aspects through time. In the present chapter we will examine how these terms were applied in different Peace Support and Crisis Response Operations (CRO). At the same time by examining existing literature we will try to determine through the ‘lessons learned’ of such operations the positive aspects of CIMIC which render it as a necessity in conflicts or humanitarian interventions, the problematic which have been identified on the field, as well as suggestions that have been formed by scholars in order to improve the cooperation.

2.1 Milestone Peace Support & Crisis Response Operations

For the above mentioned purpose recent conflicts (Post Cold War Era) will serve as an example for which extensive research has been conducted and existing literature is sufficient to draw conclusions on the CIMIC aspects of the operations. These conflicts occurred in different parts of the world and resulted in mass movements of civilians, which necessitated the deployment of both military and civilian aspects in order to handle the crisis. They are milestones in the simultaneous deployment of humanitarian agencies and armed forces. The first one constitutes the first UN humanitarian operation with a parallel application of force during which an initial introduction of Armed Forces and Humanitarian Organizations under a common mission was conducted, putting to challenge their very core values. The second one serves for many as a good example of cooperation, at least during its emergency phase. The third one is one of the most recent operations which combines all the accumulated knowledge and experience upon the cooperation and may set the grounds for future peace support operations (Klingebiel & Roehder, 2004)

2.1.1 Somalia (1992)

On January 27, 1991 the oppressive dictatorship of General Siad Barre was toppled. The rebel factions, without a common enemy turned against each other. The president that was appointed had no real power or influence due to overwhelming political and financial problems resulting in the loss of control of the capital Mogadishu a few months later. (Drysdale, 1997). In the chaos that followed, government offices, foreign embassies, schools and even hospitals were looted and destroyed. Agriculture and food distribution were disrupted and competition for resources escalated the violence, pushing Somalia further into a state of anarchy. The resulting famine affected hundreds of thousands of Somalis, who suffered from starvation as much as from the sporadic outbreaks of violent gunfights. By mid-March 300,000 Somalis had died, 3,000

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3 Non Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (NA5CRO) include multifunctional operations, falling outside the scope of Article 5 (Collective defense), which contribute to conflict prevention and resolution or serve humanitarian purposes, and crisis management in the pursuit of declared Alliance objectives. One principal difference between Article 5 operations and NA5CRO is that there is no formal obligation for NATO nations to take part in a NA5CRO. (NATO, AJP 3.4(A) Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations, 2010).
were dying daily, 500,000 had fled to refugee camps in neighboring countries, and 70 percent of the livestock had been killed (Rutherford, 2008).

The situation in Somalia resulted in the intervention of the UN in April 1992. Operation UNOSOM I was initiated by the deployment of 50 unarmed monitors and a 500 member security force to escort humanitarian deliveries. Failure of the operation to oversee the ceasefire and for the majority of aid to reach its end receiver resulted in the deployment by the US of United Task Force (UNITAF) in December 1992 under the operation “Restore Hope”. 30,000 US troops and 10,000 soldiers from other countries were deployed. (Rutherford, 2008) The operation’s goal was to create a protected environment for conducting humanitarian operations in Somalia. It lasted until May 1993 when UN launched UNOSOM II to replace the first two. This new mission emphasized the importance of disarmament and arms control while continuing to secure transport and communication routes for the distribution of humanitarian aid. This mission ended in failure. It was characterized by the violent hunt for one particular Somali warlord, General Aideed, as well as significant number of UN troop deaths. Eventually, the Somali people, disappointed by the failure of the UN to disarm the warlords, actually began to support the factional leaders. On 4 November 1994 after peacemaking efforts by UN troops had clearly failed, the Security Council voted to withdraw all forces (Domansky, 2012).

Saving Somalia with a humanitarian relief operation and the attempting to build a functioning and stable state was an enormous mission. It was a cooperative effort that involved militaries from more than thirty countries and a range of NGO’s\(^4\) UN agencies and the ICRC. The Somalia mission was a kind of laboratory for the testing of a multilateral position. The US and UN humanitarian and military actions in Somalia teach valuable lessons because there are very limited instances of internationally approved interventions without consent. Problems encountered in Somalia during the interventions redefined UN procedures and future US interventions. Somalia was the first international action in an imploded state after the Cold War, and also the first time the UN negotiated with non state actors on humanitarian and security issues (Rutherford, 2008). Duffey marks upon the mission: ‘the operations in Somalia exposed serious organizational culture differences between the military and the diversity of civilian agencies’ (Duffey, 2000). With respect to the international relief organizations, the UN experience created crisis of identity and brought home the uncertainty, dangers and benefits of working under a UN enforcement operation. According to Makinda, the dilemma raised was whether the relief agencies should remain silent when UN military operations violate human rights or whether they should speak out on behalf of the people they have gone to help (Makinda, 1998).

In terms of CIMIC Somalia served as a good example of how security of the aid is a valuable asset as several NGO’s discovered over 80% of food supplies were lost as a result of misappropriation or theft. This decision of armed escort of supplies would receive criticism in the future. As the president of ICRC stated in 1997: ‘In Somalia when faced with the urgent needs of hundreds of thousands of starving civilians it had to take the exceptional decision to place convoys under the protection of armed militias. That experience taught us, however, that such arrangements have serious drawbacks in the long term’ (Sommaruga, 1997). Moreover many NGO’s started operations after the military intervention, lacking both the experience and knowledge of the country, or even what had taken place before their arrival. The result was poor coordi-

\(^4\) The number on NGO’s involved according to Fragkonikolopoulos reached 78. (Φραγκονικολόπουλος, 2007).
nation partly stemming from the unwillingness to consult those with knowledge of the situation. (Abiew, NGO-Military Relations in Peace Operations, 2003) The Armed Forces on the other hand expressed towards the NGO’s an attitude of being the security situation experts, thus demanding authority which was counterproductive as the military were less knowledgeable about the cultural, social, and political realities of the situation. Finally, the attempt to apprehend the warlord Mohammed Aideed, was viewed at least by his supporters as the US and UNOSOM taking sides in the conflict. Consequently, NGOs feared this loss of neutrality would make them targets, and this was borne out with the attack on World Vision personnel by militias as an expression of displeasure with the US-led enforcement action. (Byman, 2001)

2.1.2 Kosovo (1999)

On March 23, 1999 NATO initiated air strikes against the Former Republic of Yugoslavia after the violation of cease fire between the Serbian Armed Forces and Kosovar Liberation Army (KLA). The former were accused of ethnic cleansing against Kosovo Albanians, while the later demanded autonomy of Kosovo. The next day operation “Allied Force” began (Perlez, 1999) against the Serbian forces, together with an increased response from the Serbian Army. The above led to a massive refugee outflow towards Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Within hours of the initial bombings, the ICRC reported that 13,919 refugees had crossed the border with FYROM. By March 29, refugees were entering FYROM at a rate of 4,000 per hour and the numbers were growing. Although FYROM stated that it would not allow more than 20,000 refugees, by April 7, over 130,000 Kosovar Albanians had entered the country.

Albania, one of Europe’s poorest countries, also faced an unexpected influx of refugees. Within 48 hours of the initial NATO bombings, over 60,000 refugees had crossed its borders and after six weeks, 422,000 refugees had entered the country. In total 1.3 million Kosovars fled their country, causing a refugee crisis for which not only the neighboring countries, but also the international relief agencies were highly unprepared. (Szczygiel, 2004)

While UNHCR had been unofficially considered the leading agency for resolving the crisis, it soon became apparent that the security concerns and the scale of flows exceeded its capabilities, as well as those of other civilian agencies. Thus on April 8, NATO officially commenced the humanitarian mission “Operation Allied Harbor” by deploying 8,000 troops to Albania and 1,200 US marines to FYROM for the immediate construction of camps. The production and running of these camps involved a great deal of coordination and cooperation between NATO, UNHCR and NGO’s. NATO forces usually constructed a camp, ensured the presence of necessary facilities, admitted waiting refugees and then turned control of the camp over to UNHCR or an NGO. (ICRC/ International Federation Steering Group, 2000)
Though the operation “Allied Harbor” is described by many as a successful example of civilian and military joint humanitarian effort which is mainly attributed to the clarity of the Army’s role as humanitarian (Szczygiel, 2004), the parallel military operations in Kosovo raised issues in the civilian military cooperation. Some civilian organizations did not wish to cooperate with the UN/NATO forces as they were part of the conflict, thus inevitably any support from the UN would be politicized. MSF later commented on the politicization of aid: “Concretely, this is why we refused any funding from NATO member states for our work in Kosovo. And this is why we were critical then and are critical now of the humanitarian discourse of NATO”. (Orbinski, 2000).

As soon as NATO was engaged in combat against Serbian forces, according to some organizations, civilians were put into risk as Serbian forces attempted to shell NATO refugee camps in Albania. (Szczygiel, 2004). The fact of NATO being belligerent jeopardized the perceived neutrality of the organizations that cooperated with them, and affected their acceptance not only locally but in a wider field. Characteristic is the example in which one of the large NGOs that had operations in Albania encountered a situation subsequently in Angola that compromised its operations in that country because Angolan rebels had seen the NGO working in a refugee camp where NATO forces were also present. In no uncertain terms, the NGO was told ‘we don’t trust you; you’re with NATO’ (Van Baarda, 2001).

Furthermore, discussions were raised, concerning the boundaries of support that the Armed Forces should supply, without compromising or overlapping the missions of civil organizations. Aid agencies often perceived civic action by the military as evidence of the militarization of humanitarianism, claim that it was in direct competition with their work and are critical of its quality and cost-effectiveness. For example the scale of the civic activities of the German brigade in Prizren, Kosovo demonstrated this. The unit had an estimated 5 million DM from government and private sources and was described by another KFOR officer as “acting like a huge NGO doing pro-
jects”. In contrast, other KFOR units usually had fewer resources and some chose to employ their troops by conducting projects that were not priorities for NGOs.

Other examples include the German KFOR contingent’s program of providing 8,000 hot meals per day to Kosovar Albanians, which was criticized for its cost (ineffective) and for creating dependency. Other controversial projects included the construction of unsuitable refugee camps or of expensive ‘state-of-the-art’ houses, problematically located opposite UNHCR tent shelters. Similarly, a large polyclinic constructed by one national military contingent was criticized for functioning at cross-purposes with broader health efforts in the area. Taking stock in October 1999, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata noted “instances in which assistance was provided directly by the military sometimes to gain legitimacy and visibility had undermined co-ordination and deprived civilian humanitarian agencies of effectiveness and clout”. She concluded that “the military should support but not substitute for agencies with humanitarian mandates” (Gourlay, 2000).

During the emergency relief phase of the Kosovo crisis, where the military presence massively outnumbered the civilian presence in the field, states expressed a clear preference for military and bilateral agencies over humanitarian and multilateral ones. British, Greek and German KFOR contingents received grants for projects from their respective bilateral aid ministries which would have normally gone to UN agencies or to NGOs (Gourlay, 2000).

Despite this competitive role of the Army against civilian relief agencies mentioned before, there was also a sentiment among the civil organizations of the Armed Forces trying to control the NGO’s. Brigadier Cross provides the interesting example where military-led meetings were instinctively viewed with suspicion by NGOs, expecting those meetings to be highly structured and for ‘orders’ to be given. Not surprisingly, many NGOs stayed out of those meetings or were reluctant participants, and throughout the NGO community there was a noticeable determination not to be controlled or commanded. The end result was military resources were not optimally utilized (Cross, 2001).

2.1.3 Afghanistan (2001)

On October 7 of 2001, operation “Enduring Freedom” was initiated by the US to counter the terrorist elements in Afghanistan where the Talibans were taking control over the country. Over the next few months the operation was reinforced by the contribution of 20 other nations. The combination of a 3 years on-going drought, previous civil conflict and the inability of humanitarian agencies to provide adequate relief led many Afghans to flee their homes. Some moved to more rural areas, while others to refugee camps along the borders with Pakistan and within Iran. A total of 3.7 million people fled to neighboring countries, while 1.3 million were internally displaced.

While the combat operations were finalized in May 1, 2003 the country was still suffering from insecurity and a destruction of the state structures and infrastructure. The approach to restore these functions in order to allow for the safe return of the refugees and to promote the development of the country was a US plan consisting of Provincial Reconstruction Teams, a plan later backed by more allies. As the Prime Minister of New Zealand put it:

Provincial Reconstruction Teams involve relatively small numbers (50-100) of personnel, and are designed to assist the transitional government under President Karzai expand its influence outside Kabul. The focus is on enhancing the security environ-
ment and promoting the reconstruction effort, while monitoring and assessing civil, political, and military reform efforts through community engagement. A PRT is not a combat unit. It provides a strengthened military observer capacity, which also acts as a centre for the facilitation of NGO and other civilian contributions to reconstruction. Three PRTs have already been established by the United States Central Command and the British will establish a fourth this month. A further four are to be established by September 2003’ (Clark, 2003).

By 2006 the above plan of mixed civilian and military teams had developed to 22 PRT’s led by different countries in different provinces. An assessment conducted by USAID provided for the following feedback:

‘PRTs established in Afghanistan at the end of 2002 were integrated civilian-military organizations designed to meet three objectives: improve security, extend the reach of the Afghan government, and facilitate reconstruction in priority provinces. In keeping with the overall policy environment at the time, the central focus was on maintaining a light international security “footprint” and on building the capacity of Afghan institutions to address instability in remote, ungoverned regions. When the assessment was conducted, 22 PRTs were operating in Afghanistan (see map), 13 managed by the U.S.-led Combined Forces Command, Afghanistan and 9 by the ISAF. Initial guidance on the structure and functions of U.S.-led PRTs was agreed to by senior civilian and military leadership in Afghanistan and approved by the U.S. Deputies Committee in June 2003. The guidance envisioned that civilian representatives and military officers in the PRT would work as a team to assess the environment and develop strategies to achieve the three primary objectives’ (USAID, 2006).

![Picture 2: Areas where PRT’s operated in Afghanistan in 2006. (USAID, 2006)](image)

Both the Counter Insurgency Operations (COIN) conducted by the Military forces as well as the PRT project under the emblem “To Win Hearts and Minds” received a great amount of criticism in terms of CIMIC. The use of aid for political reasons was
seen as violating the International Humanitarian Law and even the long term effectiveness of the projects undertaken was under serious questioning. Moreover it could even undermine the whole counterinsurgency operations. (Williamson, 2011)

The civilian actors were put under grave risk by the encroachment of the military into the humanitarian space which blurred the lines between the two, while civilian aid workers were targeted, as the provision of aid after the fall of Taliban was perceived as politicized. (MSF, Doctors without borders shocked by killing of 5 staff in Afghanistan, 2004) US soldiers were condemned by humanitarians for conducting operations in civilian clothing (Sridhar, 2009) while there were cases of locals refusing aid from organizations as they were perceived as western allies. Despite efforts by NGOs to minimize any such negative perception, the 2008 agreement signed by 100 NGOs and NATO’s ISAF to clearly distinguish civilian activities from the military’s actions against insurgents, supposedly went unnoticed by the Taliban: ‘We have no idea about these guidelines and were never part of the process which produced them, ‘…We only respect truly neutral and independent aid organizations which do not work at the behest of American and Western forces’ (Williamson, 2011).

In April 2009, sixteen NGOs involved in humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan addressed a letter to NATO and the relevant heads of state, urging NATO troops clearly to distinguish military actions from humanitarian activities, as a means of protecting Afghan civilians and aid workers. The NGOs underscored how important it was that military forces should not use relief or development activities to attempt to win people’s hearts and minds for tactical, counter-insurgency or other military objectives, and that the military should refrain from relief activities when there are civilian actors capable of delivering assistance (ibid.).

2.2 Lessons learned for CIMIC in Peace Support and Crisis Response Operations

During all those years of conflicts and international responses, the Armed Forces’ and civilian humanitarian organizations’ interaction has been put to test under various types of Peace Support and Crisis Response Operations and different mandates. The main observations of this co-existence in the fields of crises, after examining part of the overwhelming existing literature, are presented below.

2.2.1 Positive aspects of CIMIC

As it is obvious from all the modern crises there is a need for the Army to coordinate with the civilian organizations on the field and sometimes to cooperate. There are certain benefits for each side and overall for the benefit of the populations that their missions serve.

a. Security

The armed forces can provide security to the aid supplies, storage facilities, escort to the supply routes and distribution points of humanitarian missions as well as to the personnel of civilian organizations (Abiew, From CIVIL strife to CIVIC society: NGO-Military cooperation in Peace operations, 2003). Many organizations though prefer to minimize as much as possible the armed security as it could jeopardize their perceived neutrality, especially if the army is belligerent, as it could result in the totally opposite effects, thus targeting the organizations (Jenny, 2001; Sommaruga, 1997)
b. Exchange of Information
Even though the Army is reluctant in exchanging information with civilians due to confidentiality restrictions, there are certain minimums which are necessary for both. For example, the Army can provide regular updates on possible combat zones, mined areas, and other safety-related issues that are of primary importance to civilians (Jenny, 2001). On the other hand, the NGO’s need to provide the Army with the positioning of their installations in order to avoid being targeted, or even inform them about possible mass movements of civilians or other humanitarian issues which could occur into their areas of operations or could affect it.

c. Limited Capacity of NGO’s
Recent years have seen the emergence of humanitarian crises of such scale and suddenness that aid organizations found themselves overwhelmed. In the most extreme cases, they called upon international military forces to build refugee camps as well as to provide badly needed logistics, in particular airlift (Jenny, 2001). In this, we could include the reconstruction of critical infrastructure and provision of material and equipment. Armies do normally have big capacity of equipment, vehicles, and workman force and can deploy in a disciplined manner much faster than any civil organization. (Franke, 2006)

d. Privileged positioning of the Army
The military may themselves be better placed to deliver much needed humanitarian assistance, especially in newly secured areas where aid agencies have yet to arrive (Williamson, 2011). It could also be the only actor to be able to reach certain areas due to terrain or security restrictions.

e. Desirable End State
Aid workers play a substantial role in the success of a military mission because they contribute to restoring normal living conditions for the local population. Their action will encourage a rebirth of civil society and encourage the resurgence of social-economic relations between former warring parties. The better humanitarian workers will be able to do their job, the sooner it will be possible to phase out the military, thus contributing to a timely pullout of the troops (Jenny, 2001).

2.2.2 Problematic of CIMIC
As discussed before, the cooperation and coordination of the Armed Forces with civilian organizations is both beneficial and necessary. Its implementation though has surfaced differences between the two, which rendered its feasibility on the ground from difficult, under certain circumstances, to nonexistent.

a. Neutrality- Impartiality
The concept of neutrality and impartiality is most likely the wave flag of those opposing to cooperate with the armed forces. This perception though, is well based on the fact that this very concept is what protects the civilian humanitarians on the field and legitimizes their work. It can be compromised in several ways and thus the organizations are safeguarding it as a core value. Some threats to this value include:

i. Politicization of the Humanitarian Aid: The 2011 ICRC report on contemporary challenges to IHL noted that, where parties to an armed conflict perceive ‘human-
itarian operations as instruments of military or political agendas, access to the populations in need will be rendered more difficult, and the security of humanitarian workers will be ‘seriously jeopardized’. The ICRC Director General likewise emphasized that ‘aid must be prioritized and allocated strictly on the basis of humanitarian needs, not on political, military or economic objectives’ Humanitarians are not the only ones targeted as a result of the aid being used to serve strategic goals; civilians also pay a high price. It has been suggested that insurgents have attacked villages that have accepted such aid, in retaliation for ‘collaborating’ with the enemy. Even talking with US and NATO forces make local communities fearful of reprisals (Williamson, 2011).

ii. Level of cooperation with the Army: The military has traditionally been designed for war in pursuit of national or collective political interests. Forces are paid and trained to use regulated violence to accomplish objectives set by governments. Thus military action is always essentially political in nature (Φραγκονικολόπουλος, 2007), although mission statements may include reference to politically ‘neutral’ humanitarian goals. In contrast, one of the principal purposes of civilian humanitarian organizations is to relieve suffering equally to all on the basis of need. This requires maximum access to all populations which, in turn, demands that the organizations are perceived as being neutral, with no political agenda (Gourlay, 2000). The above difference makes cooperation difficult and even non desired, especially in cases where the Army is a belligerent. The clear distinction between the two has been also expressed by MSF: ‘The humanitarian is not the military, and the military is not the humanitarian. We are not the same, we cannot be seen to be the same, and we cannot be made to be the same. It is also why on the ground, we can work side by side with the presence of armed forces, but certainly not under their authority’ (Orbinski, 2000)

iii. Level of consent of the military mission: ‘…the implications for civil-military co-operation depend on the perceived politicization of the military mission and the level of consent it enjoys from the parties involved. When levels of consent among the local populations run low or the military is perceived as a party to a conflict, civil-military relationships become strained and civilian humanitarians distance themselves from the military. The link between consent and the civil-military relationship is well documented. In 1995 Weiss ranked all recent humanitarian operations in order of consent level, identifying a spectrum of consent with Cambodia, Mozambique and El Salvador at the high end and Bosnia and Somalia at the low end. His findings confirmed that the more closely associated a civilian agency is with an unpopular international military force, the less room for maneuver the agency has and the more problematic the civil-military relations become.’ (Gourlay, 2000)

b. Coordination

One of the major concerns in modern crises is how to coordinate the efforts of civilian actors among them and with those of the Army in order to increase effectiveness. The coordination is sometimes obstructed by the heterogeneity and plethora of NGO’s. Abiew sets it forward ‘The sheer number of humanitarian NGOs often makes it difficult to have an overview of their activities, let alone coordinate them. Reports indicate that some 250 NGOs were operating in the complex emergency in Goma, and about 175 in Kigali in 1994. A similar number currently operate in Kosovo’ (Abiew, NGO-Military Relations in Peace Operations, 2003). The number of international NGO’s raised globally from 135 in 1910 to 375 in 1930 and 427 in 1940. The number of
NGO’s with an international activity raised from 13,000 in 1981 to 47,000 in 2001 and reached 59,003\(^5\) by 2003 (Φραγκονικόλοπουλός, 2007).

c. **Funding**

The funding of the Armed Forces is fixed by the international body that orders the mission and by the governments of the countries where the forces originate from. On the other hand, the source of income of the Civilian Institutions varies and could heavily affect the level of cooperation that it will be willing to apply with the rest of the actors. Some of the ways the funding affects cooperation could be:

i. **Funding Competition:** The competition for high visibility, fund raising requirements, and media coverage makes it difficult for NGOs to agree on a common strategy. The consequences of this competition suggests not only is coordination with the military highly unlikely, but that it also has profound implications for the overall effectiveness of peace missions (Abiew, NGO-Military Relations in Peace Operations, 2003).

ii. **National Agendas:** Different nations participating in humanitarian missions fund either NGO’s or their military delegations, promoting their national goals which they aim to promote. Rather than extant feudal arrangements a single body is necessary to set priorities, to raise and distribute resources, and to co-ordinate emergency inputs but national calls for central co-ordination is disingenuous in light of their desire to wave national flags over assistance rendered (Weiss, 2012). This tendency is also reflected in the rise of bilateral funding (states to national NGO’s who will inevitably follow the national agenda) against multilateral funding (states to multinational organizations that are by mandate neutral). UNHCR estimated that the partner NGOs budget in 1970 was funded 1.5% by national governments while by the end of 1990’s this percentage reached 40%. (Φραγκονικόλοπουλός, 2007)

iii. **Focus of mission:** NGO’s who heavily depend on fund raising may at some point focus on the donors instead of the population in need, in order to sustain themselves, (Reimann, 2006) thus losing focus of the overall mission. Moreover, taking into account the fact that a big percentage of the funds given to humanitarian and developmental NGO’s by the donors, may it be governments or international institutions, are available for fixed time and fixed projects. Thus, often many of them end up chasing the projects instead of addressing the real needs and providing solutions for the people they are supposed to serve. (Φραγκονικόλοπουλός, 2007)

d. **Mutual Lack of Familiarity**

Twenty years ago, Thornberry suggested that ‘In general terms, the problems that exist between humanitarian workers and the military stem from lack of familiarity with one another and with the new kind of tasks they have to undertake, jointly and severally.’ (Thornberry, 1996). This view though, still seems to have some validity. Military Forces lack understanding of the different hierarchies, charters, distinctions, and modes of operation of NGOs, and a lack of recognition that what works with one NGO may not work with another. This makes it difficult for the military to engage in any sort of cooperative arrangements with NGOs. A possible consequence might be the tendency by the military to think they can provide better quality aid. Also, in dealing with issues relating to security, some military personnel act in a hegemonic manner towards the NGOs, typified by the attitude ‘only we understand the security situa-

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\(^5\) These numbers do not represent the total number of NGO’s which is much greater. Tellingly in Russia by 2000 65,000 NGO’s had been created, in France 54,000 by 1987, and 1,000,000 are functioning in India. (Φραγκονικόλοπουλός, 2007)
e. Restrictions in Sharing of Information

NGOs are often unwilling to share information not only among themselves, but also with the military. Although, they are forthcoming with information concerning the needs of suffering people, they are reluctant to share other sensitive information with the military. They will for instance not give information on the host government fearing it might jeopardize their operations in terms of access to crisis areas. Some NGO personnel are concerned that the military seeks information that goes beyond the immediate crisis. On the other hand, the military will not share information with NGOs due to operational secrecy, for example, on issues relating to deployments and capabilities (Byman, 2001). Moreover while NGO’s request from the governments and International Institutions to be clear and accessible, they often do not stand up to this demand themselves. Thus they are often reluctant to publicize information concerning their directors and employees, their source of income and utilization of funds, or internal and external evaluation of their effectiveness. (Φραγκονικολόπουλος, 2007)

f. Different Working Methods

The military forces and humanitarian workers have different working methods deriving from several factors:

i. Structure: Military institutions place a high value on command and control, top-down hierarchical organizational structures and clear lines of authority, discipline and accountability. They place great value on logistics, and substantial resources are dedicated to the acquisition of assets and training of personnel to ensure that they can function independently under the most adverse circumstances. The military’s approach to problem solving is generally directive and coercive. Humanitarian organizations are less hierarchical and more participatory in their style of decision-making and operations than the military. They pay more attention to the process by which they accomplish operations, partly because they attach more importance to long-term impacts, but have fewer back-up resources and engage in less contingency planning to ensure that short-term objectives can be met quickly (Gourlay, 2000).

ii. Institutional Culture: Both the humanitarian organizations and the military agree that cultural incompatibility is frequently one of the main obstacles to effective cooperation. (Studer, The ICRC and civil-military relations in armed conflict, 2001) ‘An army and a humanitarian organization work with fundamentally different rationales. While soldiers respond to clear lines of command, sets of rules and operational orders, aid workers are generally independent minded and retain considerable decision-making power at field level’ (Jenny, 2001). Military and humanitarian organizations find themselves as much connected as separated by the common roots in war’, and the perceived nobility both of dying for one’s country and of saving life; a major difference, however, is that while the military find it easy and morally acceptable to be humanitarian occasionally, the reverse of NGOs taking part in military activities is much less likely (Slim, 1996).

iii. Age of Personnel: Thornberry notes how in missions, NGO workers tended to be much younger than their military counterparts, and this age difference could sometimes reinforce perceived differences of approach. (Thornberry, 1996)

iv. Institutional memory: The frequent rotation of army personnel minimizes the institutional memory of the institution, and thus knowledge, contacts and trust ob-
tained through experience on the field are lost. This fact creates instability in the relationship with both the civilian aid community and the population (Franke, 2006).

2.2.3 Main Recommendations in order to improve CIMIC

a. **Training**

While this seems to be the most commonly used suggestion by scholars, it looks like it has had a significance impact in Armies which have incorporated it. For example, forces such as the Canadians are known for their diplomatic and negotiation skills acquired during extensive training for peacekeeping and implemented according to carefully tailored Rules of Engagement. Similarly, the long history of British experience in low-intensity conflict situations has engendered a familiarity with civil-military interaction and negotiation (Gourlay, 2000). Creating and exploiting training opportunities could result in better understanding and treatment of cultural differences. As such we could include conferences, joint exercises, joint training courses and civil military studying at educational institutions. (Fitz-Gerald & Walthall, 2001, pp. 1-7)

b. **Structure of Military Forces**

The strong presence of CIMIC and civil affairs personnel in operations which demand a degree of CMI has been taking place the past decades. Moreover, the presence of units of civilians or reservists with civilian skills was said to help bridge the cultural gaps between military and civilian institutions and make collaboration easier in Kosovo (Gourlay, 2000).

c. **Institutional Familiarization**

This function could help bridge the structural and cultural gaps and facilitate cooperation (Gourlay, 2000). It has been achieved to a certain point by shared experiences but needs to be sustained and expanded by:

i. **Early Relationships**: It could include early development of relationships, joint education, exercises and planning processes and exchange programmes, where the humanitarian attends military learning opportunities and vice versa. (Spence, 2002)

ii. **Mutual Respect**: Each organization needs an appreciation of the values and principles which motivate and guide the activities of others, and the mandates under which each of them operate. Fostering this greater understanding should reduce the suspicion and resistance to cooperation that sometimes surface during operations (Abiew, From CIVIL strife to CIVIC society: NGO-Military cooperation in Peace operations, 2003)

iii. **Complementarity**: Prospects for any enhanced collaboration should be complementary and based on a clear understanding and respect for each other’s mandates and operating principles (Abiew, NGO-Military Relations in Peace Operations, 2003).

d. **Clear Division of Tasks prior to the deployment**

A strategic approach to humanitarian intervention would involve a division of labor carefully constructed in advance according to the comparative advantages of civilian and military institutions. For example, the primary task of the military could be the provision of security and support for the work of humanitarian organizations would play a secondary role. The provision of direct assistance to civilian populations would only be undertaken in rare cases. Such a division of labor could be agreed in advance
in bilateral and multinational Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) and would ensure that civilian organizations knew the extent and limits of the support they could expect to receive from the military. (Gourlay, 2000). The need to know what can and cannot be achieved, what will and will not be undertaken, by whom and under what circumstances will be important factors in the attempt at having the desired impact on complex emergencies (Abiew, From CIVIL strife to CIVIC society: NGO-Military cooperation in Peace operations, 2003). Though in crisis management many decisions are situation driven, it is essential to have a view of the role of each actor prior to the deployment, as in humanitarian interventions delays in talks and agreements on who is doing what could result in loss of lives. (Lindenberg & Bryant, 2001)

e. **Exchange of Information/Coordination Mechanisms**
To overcome lack of coherence across the entire range of operations in the field, possibilities for cooperation will require the exchange of information at all levels, building on the awareness and understanding established prior to deployment (Abiew, From CIVIL strife to CIVIC society: NGO-Military cooperation in Peace operations, 2003). Civilian interagency Coordination-Information centers had been set up in various missions. They provide information on who is doing what, where and when and provides visibility ‘to empower the doers’. The military could become more involved in initiatives like this, which has enormous potential for providing overall clarity on the role of all the actors and whom they are trying to help (Fitz-Gerald & Walthall, 2001). Such initiatives could foster information categorization and common standards among responders.

f. **Authority Relationships between partners**
As mentioned before, the expertise on different fields of each actor may lead to misperceptions as to the quality of aid that their institution can offer. This sometimes, especially in vague mandates may lead to power struggle among different actors. If not addressed by their mandates, the relation between different organizations should avoid being hierarchical. As Jakobsen suggests, civil-military relations mean ‘creating an effective partnership with civilian agencies and NGOs based on mutual respect and coordination by consensus and not command’. Concerning the administration of humanitarian operations, Pugh’s suggestion that ‘the principle of civilian leadership for civilian relief should be preserved’ (Pugh, 2001) seems to gain ground as there is a growing body of literature which suggests that humanitarian operations which require simultaneous deployment of civilian and military components should be governed by a third, independent authority. The UN tends to be recognized as such, as it bares the capability to command both, is international and bares the consent of several nations. NGO’s tend to acknowledge that role and express more consent to cooperate under its coordinating authority.
3.1 The Evolution of the Syrian Refugee Crisis.

The Syrian Civil War started in 2001, as allegedly peaceful demonstrations of oppositional forces against a suppressive leader, demanding democratization of the country. By the end of the same year the oppositional forces were turned into equipped, ready to take up arms, units. Armed clashes broke up, which during 2012 had escalated to a full Civil War covering most of the Syrian territory. With the number of victims rising up as depicted on the diagram below, the first wave of refugees started fleeing the country.

Diagram 3: Number of deaths per month (BBC, BBC News, 2016).

The first wave of refugees which followed the escalation of the civil war throughout 2012 was relatively small as shown on the second diagram:

Diagram 4: Total Number of registered refugees fleeing Syria per month (Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal, 2016).

The number of refugees increased significantly through 2013 and since then had a steadily increasing rate. Through these years there has been turmoil in the fighting
arena. Internal disputes of opposing forces as well as a lot of different actors joining the fight from abroad. Since then, the number of actors in Syria kept rising with ISIS emerging at the end of 2014, radicalizing the battlefield. The majority of the refugees fled to camps in satellite countries as depicted in the diagram:

Diagram 5: Number of refugees per receiving countries (Economist, 2015).

The above diagram depicts the amount of refugees received by satellite countries as well as the great difference between 2013 and 2015. To understand at which point this fleeing turned into a realistic problem for Europe it is considered useful to examine the following diagram which depicts the evolution of asylum applications in Europe from 2011 to 2015:

Diagram 6: Number of asylum seekers in Europe per year (Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal, 2016)

As we notice, assuming that the asylum applications in Europe represent the magnitude of the influx, even though the civil war started back in 2011, the influx is
reaching a concerning point for Europe only at the beginning of 2015. This could be attributed to five main factors:

i. Inability of the refugee camps and satellite countries of Syria to provide efficient living conditions and host the magnitude of the influx. (Voon (UNHCR), 2014), (UNHCR, UNHCR: Total Number of Syrian Refugees exceed four million for first time, 2015)

ii. The ratification of the battlefield by the emerge of ISIS leading to the disregard of human life and dignity, both from governmental and opposing forces. (Prifti, 2015)

iii. The intensification of the battles by the active participation of various actors.

iv. The prolonged period of the civil war causing uncertainty to the population and unwillingness to return to Syria. (Prifti, 2015)

v. The change of policy and the opening of an official escape “corridor” towards Europe. (Kingsley, What caused the Refugee Crisis? You asked Google-Here’s the Answer, 2015)

3.2 The Eastern Mediterranean Route

In the first months of 2015, following the developments of the Syrian War, the flow of moving populations changed its main route into Europe from Libya - Italy to Turkey-Greece. The trip from that south western corner of Europe was much shorter and bared less risk in the sea (Kingsley, The Guardian, 2015). As countries like Italy and Greece struggled to cope with overwhelming demand on their administration, many people carried on to other European nations on their journey or delayed the process until they arrive in their final destination (Dearden, 2015) for which one of the reasons was choosing to apply for asylum in countries where they would receive more welfare benefits. (FRONTEX, Annual Risk Analysis, 2015)
of them arrived on several Greek islands, most on Lesvos. The number increased gradually from January to March, but began to climb in April, peaking at 216,000 in October. Many factors underpin the growing popularity of the route, both push and pull. People smuggling has developed into an important industry in Turkey, with networks active not just in Istanbul but also Izmir, Edirne and Ankara. The nationalities of people smugglers vary, frequently mirroring the nationality of their customers. The relaxation of Turkey’s visa rules towards many African countries has created another pull factor for migrants from this continent, who arrive in Turkey by plane before attempting entry into EU.” (FRONTEX, Eastern Mediterranean Route)

3.3 Greece’s Context During the Influx

Apart from the financial crisis which was already unfolding in Greece, there was political instability also, fact which hindered taking effective measures and utilising EU funds. In a period of 1 year there were two general elections held (January 2015 and September 2015) which were accompanied by rotation of leaders as well as ministerial responsibilities. (Prifi, 2015).

The EU plan to confront the influx was a hot spot approach decided in May and September 2015 as already implemented in Italy and a draft timetable for functioning was sent by Commissioner Avramopoulos on July 2015 (European Commission). The exact plan which was decided later, was to set up 5 hot spots on the islands of Lesvos, Kos, Chios, Leros and Samos where the arriving populations would be screened and registered and two relocation centers in the mainland where the incoming population would stay for a few days until their onward movement was processed. At the same time the relocation scheme, as a means to distribute the asylum seeking process equally among state members was declared during a conference of the EU’s foreign and interior ministers in May 2015, and was voted on 22 September 2015 (EU Council, 2015). While a first emergency fund of 30 million Euros would be made available to Greece provided that an authority that would be able to overview the fund would be created (Stup, 2015).

**Picture 4:** Syrian and Afghan refugees on a dinghy, wave as they approach the Greek island of Lesvos Sept 3, 2015. Photo: Reuters. (TODAY, 2015)
The Asylum Service of Greece had surpassed since May its capabilities to cope with the demands for asylum applications (Αντωνόπουλος, 2015) and anticipated reinforcements in personnel and funds both from the Greek state as well as the EU.

As depicted from the reports of various actors like Frontex and UNHCR, mentioned before, the rise on the influx of refugees and immigrants into Greece was foreseen, at least by the beginning of the year. By the summer of 2015 the situation on the islands of Lesvos, Kos and Chios was turning desperate with totally inadequate facilities. UNHCR’s Europe director appealed to the EU partners to ease the burden and Greece to lead and coordinate, Frontex did not receive enough pledges of assets from EU states to help Greece, while the Greek Prime Minister declared that the problem surpassed Greece’s abilities and that the country economic problems meant it was facing a humanitarian “crisis within a crisis”. (BBC, Migrant ‘chaos’ on Greek islands- UN Refugee Agency, 2015)

From the first signs of the influx on the Greek islands in the beginning of May 2015, the situation was primarily handled in humanitarian aspect, by local initiatives, volunteering citizens, local or national departments of international organizations (like MSF, MDM, Red Cross etc) and monitored by UNHCR (UNHCR, 2015). In August
when the situation started getting out of hand, after an official appeal of the Greek state, all major aid-providing organizations were fully deployed in operations together with a number of local NGO’s driven by citizens’ initiatives which soon were followed by appeals of the organizations towards their international bodies for support, since it was clear that the magnitude of the influx could not be dealt with national resources (Proimos, 2016). Though the Greek society responded impressively to the calls for help of the organizations the situation was overwhelming. Little resources and no coordination were among the main problems, with official state representation being absent as many declared (Meaker, 2015) (Smith-Spark, Elaine, & CNN, 2015).

By August 2015 the refugee crisis in Greece had spilled over to FYROM and Serbia with the former declaring a state of emergency on its borders with Greece, trapping thousands of refugees on the borderline. In the meantime appeals were made towards the Greek government to set up proper reception and registration points and start effectively utilizing European funds. (Amnesty International, 2015) International public attention was dramatically drawn, by the picture of drown Aylan Kurdi in September 2015. “The effect of that awakening was to tip the entire humanitarian complex toward Greece, sending resources tumbling out of the developing world into the European Union. It prompted an unprecedented number of international volunteers to descend on the country, the UN refugee agency to declare an emergency inside the European Union, and the EU to deploy its own humanitarian response unit inside Europe for the first time.” (Howden & Fotiadis, 2017).

![Illustration of EU reacting to the picture of drowned Aylan Kurdi](image)

**Picture 8:** Illustration of EU reacting to the picture of drowned Aylan Kurdi depicts the public outcry that followed the event (Chappatte, 2015).

By mid November though an influx of minor organizations and international citizens’ initiatives was marked on the islands. By end of November there were 80 differ-
ent NGO’s deployed on Lesvos Island alone. In such events of crisis, there is an urgent need of having central coordinating authority who can register, certify and coordinate on the ground the incoming organizations and moreover the individual volunteers’ (Proimos, 2016). There was no such supervising authority in Greece and especially in Lesvos Island, leading in chaos at aid providing. (Georgiopoulou, 2015).

A volunteer from an international organization who participated in missions in Lesvos described the situation as such:

“A lot of uncontrolled and ineffectively trained individuals mainly coming from abroad, deployed themselves ashore, self-proclaiming areas of responsibility. The fact averted professionally trained voluntary teams from reaching those areas in order to avoid conflict. Fund raising organizations, with privately owned media equipment, would over react in front of their cameras, by grabbing to rescue children out of the boats, separating them from the rest of the families adding to their anxiety, aiming at dramatic scenes of aid providing. Later when the incoming flow of boats started being scarce, they would race in the sea in order to tow the incoming boat to their privately set up gulf to capture the life-saving moments, sometimes disregarding human life and dignity. After the incident of the shipwreck of 28th of October 2015, all the aid providers were gathered after a call from the local authorities to provide their medical credentials. Only two of them had certified doctors” (Anonymous, 2016).

Questions started rising among the Greek media concerning the role and way of conduct of foreign NGO’s and international volunteers (Georgiopoulou, 2015), leading in January 2016 in an extensive and thorough investigation of the police authorities. Many NGO’s were ousted as non-certified and some international individual volunteers were arrested and charged for possession of drugs and illegal transportation of people in the country (allegedly they were towing dinghies ashore) (in.gr, 2016).

Concerning the implementation of the EU plan for hot spots, certain shortfalls occurred both from the Greek government as well as from the EU state members (Commission, Managing the refugee crisis: State of Play of the Implementation of the Priority Actions, 2015). These delays were underlined by the EU and with the number of arrivals still high it issued a deadline for the construction of hotspots in Greece. (Commission, Progress Report on the Implementation of the hotspots in Greece, 2015). In the meantime the humanitarian crisis, apart from the islands, had hit the Greece-FYROM borders at the crossing point of Idomeni where asylum seekers started accumulating after the restriction of movement from FYROM authorities against all other nationalities except Syrians, Afghans and Iraqis (Tsartanis, 2015). With the humanitarian crisis evolving and a deadline reaching to its end, the Greek government requested the participation of the Ministry of Defense in order to coordinate and speed up the process.

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6 It is worth mentioning for later use concerning the publicity race of some aid providers that at the same time, on the informal Camp of Eidomeni, Northern Greece, where the need for volunteers and aid was even greater the number of total IO’s and NGO’s did not exceed 8. (Proimos, 2016)
3.4 The Mandate of the Hellenic Armed Forces

The Hellenic Armed Forces were already locally involved in responding to the refugee influx since August 2015 by providing three former military camps on the islands of Lesvos, Leros and Kos, provision of heavy machinery and services for ground works in the hot spots and preparation of meals for part of the hosted population, while navy ships were constantly participating in search and rescue operations. (Nedos, 2015) (HNDGS, 2015).

Officially the participation of the Ministry of Defense in coordinating the escalating issue was declared in February 2016 after a joint decision of the Ministry of Interior, Defense, Finance and Naval Issues and the details of its participation were published in the Governmental Newspaper on 09 March 2016. (ΦΕΚ 630, 2016). According to its provisions the Central Coordination Cell for the Refugee Issue would be set up under the command of the chief of HNDGS and would be established in the premises of the HNDGS. Its role would be to administrate and coordinate, in cooperation with the Asylum Service and First Reception Service, the actions in order to effectively deal with the issues which arose due to the refugee and migrant flows in the country, strictly concerning the transportation, accommodation, food and medical provisions of the refugees and migrants.

The same publication provided for the establishment of Local Coordination Cells for the Refugee Issue. These would operate locally, on the sites, would fall hierarchically under the command of the Central Coordination Cell and would be administered by senior army officers. They would be comprised of army personnel, police officers, coast guards, personnel of the prefectures and other civilian authorities. Their mission was to administrate and coordinate, in cooperation with the asylum service and first reception service, the necessary actions in order to effectively deal with the issues which would arise due to the refugee and migrant flows in the country, strictly concerning the transportation, accommodation, food and medical provisions of the refugees and migrants.
3.5 Special Characteristics of the Operation

The main characteristics of the Army’s participation were:

a. The Greek Armed Forces were not belligerent and thus their mission was strictly humanitarian.

b. The Armed forces would operate in the interior of their origin country. This fact, together with the order provided by the inter-ministerial decision legitimized the mission.

c. Greece is a stable state. Both the government and services were established and working. That meant the Army had to coordinate and cooperate, as tasked by its mandate, both with the Asylum Service, as with the First Reception Service which have their own chain of command in place as well as the rest of state services, IO’s and NGO’s with which it would cooperate. Moreover, the Ministry which was in charge of the whole operation and responsible for the final decisions was the Ministry of Interior (later transformed into Ministry of Migration). That meant that the Armed Forces were one of the actors participating in a comprehensive approach to confront the crisis and not the primary responder.

d. The first responder for issues of security in the interior during peace time is the police. This fact meant that the Army would not have to deal with security issues of the Camps thus the personnel would not have to carry weaponry or military gear.

By these terms only, the above operation would fall into the category of Civil Emergency Plans operations making Civil-Military interaction a standardized and well applied function. (Jenny, 2001) There were special characteristics though which differentiated it.

a. The extent and nature of the issue surpassed both the capabilities as well as the authority of Civil Emergency Planning directorate. That meant that a different format of coordination, chain of command and assets had to be implemented, other than those normally used during CEP, leading to the ad hoc system of coordination described in the previous paragraph. That for military meant involving many more assets of different levels and at various locations by the establishment of coordination cells at central and local levels to which they would have to provide staff, as well as provision of personnel, machinery, material and contracting for the construction of camps and provision of services, vehicles and personnel for transportation, medical personnel and equipment for the medical support, and finally installations, personnel and later contracting procedures for the food provision.

b. The Armed Forces, apart from the usual support through their capacity in building, machinery and transportation when assisting in CEP, they would have to provide staff in key positions of coordinating and cooperating with civilian actors in their country of origin, given the fact that those actors are well established and with a working chain of command of their own. Thus though they would lead the coordination cells, their institution would not be the primary responder.
c. The deployed forces would have to go beyond Camp construction and deal with population of various nationalities, other than their own; this meant that they would confront both cultural gap and language barriers normally met in operations abroad.

d. Big percentage of the population was fleeing war torn zones, being forced by their own national armies. Moreover the hosted population was widely diverse in terms of nationality, gender and age. In order to minimize any perception of “militarized camps” and possible frustration of hosted population, the conduct of the Army would have to be different than the one it was used to during operations or daily conduct while running military camps.

All these factors led to a kind of Civilian-Military Interaction challenges which had never been faced before. The cooperation that was established bore all the characteristics of Military Forces supporting its own state’s civil services, which is a well-founded mechanism during CEP, but also bore characteristics which were never met before in the interior of the country and most of them, would be normally met in operations abroad. As mentioned in, CIMIC during Peace Support and Crisis Response Operations has been extensively studied and analyzed both by military and civil scholars contrary to CMI in Operations in the interior of stable states, due to the fact that it mostly concerned CEP, and has been considered practiced, well established and subsequently the less problematic (Jenny, 2001). For these reasons the case of the contribution of the Hellenic Army in confronting the refugee issue in Greece, due to its special characteristics, consists a field worth studying of, in the spectrum of civilian-military interaction. We will try to examine some parameters of this interaction through a case study approach of the Open Reception Center of Diavata on the next Chapter.

3.6 Overall Contribution of the Hellenic Armed Forces

In order to have a clearer view of the magnitude of the Armed Forces participation and the implementation of its mandate, it is considered useful to mention the overall contribution of the Hellenic Armed Forces from February 2016, when the Central Coordination Cell of Refugee Issue was established, until the summer 2017 (the operation is still ongoing). According to the Central Coordination Cell:

“The extremely urgent commitments which Greece undertook in order to confront the refugee issue, concerned the establishment of Reception Centers (widely known as Hot Spots). Even though the construction of some of them was in progress, the timetable of finalizing the works was surpassing the acceptable dates of the E.U. to which Greece had already committed. Apart from the 5 Hot Spots that should be completed or initialize their construction on the islands of Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Leros and Kos, two more Open Reception and Temporary Accommodation Refugee Centers (Relocation Centers) should be established in the mainland in locations which until the beginning of 2016 had not yet been identified. In the meantime the refugee and migration flows were still increasing daily.

Under these urgent circumstances, it was considered necessary to engage the Armed Forces, in order to deal immediately and effectively with the specific humanitarian issue and to fulfill the obligations of the country towards the EU. The participation of the Armed Forces, in cooperation and coordination with the
Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Citizen’s Protection provided for the secure, fast and effective management of the refugee and migrant flows.

The Ministry of Defense, through the HNDGS, initially undertook on 2\textsuperscript{nd} of February 2016, to accomplish by the 15\textsuperscript{th} of February 2016 the following:

a. The finalization and initial functioning of the 5 Reception Centers (Hot Spots) on the islands of Kos, Leros, Lesvos, Chios and Samos.
b. The quest, evaluation and selection of the locations for the settlement of the 2 Open Temporary Refugee Reception and Accommodation Centers (Re-location Centers).

The Armed Forces immediately offered two former army camps in order to host the two above mentioned Centers. Specifically there were offered: one former camp in the area of Schisto in the province of Attica and one former camp in Diavata in the province of Thessaloniki. Furthermore, in coordination with the Asylum Service and the First Reception Service, the Armed Forces undertook the administration and coordination of the actors in functioning the above mentioned sites, as well as the provision of personnel, means and services in order to facilitate the food provision, medical care and transportation of the hosted population in the above sites.

The Armed Forces through immediate and coordinated actions managed to complete the above tasks which included the initial functioning of the 4 out 5 First Reception Centers (Accommodation Capacity: 5350 persons) and the construction of the two Open Temporary Refugee Reception and Accommodation Centers (Total capacity of 2966 persons) in only two-weeks’ time. The fifth Reception Center on the island of Kos was finalized and handed over shortly after two months.

The constantly growing number of incoming refugee and migrant flows, in combination with the shutting down of the neighboring Balkan borders, necessitated the continuance of the involvement of the Armed Forces even after the successful completion of the above task. The new mission of the Armed Forces included the establishment of new temporary accommodation centers in the mainland in order to decongest the islands, which were receiving the vast majority of new arrivals and to provide humane living conditions to the refugees and migrants who were staying in the mainland of Greece.

In total, since the participation of the Armed Forces in confronting the refugee issue, until summer 2017, the HNDGS through the Central Coordination Cell of Refugee Issue, had coordinated the actions of constructing fifty (50) accommodation sites with a total capacity of 45,000 spots, while at the time (August 2017), thirty (30) sites were functioning in the mainland and five (5) First Reception and Identification Centers, together with their accommodation sites on the islands of the Eastern Aegean (Lesvos, Chios, Samos, Leros, Kos). While in waiting of the full implementation of the EU-Turkey agreement, new challenges were rising, which demanded constant awareness of the already functioning sites. There was a titanic, but invisible to the majority of the public, constant effort applied daily, for the maintenance, good and secure functioning of all the above sites, as well as for the continuous and uninterrupted provision of the basic electricity, potable water and sewage networks. The role of the Armed Forces extended further than construction and functioning of the sites, by provision of fuel, hygiene items and raw food material to municipalities which organized and run accommodation sites on their own responsibility.
Until summer 2017 the overall contribution in handling the migrant/refugee issue had been, in terms of numbers, as follows:

a. From the first months of 2016 and until the gradual hand over of the food provision to catering services, the Armed forces had prepared and delivered by their own means approximately 1,000,000 daily portions of food (1 daily portion=3 meals per day). In total up to date, under the responsibility of the Armed Forces (both by own means and contracted catering companies) more than 15,000,000 daily food portions had been delivered.

b. 25 doctors and 18 nurses were daily dispatched to contribute to the medical services of the sites.

c. Approximately 1,500 transportations had been conducted carrying a total of 17,000 tons of supplies.

d. Provided workforce in order to set up 5,000 tents and 3,000 Refugee Housing Units.

e. More than 45,000 accommodation slots had been created.

It is noted that as since of 01st of May 2017 the Ministry of Migration Policy had been gradually engaging organizations and NGO’s (in the context of a broader European program) in taking over the provision of certain services in the sites such as payment of water, sewage and electricity, rent of locations, cleaning services, maintenance services, as well as food provision via cash assistance” (Central Coordination Cell for the Migrant/Refugee Issue, 2017).
CHAPTER FOUR
Case Study of Diavata Center

As mentioned in paragraph 3.5 the case of the Civilian-Military Interaction on resolving the refugee issue in Greece, bore special characteristics which made it worth studying. Above all is that though the operation followed the basic standards of CEP, it combined segments of Peace Support Operations and required the Army to adapt to a clearly humanitarian role. The fact that there is a lack of literature concerning the cooperation of the Army with civilian actors in such a context, led to the decision of researching and documenting this relationship on the ground. To do so we will case study the Civil Military Interaction in the Open Accommodation Center of Diavata. In order to better understand the context of the research and the Civilian – Military Interaction in the Camp, it is considered useful to examine the data of the specific Center.

4.1 Diavata Center History

“Anagnostopoulou Camp” covered an area of 49,494 square meters on the western outskirts of Thessaloniki, 2 km away from the town of Diavata.

![Picture 10: Location of former “Anagnostopoulou Camp” (Google Maps, 2017).](image)

It used to be a military Camp until 2011, when after gradually evacuating it, the Army completely removed the last of its personnel and equipment. It was totally abandoned but still property of the National Defense Bureau, which had the ownership of the camp, until February 2016, when the Ministry of Defense passed to the Ministry of Interior the rights of exploiting the area for the purposes of establishing an open temporary refugee accommodation site. On the 2\textsuperscript{nd} of February 2016 forces of the 3\textsuperscript{rd}
Army Corps stationed in the province of Thessaloniki received the order of reforming the abandoned site into an asylum seekers open temporary-accommodation site in a two weeks time. The initial purpose was to host stranded population for a few days, while later to accommodate the population until their asylum application was processed or until their relocation to apartments-hotels, depending on the individual’s case.

**Picture 11:** Ruins in the former “Anagnostopoulou Camp” (APE-MPE, 2016).

The Army units initiated works in the Camp, which included: removal of garbage and debris, landscape formation (plantation, laying of gravel, ground slopes etc.), renovation of the existing buildings, installation of networks (electricity, water, sewage, and communications), setting up of tents and refugee housing units provided by UNHCR and Greek Civil Emergency Service (for which UNHCR provided initial training to key personnel for construction as well as guidance during implementation of services), installation of hygiene equipment (toilets, showers, garbage bins) and security assets (fencing, lighting, installation of signs, fire extinguishers, speaker system etc.).

**Pictures 12&13:** Ground Works (Exhibited 3rd Army Corps photos).

**Pictures 14&15:** Network Installations (Exhibited 3rd Army Corps photos).
Pictures 16 & 17: Shelter Constructions (Exhibited 3rd Army Corps photos).

Picture 18: Transportation of critical items and supplies (Exhibited 3rd Army Corps photos)

Pictures 19 & 20: Administrative building reconstruction & medical facility settlement (Exhibited 3rd Army Corps photos).
The interior of the initial accommodation units (Exhibited 3rd Army Corps Photos).

The works had to be paused for a few days due to protests of a small percentage of the local population, refusing to accept the settlement of the camp in the close vicinity of the area. The main reasons of their concern being, according to their complaints, that the local authorities were excluded and uninformed about the decision process of the government on the issue, the continuous downgrading of the western municipalities (industrial zone, city jails, roma settlements etc.), the close distance from the neighboring municipalities which, according to their perception, bore potential increase of criminality in the area, fear for the state not being able to stand up to the needs of functioning the site thus imposing hygiene risks in the area, fear of refugee congestion etc. Instead they proposed alternate locations (Ena Channel, 2016) (TV100THESSALONIKI, 2016).

After resolving the blockade of the locals, the works continued and were finalized with the final setting up of services (registration, medical care, Non Food Items distribution, sanitary services and food provision) on the 23rd of February 2016. At that time a total of 120 tents and 180 RHU’s had been set up with a total capacity of about 1,800 persons (APE-MPE, 2016).

Aerial photo of Camp Diavata after the finalization of works (Τζάρης, 2016).

The Open Temporary Reception and Accommodation Center of Diavata was handed over to the management of the Local Coordination Center on the 24th of February, which was the day it started functioning. The unit tasked to provide staff for the manning of the Local Coordination Cell was the Hellenic CIMIC Unit, stationed in Thes-
saloniki, with the support of various 3rd Army Corps Units when needed and requested. It received its first guests of approximately 1,800 people who were stranded until then across the route from Athens to Eidomeni on buses (Proto Thema, 2016).

**Pictures 24&25:** Arrival of the first guests in Camp Diavata (Proto Thema, 2016).

At that time the Greek borders with FYROM where under strict control of movement by the FYROM authorities, allowing an entrance of approximately 300 people per day, while approximately 6,000 were stranded in the area of Eidomeni (Behrakis, 2016). Even though the number of people in Eidomeni was constantly growing larger, with inhumane conditions of living, and only a handful being granted passage into FYROM, part of the population would still move from the Camp in order not to miss the chance of continuing its trip (newsit, Thessaloniki: This is how Refugees leave from Diavata, 2016) leading to a constant rotation of the hosted population of Camp Diavata. The flow of people towards Eidomeni, was halted in March 2016, when FYROM authorities stepped on completely shutting off the borders to all nationalities, strictly forbidding any onward movement and blockading more than 12,000 people in Eidomeni (skai.gr, 2016).

**Picture 26:** Refugees and Migrants in Eidomeni (Reuters/Kavic, 2016)

Among the responders in Diavata Center at that time were except from the Army, First Reception Service personnel and Police, a great number of NGO’s and IO’s, as well as local initiatives and individual volunteers from the neighboring municipalities. A remarkable point was that after the arrival of the initial guests, volunteers and
NGO’s working in the Camp as well as media covering the events and witnessing the suffering of the fleeing people, triggered an unprecedented wave of support from the local communities. The amount of volunteers and donations of food and non-food items soon surpassed the local capacity to handle and harmonize the delivery of the communal aid, leading to a regional aid collecting and distribution scheme, under the coordination of Ministry of Interior together with the Municipality of Thessaloniki, in order to evenly distribute to all the camps which by that time were opening one after another.

Despite the constant rotation of the population, the general synthesis in the Center remained approximately the same. After the closure though, of the Balkan route in early March 2016, the population in Camp Diavata stabilized. The vast majority of the population were Syrians 75%, a 15% were Afghans and a 10% various other nationalities, mainly Iraqis. In terms of demographics the majority of the hosted population was families, with an average percentage of male –female 51-49%, while approximately half of the population was under the age of 18. A more detailed synthesis of the population for the needs of the research will be provided at the data analysis in paragraph 5.3. The population’s agony to reach the borders in Eidomeni was replaced at that time by the stress to register for application in the Asylum Service of Greece which had to be accessed via Skype.

4.2 Diavata Center Coordination Scheme

The presence of Army personnel, after the initial construction of the Center to which an approximate number of 250 personnel was used, was reduced to the number of staff necessary to run the Local Coordination Cell. These were 5 officers from the Hellenic CIMIC Unit and 4 Non Commissioned Officers from different Army units. The personnel forming the cell had standard daily presence. The posts they were manning according to the mission of LCC (ΦΕΚ 630, 2016) were:

a. LCC Director  
b. Transportation Department  
c. Food delivery and supplies Department  
d. Shelter and Accommodation Department  
e. Medical Support Department  
f. Liaison Officer with GO’s, IO’s and NGO’s.

Apart from the above mentioned personnel when a need arose, a request for support was directed to the Regional Coordination Cell and the Units which supported it, thus the number of Army personnel involved would increase in order to support the service needed (may it be medical support, transportations, constructions maintenance etc.) without standard presence though. In this administrative cell the First Reception Service participated with rotating personnel (until the handing over of the administration when permanent personnel were appointed from the Service) and the police had a 24/7 presence in the camp dealing with security.

The fact that Diavata Center was the first to open in Northern Greece and the Armed Forces had a relatively more extended time to construct than other sites, together with the facts that it was close to Thessaloniki, facilitated the involvement of many actors in the Center. The permission for an actor to participate (other than the state actors) was granted after the request was directed to the Ministry of Migration. Though the Coordination Cell was responsible for transportation, medical provision,
accommodation and food provision it soon became apparent that apart from the administrative cell, a broader coordination scheme of the services would be needed in order to better facilitate the functioning of the Center as the number of actors on the site reached its peak number of 25 different organizations or NGO’s.

The number of participating actors was constantly changing, due to identified needs in other sites and depending on the funding of the programs of NGO’s or the availability of volunteers. The ad hoc coordination scheme of the services that was formed about a month after its functioning and was followed until the handing over of its administration to the First Reception Service in November 2016 (ΦΕΚ 3720, 2016) consisted of the outline mentioned below:

Sectors:

a. Accommodation/Shelter  
b. Food Provision  
c. Protection  
d. Non Food Items (NFI) Distribution  
e. Psycho-Social Support  
f. Children’s Education/Recreation Activities  
g. Medical Support  
h. Adult’s Activities  
i. Water-Sanitation-Hygiene (WASH)

It is important to mention that this system of coordination of the services was not necessarily applied to all the sites, neither exactly follows the sectors identified by humanitarian actors on other missions. It rather served the coordination among the actors on the identified fields.

To each of the above sectors a coordinator was selected. He/she would be either an appropriately mandated state employee, if present, or coming from an International Organization or an NGO. For the last two cases the decision of appointment would be made after a meeting of the actors who were active on the specific sector and would depend on the degree of its involvement in the site, as well as its capacity to support the sector, after the approval of the Local Coordination Cell and First Reception Service Employee. Their role would be to monitor the activities of their sector and report to the management for approval of any actions scheduled or any concerns. Each sector coordinator would meet his team of actors once per week, produce a schedule of the oncoming week, produce feedback of the previous week and report any issues arising. Issues that necessitated the involvement of more than one sectors would be brought in the Coordinators meeting which was held once per week and in which all the coordinators of different sectors participated, together with the Coordination Cell Commander (mandated for transportation, medical, food and accommodation issues) and First Reception Representative (responsible for all the rest). Reports, requests and information would then be addressed through the chain of command in the Central Coordination Cell and to the First Reception Service.
The actors involved until November 2016 in each sector were as follows:

a. **Accommodation/Shelter:** Army (initial construction and administration of shelters), Protecta (Maintenance of tents), UNHCR (provision of tents and RHUs), Civil Protection Agency of Greece (Provision of tents), ASB (upgrade of the shelters to container units and administration of shelters at a later stage).

![Initial tent/RHU shelters and later upgraded to containers by ASB](image)

*b. Food Provision:* The Army provided three meals per day, prepared on its own premises for the first month and then via contracted catering services. Later in 2017 this service was replaced by cash assistance program.

![Food distribution by the Army](image)

+c. **Protection:** By that term we mean the detection and handling of vulnerable cases like sexually or gender based violence, unaccompanied minors, single parent families, victims of torture, trafficking awareness etc. It was provided by UNHCR, International Rescue Committee (IRC), Arsis and A21.

![Women’s safe space run by IRC](image)

**Pictures 27&28:** Initial tent/RHU shelters and later upgraded to containers by ASB (Tsakalidis, 2016) (Papanikos/ASB, 2017)

**Pictures 29&30:** Food distribution by the Army (seas, 2016) and volunteers and later by catering services.

**Pictures 31&32:** Women’s safe space run by IRC (Shaer, 2016) and drawing on one of the Camp walls conducted by unaccompanied minors supervised by Arsis (UNHCR, One love..from the unaccompanied minors, 2016).
d. **NFI Distribution**: This sector provided all the necessary items for living, except from food items. That included hygiene items (toilet paper, shampoos, soap, toothpastes, toothbrushes, female kits, laundry soap, comps etc.), clothing items (shoes, slippers, underwear, socks, male, female, children and baby clothes, raincoats etc.), items for baby care (diapers, baby carts, feeding bottles etc.), as well as items for the accommodation in the shelters (blankets, sheets, buckets, drying lofts, brooms, mops etc.). It was provided by UNHCR, Red Cross, AGAPE, IRC, Ecopolis with the help of local volunteer groups and individuals, as well as donations.

![Picture 33: Distribution of sleeping bags by Italian Red Cross (Red Cross, 2016).](image)

e. **Psycho-Social Support (PSS)**: This sector provided psychological individual counseling available on a daily basis, and community intervention projects. The participating organizations were SOS Children’s Villages, MDM, Praksis, Arsis and the Red Cross.

f. **Children Education/Recreation Activities**: Initially coordinated by the Municipality of Thessaloniki and the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki this sector served the children population by providing non standardized educational projects, lessons and excursions in cultural sites of Thessaloniki. On a later stage the Ministry of Education provided mandated personnel for coordinating the educational activities and establishing refugee afternoon classes. In 2017, on local schools. The actors participating in this sector either by standard presence or projects were: Ministry of Education, Municipality of Thessaloniki, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Red Cross, SOS Children’s Villages Greece, Smile of the Child, YMCA, Antigone, IOM.
Pictures 34&35: SOS Children’s Villages during classes in Diavata Camp (Thalia Galanopoulou / Vodafone Foundation Greece, 2017) and YMCA during theatre play with TheatrAction (WORLD YMCA, 2016).

Picture 36&37: NGO Antigone during recreational activities in the Camp. On the left (Γαγλίας, 2016) and on the right (Τσιτιρίδης, 2017).

g. Medical Support: This sector provided first aid, first degree medical support and vaccination of the hosted population. For more complex examinations or treatment when necessary, the patients were guided to Thessaloniki’s hospitals where free treatment was provided according to Greek legislation. The clinic in the camp was working on a 24/7 for the first 3 months and later worked daily at least for 8 hours, according to the needs of the hosted population. In this sector the actors involved were: Hellenic Army (via military doctors), Red Cross, MDM, WAHA, Praksis, AGAPE, PROTECTA, and Social Infirmary of Thessaloniki while guidance was also provided by the Ministry of Health/National Center of Health Operations/Centre of Control and Prevention of Infectious Diseases. The medical facility was provided in a tent for the first couple of days, while later, one prefabricated house was turned into a clinic. After the summer of 2016 a dental clinic was also set up in the Camp by Health Point Foundation. Furthermore, mobile clinics from several organizations with specialized volunteer doctors visited the Camp.
Pictures 38 & 39: Red Cross working in a tent during the first days (newsbomb, 2016) and WAHA in the clinic which started working a few days later (WAHA, 2017).

Pictures 40&41: MDM during vaccination campaign in the Camp (LIFO, 2016) and volunteer in the dental clinic of Health Point Foundation in the Camp (Dr Angela Ly, 2017).

Water-Sanitation-Hygiene (WASH): WASH sector included all the facilities (toilets, showers, water tabs, garbage bins) as well as services (trash pickup, sewage and water network maintenance, hygiene promotion projects, camp cleaning, disinfections, mice and mosquitoes control etc.). The actors which were involved were: the Army (initial construction, initial contracting of hygiene services, water, food and sanitary inspections by military veterinaries), IRC (undertook the whole sector a few months after functioning), 6 local municipalities by providing garbage tracks.

Adult Activities: This sector included activities for adult population. The main actors involved were ARSIS, Red Cross and Antigone. The first was running an adult recreational area in one of the buildings, while the sector organized classes for language learning as well as workshops (handmade jewelry, knitting etc.). One-time projects were applied and supported by several actors (NGO’s like Intervolve, Thessaloniki’s football team PAOK, Hercules Cricket Club of Thessaloniki etc.) both inside or outside the camp (football matches, cricket matches, chess and backgammon tournaments, music concerts, etc.).
Pictures 42 & 43: On the left knitting workshops (ARSIS, 2016) on the right the refugee football team of the Camp meet with the President of the Portuguese football team of Braga (Lifo, 2016).

Pictures 44 & 45: On the left music concert organized by Thessaloniki’s Music Concert Hall while applying a refugee musicians project (CNN Greece, 2016) and on the right concert organized by Thessaloniki’s University of Macedonia during an “Action for the refugees day” (typosthes, 2016).

Furthermore, there were actors providing critical and essential services even though they were not falling in one of the above sectors, since their work benefited and involved most, if not all, the sectors including the hosted population. *Metadrasi* for example, would provide interpretation for UNHCR, the authorities and elsewhere needed (funded for this project through UNHCR) while most of the NGO’s were using their own interpreters. *Nethope* provided and maintained internet access to the Camp and via wireless technology to the hosted community. *IOM* was handling voluntary return cases, *DRC* was providing legal support etc.

The above mentioned actors are those who during the course of one year had a more prolonged and active presence in the Camp. Certain other actors like The University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki Music Concert Hall etc. applied one time projects/concerts etc., while others actors, especially voluntary groups provided services and donations (tea serving, baby care material etc.) when mostly needed. Their contribution even if not mentioned in the sectors, had been significant and strongly appreciated. In the coordination scheme we should also refer to the civilian personnel who were dispatched from other state services and were used in administrative support, as well as the approximately 250 employees of state 7-months programs who started working in the Camp after the summer of 2016 (ΟΑΕΔ, 2016). They were dispersed
into the different sectors according to their expertise and helped facilitate the different functions.

4.3 Diavata Center Hosted Population Statistics

In order to be hosted in the Center of Diavata, the applying person should bare their registration documentation issued at the registration points (hot spots). Once access was granted, a camp registration process was initiated, which included initial medical interview through which the status of the Person of Concern (POC) was determined (health status, special dietary needs, pregnancy etc.), an appropriate shelter among the available was appointed and a camp card was issued in order to provide access to camp services. Through this registration process the number of the camp population and the shelter availability was monitored. Being in an open accommodation center though especially during the first months of functioning, many POCs would chose to leave the Camp without informing the authorities or returning their cards, thus leading to approximate number of hosted population. In order to solve the issue, on regular bases, a physical countdown of the population was conducted in order to determine and erase any unofficial voluntary leaves, keeping in track with the real number of inhabitants.

The following diagram depicts the total number of hosted population in Diavata Center from February 2016 to December 2016:

**Diagram 7:** Number of hosted population in Diavata Center from February 2016 to December 2016 (UNHCR, Site Profile: Diavata, 2016)

The above population monitoring system provided for the February 2017 statistics during which our research was conducted. Thus the population synthesis as of February 2017 had been as follows:
a. *Population Synthesis per Nationality (Out of a total of 348 guests)*:

![Diagram 8: Distribution of the hosted population in Diavata Center on February 2017 per nationality.](image)

As we can notice from the diagram above the majority of the population were of Syrian origin (69%, including Palestinian refugees to Syria), while the second largest nationality were the Afghans (22%). The majority of the other nationalities were unaccompanied minors.

b. *Population Synthesis per Gender (Out of a total of 348 guests)*:

![Diagram 9: Distribution of the hosted population in Diavata Center on February 2017 according to gender.](image)

The percentage of male (60%) and female (40%) guests in the Center was approximately the same during the whole period of its functioning.
c. *Population Synthesis per Age Group (Out of a total of 348 guests):*

![Diagram 10: Distribution of the hosted population in Diavata Center on February 2017 according to age](image)

The percentage of minors (younger than 18 years old) among the population was at 52%. That is due to the fact that the hosted population consisted of a lot of families, with more than 2 children. This fact led to an overall age average of 20.5 years in the Camp.

*d. Population’s Illiteracy Rate*

Since there were no records of the literacy status of the hosted population, we conducted a small scale sample research by handing out to 10 randomly chosen adult residents (5 male and 5 female) a written invitation in their native language to attend a discussion and requested them to respond whether they understood the details. 1 out of 5 men and 2 out of 5 women were not able to read the invitation.
SECTION B

CHAPTER FIVE
Methodology

In the first section of the dissertation we presented the evolution of CIMIC in military operations and its current definitions in a wide range of different actors involved. We presented the main problematic and advantages that the interaction between civilian and military bodies faces in a spectrum of operations. We briefly described the evolution of the refugee crisis in Greece and we case studied one of the refugee camps in Greece in which our research was conducted. In the second section, after presenting the main objectives of the research we will describe the model which we will follow in order to conduct the research and we will describe the process.

5.1 Aim and Objectives

As previously mentioned the purpose of this research is to examine whether CIMIC experiences and lessons learned obtained through Peace Support and Crisis Response Operations could be applied in the concept of refugee influx aid provision. Thus it aims to compare the CIMIC experiences obtained through existing literature on Peace Support and CRO Operations with the aspects of CMI at tactical level of the refugee crisis in Greece. In order to accomplish that the following objectives have been set:

a. To identify through a case study approach the aspects of CMI at tactical level in the refugee crisis in Greece.

b. To identify main similarities and differences between CIMIC lessons learned from literature and CMI from research results.

c. To form proposals that could enhance the CMI in non-conflict crisis response.

5.2 Research Approach

In order to examine the CMI tactical aspects of the response operation to confront the refugee crisis in Greece, we conducted a case study about the civil-military relationship in Diavata Open-Access Temporary Accommodation Center. The author had the opportunity to work in the specific Center, as director of LCC for 1 year, thus was acquainted with the camp environment, fact which led to studying the specific site after the permission of the Army. Being also the Commander of the Hellenic CIMIC Unit and volunteer member of the Hellenic Red Cross provided for a more comprehensive view of the situation on the ground. To obtain and document a holistic view of the aspects of the interaction between civilian and army personnel though, we examined the perceptions and stance of all the main actors involved. Those could be defined in three main categories:

a. The hosted population
b. The civil organizations and institutions (national and international)

c. The military personnel

Due to the great number of different civilian actors, heterogeneity, language barriers and rate of illiteracy of hosted population, as well as limited time over the sample audience and the various aspects and sensitivity of the subject of the research upon the
hosted population, we chose to follow a qualitative approach in order to collect the views and stance of the different actors upon the civil military interaction in Diavata Center.

5.3 Research Plan

5.3.1 Focus Groups

The selected method of accomplishing the above mentioned task was forming ‘focus groups’. It is a method which started being developed during the end of 1930’s when social scientists were seeking alternative ways of conducting interviews. They were researching strategies through which the researcher would share his role with the interviewee and his presence would be less patronizing. The non-structured interviews which were produced after this quest were enhanced towards the end of the 1930’s and 1940’s when Roethlisberger and Dickson used them in their study for enhancing the employee’s motivation and Carl Rogers in psychotherapy (Krueger & Casey, 2000).

The first actual implementation of this method traces back to World War II. It was then that Robert Merton and Paul Lazarsfeld used the method to examine the moral and ethical codes in the US Army (Morgan, Krueger, & King, 1998). It was essentially during the 1980’s when academics started to discover the focus groups method by adopting several practices, which were until then applied to the market groups. They made the necessary adaptations and changes to the technique depending on their audience. Since then, the focus groups method consists a widely used research tool of social sciences which aims at a deeper interview (Stewart, Shamdasani, & Rook, 2007).

5.3.2 Focus Group Advantages

The reasons for choosing the above mentioned method in order to conduct our research are the following:

a. The interaction which the focus groups deliver is useful as it allows for groups of similar age to express their views, share many of their feelings and experiences and exchange opinions. (Morgan D., 1993) This fact served one objective of our research which was the collection of different opinions and views from a variety of sources upon the civil-military interaction.

b. Focus Groups provide data from groups of people much faster and in a more efficient way than individual interviews. Furthermore they allow for the coordinator to interact immediately with the interviewees. This allows for providing clarifications, enhancing the answers and implementing further questions. The free choice of answers allows the researcher to enter a deeper meaning, make connections and trace details in expression and meaning (Stewart, Shamdasani, & Rook, 2007). These facts serve for our limited time over the sample audience; help the interpretation process and most of all facilitate the discussions by overcoming the inevitable language barriers which will rise due to different ethnicities of the sample audience by providing direct communication.

c. It is a very flexible method. It can be used to examine a variety of issues with different subjects and under different specifications. It is one of the few research tools which can be applied to children or other subjects which are illiterate. (Stewart, Shamdasani, & Rook, 2007) This advantage helped us to overcome the illiteracy rate
of the hosted population and most importantly to deal with the wide variety of different backgrounds of the examined groups of actors described in paragraph 4.2.

d. Moreover, the focus groups are used when a friendly method of research is necessitated. One which respects the audience without being judgmental. Focus groups has a unique way of obtaining information when tension between opposing participants start to rise. Other methods could often be ineffective due to the fact that none of the participants trusts the intentions of the other. By creating and sustaining an environment which promotes interaction, it transfers a humane sensitivity, a willingness of the participant to listen without being defensive and to respect the different opinions. Focus Groups is beneficial to such emotionally charged audiences. (Morgan D., 1993). Since the issue of the relationship with the Armed Forces could be sensitive especially for the hosted population which is by itself an emotionally charged audience, it allows the researcher through direct contact to explain, provide clarifications and thus gain the confidence of the participants.

5.3.3 Discussions Coordinators

The coordinator has to emotionally abstain from the subject of the discussion. Not to express his personal view, nor to defend or explain but to guide and facilitate the flow of the discussion. The participants must feel comfortable with him, to consider him as an appropriate person to whom they can ask questions and speak openly. (Krueger & Casey, 2000) For that reason and in order to minimize any possible influence, it was decided for the researcher to abstain from the discussions, as he was the LCC director of the site for almost a year, and had personally cooperated closely both with the hosted population and the civilian organizations/institutions.

The personal characteristics, educational background, knowledge and experience are important factors in the selection of coordinators. They must have very good knowledge of the issue and to provide with comments which will lead to important sections. (Krueger & Casey, 2000) Thus 3 different coordinators were chosen to conduct the discussions with the different groups. All of them fulfilled the above mentioned criteria and had already experience upon the subject. They were briefed before the discussions.

5.3.4 Interview Guides

The interview guide sets the agenda of the discussion of the focus group. It needs to be formed with cautiousness and essential understanding of the research issue. As all the research methods, thus the focus groups method begins and has to be guided by a well-established cause. The purpose of the research is what provides the guidance to the group discussion. (Stewart, Shamdasani, & Rook, 2007) Each coordinator chooses, depending on the research and the participants the way that he will plan the interview guide. (Greenbaum, 1998)

While planning the interview guide we need to be aware of two basic principles. The first concerns the layout of the questions which must pass from the more general to the more specific. That means that the more general questions and the less structured, need to be implemented at the beginning of the discussion. The more focused questions, those which will demand more specific answers should be placed towards the end of the guide. Secondly, the questions which are more important should be placed earlier, while those with less gravity towards the end. (Stewart, Shamdasani, & Rook, 2007).
There are different types of questions that are used. Each type has different cause. Some prepare the ground for more important questions and need to be passed quickly, like the introductory ones. Others, like key-questions need to be discussed more and to be analyzed with more cautiousness. (Krueger & Casey, 2000).

Following the above mentioned guidelines, the interview guides\(^7\) were issued, one for each set of groups. The guides were rehearsed during a small test group with Greek civilians. Then they were discussed with the focus groups coordinators, together with details about the place, way, logistical issues and participants of the discussions.

5.3.5 **Planning of the Discussions and Sample Audience**

An important principle in the selection of the participants is the homogeneity, in relevance with the subject of the research. The members of the groups should have among them a common feature which interests us. People with different experiences and background may influence the free and sincere expression. Nevertheless it is important to achieve a variety of views. (Krueger & Casey, 2000) Thus three groups were identified (later in the process a fourth had to be created by splitting the hosted population group to Arab and Farsi speaking). The distinction among the groups was based upon the different role of each group in the Civil Military Interaction as it was the primary feature in the relationship that was developed. The three groups are explained below.

While in the classical implementation of the focus groups method the participants were unfamiliar to each other, in latest researches on the field of mass media, the groups are often naturally formed, like families (Billig, 1992) or friends (Liebes & Katz, 1990). The justification behind that is that the issues of the discussion could have been discussed in prior by the members of the group in everyday life. This approach of naturally formed groups allows for exceptions in the rule concerning that the number of the participants which should range between 6-12 persons, allowing for smaller groups. For example, Morley in his research (Morley, 1980) for the “Nation-wide” show, used groups consisting of 3-13 people.

\[a. \quad \textit{Hosted Population Group:}\]

In order to reach out to the most of the population, and for psychological reasons, we decided to conduct a focus group for the adults (both arab and farsi speakers) and to get the children’s experiences/stance via a drawing task at their informal school classes. The unaccompanied minors were excluded from the research due to their small overall percentage and mainly due to the vulnerability of the group (Leaninig, 2001).

The adult group was scheduled in the planning process to consist of both Arab and Farsi speakers, in order to avoid discrimination between them. Following the general percentage according to ethnicity and gender, as described in paragraph 5.3 six male and six female adult Arab speakers and 3 male and 3 female Farsi speakers were randomly chosen from the hosted population lists and invited to participate in a discussion at the adult recreation area inside the Center on the 14th of February 2017 at 15:30. Interpretation was kindly provided by Metadrasis in both languages simultaneously. An appropriate civilian, the PSS Sector coordinator Ms Eythymiou Sotiria who had been briefed in prior, kindly accepted to coordinate the discussion.

Four male and four female Arab speakers and three male, three female Farsi speakers accepted the invitation and participated. During the first stages of the discussion

\(\text{\footnotesize{\cite{Morley}}}\)

\(^7\) The interview guide for the hosted population focus groups is presented in Annex A and the interview guide for the civilian organizations/institutions focus group is presented in Annex E.
though and as one of the Arab speakers happened to be a self-proclaimed “leader” in his community, he felt that both the subject and way of conduct of the discussion were suspicious to him, provoking the Arab speaking members to leave the discussion. The coordinator realized his intention of implementing his opinions over the rest of the participants thus facilitated the continuance of the discussion without his presence.

The focus group continued as planned with the Farsi speakers, while the Arab speaking group was invited in a different room by the researcher, briefed again about the purpose and that discussion was coordinated by the researcher in order to avoid any misunderstandings or misperceptions. Both discussions were recorded, and later their transcriptions were analyzed. The participants were fully informed about the purpose of the discussion, the fact that it was being recorded, as well as that their anonymity would be kept. In the transcription they are depicted as Arab Male (AM), Arab Female (AF), Farsi Male (FM) and Farsi Female (FF) and the respective number of the speaker.

In order to retrieve children’s feelings towards the Army we had to take into account the fact that some of them might bare negative experiences as they could have been fleeing conflict zones. Thus, it was decided, after consulting psychologist’s teams and after being granted permission by their parents, to ask the children to express their thoughts and feelings through a drawing task in a secure environment and under surveillance from specialized civilian personnel.

The task was organized on the 15th February 2017 by the children’s education/recreation sector. It took place in the informal school premise inside the Camp during a regular teaching hour without any presence of Army personnel. The children were given by their caretakers two pieces of A4 paper and color markers of all colors and were asked, in collaboration with the interpreters of the NGO’s which participated in the children’s education/recreation sector, to draw on one piece of paper how they would depict the Army in their home country and on the other, the Greek Army. The caretakers were tasked to guide the children who might not have any such view, to draw anything that they wished. The task was held simultaneously at the four classrooms of the school (3 Arab and one Farsi speaking) while participation was not obligatory. If the children did not A total of 29 children (21 Arab speaking and 8 Farsi speaking) from 5.5 to 14 years old participated. One of them initially hesitated in participating, while later decided to draw and hand over the drawings.

Both the teaching personnel as well as the PSS coordinator with the sector’s team were monitoring the kids for any explicit signs of feeling uncomfortable and were standing ready and available to support if needed. The drawings were collected, together with any caretakers’ special remarks, digitalized and sent for further study to Professor Eleni Hodolidou. She teaches at the Department of Philosophy & Education of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. We requested her to extract general remarks concerning the sentiments of the children towards the Army in their home countries and in Greece.

b. Civil Organizations Group

In order to examine the view/stance of Civil Organizations towards their cooperation with the Greek Army, a focus group discussion was organized in the meeting room of Diavata Camp on the 21st of February 2017. 13 representatives of civil organizations, state services and NGO’s were invited, among all those being active in the Center at the time of the research. 12 of them participated in the discussion. The focus group discussion was coordinated by one of the Educational Coordinators of the Camp. Participants were fully aware of the subject of the conversation, the fact that it was being
recorded, as well as that their anonymity would be kept. All the participants were of Greek origin, thus the conversation was conducted in Greek. For reasons of confidentiality they had been assigned numbers from 1 to 12.

c. Military Personnel Group
In order to examine the view/stance of military personnel towards their cooperation with the civil state services, IO’s and NGO’s, a focus group discussion was organized in the officer’s club of Thessaloniki on 22nd of October 2017. All the invited personnel were officers, trained in CIMIC and had serviced in Diavata Open Access Accommodation Center. Out of the 7 officers invited, 6 attended the discussion which was coordinated by Professor Eleni Hodolidou, who was acquainted with all the participants. They were fully aware of the subject of the conversation, the fact that it was being recorded, as well as that their anonymity would be kept.

5.4 Discussions Analysis

5.4.1 Recording Transcripts
All the discussions were recorded with the consent of the participants, fact which was stressed both at the invitation letter that they received in order to participate in the focus group, as well as at the beginning of the discussions, by the coordinators. In order to preserve the anonymity of the participants, the hosted population groups were asked to use nick names. As the conversations went on though and due to the fact that the participants forgot the presence of the recorder and used their real names, despite of the fact that the coordinators reminded them several times, the nickname system was replaced at the transcript with symbols. AM1-AM4 stand for Arab speaker Male number 1 to 4, AF1-AF-4 stand for Arab speaker Female number 1 to 4, FM 1-3 stand for Farsi speaker Male number 1 to 3 and FF 1-3 stand for Farsi speaker Female number 1 to 3. The Civilian organizations focus groups used numbers from 1 to 12 and so did the Army Officers group with numbers from 1 to 6.

The conversations were put into transcript while simultaneously being translated into English, in order for the researcher to be able to examine them multiple times, which is necessary in order to conduct the analysis and to examine the details of the speech (Wood & Kroger, 2000). Though the researcher tried to keep as many aspects of the speech as possible, certain alterations are expected due to the interference of the interpreters and then due to translation. This is not expected to be of significant importance for the analysis as the details of the speech are not studied in the Analysis at such a degree as to influence the research.

5.4.2 Analysis

The transcripts were carefully examined and then the group discussions were broken down to thematic sections, which sometimes coincided with the interview questions and others which emerged by the participants themselves. Then segments of the conversations were selected under certain topics depending on the group and the research questions. The results of the analysis are presented in the next chapter by focus group. The results of the analysis of the two groups (Arab and Farsi speaking) which came out from the splitting of the adult hosted population focus group were merged into one
and are presented as such. Any differences in the perceptions of the Arab and Farsi speaking communities are appropriately mentioned.
6.1 Adult Hosted Population Focus Group

The transcripts of the conversations with the adult hosted population both Arab and Farsi speaking were analyzed and the following main topics emerged:

a. **Experience from the Armed Forces in the countries of origin:**

This parameter was perceived as important to examine, as we believe that the experiences and beliefs that the hosted population had about the armies in their respective countries of origin would set the grounds for the stance they would have at least in the initial stages of their interaction with the Greek Army.

i. Both nationalities mentioned that their country’s Army primary mission is to provide security in the country, against exterior threats. The Arab speakers seemed to have a need to specify their view, while the Farsi speakers were more concise, linking their view about the Army with the word security.

“AM1: Concerning the Army in our country, the Army’s role is to protect the whole population… the Army has nothing to do with internal politics it exists to safeguard the country…For all of us who are Syrians we have positive thoughts about the Army, safeguarding our homeland.”

“Coordinator: Concerning your country of origin when you hear about Army, what thoughts come into your mind?

FM1: Security of our country.”

Some Syrians stressed how harmonized their coexistence with the Army was in Syria before the war.

“AF1:.. I participated in social life and never faced any problem. But not now. We used to travel by airplane, we showed our Syrian ID, we didn’t have any problem.”

“AM3: …I wasn’t afraid of anything. I would go downtown and I would not feel scared or afraid of anything since I had done nothing wrong and whatever would happen that was against the law, I felt free to go and report it.”

ii. The Arab speakers tend to express a different, negative view and experiences about the Army in their country after the war in Syria. They refer to the Army with fear and anger, clearly marking that these feelings were created after the war broke out in Syria.

“Coordinator: Nevertheless, when you heard about Army in your country, how did you feel?

AM4 [interrupting trying to clarify]: Before the events or now? Before, we used to respect it. Before or now?

Coordinator: How do you feel now?

AF1: Now we hate the Army and we are afraid of it.

Coordinator: If you feel that your feelings changed after certain events, you can say that before that certain events we felt this way, and after the event we feel this way.

8 The original transcripts are presented in Annex B for the Farsi speaking focus group and Annex C for the Arab speaking focus group.
AF4: Exactly that. In the past we wanted our children to fulfill their military duty, which was a big one. They had to serve for 2,5 years. But now we have to say this and it is important, that we are afraid of the Army now.
Coordinator: Ok, I wouldn’t like to extend the discussion more upon your past experience with the Army...[Interrupted]
AF4: Now we don’t want to send our children to serve the Army anymore.
AM1: Before the events in Syria, when mothers sent their children to serve the Army, they felt pride.
AF1 [Imitating with pride]: “My child is serving his duty”

Some connect this change of feelings towards the Army with the perception that the mission of the Army changed from securing the country to securing the interests of governing elite in Syria and the description includes words expressing violence.

“AM1: But after the events that have been taking place the past 6 years we were afraid for our children. Any given mother would prefer to slaughter her own child rather than letting it join the Army. She would no way let him serve his military duties, because our whole perception of the Army changed in our country. In the previous discussion, which we stopped, I expressed my opinion and I will repeat it now to this coordinator: The Army that we used to have, was meant to protect and secure our Country but now its mission is to destroy the country, suffocate its people and protect just a small group of the government. Not to safeguard the whole of society. That is the truth.”

Some justify their negative feelings with personal stories, experiences and possibly legends to which the Army personnel are depicted as authoritarian, ruthless and arrogant towards the civilians.

“AM3: In the Syrian Army whenever someone was given a rank he would automatically feel like as he had been named the prime minister. They would then address to us with arrogance.
AM4: They only spoke with two words, acting like secret agencies. They wouldn’t accept to speak any further than that.
AM1: They mean that they would demand obedience. First you would have to execute the order and then you could disagree with it. To give you an example, if I and you were in the Syrian army, and I was a superior giving you an order, even if my order was false, you wouldn’t dare to correct me. You have to obey and execute my orders either it is right or wrong …

AF1: I will tell you a story that took place in Syria. There was a mother begging one soldier not to take away her son (as a recruit). He replied to her: “Drop to your knees, kiss my boots, and then I will decide whether I’m going to recruit your son or not”. She then dropped to her knees and after kissing his boots several times, he decided not to take her son away.”

iii. While the Afghan community didn’t seem to express negative feelings towards the Army in their country, among the Arab community it seemed that the adults were stressing the fact that there were different views of the Army depending on the circumstances. It was mentioned that those who bore fear and negative feelings towards the Army concept in general, were mainly the children and youngsters. The former due to their conflict experiences and feedback and the latter due to the fact that they did not serve their military duty before the war in Syria. Thus the only view of the Armed Forces they had was that of the Syrian Army during the war.

“AM2: When we heard the word Army back in my country we felt scared [long pause] do you understand what I mean?
Coordinator: Yes, you don’t need to explain, if that’s the way you feel that’s all.
AM1: AM2 said before that when he heard the word Army he felt scared. The events in Syria have been taking place for the past 6 years and this youngster wasn’t able to serve his military duties in Syria. That’s because 6 years ago he was a minor and the events had already started
there. As it concerns the rest of us who are of a bigger age and who have completed our military duties, we have no fear of the army.”

“AM1: The new generation and the kids were afraid of the Army due to the events that we faced.”

b. **Perception when entering a refugee camp ran by the Army**

i. The majority of both nationalities expressed ignorance, prior to arriving, on the fact that that Camp was set up and ran by the Greek Army. It was something that as most of them stated was realized upon arrival in the Camp. The Afghans seemed to express more need for recognition and protection by authorities and upon arrival in the camp they had the tendency to express positively on the existence of Armed Forces:

“Coordinator: Ok. Before arriving here were you informed that you would be hosted in Camps where Army would be present?

... 
FM1: Yes. 
Coordinator: So you knew about it. 
FM1: Yes.
FM2: I didn’t know about it. When we arrived in the Camp the Army assisted us. 
Coordinator: When you realized that the Army was present in the Camps how did you think about it?

... 
FM2: We felt security
FM3: It was very good because we feel safe when we see the Army.”

“FM3: ... When I arrived in the Camp and realized that, I felt safe. Because back in our country there is terrorism and bombs explode, so when I saw that, I felt that we reached a country where we can have security.
Coordinator: What about the rest?
FM1: I was told that this would be a military Camp, and that was the reason I came here.
Coordinator: Oh! So you had been informed before arriving that there would be Army here and that was the reason you came?
FM1: No, I realized it when I arrived at the gate.
Coordinator: And how did you feel about that?
FM1: I felt very good because the Army is always conducting its mission in a very good way.”

ii. The Arab speaking group on the other hand expressed itself as rather indifferent when realizing the presence of the Army, stressing the fact that the adults were not afraid of the Army’s presence, contrary to children.

“Coordinator: ...Were you aware of that fact or did you realize it once you were transferred to the Camps?
AM1, AF1: No, we were not aware of the fact.
AM1: We were among the first group of arrivals in Greece which faced shut borders.
Coordinator: So, [addressing to AM3] were you aware of that fact?
AM3: I was expecting it, since I was in Kurdistan, which is part of Iraq, before arriving here. Since the camps are part of the country, they should have a portion of the Armed Forces which will be responsible for the overall security. So we knew that the Army or any other branch of the Armed Forces, would be responsible for the security and defense of the area and all the rest of the organizations would facilitate the rest of the services. So it didn’t make any difference to us whether the Army would be present or not.
Coordinator: [Addressing to AM4]: What about you? Were you aware of the fact?
AM4: No, I was not aware of the fact.
AM4: I felt safe and secure. That even if I walk out of my tent in the middle of the night I will be safe. Cause the Greek Army is not the same with the Syrian Army.
Coordinator: But you were not aware of that difference when you initially arrived.
AF1, AF4: We were not aware that the Greek Army would be here, but we were aware that it’s not the same with the Syrian.

Coordinator: I am interested in your opinion also AF3. When you arrived in the Camp and realized that the Army is present, how did that make you feel?

AF3: It was something normal. I wasn’t afraid of the Army’s presence.

AF3: Smaller kids were afraid at the beginning, due to all that they had seen and they had heard. But the elders were not.

Coordinator: What about AF2?

AF2: I agree with AF3.

AM4: We felt safety; we knew that it wouldn’t be like the Syrian army and that it would show more mercy than them.”

c. Population’s interaction with the Army in the Camp

i. Both nationalities stressed the positive view they had of their interaction with the Army personnel in the Camp.

“FM1: It is really good. I am among the first people who arrived in the Camp. The day we got here and realized that the Army is here we were happy. The Army is really working for all the nations in the Camp. They helped us a lot and in this Camp they worked a lot for us. We are very satisfied with the Army and they did help the Afghan people a lot.

Coordinator: Would anybody else like to comment about his interaction with the Army?

FM3: All the Army personnel who served here were very good people. If one bad person existed he would give a bad impression for the whole Greek Army. Luckily we only met good people here.

Coordinator: Do you have anything negative to say? Express any complains? [Laughing] it’s anonymous don’t forget about that. Nobody will know who is talking.

FM3: No really, we are all satisfied with the Army.”

“Coordinator: If I asked you to describe with one word, the overall feeling that you have from all the Army personnel that you met in this Camp, what would that be?

…

AF1: It is security for the people and the country. And we felt good inside.

Coordinator: Now how do you feel having all this experience?

AF1: Security and that you are better than the police.

Coordinator: [Laughing] Lets stick to the emotions you have for the Army. Leave the rest.

AF1: I told you I feel safe.

AF2: Safety.

AF3: If you ask all the women in the Camp they will tell you the same thing. We have been staying in the Camp for one year, not one month. And we have met other Army people rather than you.

AF4: Safety.

…

AM4: We never saw something negative.

…

AM4: Safety and respect. Whenever somebody needed you, you were there to listen to him and to assist him.

AM3: Safety and psychologically calm. We might have not been totally aware of what exactly you were responsible for, the Army was not constantly out in the Camp, but we could always come and meet you. You were available to solve any questions.

AF3: So generally we could feel safety and that you were taking care of the people here.

AM1: Exactly that. Calmness and safety. And I think that includes all that we said.

AF3: And we didn’t see anything rather than good.

AM1: And I am referring to all the Army personnel that we saw here. And all of them were good, but the one who is in charge of them is the most responsible through his position. Cause any subordinate who may come to serve, he will receive his guidance and orders from his superior and he will respond to his duties.”
During the discussions, some characteristics of the military personnel’s way of conduct were mentioned as features which helped gain the respect and trust of the people and promoted a positive interaction with them. To name a few:

**Fairness/Non Discrimination**

Both nationalities mentioned that the Army personnel did not discriminate against any population of different origin, while they conducted their duties with fairness.

“AF1: Army personnel have been very kind. At the beginning they were serving the food, they made sure that it was equally distributed, whenever there was excess amount they would distribute it, they treated us very kindly.”

“FM1: …The Army is really working for all the nations in the Camp. They helped us a lot and in this Camp they worked a lot for us. We are very satisfied with the Army and they did help the Afghan people a lot.”

“Coordinator: …You mentioned before that all the personnel are on the same side but George is distinctive. What do you mean by that?

FF1: I mean that George has helped us a lot. I can see him coming early morning and he stays till late afternoon to help us while the rest are leaving. They are all good, but he has helped us a lot and has very good relationship with us. That’s why I say he is distinctive. He doesn’t treat us differently. He is equal towards everybody. Either he is Arab or Afghan.

Coordinator: Do you have the same feeling from the rest of the Army personnel?

FF2: Not only the Army, but everybody in this Camp is very good and they have very good relationships with us.”

**Accessibility**

Being accessible seems to have been important for the Arab speaking community. They felt comfortable to reach the Army personnel in order to resolve personal issues or problems with the services.

“Coordinator… The question is whether during this time you addressed to army personnel when you faced problems? And for what kind of issues would you reach them? Lets begin with someone who hasn’t spoken a lot (addressing to AF2).

AF2: I don’t know what to say, I’d rather let F3 answer that.

AF3: I felt psychologically calm and ok to speak to you. Because once I had faced an issue and I addressed it to you and you supported me.

Coordinator: What kind of problem was it? Was it something personal or did it concern the provided services?

AF3: No, it was a personal issue.

Coordinator: OK. So you reached the army personnel for a personal issue.

AF1: You were also solving Camp issues. We didn’t address to the police, we addressed the Army.

AF3: We addressed for the Skype issue [the process for registering for the asylum service in Greece] also at the Army.

Coordinator: (Addressing to AF4): Did you ever need support from the Army? Did you feel comfortable to address to the Army?

AF4:[laughing] It’s you to blame for Sydra (daughter’s name). For anything that Sydra requests now you are responsible. And she is angry with you and we want you to be friends again. [Referring to her 8 years old daughter who was angry with the coordinator for forgetting her birthday].”

“Coordinator: It’s ok …so describe how you feel in one word. Like I feel respect, I feel…whatever…”

AM4: Safety and respect. Whenever somebody needed you, you were there to listen to him and to assist him.

AM3: Safety and psychologically calm. We might have not been totally aware of what exactly you were responsible for, the Army was not constantly out in the Camp, but we could always come and meet you. You were available to solve any questions.”

Reliability/Efficiency

The Arab speaking community stressed the importance and gratitude they felt for finding appropriate solutions when they addressed to the Army for certain issues.

“Coordinator: …Were you aware of the role of the Army in the Camp? Which its mission was?

AF3, AM4: To run the Camp.

AM4: Whenever we faced an issue we would come to you. AM1 is aware of the fact that whenever we had a personal problem or a concern about the services you would take care of it completely.

Coordinator: Nevertheless, were you aware of which issues was responsibility of the Army and which were not?

AM1: We were aware that the overall responsibility of the Army was the food delivery. Moreover, when we were lacking certain stuff, you would supply them. The Army was very cooperative, and tried to fulfill everybody’s requests concerning food delivery. It upgraded the food. One other time you asked us, which Syrian food we missed and you requested the catering service to provide it. So you were really taking care of the needs.”

“AM4: …I am here with my two kids which needed doctor. When I visited the clinic they would tell me come back tomorrow, come back in an hour, they asked for my phone number but they never called me back. So I came to the Army Commander. He took my kids in his arms and went to the clinic. And I will never forget that.”

Dedication

The dedication of the Army personnel to accomplish their mission, even in adverse circumstances was noticed and appreciated by the population.

“AF3: I need to add something before I forget it. On the day of the fire, [there was a big fire in the Camp on the 20th of April 2016, destroying 30 tents and RHU’s] no one stood so close to us as the Army did… I will never forget that for the rest of my life. Every time I recall it I cry, because you treated us with care and love more than anyone else. And you yourself suffered a lot and gave big effort.

M1: And for the personal issue which I faced with the two children and the youngsters from Daraah you helped a lot [The later stabbed the former on an escalated fight]…The Army Commander came inside the Camp at night and we stayed until 03:00 in the morning, running from one side to the other [meaning negotiating between the two sides in conflict] until we solved the overall problem. This has to do with the good manners and humanity you have…”

Politeness/Respect/Gender Issues

Being polite, showing respect towards the elderly and having gender awareness were issues which were commented by both populations.

“AF3: You were also very polite and respected the women and girls as well. All the Army personnel were very respectful, professional and polite.”

“FM2: When we arrived in the Camp we realized that the Army has a very good relationship with the refugees. They have very good manners and they are very polite…”
**Professionalism**

A professional way of conduct seemed to have an impact on a good cooperation with the population.

“FM1: I felt very good because the Army is always conducting its mission in a very good way.
Coordinator: Anyone else?
FM2: The Army has a very good cooperation with the refugees. We have seen that they have a very good way of conduct…”

d. **Level of cooperation between the Army and Civilian Organizations according to the hosted population’s view.**

According to the hosted population’s view, the cooperation between the Army and civilian organizations looked smooth. According to their perception there were no visible signs of duplicating or overlapping responsibilities, on the contrary there seemed to be mutual support and complementarity between them, while at certain points the Army seemed to facilitate the interaction of the population with the civil organizations.

“Coordinator: … How did you feel about the cooperation between the Army and the Organizations?
AF4: I could see there was cooperation from both sides.
Coordinator: What about the relationship between them?
AF4: To us, from an outsiders view it looked ok. We don’t know how it was though between you.
Coordinator: How did it look to you?
AF4: We could see that there was good relationship among you. We didn’t see any disagreements. Nothing ever happened.
AF3: Nothing negative ever happened in front of us which we could describe. We only were aware of the good side of your cooperation. Or when an organization wanted to reach a specific refugee for a reason, the Army would guide him to where he was or help with the communication. And if you asked us to choose between the organizations and the Army we would chose the Army.
Coordinator: No, no there is no such question. We do not wish to compare the Army with the organizations. What we wish to understand is whether to your perception the Army looked to cooperate well with the organizations or if it looked like they were competing each other or it looked like they cooperated.
AF3: They were supporting each other. We didn’t realize any mistake.
AM4: It looked like the organizations were the minor members of the administrative system and the Army was in charge. Whenever there was a problem with the organizations we would address to the Army.
AF3: To bring you a real example, one day a refugee suffered from appendicitis and nobody was eager to help him. We were requesting to transfer him to hospital. Only the Army brought the ambulance to the Camp.
AM1: Anyway there was cooperation between all the services and organizations that were here. Each one had its own responsibilities but was connected to the others also.
Coordinator: Did you feel that the responsibilities were overlapping?
AM1: Of course not. No one had the right to intervene in the other’s job, except when there was a report. If for example I addressed to UN (meaning UNHCR) and UN could not respond to my request I would then address either to the Army or I would come meet the representative of the Ministry. (Meaning the employee of First Reception Service)…”"
e. **Perception of the Hosted Population towards the Greek People.**

This factor was considered as important to examine as we believe that the feelings that the hosted population received from the Greek people would influence the feelings towards the Greek Army personnel and vice versa.

According to the Afghan’s point of view Greek people had treated the refugees good so far, fact which is partially attributed to education. At the same time some mark that the hosting population’s behavior would depend on the actions of the hosted ones.

“Coordinator: … How do you feel about the civilian Greek people outside the Camp? Those who you meet when you are out for a walk in Thessaloniki or Diavata. How do they seem to you?
FF1: We can’t say if they are good or bad. They don’t say either good or bad words, so they are neither bad nor good. They are 50-50 %.
FF2: I believe what you give is what you get. If they see good from us they will be good. If they receive bad they will be bad.
FM1: Good and evil exist everywhere.
FM3: Most of the people are very good. When we ride the public bus downtown and we carry a young child with us they stand up and offer their seat to our children.
FF3: In every nation there are good people and bad.
FM1: People are educated and due to that they have good relationships with us.”

The Arab speakers also expressed positive view towards the Greek population. It was expressed either by mentioning the development of friendly relationships, by receiving empathy as they acknowledged that Greeks had a refugee background of their own, by mentioning the non receipt of racism against them, nor being excluded. Some marked their positive feelings with a willingness to settle in Greece, if the financial situation of the country was such in order to provide for their families.

“Coordinator: … How do you feel about Greek people?...
AF1: If my son had not been in Germany already I wouldn’t like him to become citizen of any other foreign country rather than Greece as people here are really nice.
…
AF3: I am in contact with Greek people outside the Camp. They are very nice. If I had the chance to move out of the Camp, I would stay in Greece, I wouldn’t have any problem with that. To explain: if the state had the ability of providing me and my kids with accommodation, I would choose to stay here.
AF4: Me too. If I didn’t have my kids in Germany I would choose to stay here. I have 5 kids in Germany.
AF4: [Laughing] I never had any contact with any Greek.
AM1: OK
AF4: Inside the camp they were very nice.
Coordinator: How do you feel though?
AF4: I felt that Greek people are as nice as Syrian people.
AF3: They are very nice because they have been through what we are going through. The Greeks have lived injustice themselves and they have welcomed us into their houses.
AM4: I have my relatives in Germany, my brothers are there. But now that I get to think about it, I don’t want to move there because I see that no other nation will treat me the way the Greeks did and there is a chance I will apply for asylum in Greece. Cause Greek people are really nice…
AM3: I will apply for asylum in Greece. I have applied for another country; it was rejected, so I will apply here. And the behavior was really nice. I didn’t notice anything wrong. Given that members of my family are in Germany, I wanted to join them, but wasn’t lucky, so I will be living among you here.
…
AM2: Greek people are very nice. I have many friends; they never deprived us from anything.
…
AM1: I just want to add something more about Greek people. I will tell you that what I received from Greek people, not just the Army, but all people, is that the whole population is very nice, generous, shows hospitality, doesn’t have any signs of racism, they are cooperative, and it differs from the sentiment that the whole Europe expresses. We have not yet reached Germany, but we receive feedback from there. Whoever Syrian tried to speak with German people, even if the latter spoke English, they wouldn’t accept to talk with him, unless they spoke German. That is a sign of racism. Here in Greece instead, if I try to speak with people, even if they don’t speak the language, they try to understand what I need. We happened to ask for support of Greek people in stores in Thessaloniki and Diavata, or people we met on the streets for instructions. People are very nice here and they don’t express any signs of racism.”

6.2 Children’s Drawing Task

**Pictures 46 & 47: The drawings of Media from Syria, 13 years old. (Sample from the children’s drawings exhibited in Annex D)**

The drawings which the children produced were sent to professor Hodolidou who coordinated the children’s education/recreation sector during the emergency phase, for a further study. Her remarks were as following:

“Drawing has a long history in approaching children’s views, feelings (fear, happiness, and trauma) and has been widely used in therapy along with other educational means: drama, play… From the very beginning it was more than obvious that the children were not feeling fear or anxiety inside the camp. A high standing official from UNICEF had remarked that during a visit he paid to the camp. The volunteers and the NGO’s personnel in the children’s education/recreation activities were mainly young girls and, to a smaller extend, boys. The army officers, who were also relatively young, did not carry weaponry. They served as fatherly figures more than anything else. Their parents showed respect towards the army officers, but the children’s respect carried a friendly behavior also.

My first remark seeing the drawings is that the children are not systematically exposed to lessons in drawing. Moreover the interpreter in one class attempted to explain the task by writing the words Syria and Greece on the board, and thus intervened in the outcome. Surprisingly enough, most children drew in a way that most students in Greece follow at a much younger age. When the task was understood and the child had had an experience in drawing we can detect their bond with their country. Some actually drew war scenes in their home country while, on the contrary, in Greece the drawing was calm, tranquil and certainly much happier. My role is not to psychologically analyze the drawings but to offer some general remarks about them.

The children drew divided in four groups. The drawings of the Afghan group of children 5,5-11 years old express willingness to draw but either because they did not understand the task, or they lack such a view, they did not depict armed forces at all. Drawings of Afghanistan and Greece look alike: colorful, happy moments and flags of their home country. The group of the Syrian children 6-9 years old seems like they have copied the words Syria and Greece from the board. In some cases one could argue that there is an effort by part of the children to express

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9 The digitized drawings are presented per school class in Annex D.
10 More detailed remarks are included, were plausible, under each drawing in Annex D.
possible traumatic experiences with no cohesion. In some cases color is used in an interesting way (grey and black in Syria, more colors in Greece). The group of the Syrian children 7-11 years old seems to have internalized their situation: army vehicles, contrast between the two countries, more colors in Greece, and clear army presence. The group of Syrian children 11-14, although their drawing skills are not developed, depicted violence in Syria and, on the contrary, peace, joy and play in Greece.

My overall remarks are that the efficiency of the chosen task was negatively affected by the intervention of interpreters as well as the limited drawing skills of the children. Nevertheless, some drawings provide us with a very clear idea as to the matter under question. The Greek military staff was not depicted in all drawings but in those that it was, it was definitely portrayed as non-hostile or fearful figure. Quite the opposite is depicted. Soldiers appear smiling, offering flowers and playing with them. Another research in the camps or in the urban settings could analyze further and more systematically children’s’ drawings.”

### 6.3 Civilian Organizations/Institutions Focus Group.

The transcripts of the conversation with the representatives of civilian institutions, international organizations and NGOs were analyzed and the following main topics emerged:

**a. Perception for the Army before the cooperation**

We can distinguish three different categories of perceptions closely related to previous experiences:

i. Those who never had any direct cooperation with the Greek Armed Forces in the past. Those were the majority. Their view of the Army ranged between carrying stereotypical perceptions of its functions like strict hierarchy, inflexibility in decision making, absolute discipline etc. and neutral to negative sentiments.

“10: I never cooperated with the Armed Forces in the past. Due to my family professional background though, I had the perception that the concept would be a bit strict and their way of conduct would be more inflexible.

9: It didn’t occur to me to cooperate directly with the Army except in one case where I had a contact with the NATO base in Kosovo, while conducting my thesis for my MA studies. Of course the context was totally different there for many reasons. Exactly because I never had any other contact, what I perceived was that there the professional context was really strict. So, nothing, the feelings I got was that of discipline and order.”

4: I never had any experience and generally I didn’t have any view as I was not concerned about the Army.

3: I didn’t have any past experience with a similar context to this one. The only case I cooperated with Army personnel was with a colleague of mine in clinical laboratories…Thus I came here carrying all the known prejudice towards the Army where things are supposed to be inflexible, where discipline is supposed to be totally strict, where decisions are not under discussion and such things…”

2: I have never cooperated in the past. The perception I had was from neutral to negative.

6: I have never cooperated. The perception I had was that people working for the Army are on a hard and strict context and they are not flexible concerning their rules.”

ii. Those that had little cooperation with the Greek Armed Forces in the past on a different context. Their view of the Army was accompanied by positive comments upon the field on which they cooperated.

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11 The original transcript of the discussion is presented in Annex F.
"11: My only cooperation with the Army was in the Military hospital when I was conducting my practice as a volunteer for the Nurse Corps of the Red Cross. I had positive impression. The context of course was quite different, since this was a medical institution, but overall I had a positive view. The military doctors are considered very good and I had a good impression...

12: Me too, I have never cooperated before. My only experience was during my military service, which I fulfilled in a military hospital in Alexandroupoli. My experience with the military doctors was really good."

iii. Those that had cooperated with the Greek Armed Forces in the past on a similar context. Their view of the Army was accompanied by positive comments.

"1: I have cooperated in the past. Again it was in a refugee Camp. I have a good opinion over our cooperation. Our roles were clearly defined.

7: I have cooperated many times in the past. One of the top moments was outside the Greek borders. Again it was in a disaster relief context and especially concerning refugees. From there I had formed a very good opinion cooperating with the Armed Forces. I was reminded of that when I started working here."

b. Main Points of Concern before the cooperation.

The main concerns of the group, when informed that the Army would participate in coordinating the effort of settling the crisis included: fear of militarization of the camps, behavior towards the refugees, ability to respond to the task, previous war traumatizing experiences of the incoming populations:

"5: I was really anxious and in doubt, because the role of the Army was not clear to me nor how the Camps would be set up. So we were afraid of a militarized Camp…

12: Me too, when I was informed that the Army would take over many aspects of the functioning of the Camp, I was worried of how they would respond to this task, and what kind of behavior they would have towards the refugees…

8: I will agree with 5. My doubts mainly concerned the interaction of the Army personnel with the incoming population. Many of them came from war torn countries and they have suffered a lot from military forces…

3: Initially, when I was informed that the Army would construct the Camps I was skeptical too because I was thinking about the way that they would interact with the population…"

c. Aspects which facilitated a good cooperation

i. Complementarity

The situation in the initial phase of the functioning of the Camp seemed to be overwhelming for many actors, thus necessitating support. The Army in the Camp supported the different actors that needed it, without duplicating the efforts and most importantly without creating competition or overlapping their missions.

"1: … I don’t see any overlapping or competition; I would rather name it support…

3: Complementarity, yes

1: …in parts of the work that had to be done here and it was positive that it was provided. With the credibility of the Army, many things ran more smoothly.

10: …But what I can state is that due to that situation there was high interaction and support among partners and it was necessary in order to be able to make some things happen…

5: … What I observed though, among the rest of the actors, was that it was necessary for different partners to sometimes step into the fields of others, but from my point of view it was a form of cooperation.
12: ... there was a need for support with several hours of medical coverage until we could record all the medical cases and be able to regulate their treatment. That’s why I believe that the Army in the medical sector, stood by our side.

7: I believe that we supported each other, at least as far as it concerns the distributions sector and general support through the initial days of functioning… I think, overall, there was a very correct complementarity as time went by. We didn’t feel that they were stepping into our fields.

8: ... I believe that there is no overlapping or competition, but very good cooperation. Not only with the organization I represent, but with all the partners with which they cooperated in the specific site.

10: The presence of the Army in the initial phase was much more intense, but in no case did it overlap or compete...

9: ... in absolutely no case there was overlapping or competition. We can only speak about complementarity here.

4: ... I never felt competition by their presence, only in terms of help, support and complementarity.

3: Supportive and…basically the role of the Army was supportive. That’s the way I perceive it. There was no case of competition...

2: Definitely as far as it concerns my case there was no competition…

6: … I believe it’s’ way of conduct did not overlap the tasks of other organizations.”

ii. Coordination

The Army’s coordinating role through the LCC was appreciated by the participants.

“11: I was very positive to the information that the Army would participate in the construction of the sites. Having experienced the situation in Idomeni where there was no control from anybody, a total absence… generally a chaos, made me think that the aid of the Army would be good, as it bore both the capacity and knowhow of working systematically. And indeed, when I arrived here I noticed that this was the case exactly…”

“10: … The way it was introduced was very correct and its role was strongly coordinating and that was a very good thing. It did not interfere, in any case in the functioning of any other organization. On the contrary, it coordinated, and achieved it really well, which of course has to do with the personnel also.

4: ... I noticed that the Army’s role in this site was much more active than others and it bore a coordination task also, which according to my perception was a good thing.

2:...I can’t answer honestly whether the Army’s mission was clear to me, but what I need to stress is that it supported us very much in terms of coordination and to facilitate our work. Under these terms, its presence was very positive.”

iii. Flexibility

It is mentioned by some of the participants that the mission of the Army was not very clear, especially through the first phases of the functioning of the Camp, nor homogenous among different sites and it took some time to settle. It is mainly attributed to two main factors. Primarily to the weak presence of other state actors whose absence had to be filled by the Army personnel and secondly to the rapidly changing and emergency nature of the situation during the first days of the functioning. The flexibility to go beyond the strict borders of the mission in order to facilitate the functioning was something acknowledged by the participants.

“10: ...the official state’s representation in the Camp was initially very weak, and it was a good thing that the Army was given the role that it had. In time, some things changed for different reasons. I believe there was nothing threatening to any side. It was a very good presence and I believe that it played a very good role on that part.
8: I believe that their mission was clear from the very first moment, and I believe that they helped define the mission of the rest of the organizations inside the site. That was mainly due the fact that they possess the knowhow of setting up a Camp…

9: The truth is that nor I, could clearly define the role of the Army for quite some time and that was mainly due the fact that I noticed in other sites its role was not that active.

4: I am quite new in the Camp, so when I arrived the role of the Army was quite clear…

3: Clear in the initial phase… I guess it was not, but that was due to the fact that at that point they were filling in the gaps, state gaps mainly, and that was something all of us did more or less. All of us went into that procedure in order to facilitate the functioning as smoothly as possible…

6: The Army’s mission in the Camp was and still is clear. Our cooperation was flawless”

“7: I believe that we supported each other, at least as far as it concerns the distributions sector and general support through the initial days of functioning. I can’t recall at that point having a specific role as they were everywhere, anywhere needed. Given time, they achieved a clearer role, but even we, apart from our medical sector, we were in a bit of a quest to fix the functioning.

12: ... I need to stress that the Army covered many times certain shortfalls that came up, either by NGO’s, by public actors, or the police. It made indeed the work that is being conducted here, much easier in several occasions.”

iv. Respect relationship with the hosted Population

The respect that the military personnel expressed towards the hosted population was a fact noticed by most of the participants, from the early stages of the functioning of the Camp. Politeness, professionalism on the way of conduct and established chain of communication are some of the factors which facilitated this relationship and according to some also facilitated the functioning of the camp.

“5: … From the first day of its functioning though, as I happened to be present, I realized something totally different, very organized, and very organized in terms of behavior towards the refugees also, which was impressive and exceeded my expectations.”

12: … when I arrived here, since the opening of the Camp, I came across an incredibly good behavior towards them.

8: … For me though the interaction of the military personnel with the population has been a very pleasant surprise, especially here in Diavata.”

“7: … Until now we have conducted 43 reports. On none of them did we mention that there was something to report concerning the relationship between the Army team and the hosted population [laughing] and let’s state this to the Army service. Like hostile relationships or other kind of relationships and that’s why I mentioned professionalism at the beginning. You can correct me if I’m wrong, but I never noticed anything. I felt that there was a professional distance which helped facilitate what was happening.”

“11. Concerning the relationship of the Army with the hosted population I would like to add that I noticed that our Army personnel, who serve in this Camp, I don’t know about other Camps, may have provided another view of what Army is about, to people who have arrived from other places where the Army had a totally different role.”

“8: … I need to stress that the specific team in this Camp was the first one to build up a bridge of communication with the hosted population. This fact limited the impact we had concerning the problems we faced with the food sector in the Camp.”
v. **Methodical**

Working methodically, in an organized manner and orderly was a feature appreciated by the participants.

“7: I was sure that they would be organizing and methodical as I had seen that before. I had seen those people working exceptionally on the ground before…”

“11: I believed...that the aid of the Army would be good, as it bore both the capacity and knowhow of working systematically. And indeed, when I arrived here I noticed that this was the case exactly...

9: … My view changed on the first day that we arrived here and gathered for the first meeting of the organizations. Before even seeing what would follow in action, I was convinced about the outcome, just due to the way that the meeting and the contact with the Army personnel were conducted. I formed a very positive opinion, I was given the sense that they are fare and they inspired in me the perspective of a very positive cooperation.”

“9: Speaking about the construction of the site, reality was not far from my expectations. I was sure I would meet order and immediate actions on that task.”

vi. **Credibility**

The credibility of the Army as an institution seems to have provided for better services via its contractors.

“1: … It is positive of course that due to the fact that the Army is considered a more serious organization, the companies that cooperate with him might try to do their job more effectively as they understand that cooperation and its development with the Army may be positive for their business in terms of whether they will be granted other contracts”.

vii. **Personnel’s character**

Many times throughout the discussion it was mentioned that individual personalities, apart from their professional standards, were a contributing factor to the overall success of the cooperation. Among the skills and characteristics which were mentioned as catalysts to better functionality were: knowledge of first aid provision, intense working schedule and effort, enthusiasm, flexibility, knowledge around the refugee camp management and it’s functions, accountability, social sensitivity, professionalism, effectiveness, accessibility, politeness, eagerness to learn, loyalty, self-sacrifice, consistency, diligence, inspirational, respect towards the civilian colleagues and their code of conduct and team spirit with the rest of the actors.

“11: Yes, not only generally, but the individual itself plays important role.”

“1: … Concerning the interaction with the refugees I believe it has to do again with the character and personality of each army individual.”

“8: … Having experience in other Camps in Northern Greece, I believe that their performance in this specific Camp was exceptional. I don’t believe that this was only due to the training that they received, but it was also a matter of the individuals with which we had the opportunity to cooperate here with. Apart from the typical military training they had other skills also, to mention specifically, they were trained in first aid, they had medical skills which could not be covered in any other way, and above all they had a big will to work beyond their working schedule and even beyond their capabilities.”
“6: … Of course I believe it is also a matter of the character of the army personnel who serve here. I believe we are lucky because most of the people wished to contribute to the site and helped a lot.”

“4: Personality aspects…flexibility, knowledge upon the subject, and of the structure and functioning. Organizing…that’s all…and accountability.

2: … A total trust towards the persons which were present from the Army. Why…Because I saw that they were people with great social sensitivity, great professionalism which also means great organizing…and because some things fit my way of thinking, that some problems should be solved methodically, with organization and targeting to a result. Thus…

11: I would like to add, beyond agreeing with 2, that there was a good combination. From one side there was efficiency and capability, but it was combined with a good character which had the characteristics of being accessible, polite and there was something important…there was no arrogance. The person was asking and was willing to know. It wasn’t an arrogant person pretending to know everything. And that was a very good compilation. On the process it became obvious that whatever it undertook, it completed it with a great efficiency.

8: I agree and I would like to add loyalty and self-sacrifice. Especially during the first months the exhaustive working hours didn’t decrease neither their performance, nor their behavior or politeness.”

“10: I agree from 1 to… [Laughter] what I would like to add is that what personally won my heart is that it made me believe that we could do it. It worked like a bridge among all and even when we didn’t know what to do it would lead the way and we would follow. Thus yes…

11: Thus inspiration.

7: I will agree with all the characteristics that were mentioned and I will add consistency and diligence. To the point I was surprised. And of course a will to find solutions…and neither to hide problems under the carpet, nor to bypass it…the will to find solutions.

10: Exactly. I would like to add to what 7 said that it has to do with the army personnel that generally served in Diavata. Both the personnel of the Army as well as the organizations, I don’t know which the situation was in other sites, maybe it was from the best. We were always connected.

9: I agree with the rest. I would like to add to the characteristics the immediate adaptation and the respect towards the way each organization works. Without second thoughts. That. From the first moment.

3: Yes they totally won my trust. It is very difficult Mr. President, for us here, to speak in general. Because this is what we met here…Thus…at least I’m not aware of something else.

6: The Army personnel totally won my trust. I agree with all the rest and I will add that the willingness of the army staff here was very important.”

viii. **Professionalism**

“1. Concerning the performance I would like to add that I found very positive the seriousness of the approach which they showed on the matter of providing hospitality to refugees as well as the procedures. Commonly, there was never a case where a subject was discussed or treated light-hearted or with lack of seriousness.”

“11: We had a very good cooperation in my sector, the distribution sector. It fits my personal style and I like things to be clear and clean-cut, without curves and roll over’s. I think my cooperation with the Army on this sector was excellent. I didn’t have any delays, I didn’t have any postponements thus I had a very good relationship…”

ix. **CIMIC Background**

The participants acknowledged the fact that CIMIC background of the personnel had a big positive impact on the effectiveness, and even differentiated the situation in the specific Camp from others.

“3: The performance of the Army personnel in the Camp, from my point of view, was very positive. Of course we were more privileged than the other Camps. I believe we were lucky because,
if I’m not mistaken, we had a team which was trained in Civilian – Military Cooperation. That had a big impact. I mean the way their leadership interacted as well as the rest of the personnel, obviously had its significance. Thus, it is rather an issue of training.”

“11: I believe their performance and presence in the Camp was perfect. I don’t know whether the army personnel that were working in other Camps were coming from CIMIC units. But I believe that here, it made the difference. The fact that the people in charge were coming from that team, because they seemed to have a much better experience concerning the cooperation with the civil actors.
5: ...I do believe that it is mainly due to the training of the army personnel that served here and not to its social sensitiveness. I could understand that by observing how other Camps worked. My job has to do with reaching out to the people, and the really serious training is on that. On details like whether you are allowed to touch, how you touch and etc.”

xi. Eagerness to exchange knowledge

“9: The constant interaction of the army personnel with the rest of the actors, who theoretically are acquainted to working with vulnerable groups, helped very much. All the military personnel who serve here were eager to learn from the rest of the organizations as well as teach. Essentially it was an exchange of knowledge.”

d. Factors which could potentially obstruct the cooperation

The participants identified some factors which differentiated Diavata Camp from the other sites. The presence of these aspects in the Camp worked positively, but according to their perception, the non existence of these factors in other Camps limited their effectiveness.

i. Rotation of Personnel

All the participants unanimously stressed the importance of stable presence of the same personnel. According to their belief it had a big impact on the cooperation and effectiveness. On the contrary, often rotation of personnel every few weeks’ time which was observed in other sites seriously obstructed it.

11: ...I noticed a big difference from our Camp as we maintained the same army personnel, in contrary to other Camps where the personnel would rotate every 2 weeks or a month. At that point I believe I noticed a difference. The standard physical presence of fixed army personnel was much more efficient and important…
2: I agree with 11 on that one.
9: I agree also with this stability.
10: Number 10 also
[Most participants call out their number amid laughter that they agree],
9: I need to add that I consider very important the fact that the personnel was fixed in the Camp.”

ii. Failure to be flexible

Resilience of the military personnel was mentioned as a very positive and often necessary skill which was available in the Camp. In other sites though, where this was not the case, according to the participants it arose serious incidents both for the hosted population as well as the organizations which were working in them.

“3: … When the leader is trained upon certain issues, especially in our sector were things are very sensitive, an Army person needs to understand that you need to have resilient skills, flexibility, we will get too often in a position of negotiating...I’m not sure whether it happens too of-
ten in the Army. We had it. I don’t know whether it existed in other Camps. And what I am saying is that I believe it lays in the capabilities of the Army to foresee. To send in teams which, beyond their Civilian-Military Cooperation training, they need to examine the personalities of the staff, at least of those in charge.

11: Yes, I agree.

8: I would like to add that in similar cases in other Camps we had serious protection incidents, exactly because the leadership of that specific Camp was insufficient, not only for the hosted population but for the working personnel itself.”

iii. Insufficient Skills for Refugee Camp Management.

According to a participant’s perception the standard Army personnel, normally do not have the necessary skills to manage refugee Camps. Some of the skills they would be missing would be flexibility, failure to respond to psychosocial aspects of the hosted population, failure to discriminate the difference between running an Army camp and a refugee Camp.

“1: I would like to add that it is very different when the Army is assigned to a specific sector of the functioning of the Camp and when the Army is the authority in charge of the Camp. When it takes up a specific role it responds very clearly, as it has the corresponding chain of report and responsibility. When it takes up the management, which I believe is a task that should be granted to civilian personnel…because the Army does not have the flexibility or the knowledge to fully respond to that.”

“1: …the Army has also things to learn from the refugee Camps, mainly as it concerns the psychosocial handling of the hosted population. It does perplex the situation at the point where the Army cannot perceive the difference between an army Camp and a refugee Camp.”

Such insufficiency of skills could have a negative impact on the work of civil organizations.

“9: In Diavata I wouldn’t say that the presence of the Army is only helping. Instead it supports the tasks of the organizations. I mean the presence of the Army motivates you for extra activities in safety and order. This is something that I repeat doesn’t happen in the rest of the Camps. From my experience on other places the role of the Army may sometimes have caused trouble in the activities of the organizations on the contrary to Diavata.”

e. Suggestions to improve the Army effectiveness and Civil-Military Interaction

i. To provide common training concerning the Army’s stance towards the hosted population, to all the Army personnel dealing with refugee Camps in order to facilitate a common line of behavior.

“10: What could be done and I clearly suggest, is that due to the fact that the Army personnel come from different units, they could have a common training concerning the interaction with refugees. Thus they could achieve a common line concerning the behavior.

ii. To provide background information and training about the refugee crisis to both civilian and military personnel working in Camps in order to obtain a holistic view of the crisis and develop social sensitivities.

“1: The whole situation and concept needs to be described to them that brought them in our country. For the civilians applies the same. I mean whatever applies to each civilian, needs to be applied to the army personnel also. They need to be briefed clearly and understand for which reasons and what factors triggered this movement of population.”
“2: … individuals who have a developed social sympathy and the sense of social justice can perform better, especially when dealing with groups like refuges. For that reason I would suggest, in order to be better prepared, to train the personnel which deals or will deal with the refugee issue.”

iii. To include interpreters in military teams in order to be more effective.

“11: … a suggestion to include interpreters in their teams. This was a need that came up pretty early… maybe it would help them little bit more.”

iv. Select personnel which can work in a multicultural environment.

“1: … I believe that in order to promote the cooperation with other organizations, the Army needs to select personnel, which I believe it already does, who can speak foreign languages, who perceive the multicultural environment in which they are involved…”

v. Build up cooperation and trust between the Army and civil organizations from non-crisis time by co-training.

“10… What I could suggest concerning the cooperation is to build it up. Again, in this Camp we had a specific team. What could be done is to involve the organizations in some kind of training programs with the Army, in order to build up in prior a picture, collaboration and trust with each other…”

“12: … Apart from the training of the Army personnel, I believe that the Army could also train the personnel that are working in the Camps on how to respond more effectively on crisis situations.”

“7: I will add in terms of cooperation, that it helped our team many times to continue working in the Camp when it came to security issues, it supported our team in difficult occasions in the medical sector, and again in difficult occasions of providing voluntary help. I would say that we were taught cooperation on the field. I would prefer, like 10 mentioned, to have it tested in prior, before the need arose.”

“6: … What I would also suggest is to train all the personnel of the Army in interacting with the hosted population.”

“1: Through the process of co-training each actor could benefit from the others. Because each one approaches the refugee issue from another point of view, a social service has one way, more humanitarian oriented to run a refugee Camp. The Army which is very good at procedures and effectiveness has another way. A political actor has a way which has to do with its contact with the society. Both could benefit from that, from the co-training and at some point this should occur”

vi. For the Army to choose as leading personnel to such operations personalities which beyond CIMIC training bare resilience, negotiating and flexibility skills.

“3: … it lays in the Army’s capabilities. It is always a matter of the personalities involved, so maybe they could choose with caution the personnel and teams that they are sending on the field, at least their leadership… When the leader is trained upon certain issues, especially in our sector were things are very sensitive, an Army person needs to understand that you need to have resilient skills, flexibility, we will get too often in a position of negotiating… I’m not sure whether it happens too often in the Army. We had it. I don’t know whether it existed in other Camps. And what I am saying is that I believe it lays in the capabilities of the Army to foresee. To send in teams which, beyond their Civilian-Military Cooperation training, they need to examine the personalities of the staff, at least of those in charge”

vii. For the Army to clearly define its role and mission and have a homogenous way of conduct across different sites. In order to be clear upon the support it provides needs to define
which exactly its contribution is, how it is provided, which the duration of the provision is and what the end state is.

“5: … I think it would generally help all the actors in all the Camps for the Army to have a clear role and be homogenous on the tasks that it has taken up in the Camps.”

“10: …Maybe in the future, as I mentioned in all 5 previous questions, there is a need to have a clue of what all the different organizations do, in order to have a more immediate responding to emergency situations.”

“7: You can keep that it clearly supported. ‘Supports’ is a different thing [Laughter]. I noted target, role and time limit. These are some things that I thought right now and which would make clear whether it supports. Meaning to support a clear presence in crisis situations. When, for which tasks, with which role and when I will move out from the field. Which is the duration?”

6.4 Army Officers Focus Group.

The transcripts of the conversation with the Army officers were analyzed and the following main topics emerged:

a. Difficulties that the Officers met during the conduct of their duties.

i. Organizations/Individuals exploiting the circumstances.

The officers found difficult to deal with small organizations or individuals who were taking advantage of the situation for political reasons, publicity or fund raising during the initial stages of functioning.

“1: There was an initiative that brought food, chocolate I think, they dropped them off and they were taking photos of children who were throwing themselves to grab them. Instead of distributing it in an orderly manner, or communicate with us.”

“3: Many times they were taking pictures in the food distribution and they were uploading them. People felt like beggars and they were frustrated. When you are waiting in line to get your food and the other is taking pictures of you presenting it in an exhibiting way, it is something that makes you angry. They didn’t respect the people and they only cared for winning some clicks on their website or to increase their audience.”

“3: I believe the only problematic was with those independent volunteers who were political activists, who entered the Camp supposedly to help. The organizations, with the knowledge they had, as some of them were being deployed here for the first time, did try to support.”

Some of them did not wish/could not cooperate. They would rather exhibit their work and sometimes cause trouble during the initial stages of functioning. The situation settled after stricter control of the Ministry of Migration as to which organizations access was allowed.

“1: Concerning the cooperation with the NGO’s…some gave me the impression that they were there for their own profit, may it be personal or financial and they were constantly creating trouble as they wanted to show themselves.
2: What I said happened during the first days. When the Camp started functioning normally, and there was control, with only certain organizations allowed in the Camp, then things got better…”

12 The original transcripts of the conversation are not provided in order to protect confidentiality as through the conversation specific posts and profiles of personnel could be identified.
While some other initiatives had religious purposes, contrary to the official Greek Orthodox Church, whose role was described as supportive and distinct.

“3: There were even efforts from different dogmas to enter the Camp and distribute religious material. On the contrary the Greek Orthodox Church only met the officials in the Camp, asked how it could support and tried doing so without any efforts to convert people’s beliefs.
5: That is true. The official religions representatives supported without intervening.”

ii. Stereotypes

The personnel noticed certain military stereotypes and sentiments by some civilians among the civil actors, which necessitated some time and contact in order to be surmounted.

“1: ...They were looking down on us as if we were aliens. As if we wanted to harm people. That changed after a while. The organizations themselves would come and talk to us…”

“3: Concerning the organizations...At the beginning it looked like they were facing us with some suspicion. They didn’t know what we were doing in there, which our mission was, maybe they saw us like hostiles, and obviously they were not informed. Later when we cooperated with them there was absolutely no problem...From that point on, when they realized that we were there to help, that we were on the same cause, I believe their stance was positive.”

“3: ...The fact that they were suspicious upon me at the beginning, just because I was wearing uniform, was something I expected.”

iii. Different working hour’s perceptions between the Army and Civil actors.

The Army personnel, when tasked, were acquainted to work beyond working hours in order to accomplish the mission while the civil organizations/NGO’s followed the working schedule. This fact led some personnel to a feeling of being exploited.

“4: ...What I can give you as an example of what I didn’t like, was that during the official non working days, there was no medical coverage by civil actors. To specify there were certain dates that the organizations declared that they wouldn’t be working. That seemed bad to me. For our standards, this sounds bad. There was no chance that we would state that on 25th of December we will not be there. That was a point where I perceived that sometimes there was a kind of exploitation of the ‘altruism’ of the Army personnel.”

“1: ...It happened to me during one of the first nights that we were on duty that they called us to inform us at midnight that a bus with 32 people was arriving. The rest of the partners could not respond... I ended up calling 3 who came in the Camp and we provided them with blankets, food and settled them in accommodation without taking into consideration that it was 12 at night.”

iv. Insufficient treatment of misbehaving.

Lack of officially recognized regulation of the Center led to misconducts among a small percentage of the hosted population. This fact had impact both on the hosted population as well as the actors.

“6: ...We didn’t receive clear answers to questions. For example: Someone constantly created trouble in the Camp and he was known. What should we do with him? Send him to the police. The police was asking what to do with him. Take him to the representative of the Ministry of Migration. What is he supposed to do? Take him to the Army. What should we do with him? There were no clear answers that this guy had to be kicked out of the Camp as he was ruining the whole function. It starts from that.
To what 6 stated, this was an issue that had been discussed many times in the coordination meetings. After long discussions, it always ended with the same conclusion. The main problem was that for a very long time there was no fixed and institutional regulation for the functioning of the Camp.

6: That had an impact on the refugees themselves.... Since there are no consequences for us, we can do whatever we want. And the rest would see them. The guy would draw a knife and stab another. What would happen to him? Nothing. So it continued."

“4: The issue of impunity should have been dealt with. That thing turned against us all. To us, as state actors, and to the refugees themselves. A minority was taking advantage of it, using bad language and behavior, threats, knives and drug cases which should have been dealt with from the beginning.”

v. Lack of interpreters in the military teams.

Lack of interpreters in the military teams led to high dependency on civil actors for the needs of communication with hosted population. The civil organizations had their own interpreters, while the needs of the army were covered by civil actors.

“3: Difficulties...we only had 2 interpreters for UNHCR and the authorities in the whole Camp. One Arab and one Farsi speaking. When everybody comes to ask for something, it is really difficult to communicate, especially when the hosted population doesn’t at least speak English.”

b. Factors which facilitated the Army’s personnel work.

i. CIMIC Training

CIMIC Training provided certain tools to the Officers which helped them while conducting their duties. Among those tools were cultural awareness, humanitarian actors and relationship with the civil organizations as well as working with interpreters.

“2: The CIMIC training I had helped me personally a lot. I learned a lot concerning the mentality of people in the Camp.”

“2: The first thing I thought when I entered the Camp was that my CIMIC training helped me. It helped me by providing cultural awareness about the Arab countries, for which I had no idea. It guided me on how to get into the mentality of the people. I had a negative view over the NGO’s, I knew they would be negative towards me, but I had to do my job.”

“3: During our CIMIC training we were trained on how to work with an interpreter. How to set up a refugee Camp, cluster approach and other staff which helped. Most of the lessons we had attended were then applied on the field.”

ii. Trust and cooperation among partners.

Trust was achieved after working together with civilian actors. It provided for better cooperation and coordination and subsequently resulted in higher effectiveness.

“4: As I entered later than the rest of the guys in the Camp, what I noticed was that there was no gap between the Army and the organizations. It had been already bridged. Trust towards the Army had been established and that was work of my previous colleagues. They were there for quite long and there was daily coexistence and interaction with each other. Thus the different ways of working got closer to each other. Partially there was a common way of working and thinking, by adapting to each other…”

iii. Leadership
Among the rest of the skills that the leader of the team would necessitate was that of resilience. It supported according to the personnel in facilitating better understanding between the different actors and facilitated cooperation.

“3: To us, what played a very crucial role in order to cover the gap between the Army and the organizations was our commander. With a lot of personal effort and a lot of hours. He spoke with the people and the organizations and interacted for many hours in order to bridge the gap…”

iv. Team Spirit

There was an advantage in using pre-built teams of limited army personnel. They could be more effective as they had better discipline, trust, and knowledge of their capabilities and distribution of roles.

“2: … Whatever we did, we did according to what we had been taught in our training and after the orders of the commander. Beyond that all the work that was achieved, had been with a lot of effort...
1: And the bond that we had between us. All of us. From the commander to each of us. We functioned a team.
5: But that team was already built. It was not something that came up on the field.
1: Yes of course, it couldn’t have been done otherwise. It was achieved in prior, thus it worked out positively. A tight bonded team, which covered for each other. I knew that I had my colleague on the left and the other one on the right, and the person in charge did not have to interfere in our work. We were only few and we knew each other very well.
…
3: We were only few and we could coordinate better. If we were 30 people scattered in there I don’t believe we would work that good.”

c. Relationship with the hosted population.

The Army personnel perceived their relationship with the hosted population as a positive one. They based it on mutual respect, by taking into account cultural parameters in a professional manner including religious parameters:

“2: …They invited me for breakfasts, we had lunches together, I enter their tents with them, in the manner that I should visit them, respecting their place. I removed my boots, even when they asked me not to do so. I tasted their food; with humbleness we did it all. But always with respect to the uniform I wear and to the country they are. I tried to pass that to them also.”
3: What impressed me more from the refugees was that they totally respected the Christian Orthodox Church that existed in the Camp…”

At the same time, the personnel acknowledged the fact that there was an initial sentiment of fear among the hosted population towards the uniformed personnel, based on their previous experiences:

“3: The hosted population was kind of afraid of us at the beginning. They explained to me, why they were facing us with fear, because they were beaten by other Armies on their way here in order to get in line and stuff.”

The personnel perceived their work as their mission and connected it with their own refugee past:

“1: ...we responded. There was no chance we wouldn’t. We may had reached our limits but we did what we had to do, as Greek Army, as Greek nation. And we all know in our flesh and bones what being a refugee is. I come from a refugee family. I have memories and I have listened to a lot of stories.”
While after cooperating in the field, they developed emotional relationships with the hosted population:

“2: … Refugees were crying when we were transferred. They were hugging us and thanking us crying, saying ‘thank you’.”

d. **Suggestions to improve effectiveness**

Concerning the Civil Actors:

i. **Early planning**

In order to respond more effectively in a similar case, the personnel acknowledged that the civil authorities should respond with an earlier planning. According to that it should include definition of the country’s capabilities, desired end state and then distribution of roles and funding.

“2: The first thing I would tell the authorities would be to define the amount of people they could receive. Then what kind of living conditions and services they want to provide. Define processes of social integration, and how many they could include, and define processes of returning those that it would not be able to integrate or wouldn’t meet the standards. Those things are achieved after meetings, discussions and coordination. When we would have defined the desired end state I would then call the organizations and deliver roles and funding for that.”

ii. **Expertise among the organizations**

The organizations could distribute roles according to their expertise and not involve themselves in many different sectors.

“1: I would suggest to the organizations to gather and organize themselves, and most of all distribute roles. No matter how big of an organization you are you cannot respond to everything. Thus they should distribute their roles. One should take food provision, the other education, the other accommodation, the other medical support etc. Thus each one should expertise on his field, and I believe he would do it much better.”

iii. **Training of Civilian Personnel of the organizations.**

According to the military personnel’s perception a better training and preparation of the civil organization’s personnel could be beneficial. The training should be focused on the specific context and closer to the challenges they will face on the field.

“3: To better train their personnel. They were hiring personnel, throwing them in the field, without preparing them. Yes you are a psychologist but you are not a specialist on that field. You are a doctor, but you have not been briefed about the special circumstances that you will face in this Camp.”

Concerning military personnel:

Among the preparatory actions that the Army personnel identified as potentially beneficial for the effectiveness of the Army in such a context were:

i. **CIMIC Courses.**

As stated before, the personnel perceived their CIMIC training as one of their skills which helped them conduct their mission. Thus it was suggested as a preparatory measure which the Armed Forces could inherit in order to better prepare their staff for such a mission, adjusted to a more realistic scenario, and focused on refugee camp management issues.
“2: To attend CIMIC courses. Basic.
3: But to inherit a go-no go evaluation system in the course.
1: From the pool of trained personnel that would be created I would put the personnel for simulation training in an empty Camp, before the arrival of hosted population.”

ii. Selection of personnel

Choose the personnel which are to be deployed in such circumstances with criteria, depending on their posts, such as knowledge of foreign languages, with English considered a prerequisite, training in first aid, technical skills, humanitarian experience and knowledge.

“1: Of course you can choose. What I would suggest would be knowledge of English, training in first aid, knowledge on technical constructions, knowledge in humanitarian aid. Yes, of course they should choose, and the Army General Staff has the pool of experts and knowledge to do that.”

6.5 Summarize of the Focus Groups Discussions

After we concluded analyzing the discussions, the following general remarks were made:

a. Hosted Population Group:

Syrians which were coming from war torn zones even though they expressed remorse feelings towards their home country’s army, managed to develop a relationship of respect towards the Hellenic Armed Forces. For both Syrians and Afghans indications show that they had a very good interaction with the army which was based on mutual respect, personal contact, fairness, accessibility, interest in their needs, dedication in the mission and reliability. For the children which were considered the most vulnerable group, research indicates that even though at the beginning they were afraid of uniformed personnel, due to previous experiences, they perceived the Greek military personnel as non threat figures connecting them with friendly behavior, safety and calmness.

b. Civilian Actors Group:

Concerning the civilian actors group, research suggests that before the cooperation certain stereotypes existed among the actors, such as the army being inflexible, strict and patronizing creating concerns as to what kind of behavior they would show towards the hosted population. This fact changed though after their contact with the military personnel in the camp. They surprisingly met a very respectful interaction towards the organizations and the hosted population. They seemed to accredit to the army a well accepted and functioning coordination role, while its capacity, effectiveness, professionalism and credibility were appreciated.

The cooperation and coordination between them and the Army was based in complementarity, flexibility and mutual respect of their mandates and way of conduct while there were certain personal characteristics which were perceived as above the perceived military standards and facilitated a better interaction. Those included the CIMIC background of personnel, resilience skills, eagerness to exchange knowledge and enthusiasm. Factors which could have obstructed the cooperation, but were not
met in the specific camp were then defined. They included frequent rotation of military personnel in different camps, lack of resilience skills, and indifference for any other issue apart from the strict mission. Suggestions to improve the cooperation included pre-deployment co-training and institutional familiarization and CIMIC training of military personnel.

c. **Army Officers Group:**

Research in the military officer’s focus group suggested that they faced certain coordination issues and that they also had stereotyped the humanitarian providers prior their cooperation, especially at the emergency phase, which partially derived from individuals, NGO’s, or volunteer initiatives exploiting the situation for own publicity, fund raising, political or religious purposes. They also received skepticism from certain organizations. Full coordination and trust was achieved after cooperating on the field with the certain, fixed and validated partners and stricter control by the ministry of migration on the access to the camps.

One of the main problems they faced was insufficient treatment of misbehaving individuals among the hosted population, which led to a raise of security issues in the camp. Another difficulty was lack of interpreters in their team, a gap which they had to fill in with the support of civilian actors. The factors which facilitated better cooperation with the civil actors were according to their perception their CIMIC training, trust relationships they built with civil actors, team spirit and effective leadership. In time, they also built a very good cooperation with the hosted community. During the first days they felt that the hosted population faced them with a sense of fear, but being culturally aware, effective and trustworthy helped them build trust relationships which by the end of their tour would even be sentimental from the hosted community.

Suggestions for a more effective response included early planning, CIMIC training, selection of military personnel according to certain criteria, training/co-training with civilian actors and distribution of roles to the civil actors according to their expertise without duplications.

We then categorized the CMI aspects which were identified through research under the same thematic as the one with which we examined CIMIC in paragraph 2.2 in order to compare them. That is to include the positive aspects of the interaction between the Armed Forces and the Civil Organizations/NGO’s in the specific operation. The potential problematic which could be identified, as well as the main suggestions which were formed in order to improve the interaction.

6.5.1 **Positive aspects of CMI**

Our discussions suggest that the interaction between the Armed Forces and Civil Organizations/NGO’s bore the following positive aspects:

a. **Capacity-Capability of the Armed Forces:**

The Army provided the capacity in logistic support and manpower as well as the know-how in order to set up timely and efficiently the camp and to facilitate its services.
b. Structure of the Armed Forces:

The established lines of command and report as well as the discipline and organization provided for the fast and effective deployment of its capacity and was appreciated especially throughout the emergency phase of the operation. Moreover the deployment of pre-existing teams in the functioning of the camp facilitated for better coordination among them and knowledge of its capabilities.

c. Cooperation/Coordination

At the emergency phase the Armed forces set up an administrative system which provided for a context in which the civilian actors could perform and the humanitarian actors could provide their services. At the initial phase their role was vaguer as they would fill in identified gaps both from the state actors as well as the organizations/NGO’s, thus resulting in close cooperation. In the process and as a coordination scheme was facilitated the interaction depended on good coordination in the camp which was again provided both from the civil and military personnel and was acknowledged by the hosted population.

The cooperation and coordination were dependent on mutual knowledge and respect of each other’s mandates and way of working, trust and team spirit. There was avoidance by the military staff to force decisions or authority upon the partners, marked by an eagerness to exchange knowledge and experience. Its good implication resulted in great complementarity and avoidance of duplication, overlapping tasks and competition. Moreover as the civil actors were ready to take up certain sectors, the Army would pass the role to them, resulting in a timely pull out of the military personnel without affecting the regularity of life and services in the camp. The overall sense of the civilian aid providers was that their cooperation with the Army in the specific Camp provided for a safe context, supported their work, promoted it and even inspired and encouraged them to go further and beyond their mandates.

d. CIMIC Background of the Army Personnel

The CIMIC background of the Army personnel that served in the Camp facilitated, according to both the army’s personnel perception as well as the Organizations'/NGO’s view, their cooperation with the civilians, concerning both the hosted population as well as the partners. It provided for:

i. Cultural Awareness of the hosted population which facilitated better interaction and respect relationship with them acknowledged by all the actors and population.

ii. Awareness of the humanitarian actors’ mandates and way of conduct.

iii. Increased sensitivity in the refugee background of the hosted population.

iv. Negotiation skills.

v. Meeting organization-Discussion skills.

e. Leadership Skills

According to the civil actors, military personnel and hosted population an effective leadership is necessary in order to coordinate efforts and maintain stability especially during ‘crisis within a crisis’ situations. Among the positive characteristics of leadership for the specific operation which were displayed on the field by military personnel were:
i. Accountability/Credibility/Reliability
ii. Professionalism
iii. Flexibility
iv. Resilience/Negotiation skills
v. Politeness/Respect/Gender awareness/Cultural awareness
vi. Social sensitivity/social awareness
vii. Dedication
viii. Durability and self-control under increased workload or adverse conditions
ix. Fairness
x. Accessibility
xi. Motivating/Inspiring
xii. Ability in provision of first aid.

f. Exchange of Information

The participatory system of coordination which was implemented, promoted the appropriate dissemination of information and the planning of appropriate response by the actors. Furthermore it fostered for better evaluation of needs and smooth integration of new coming actors.

g. Good relationship with the hosted population

According to all the categories of participants in the research, the military teams managed to build a good relationship with the hosted community. That was fostered by respect, professionalism, cultural awareness and reliability and bridges of communication which were built from the early stages of the operation. This fact supported the interaction between the army and hosted population, but also facilitated the work of civilian actors, either by providing a valid assessment of the needs or even mediating in some cases the interaction between them, either by addressing needs, facilitating communication or resolving unnecessary tensions.

6.5.2 Problematic of CMI

During the discussions the actors identified factors which complicated or could have complicated their overall work and interaction with each other:

a. Varying Agendas of Individuals/initiatives/minor NGO’s

At the first stages of the functioning, when control of the entrance in the camps was not strict, there were incidents of individuals, groups, or minor NGO’s for whom there were allegations of misconduct. Guided by political, financial or religious motives they would exploit the situation for their own profit, or they would provide aid in a manner which would not support the hosted population and even obstruct the work of the rest of the partners. The situation was smoother after the ministry of Migration implied stricter rules of entrance into the camps and verification of the different NGO’s and individuals.
b. **Lack of Official Regulation**

Non-existence of protocols on how to treat cases of misbehaving from the part of hosted population led to increase of criminality inside the camp. This resulted in security problems towards the partners as well as the hosted population themselves. This result was also facilitated by the ethical inability of humanitarian aid providers to press charges on certain cases (receive of threat, destruction of property, stealing of aid supplies) as well as low presence of security forces.

c. **Inadequate interpreters in the military teams**

The military teams were not supported by own interpreters, thus they heavily depended on civil organizations for this purpose. When not present, the army personnel would have to ask for support from English speakers among the hosted population. Even though this fact facilitated for closer cooperation with both the organizations and the hosted population in the long term, in some cases it would work counter effectively for the teams.

d. **Stereotypes**

Lack of previous cooperation or institutional familiarization led to existence of stereotypes. According to the army personnel, they were perceived with much skepticism by civilian organizations at the early stages of the operation, while many of the organizations initially held the perception that the Army personnel would be strict and inflexible and were worried about the behavior of the Army personnel towards the refugees. On the other way around, the army personnel due to the perceived situation of the humanitarian chaos which existed before the Army’s involvement considered that the humanitarian aid providers would be unwilling to coordinate and many of them would be incapable of providing proper aid. It was only shortly after coordinating, that each other’s capabilities and common goals were appreciated.

e. **Rotation of Military Personnel**

Even though it was not an issue in the camp, civil actors which were active in other camps also, stressed the importance of cooperating with fixed personnel. Longer terms of service provided for increased situational and functional awareness, building of trust and standard points of contact. On the contrary personnel who served for a 2-3 weeks term, were in some cases unaware of the situation or the actors and they would show unwillingness to cooperate on any other issue apart from issues which strictly concerned their mission.

f. **Perception about Insufficient skills of Average Army personnel**

According to some civilian actors, the perceived average military personnel, lack the skills to manage a refugee Camp when they fail to perceive the psychosocial aspects of the hosted population or fail to be flexible in decision making. According to this view they are trained for managing a different environment and thus the management of such humanitarian interventions should be better appointed to civilians. According to another, the Army has shown that it possesses individuals with the appropriate skills. Fail to appoint the right ones though in other cases had shown that it resulted in
situations which caused security concerns, both to humanitarians as well as the hosted population.

6.5.3 Main recommendations in order to improve CMI

The main suggestions from all the actors in order to foster better cooperation and effectiveness included:

a. Training

   i. Training of the Army Personnel was a prerequisite in order to achieve common line of behavior towards the hosted population and actors, as well as same level of effectiveness among different Camps. That could also include simulation scenarios in Camp environment before deployment. CIMIC training was considered of high relevance and significance.

   ii. Training of civilian personnel. That includes training by their respective organizations which would prepare them for the needs of the specific field of operations as well as training from the Armed Forces prior to deployment on simulation scenarios and handling of emergencies.

   iii. Common training/exercises. This could foster their interaction prior to their deployment. They could organize training in common and/or the Army could call the organizations to participate in exercises in corresponding scenarios.

b. Interpreters

Inclusion of trained interpreters in the military teams could ease the burden of the interpreters from civil organizations and increase the overall efficiency of the teams.

c. Building of relationships, knowledge and trust before deployment

By building relationships prior any emergency, all the actors would be aware of each other’s capabilities and mandates. Thus they could have built trust and be more ready and efficient on the field prior to their deployment.

d. Selection of Army personnel

The Armed Forces supposedly possesses the capability to choose from a pool of experts the appropriate personnel for such missions. Special attention could be given to the leaders of the teams. Apart from the standard military and leadership skills and suggested CIMIC training, other skills which were considered important included: resilience and negotiation skills, higher education, social sensitivity, knowledge of the humanitarian environment, first aid capability, foreign languages, and ability to work in multinational and multicultural environment.

e. Clear mandate

In order for the Army to be more clear and effective, its mandate in such operations needs to be accurate at least in some basic aspects. That is to define what it provides, how it provides it (means, personnel and process), for how long, for what purpose and
what the end state is. According to some civilians this could help define better their relationship and the cooperation.
CHAPTER SEVEN
Concluding Remarks

7.1 Main Differences between CIMIC Operations and the case studied operation.

As we mentioned in paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3, CIMIC in Greece applies according to its doctrine, only outside the national territory and in support of the military commander’s mission. This by definition means that we cannot characterize the participation of the Hellenic Armed Forces in resolving the refugee influx in Greece as a CIMIC operation, neither that its components conducted CIMIC. Primarily because there were no military operations. Thus the Hellenic Armed Forces were neither a belligerent nor a component of an international institution’s mandate. Simply enough, there were no military objectives to facilitate. Furthermore the operation was conducted in national territory. By further examining the implications of these facts we can identify fundamental differences between the case study operation and the Peace Support and Crisis Respond Operations, to which CIMIC applies as explained in Chapter Two.

The first fact is that the Army was not a belligerent. Thus the main issue of jeopardizing the neutrality and impartiality which averts the civilian aid providers from cooperating with the Army in PSO’s and CRO’s did not exist. Moreover, the military forces were deployed inside their country of origin on a solely humanitarian concept. Thus no national agenda of active external policy could be attributed to the decision of deploying or funding the Army. This fact does not allow for perceptions of politicizing the humanitarian aid in favor of external policy and subsequently averts from characterizing as such the potential partners.

Despite the above though, we could argue that even the way that the host governments respond to mass refugee influxes, is indeed a highly political decision which as Jacobsen suggests relies on a variety of internal factors (Jacobsen, 1996). Even during the same crisis, different governments will respond in various ways, as explicitly shown during the specific influx across Europe (Koulioumpis, 2017), and they will deploy their national armies on either humanitarian or security mandates accordingly. Thus, again, the Army’s aid provision, as a state’s component, remains a political act of the government that commands it. The difference though in this case, concerning the CMI, is that the potential civilian partners are defining their relationship towards the policy of the government directly. The Armed Forces thus are spared from the role of mediator of any objections that civilian actors might bare towards governmental policies. On the other hand it spares the civilian aid providers from risking their perceived status by depending on the aspirations or policies of a third party in the Civil-Military relationship which would be the case if deployed abroad on failed or fragile states.

That leads us to the next big divergence of the studied operation. It was conducted in a stable state. Governmental functions and international institutions were in place functioning through their respective hierarchies and communication channels. Even though the coordination can be challenged, as expected in crisis situations, what it offers to the actors is riddance of any potential power struggles among them. The higher end of the chain of command is overall governmental. This leaves little room for partners to define by themselves where they stand in terms of authority and alleviates any hierarchical status competition which could potentially obstruct the cooperation as described in Chapter II.
Finally, another big advantage of the studied operation was that the mandates of the Army and the civilian actors coincided. Their mission was to serve the exact same humanitarian cause. Our research indicates that this fact, in combination with a clear mandate from the side of the Armed Forces left no room for contradicting interests, goals or objectives. All the above factors facilitate more eager and less risky cooperation among the Army and civilian aid providers. All the above characteristics are met also during normal CEP operations, and as suggested by literature consist the factors which renders them less problematic in terms of Civil-Military Interaction a fact which our research tends to confirm.

7.2 Common problematic between CIMIC from literature and the indications of our research on the current operation.

Despite the fundamental differences between CRO’s/PSO’s and the Operation of the Hellenic Armed Forces, which were mentioned in the previous paragraph our research suggests that aspects of the same problematic may appear in both situations. There are indications that the issue of coordination between different actors remains. The plethora of NGO’s as well as their heterogeneity still exists in responses to crises in the interior of the states. Different protocols, priorities and objectives can be traced among them, rendering central coordination challenging. The number of actors in the studied operation was enhanced even more, by the engagement of several official state actors, such as different ministries and their respective services.

Moreover, since the crisis unfolded in a secure environment, close and into developed countries, as well as the level of the appeal that it had on the public sentiment through media, fostered for the attention of far more many private initiatives, both local, as international. The problem, except from the sheer number, as indicated, was that some of them were potentially malevolent, having political motivation, religious background tasks, publicity or fund raising agendas and could potentially obstruct the work of the humanitarian aid providers or consume time and effort of state actors to confront their activities.

The fact that funds were available for certain time and certain services, seems to have led in some occasions, as CIMIC literature suggests, to fund driven aid. Inevitably different NGO’s in order to sustain themselves may have appeared with competing projects, overlapping missions and struggle to demonstrate their work in order to respond to the donors need for justification of their provisions. That could potentially lead to ineffective utilization of funds and failure to keep up with the real needs on the ground. Our research suggests though that strong and participatory coordination schemes, supervision of the approved tasks as well as immediate exchange of information may minimize the effect.

Institutional unfamiliarity between the Armed Forces and humanitarian agencies seems to have made its way through this operation also. Potential existence of stereotypes among the different actors may contribute to lack of trust and inherited unwillingness to cooperate. This fact at tactical level seems to have been easily surpassed especially through the emergency phase of the crisis due to inevitable close contact and badly needed complementarity of tasks and efforts. At operational and strategic level though it is an issue that may necessitate more long term solutions and planning, as existing CIMIC literature suggests.

Another common factor between the two kinds of operations which does not build upon the trust and cooperation of the partners seems to be the frequent rotation of
military personnel in the LCC’s. Institutional memory could be strongly affected, leading to lack of ability to perceive the situation and the actors, let alone coordinate it. Moreover it doesn’t allow for inter-professional bonds to develop neither interagency relationship on the ground which would help the military personnel conduct their mission more effectively. Our research tends to confirm that long term service of military personnel can lead to an overall better cooperation and effectiveness.

7.3 Suggestions

As presented in the previous paragraph, certain problematic is common among the Interaction of Armed Forces and Civilian Actors in complex emergencies responses and in refugee influxes. Through years of application in the field and extensive studies, CIMIC suggests that those issues could be addressed and our research results tend to confirm that, as similar proposals emerged from the field of refugee influx. Thus for national operations were the military component might have to take up tasks involving civilian actors, further than supporting them with its capacity, recommended actions would involve:

a. Training

Civilian actors and army personnel could participate in common exercises, seminars and academic studies involving both actors. Our research also suggests that CIMIC training could contribute as it holds close resemblance to the specific field. An independent study conducted by Magklaras Pantelis tends to confirm, through a quantitative research using measurable factors, our suggestion. His conclusion suggests that ‘data indicate that the knowledge and application of practices according to the CIMIC protocol, affected positively the quality of the provided services, as well as the overall management and normal function of the camps’ (Magklaras, 2017).

b. Institutional Familiarization

By the term we refer to acquainting the civilian and military actors from a pre-deployment or non crisis period. Apart from training it could be achieved by personal and institutional relationships, as well as exchange of personnel, for example army officers could be encouraged to volunteer for humanitarian organizations. Such a relationship could foster the exchange of knowledge, construction of coordinated response protocols, mutual respect towards respective mandates and awareness of the partner’s capabilities. All the above have been acknowledged through our research as primary necessities for an effective coordination, especially through an emergency phase where the time that the actors will need to accomplish them will run against the effectiveness of the aid provision.

c. Cultural Awareness

Being culturally aware of the population that the aid is aiming to will provide for better assessment of their needs. Thus it can support better preparation and distribution of installations (accommodation units, latrines, dining facilities, mobile charging stations etc.) better adjustment of services (wi-fi provision, dietary specifications, medical needs etc). Furthermore it can support better assessment of the facts taking place and
understanding of the mentality of people. (e.g. psychological pressure during Ramadan, celebrations of Nauruz etc.) Moreover it can provide with the tool of showing respect towards the hosted population’s culture (daily life customs, religious celebrations, handshakes, language standards and possible traps etc) which will in turn support the quest for respect towards the host nation’s culture. It can be achieved by seminars or handbooks before deployment and utilization of cultural mediators/interpreters or counseling from experts on deployment.

d. Participatory coordination

None of the actors is fully specialized or capable to respond to all the aspects of confronting a crisis. A participatory coordination scheme at all levels provides for better assessment of the situation on the ground and the needs of people. Furthermore it can provide with holistic view of any problems, as well as coordinated actions to resolve them. It can also facilitate timely and efficient dissemination of information. Furthermore a proper distribution of responsibilities, even before deployment can result in avoidance of duplication of efforts and promote accountability.

e. Complementarity of tasks

As mentioned before the Armed Forces can support the civilian actors, especially during an emergency phase when there is a great need for fast and decisive action, workforce and logistics support. Thus the Army’s structure and capabilities are mostly appreciated during confronting the emergency phase which is generally short termed. Civil actors are better trained, structured and staffed for more long term operations and planning. We could suggest that ideally confronting a refugee influx or even other crisis, would heavily involve the military component at the early stages. A phase of hand over-take over should intervene until the civil actors would be ready to take up respective roles and tasks.

What the field of refugee influx response explicitly shows is that there is a great direct and indirect connection of every service provided. No actor can perform independently without affecting the other’s mission. For example any malfunctions in the food provision, will directly affect the medical sector, while children’s education/recreation activities could indirectly affect the security sector, by lowering the misbehaving of minors. Considering the above fact together with all the services provided in a refugee camp as shown in paragraph 4.2 shows the degree of coordination and complementarity that needs to be applied on the field.

f. Mandates

While we suggest that in early planning setting up the mandates should take into account the partners mandates, the specific mission statements should be clear as to what the actor will provide, by which means, how he will provide it, for how long and define the end state. As potential gaps are expected to emerge in every emergency, the mandates should allow for flexibility.

The refugee influx response operations deliver some more suggestions though, concerning the handling of crisis in the interior:
g. Maximum Exploitation of Volunteers and Donations

During the initial stages of a crisis response, a great amount of mobilization of individuals and donations should be expected. Their support could fill in gaps in services or manpower, mobilize and involve the community and bring closer the providers with the people in-need. Certain amount of time and effort though should be addressed to register them, provide them with basic guidelines and way of conduct and supervise them. Appropriate authority should undertake these tasks. Individual actions or donations, if uncontrolled could end up in serious security concerns, for all involved, may it be the volunteer himself (hazardous situations if not efficiently trained, attacks to retrieve the provided aid, loss of property etc) the population in need (perception that all individuals are good willing, receipt of non appropriate aid etc), or the rest of the actors (delivery of misleading information, questioning of their performance etc).

In the case studied example the Army Personnel coordinated volunteers in the early stages. When the needs multiplied by the opening of several camps and the amount of donations surpassed the capability of the LCC’s to handle the aid ad hoc, a central coordination of the aid and volunteers at regional level by civil authorities served the cause. The donations were received at a central point, categorized by volunteers and then were dispersed to the different points according to the needs.

h. Security role of the Army

As mentioned before, the political will in involving the Armed Forces in supporting a refugee influx operation may be expressed by deploying them with a security mandate or with a humanitarian one. Since in Greece the second choice was selected, our research suggests that the disarmament of the personnel which participated in the aid provision and the abolition of security as a role undertaken by the police forces supported the interaction with the hosted community. It must be taken into account that such a luxury of mandating the security to another actor could only be feasible in such a context. In Peace keeping missions and international humanitarian operations the primary service that the Armed Forces are requested to provide is according to some, security both to aid providers, but mainly to the aid receivers. (Terry, 2001)

Furthermore, the concerns expressed by humanitarian actors concerning the perception of the incoming population towards the army personnel were foreseen by the military command. As research indicates part of the incoming population was fleeing war torn zones and indeed bore negative sentiments. Confrontation with military forces tasked with security might have further traumatized them, especially children. On the contrary, by selecting appropriate personnel, and providing them with a humanitarian mandate, the military personnel were able to develop a mutual respect relationship with the hosted population. As a civilian partner put it through the discussions: ‘they might have showed them another face of the military’.

On the other way around, CIMIC could also benefit from lessons learned from responses to refugee influxes. Jessica Szczygiel, in her case study analysis of international humanitarian operations deriving from conflict, suggests that the greatest barrier to military and NGO cooperation in complex emergencies is the lack of humanitarian space provided for NGO personnel and civilians in hostile and insecure areas as well as the very mandate of the actors (Szczygiel, 2004). The specific response we examined, as explained in the previous paragraphs, bares none of these barriers. Thus serves as a field where a researcher could examine the dynamics of the rest of the parameters which affect the Civil-Military Cooperation. Our research suggests that even if there
was enough humanitarian space and mandates coincided, there would still be issues in CIMIC as expressed in paragraph 7.2. Luckily most of those issues have already been identified, and CIMIC in Peace Support and Crisis Response Operations, even if still challenging is on the right track of addressing those issues.

7.4 Conclusion

The evolution of complex environment has brought crises in the interior of stable countries. Responses like Civilian Emergency Planning do not suffice to surmount them. Procedures which have been considered well implemented and standardized will have to be put under reconsideration. Thus the different actors which participate in the response may have to step out of their comfort zones. That very step, taken by military forces, according to our research is a point where problematic may appear concerning its interaction with civilian actors. Addressing this potential problematic we examined whether CIMIC experiences gained through the interaction of Armed Forces and Humanitarian Providers in complex emergencies could serve to address Civilian Military Interaction in humanitarian responses in the interior of stable states.

Concluding, our research we suggest that CIMIC can support such operations, not as a military function, but through its elements, experience and knowledge gained on the field. The responders in Peace Support Operations/Crisis Response Operations in fragile or failed states and those in a refugee influx in a stable state are very similar. The dynamics between them in the first case are well documented and we suggest that the problematic for which we have indications that may appear in their cooperation in a crisis response in the interior could be addressed through the scope of CIMIC.

Evaluating the overall effectiveness of the operation was not possible through our approach. Such a goal would demand highly evaluating the political component of the operation. This was out of the aim of this dissertation which tries to focus on the interaction between armed forces and civil actors. Concerning our research results, the author has taken effort to minimize any potential impact that his cooperation and acquaintance with the participants could have had. Moreover, the research was focused in one refugee camp, thus any generalizations would be dicey. The focus groups method by design, as well as our approach was meant to offer insight on an issue that is not sufficiently covered by literature. In order to form measurable factors and safe conclusions, further studies are needed.
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ANNEX A
Interview Guide for the Hosted Population

1. How do you think of the Army in your home country?
2. Were you aware of the fact that the refugee camps in Greece were built and ran by the Hellenic Armed Forces? How did you feel when you learned about it?
3. Do you feel comfortable to address to the army personnel for any issues you might face?
4. How is your relationship with the army personnel in the camp?
5. How do you think of the cooperation between the Army and the civil organizations in the camp?
6. Have you ever been in contact with organizations in your home country? How do you feel about their work here?
7. How do you feel about the Greek people?
ANNEX B
Transcript of the Farsi Speaking Focus Group

The conversation starts with both Arab speaking (Kurds and Syrians) and Farsi speaking (Afghans) in the same group with parallel interpretation in both languages as initially planned.

AM: Arab Male
AF: Arab Female
FM: Farsi Male
FF: Farsi Female

Coordinator: I would like to thank you for responding to the request and joining the discussion. You have been informed about the purpose of this meeting correct?

AM1: We have been informed that it will be a discussion with the Army.

Coordinator: It will be a discussion about the Army. It has to do with how you think about the Army. We will make specific questions and your opinion will help the Army understand better the relationship and its contribution with you. To facilitate the discussion I would like to request not to speak at the same time and when you answer the questions please chose a nickname. We wish for this discussion to be anonymous and we do not need to know who express the opinion. So when you give a response you can start by: “I am Halil and my opinion is this..”. ok?

AM1: ok

Coordinator: Concerning your country of origin, when you hear about Army, what thoughts come into your mind?

FM1: Security of our country.

AM1: Concerning the Army in our country, the Army’s role is to protect the whole population, but it essentially is protecting the interests of a specific group. So the Army has nothing to do with internal politics it exists to safeguard the country. That is my opinion about the Army in our country.

FM1: Security of our country.

AM1: For all of us who are Syrians we have positive thoughts about the Army, safeguarding our homeland.

[The discussion is interrupted by the Army coordinator who has brought in the discussion the Arab speaking women and repeats the purpose and guidelines to the participants].

Coordinator: We were discussing before you came, how you think of the Army in your country of Origin:
[The Arab speaking group is internally discussing the purpose of the discussion, thinking that the discussion though meant to be about the Army in Greece, is now turning into a discussion about the Army in Syria].

Coordinator: So who would like to speak about his view of the Army in his home country?

AM2: Of how it used to be or how it is now?

Coordinator: Of how you think about it. What comes into your mind?

AM1: There are two distinctive views. The Army in the past and the Army now. There is big difference. In our country we went from one stage to another. And by moving to the next stage we were able to understand the meaning of the Armies in all countries. We were able to understand from which view we are going to refer to the Army. Are we going to speak about how the Army is meant to be in theory or in practice? And we need to mark how the Army was five years ago, and how it is now. So what is the sub question?

Coordinator: So the question is how would you describe the Army concerning your countries of origin.

AM2: Yes, but concerning the Army in the past, now, or generally?

Coordinator: Whatever you want and feel.

AM1: In our country the Army 6 years ago was totally different from what it is now. It has turned to the totally opposite. In the past it was concerned with the protection of people by safeguarding the external borders and since 6 years ago till now it is concerned with something else which is the murder of the population and the distraction of the cities. So which phase do you want us to discuss about?

[The coordinator is discussing with the interpreters how to better facilitate the discussion as the Farsi speakers seem to be excluded since AM1 is trying to lead the discussion]

Coordinator: [Addressing to the Farsi speakers] How about you?

FM1: Security for our country.

Coordinator: ok. Before arriving here were you informed that you would be hosted in Camps where Army would be present?

AM1: No, no. We came here considering it as a passage.

Coordinator: Just a minute.[Giving some time for the Farsi interpreter to address the question to the Afghans]

FM1: Yes.
Coordinator: So you knew about it.

FM1: Yes

FM2: I didn’t know about it. When we arrived in the Camp the Army assisted us.

Coordinator: When you realized that the Army was present in the Camps how did you think about it?

AM2: We didn’t feel any difference.

FM2: We felt security

FM3: It was very good because we feel safe when we see the Army.

AM1: When we left our country and settled here and we heard the words Army and Police we automatically felt good cause that would mean security. And that is our opinion about the Army.

Coordinator: would anybody else like to express his opinion? You girls also?

AF1: Our opinion is the same with AM1.

AM1: Excuse me. [Standing up to leave the conversation].

[Tense discussion between the Arab speakers, most of the members of the group stand up to leave.] AM3 explains to the coordinator that AM1 was annoyed by the fact that when he was expressing his opinions the Farsi speakers were making comments over his views in a different language on purpose.

Coordinator: [Explaining to the leaving group that nothing like that happened, while anyone can leave the discussion at anytime he wishes] I don’t understand what your problem is but if you wish to leave you are free to do so.

AM1: [Raising voice and yelling at the interpreters and the interpreter coordinator while addressing to the rest of the Arab speakers to leave the room]

The Arab speaking group left the room, so the Arab translator was released and the discussion continues after a request of the coordinator for staying inside the room only those people who would like to continue the discussion. Only the Farsi speaking group remained.

FM1: We left our country for exactly that reason. In order to have freedom of speech. I don’t understand why they are doing this.

Coordinator: It is ok. It is their own decision. They can stay if they wish, they can leave whenever they want. We continue.
FM2: Why did they leave? We would like to know. We understood that they said something like “The Afghans, the Afghans..”

Coordinator: No. They thought that before, when the interpretation supervisor was talking to me, we were secretly commenting on what the gentleman was saying.

FF1: But the interpretation coordinator cannot speak Arab, how could she comment on what he was saying?

Coordinator: Guys, what I can say about that. That’s what he imagined, he was upset and he left. It’s ok.

FM3: [Short laugh] You are translating the conversation, don’t they understand that if he says something more or less you can understand it?

Coordinator: Its ok, in any case what was said will not be used out of this room, so whatever happened, doesn’t matter.

FM1: We have no problem if our conversation will be used somehow out of this room. Whatever we say is the truth and we are not afraid to say it.

Coordinator: Would you like the rest of us to continue our discussion?

FM2: No problem.

Coordinator: ok. I would like to remind you to use a nickname when you are answering so that the interpreter can use it to translate your response. We stopped our conversation at the point where when you arrived at the Camp you realized that the Army would be present. What did you think about that?

FM3: I, specifically, when I arrived at the Camp and realized that, I felt safe. Cause back in our country there is terrorism and bombs explode, so when I saw that I felt that we reached a country where we can have security.

Coordinator: What about the rest?

FM1: I was told that this would be a military Camp, and that was the reason I came here.

Coordinator: Oh! So you had been informed before arriving that there would be Army here and that was the reason you came?

FM1: No, I realized it when I arrived at the gate.

Coordinator: And how did you feel about that?

FM1: I felt very good because the Army is always conducting its mission in a very good way.

Coordinator: Anyone else?
FM2: The Army has a very good cooperation with the refugees. We have seen that they have a very good way of conduct. What I would like to ask is do they have such a good relationship with their own people also?

Coordinator: I didn’t understand the question.

FM2: When we arrived in the Camp we realized that the Army has a very good relationship with the refugees. They have very good manners and they are very polite. We feel secure. What I would like to know is whether they have such a good relationship and they treat the Greek people in the same way.

Coordinator: So you would like to know how is the relationship between the Greek people and the Greek Army?

FM2: Yes, exactly.

Coordinator: What you are asking has also to do with the cooperation of the organizations in the Camp with the Army, as most of the employees of the organizations are Greek. And it is really interesting for us to know, how you perceive the relationship between the Army personnel and the Organizations in the Camp. How does this cooperation seem to you?

FM1: It is really good. I am among the first people who arrived in the Camp. The day we got here and realized that the Army is here we were happy. The Army is really working for all the nations in the Camp. They helped us a lot and in this Camp they worked a lot for us. We are very satisfied with the Army and they did help the Afghan people a lot.

Coordinator: Would anybody else like to comment about his interaction with the Army?

FM3: We heard that on the islands there are closed camps which have their own regulations. We heard that the gate is open from 8 to 20:00, and if you go out and return later than that you can’t get in. We didn’t see such restrictions in this Camp. With George especially we had very good cooperation.

FM2: All the Army personnel who served here were very good people. If one bad person existed he would give a bad impression for the whole Greek Army. Luckily we only met good people here.

Coordinator: Do you have anything negative to say? Express any complains? [Laughing] it’s anonymous don’t forget about that. Nobody will know who is talking.

FM2: No really, we are all satisfied with the Army.

FM1: There is no security in the Camp [Intense voice]. Concerning the Police, not the Army, there is no security. Someone can come 4:00 in the morning and stay inside for 2 hours and nobody will check upon him.
Coordinator: That concerns the police right?

FM1: Yes it is. Whoever comes in needs to be recorded by the police.

FM2: This is true. People are coming in without informing the police. If anything happens to us who will answer on that?

Coordinator: I do understand your concern, but since this conversation has to do with the Army, let’s restrain to that.

FM1: Yes it has to do with the Police. We need to be protected by the police.

Coordinator: OK. Let’s continue. Previously, FM2 mentioned about the relationship among the Army personnel and civilian personnel of NGO’s and I asked him if he observes cooperation among them.

FM2: Very good. The way Army personnel interact with Greek civilians and with us here is very good. But maybe in other places it is different.

Coordinator: Yes, but we can speak about your own experience since you are here.

FM3: FM2 is newly arrived here. Maybe he doesn’t know how exactly it is. The rest of us who have been here for almost a year we know that the Army has very good cooperation with everybody.

FM2: Are you from the Army?

Coordinator: No, I come from “..name of the NGO that the coordinator comes from”

FM2: This thing that you organized, the discussion for the Army, you could do it for the Police also.

Coordinator: I could propose it if you wish.

FM2: The Army has limited presence in the Camp according to working hours, but the Police is here 24 hours. There are some problems which it would be better to express if we have a conversation about the police. I’m not referring to a specific person from the Police, but there are issues in their system. There are some issues which if they fix it will be better.

Coordinator: The conversation that we are having today has been requested by the Army. Your opinion and remarks are important for Army personnel to understand how you feel cooperating with them and which your observations are, on their way of conduct.

FM1: The Army has been very good, we never faced any issues. We don’t have any complaints about the food distribution, no issues with them, we were safe.
FF1: All the Army personnel are on the same side, but George is distinctive. When there was fire in the Camp he alone went into the flames to save us. He has helped us a lot. We are really satisfied with the specific person.

FM2: We see them around the Camp, on the food distribution and everywhere. Whatever they do, they do it good.

Coordinator: Lets speak one a time. You mentioned before that all the personnel are on the same side but George is distinctive. What do you mean by that?

FF1: I mean that George has helped us a lot. I can see him coming early morning and he stays till late afternoon to help us while the rest are leaving. They are all good, but he has helped us a lot and has very good relationship with us. That’s why I say he is distinctive. He doesn’t treat us differently. He is equal towards everybody. Either he is Arab or Afghan.

Coordinator: Do you have the same feeling from the rest of the Army personnel?

FF2: Not only the Army, but everybody in this Camp is very good and they have very good relationships with us.

Coordinator: Did you ever meet any NGO or international organizations in your country before coming to Greece?

FF2: No, when we arrived in the Camp, it was the first time we met organizations.

FF3: Before arriving in the Camp we only knew about The Red Cross and UNHCR.

Coordinator: What about now?

FF3: Now we know all the organizations who work here.

Coordinator: How do you think of them?

FF3: They are very good.

Coordinator: [Laughing] So, aren’t there any complaints? Are we all so good and amazing?

FM2: What we observe from distance is that. That’s why we are saying you are good. We are not inside the organizations to know how it works from the inside.

Coordinator: So, from distance you may have better view. How does the cooperation between the Army and civilian organizations seem to you?

FM2: The Army is much better than the rest of the organizations because they are securing us.

FF2: The Army is much better than the Police.
Coordinator: One last thing I would like to ask. How do you feel about the civilian Greek people outside the Camp. Those who you meet when you are out for a walk in Thessaloniki or Diavata. How do they seem to you?

FF1: We can’t say if they are good or bad. They don’t say either good or bad words, so they are neither bad or good. They are 50-50 %.

FF2: I believe what you give is what you get. If they see good from us they will be good. If they receive bad they will be bad.

FM1: Good and evil exist everywhere.

FM3: Most of the people are very good. When we ride the public bus downtown and we carry a young child with us they stand up and offer their seat to our children.

FF3: In every nation there are good people and bad.

FM1: People are educated and due to that they have good relationships with us.

Coordinator: Nice. Thank you very much for your participation and help.

FM1: Thank you for giving us the time and opportunity to speak.
ANNEX C
Transcript of the Arab Speaking Focus Group

The Arab speaking focus group has been briefed again about the purpose of the discussion, and was moved to another room. Present were only the coordinator, the interpreter and the group which consisted of 4 males and 4 females all adults.

Coordinator: We are going to conduct an open discussion. We are interested in your opinion towards the Army. Not in the political issues of your home country or anything like that. How do you feel when you think about the Army in your home country? You don’t have to analyze, you can describe your feelings even with one word. I would like the opinions of all the participants, so we are going to answer in a circular mode.

AM2: You want my opinion of the Army before or after the events?

Coordinator: Can you describe with one word how you feel when thinking of the Army in your Country?

AM2: Of my own Country?

Coordinator: Yes

AM2: When we heard the word Army back in my country we felt scared [long pause] do you understand what I mean?

Coordinator: Yes, you don’t need to explain, if that’s the way you feel that’s all.

AM1: AM2 said before that when he heard the word Army he felt scared. The events in Syria have been taking place for the past 6 years and this youngster wasn’t able to serve his military duties in Syria. That’s because 6 years ago he was a minor and the events had already started there. As it concerns the rest of us who are of a bigger age and who have completed our military duties, we have no fear of the army.

Coordinator: So how do you feel when you get to think about the army of your home country?

AM1: I feel nothing bad. I’m telling you, whoever citizen sees the Army, the Police or whichever national defense uniform personnel feels security and protection.

Coordinator: Do you feel that?

AM1: Of course cause in any given country, Army and Police provide defense and security for the country, as well as security for the whole of the population. But there are some individuals in Syria who have completely distorted the meaning of safety and security leading to the events that we now face (in Syria).

(AM3, AM4 and AF1 after small discussion suggested that everyone agrees with AM1 so there will be no different answer to that, so the coordinator should move to next question with the next person)
Coordinator: I would like to ask the same question to the females since according to my understanding the rest of the men in the room have all served the Army and share the same opinion with AM1. So the ladies in the room who haven’t served...[interrupted]

AM3 [interrupting]: The same with me, I have served my military duties. I wasn’t afraid of anything. I would go downtown and I would not feel scared or afraid of anything since I had done nothing wrong and whatever would happen that was against the law, I felt free to go and report it.

AM1: The new generation and the kids were afraid of the Army due to the events that we faced.

Coordinator: So, those of you who have served your military duties feel more comfortable when thinking about Army in your country. That shows that you understand that the Army there was just executing orders given by the politicians.

AM1: Exactly. And we were part of the Army. And what is the Army afterall? It is a part of the society. It didn’t come from another country as a missionary to represent our own.

Coordinator: So, ladies, since you had not served in the Army and you didn’t have the same direct experiences, how do you feel about it, which is your view?

-AF1: Our opinion is the exact same with AM1. I participated in social life and never faced any problem. But not now. We used to travel by airplane, we showed our Syrian ID, we didn’t have any problem.

Coordinator: Nevertheless, when you heard about Army in your country, how did you feel?

AM4 [interrupting trying to clarify]: Before the events or now? Before, we used to respect it. Before or now?

Coordinator: How do you feel now?

AF1: Now we hate the Army and we are afraid of it.

Coordinator: If you feel that your feelings changed after certain events, you can say that before that certain events we felt this way, and after the event we feel this way.

AF4: Exactly that. In the past we wanted our children to fulfill their military duty, which was a big one, they had to serve for 2,5 years. But now we have to say this and it is important, that we are afraid of the Army now.

Coordinator: Ok, I wouldn’t like to extend the discussion more upon your past experience with the Army...[Interrupted]

AF4: Now we don’t want to send our children to serve the Army anymore.
AM1: Before the events in Syria, when mothers sent their children to serve the Army, they felt pride.

AF1 [Imitating with pride]: “My child is serving his duty”

AM1: But after the events that have been taking place the past 6 years we were afraid for our children. Any given mother would prefer to slaughter her own child rather than letting it join the Army. She would no way let him serve his military duties, because our whole perception of the Army changed in our country. In the previous discussion (which was stopped) I expressed my opinion and I will repeat it now to this coordinator: The Army that we used to have, was meant to protect and secure our Country but now its mission is to destroy the country, suffocate its people and protect just a small group of the government. Not to safeguard the whole of society. That is the truth.

Coordinator: Ok. I don’t want to continue talking about the past, and I will explain again why I asked you this question. Right after the events in Syria, you are entering another country seeking for safety, and you are informed that the local Army is setting up the Refugee Camps. First of all, once in Greece, were you aware that the Army was tasked to build up the Camps and it would, at least at an initial phase participate in the functioning of the Camps? Were you aware of that fact or did you realize it once you were transferred to the Camps?

AM1, AF1: No, we were not aware of the fact.

AM1: We were among the first group of arrivals in Greece which faced shut borders.

Coordinator: So, [addressing to AM3] were you aware of that fact?

AM3: I was expecting it, since I was in Kurdistan, which is part of Iraq, before arriving here. Since the camps are part of the country, they should have a portion of the Armed Forces which will be responsible for the overall security. So we knew that the Army or any other branch of the Armed Forces, would be responsible for the security and defense of the area and all the rest of the organizations would facilitate the rest of the services. So it didn’t make any difference to us whether the Army would be present or not.

Coordinator: [Addressing to AM4]: What about you? Were you aware of the fact?

AM4: No, I was not aware of the fact.

Coordinator: When you arrived here and realized that the Army was present how did that make you feel?

AM4: I felt safe and secure. That even if I walk out of my tent in the middle of the night I will be safe. Cause the Greek Army is not the same with the Syrian Army.

Coordinator: But you were not aware of that difference when you initially arrived.

AF1, AF4: We were not aware that the Greek Army would be here, but we were aware that it’s not the same with the Syrian.
Coordinator: I am interested in your opinion also AF3. When you arrived in the Camp and realized that the Army is present, how did that make you feel?

AF3: It was something normal. I wasn’t afraid of the Army’s presence.

Coordinator: I am asking this in combination with the previous question of how you felt about the Army in your own country, because many of us were thinking that due to your past experiences with the Army, once you would be informed that the Camps here were built and working by Army personnel, maybe you would feel threatened.

AF3: Smaller kids were afraid at the beginning, due to all that they had seen and they had heard. But the elders were not.

Coordinator: What about AF2?

AF2: I agree with AF3.

AF1: Army personnel have been very kind. At the beginning they were serving the food, they made sure that it was equally distributed, whenever there was excess amount they would distribute it, they treated us very kindly.

Coordinator: We will reach to that point. Right now I would like your feelings on the initial point when you realized that the Army is working in the Camp.

AM4: We felt safety, we knew that it wouldn’t be like the Syrian army and that it would show more mercy than them.

AM3: In the Syrian Army whenever someone was given a rank he would automatically feel like as he had been named as the prime minister. They would then address to us with arrogance.

AM4: They only spoke with two words, acting like secret agencies. They wouldn’t accept to speak any further than that.

AM1: They mean that they would demand obedience. First you would have to execute the order and then you could disagree with it. To give you an example, if me and you were in the Syrian army, and I was a superior giving you an order, even if my order was false, you wouldn’t dare to correct me. You have to obey and execute my orders either it is right or wrong.

Coordinator: But it is the same here.

[Laughs from all] AM1: You too?

Coordinator: Yes

AM1[Laughing]: Then probably all the army personnel is the same.

AF1: I will tell you a story that took place in Syria. There was a mother begging one soldier not to take away her son (as a recruit). He replied to her: “Drop to your knees, kiss my boots, and then I will decide whether I’m going to recruit your son or not”.
She then dropped to her knees and after kissing his boots several times, he decided not to take her son away.

[silence] Coordinator: So, during this one year that the army is present here, almost as long as you are…

AF4: After George (Army coordinator) leaves we don’t know how they Army here will transform. That is our problem.

AF3: We were used to George. Whatever was coming from the Army was good.

Coordinator: I would like to ask you now, and that is the reason why I asked from a different person to coordinate this discussion, because it will sound silly. So, try to imagine that I am not present here. The question is whether during this time you addressed to army personnel when you faced problems? And for what kind of issues would you reach them? Let’s begin with someone who hasn’t spoken a lot (addressing to AF2).

AF2: I don’t know what to say, I’d rather let F3 answer that.

AF3: I felt psychologically calm and ok to speak to you. Because once I had faced an issue and I addressed it to you and you supported me.

Coordinator: What kind of problem was it? Was it something personal or did it concern the provided services?

AF3: No, it was a personal issue.

Coordinator: OK. So you reached the army personnel for a personal issue.

AF1: You were also solving Camp issues. We didn’t address to the police, we addressed the Army.

AF3: We addressed for the skype issue [the process for registering for the asylum service in Greece] also at the Army.

Coordinator: (Adressing to AF4): Did you ever need support from the Army? Did you feel comfortable to address to the Army?

AF4:[laughing] It’s you to blame for Sydra (daughter’s name). For anything that Sydra requests now you are responsible. And she is angry with you and we want you to be friends again. [Referring to her 8 y.o daughter who was angry with the coordinator for forgetting her birthday].

Coordinator: [Laughing] OK. Were you aware of the role of the Army in the Camp? Which was its’ mission?

AF3, AM4: To run the Camp.
AM4: Whenever we faced an issue we would come to you. AM1 is aware of the fact that whenever we had a personal problem or a concern about the services you would take care of it completely.

Coordinator: Nevertheless, were you aware of which issues was responsibility of the Army and which were not?

AM1: We were aware that the overall responsibility of the Army was the food delivery. Moreover, when we were lacking certain stuff, you would supply them. The Army was very co-operative, and tried to fulfill everybody’s requests concerning food delivery. It upgraded the food. One other time you asked us, which Syrian food we missed and you requested the catering service to provide it. So you were really taking care of the needs.

AF2: Even for the services in the Camp, for example the showers.

Coordinator: How were your relationships with the Army personnel? I am not referring to our personal relationship, but with all the Army personnel that you met inside the Camp.

AM1, AF2: No problem

AF3: Very normal one. They would do their duties and leave.

AM1: We need to separate the Police from the Army. The way of conduct of the Army was very, very good.

AF3: I need to add something before I forget it. On the day of the fire, [there was a big fire in the Camp on the 20th of April 2016, destroying 30 tents and RHU’s] no one stood so close to us as the Army did. The police decided to abstain. I will never forget that for the rest of my life. Every time I recall it I cry, because you treated us with care and love more than anyone else. And you yourself suffered a lot and gave big effort.

M1: And for the personal issue which I faced with the two children and the youngsters from Daraah you helped a lot [The later stabbed the former on an escalated fight]. And for the guy who was stabbed, the police was standing outside the fight just observing. We asked them to call an ambulance for the youngster but they didn’t respond. At the same time, George came inside the Camp at night and we stayed until 03:00 in the morning, running from one side to the other [meaning negotiating between the two sides in conflict] until we solved the overall problem. This has to do with the good manners and humanity you have. But we have to totally separate it from the Police behavior.

Coordinator: Ok if I asked you to describe with one word..[discussion interrupted]

AF3: We just want to stress out that the Police was abstaining and just observed, while the Army tried to help.

Coordinator: If I asked you to describe with one word, the overall feeling that you have from all the Army personnel that you met in this Camp, what would that be?
AM3: All?

Coordinator: Yes the overall feeling you have for all. The first thing that comes into your mind.

AF1: It is security for the people and the country. And we felt good inside.

Coordinator: Now how do you feel having all this experience. How do you feel?

AF1: Security and that you are better than the police.

Coordinator: [Laughing] Lets stick to the emotions you have for the Army. Leave the rest.

AF1: I told you I feel safe.

AF2: Safety.

AF3: If you ask all the women in the Camp they will tell you the same thing. We have been staying in the Camp for one year, not one month. And we have met other Army people rather than George.

AF4: Safety.

Coordinator: So after a small break I would like to ask now the men, thinking of all the army personnel that you have met in the Camp, what is the first word that comes into your mind?

AM4: We never saw something negative.

Coordinator: It’s ok…so describe how you feel in one word. Like I feel respect, I feel…whatever…

AM4: Safety and respect. Whenever somebody needed you, you were there to listen to him and to assist him.

AM3: Safety and psychologically calm. We might have not been totally aware of what exactly you were responsible for, the Army was not constantly out in the Camp, but we could always come and meet you. You were available to solve any questions.

AF3: So generally we could feel safety and that you were taking care of the people here.

AM1: Exactly that. Calmness and safety. And I think that includes all that we said.

AF3: And we didn’t see anything rather than good.

AM1: And I am referring to all the Army personnel that we saw here. And all of them were good, but the one who is in charge of them is the most responsible through his
position. 'Cause any subordinate who may come to serve, he will receive his guidance and orders from his superior and he will respond to his duties.

AF3: You were also very polite and respected as well the women and girls. All the Army personnel were very respectful, professional and polite.

...The conversation goes into private talking...

Coordinator: Since we are talking about Syria, I wanted to ask you whether you had any contact with NGO’s before the Camp. Either in Syria or elsewhere.

AF2, AF3: No

AM4: In Iraq there were. There were some organization from Libya. There were some refugee camps there but I was staying in the capital and heard about the Camps.

Coordinator: Did you personally ever met an NGO before?

AM4: Yes, I am still in contact with them.

Coordinator: How do you think of the cooperation between the Army and the civilian organizations inside the Camp. Did you feel…

AM2: The Army was better than the organizations.

Coordinator: No, not who was better...how do you feel they were among them.

AM1: I will tell you how they were. The Army was treating people very nicely, but the organizations are still lying to the refugees. All the organizations, without any exceptions. Or we could exclude IRC (International Rescue Committee) which was the only organization which truly offered something to the refugees. But the Army was very trustworthy, offered us security and stood up to all the services which he had taken over.

Coordinator: How did you see the interaction of the Army with the rest of the organizations in the Camp?

AM2: I don’t know which the relationship between you was, but I know that the worst organization was UN (meaning UNHCR).

Coordinator: From your view, from the outside, the relationship between the Army and the organizations. Not whether someone was good or bad, but how was the relationship between them.

AM3: It was something normal.

AM1: Whenever there was a problem between the refugees and the organizations, the refugees would go to the Army to explain. And then the Army would intermediate to explain the situation to the organization and solve the problem.
AM2: There was no organization that would help 100% the refugees, so we would go to the Army and the Army would tell us the truth and help us.

Coordinator: What about you AM4?

AM4: I am here with my two kids which needed doctor. When I visited the clinic they would tell me come back tomorrow, come back in an hour, they asked for my phone number but they never called me back. So I came to George. He took my kids in his arms and went to the clinic. And I will never forget about that.

Coordinator: How about you? How did you feel about the cooperation between the Army and the Organizations?

AF4: I could see there was cooperation from both sides.

Coordinator: What about the relationship between them?

AF4: To us, from an outsiders view it looked ok. We don’t know how it was though between you.

Coordinator: How did it look to you?

AF4: We could see that there was good relationship among you. We didn’t see any disagreements. Nothing ever happened.

AF3: Nothing negative ever happened in front of us which we could describe. We only were aware of the good side of your cooperation. Or when an organization wanted to reach a specific refugee for a reason, the Army would guide him to where he was or help with the communication. And if you asked us to choose between the organizations and the Army we would choose the Army.

Coordinator: No, no there is no such question. We do not wish to compare the Army with the organizations. What we wish to understand is whether to your perception the Army looked to cooperate well with the organizations or if it looked like they were competing each other or it looked like they cooperated.

AF3: They were supporting each other. We didn’t realize any mistake.

AM4: It looked like the organizations were the minor members of the administrative system and the Army was in charge. Whenever there was a problem with the organizations we would address to the Army.

AF3: To bring you a real example, one day a refugee suffered from appendicitis and nobody was eager to help him. We were requesting to transfer him to hospital. Only the Army brought the ambulance to the Camp.

AM1: Anyway there was cooperation between all the services and organizations that were here. Each one had its own responsibilities but was connected to the others also.

Coordinator: Did you feel that the responsibilities were overlapping?
AM1: Of course not. No one had the right to intervene in the other’s job, except when there was a report. If for example I addressed to UN (meaning UNHCR) and UN could not respond to my request I would then address either to the Army or I would come meet the representative of the Ministry. (Meaning the employee of First Reception Service)...and we just finished your pack of cigars...

Coordinator: No problem. How do you feel about Greek people? I will ask you on a circular mode, starting by you. (AF1)

AF1: If my son had not been in Germany already I wouldn’t like him to become citizen of any other foreign country rather than Greece as people here are really nice.

Coordinator: Do you have experiences with Greek people? Have you been in any contact with Greek population? Not inside the Camp, but outside.

AF1: My husband has traveled from Germany to Greece and he has told me that the Greeks are treating us better than the Germans. They are very good.

Coordinator: But still do you have contact with Greek people?

AF1: Mainly here.

AF3: I am in contact with Greek people outside the Camp. They are very nice. If I had the chance to move out of the Camp, I would stay in Greece, I wouldn’t have any problem with that. To explain: if the state had the ability of providing me and my kids with accommodation, I would choose to stay here.

AF4: Me too. If I didn’t have my kids in Germany I would choose to stay here. I have 5 kids in Germany.

AF4: [Laughing] I never had any contact with any Greek.

AM1: OK

AF4: Inside the camp they were very nice.

Coordinator: How do you feel though?

AF4: I felt that Greek people are as nice as Syrian people.

AF3: They are very nice because they have been through what we are going through. The Greeks have lived injustice themselves and they have welcomed us into their houses.

AM4: I have my relatives in Germany, my brothers are there. But now that I get to think about it, I don’t want to move there because I see that no other nation will treat me the way the Greeks did and there is a chance I will apply for asylum in Greece. Cause Greek people are really nice...
AM3: I will apply for asylum in Greece. I have applied for another country, it was rejected, so I will apply here. And the behavior was really nice. I didn’t notice anything wrong. Given that members of my family are in Germany, I wanted to join them, but wasn’t lucky, so I will be living among you here.

Coordinator: No problem with that. Money is a problem but we will see.

AM4: I wanted to skip Greece and enter Bulgaria directly but didn’t make it. So I entered Greece and the course of my journey altered.

Coordinator: How about you youngest of the company? How do you feel? (Addressing to AM2)

AM2: Greek people are very nice. I have many friends; they never deprived us from anything.

Coordinator: Where are your friends? In Thessaloniki?

AM2: Both in Thessaloniki and Diavata

Coordinator: Nice. That was more or less all I wanted to discuss with you.

AM1: I just want to add something more about Greek people. I will tell you that what I received from Greek people, not just the Army, but all people, is that the whole population is very nice, generous, shows hospitality, doesn’t have any signs of racism, they are cooperative, and it differs from the sentiment that the whole Europe expresses. We have not yet reached Germany, but we receive feedback from there. Whoever Syrian tried to speak with German people, even if the latter spoke English, they wouldn’t accept to talk with him, unless they spoke German. That is a sign of racism. Here in Greece instead, if I try to speak with people, even if they don’t speak the language, they try to understand what I need. We happened to ask for support of Greek people in stores in Thessaloniki and Diavata, or people we met on the streets for instructions. People are very nice here and they don’t express any signs of racism.

Coordinator: In order to conclude, because I should have released the interpreters like half an hour ago, I would like to thank you for your participation in the discussion and for responding to our request.

…Conversation continues on personal issues…
D1. First Class: Afghan Children 5.5-11 years old (8 children)

1. Milad 11 years old:

Caretaker’s Remarks: He copied the word “danger” from a poster near the board warning children for not touching the pesticides. He doesn’t know the translation of the word.

Eleni Hodolidou’s Remarks: the child feels confident in both countries. In Afghanistan, he feels at home and he draws the flag. But in both drawings the child is holding hands with the adult drawn (probably a mother figure).
2. *Morsal 6 years old:*

![Afghanistan drawing](image1.png)

![Greece drawing](image2.png)

**Caretaker’s Remarks:** NSTR

**Eleni Hodolidou’s Remarks:** Both drawings include the flag of the child’s country. Obviously the child has not been widely exposed to drawing lessons. It is interesting that he includes his country’s flag in the drawing of Greece as well.
3. Bahare 11 years old: Afghanistan

Caretaker’s Remarks: NSTR

Eleni Hodolidou’s Remarks: NSTR
4. **Rafi 8 years old:**

Caretaker’s Remarks: NSTR

Eleni Hodolidou’s Remarks: Happy sun in Greece. Both drawings are similar.
5. **Setaish 6,5 years old:**

Afghanistan

Caretaker’s Remarks: NSTR

Greece

Eleni Hodolidou’s Remarks: NSTR
6. **Shophan 8 years old:**

   Afghanistan

   Greece

Caretaker’s Remarks: NSTR

Eleni Hodolidou’s Remarks: NSTR
7. **Sohael 5,5 years old:**

Afghanistan

Greece

Caretaker’s Remarks: NSTR

Eleni Hodolidou’s Remarks: NSTR
8. **Sohel 10 years old:**

- Afghanistan
- Greece
- Void

Caretaker’s Remarks: NSTR

Eleni Hodolidou’s Remarks: NSTR
D2. Second Class: Syrian Children 6-9 years old (9 children)

1. Adira 8 years old: Country: Undefined

Caretaker’s Remarks: (Concerning the whole class) I believe that the children understood the concept but focused on what the interpreter wrote on the board in order to explain the task, thus most of them copied the words Syria and Greece

Eleni Hodolidou’s Remarks: NSTR
2. **Mayada 6 years old:**

   **Country:** Undefined

   Caretaker’s Remarks: (Concerning the whole class) I believe that the children understood the concept but focused on what the interpreter wrote on the board in order to explain the task, thus most of them copied the words Syria and Greece.

   Eleni Hodolidou’s Remarks: NSTR
3. **Melek 6 years old:**

![Syria](image)

Caretaker’s Remarks: (Concerning the whole class) I believe that the children understood the concept but focused on what the interpreter wrote on the board in order to explain the task, thus most of them copied the words Syria and Greece

Eleni Hodolidou’s Remarks: NSTR
4. **Beshma 9 years old:**

Syria

Caretaker’s Remarks: (Concerning the whole class) I believe that the children understood the concept but focused on what the interpreter wrote on the board in order to explain the task, thus most of them copied the words Syria and Greece

Eleni Hodolidou’s Remarks: NSTR

Greece
5. **Darin 9 years old:**

```
SYRIA
GREECE
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Caretaker’s Remarks: (Concerning the whole class) I believe that the children understood the concept but focused on what the interpreter wrote on the board in order to explain the task, thus most of them copied the words Syria and Greece.

Eleni Hodolidou’s Remarks: The mediated language is English and the striking difference is that one drawing is with in black and the other one in pink.
6. **Shadika 6 years old:**

   **Syria**

   Caretaker’s Remarks: (Concerning the whole class) I believe that the children understood the concept but focused on what the interpreter wrote on the board in order to explain the task, thus most of them copied the words Syria and Greece.

   Eleni Hodolidou’s Remarks: Santika either accidentally or on purpose has depicted herself only in Greece. If so, she a pragmatist.
7. Suleiman 7 years old:

Caretaker’s Remarks: (Concerning the whole class) I believe that the children understood the concept but focused on what the interpreter wrote on the board in order to explain the task, thus most of them copied the words Syria and Greece.

Eleni Hodolidou’s Remarks: NSTR
8. **Chilo 6 years old:**

Caretaker’s Remarks: (Concerning the whole class) I believe that the children understood the concept but focused on what the interpreter wrote on the board in order to explain the task, thus most of them copied the words Syria and Greece

Eleni Hodolidou’s Remarks: NSTR
9. **Hamsa 8 years old:**

**Syria**

![Image of Hamsa's drawing of Syria]

**Greece**

![Image of Hamsa's drawing of Greece]

Caretaker’s Remarks: (Concerning the whole class) I believe that the children understood the concept but focused on what the interpreter wrote on the board in order to explain the task, thus most of them copied the words Syria and Greece.

Eleni Hodolidou’s Remarks: Hamsa decided to depict Syria stressfully and in black whilst she has chosen a lonely but colorful tree for Greece.
D3. Third Class: Syrian Children 7-11 years old (6 children)

1. Alaa 7 years old:

   Syria

   Greece

   Void

   Caretaker’s Remarks: NSTR

   Eleni Hodolidou’s Remarks: NSTR
2. *Ariam 11 years old:*

**Syria**

Caretaker’s Remarks: NSTR

Eleni Hodolidou’s Remarks: In both drawings the presence of army officers is obvious. In Syria possibly smoke or shootings, in Greece tranquility
3. **Ziaan 8 years old:**

**Syria**

**Greece**

Caretaker’s Remarks: NSTR

Eleni Hodolidou’s Remarks: NSTR
4. *Lotes 7 years old:*

**Syria**

**Caretaker’s Remarks:** NSTR

**Eleni Hodolidou’s Remarks:** NSTR

**Greece**

**Caretaker’s Remarks:** NSTR

**Eleni Hodolidou’s Remarks:** NSTR
5. Malad 9 years old: 

Caretaker’s Remarks: NSTR

Eleni Hodolidou’s Remarks: Malad, felt like drawing her class in Greece. The first picture is certainly fleeing from Syria.
6. Faridha 8 years old:

Caretaker’s Remarks: NSTR

Eleni Hodolidou’s Remarks: Her heart is in Syria and transportation in Greece.
D4. Fourth Class: Syrian Children 11-14 years old (6 children)

1. Ali 12 years old:

Caretaker’s Remarks: He initially refused to take part, but then drew the picture.

Eleni Hodolidou’s Remarks: Black, grey and white in both drawings. War and shooting in Syria, boats and cars in Greece (Aid provision?).
2. **Amira**12 years old:

Syria

![Syria drawing](image)

Greece

![Greece drawing](image)

Caretaker’s Remarks: NSTR.

Eleni Hodolidou’s Remarks: Amira, although not a skilled painter passes her feelings very clearly. Moustaches and grieve faces for the army people in Syria, love flowers and happy faces in Greece.
3.  **Media 13 years old:**

**Syria**

Caretaker’s Remarks: While her class was being briefed about the task she was particularly sullen.’

Eleni Hodolidou’s Remarks: This could be a typical example of the use of drawing for therapeutic reasons. In Syria a sibling has died, airplanes above the family, in Greece a huge orange butterfly and a couple (man offering flowers). It would not be unreasonable to note that the same male figure in Syria holding a gun, in Greece offering a flower.
4. **Mohamed 11 years old:**

Mohamed has realized what has happened to his family. They fled Syria where there was a war and moved to Greece by a vehicle, smiling.

**Caretaker’s Remarks:** NSTR

**Eleni Hodolidou’s Remarks:** Mohamed has realized what has happened to his family. They fled Syria where there was a war and moved to Greece by a vehicle, smiling.
5. **Noor 14 years old:**

Syria

Caretaker’s Remarks: NSTR

Eleni Hodolidou’s Remarks: We cannot argue that the child has view from the war in Syria as she clearly draws military forces.
6. **Jilan 13 years old:**

Caretaker’s Remarks: NSTR

Eleni Hodolidou’s Remarks: Jilan, being a boy, knows the difference between fighting jets and commercial airplanes. War scenes in Syria and smiling faces in Greece.
ANNEX E
Interview Guide for the Civilian Organizations/Institutions Focus Group

1. Have you ever cooperated with the Armed Forces in the past? If yes, which was your opinion over your cooperation and under which circumstances did it occur? If not, which was your opinion of the Armed Forces in general?

2. Which was your initial view on the construction and presence of the Armed Forces in the Camps and why?

3. Do you believe that the mission of the Army is clear in the Camp? Do you believe it overlaps or competes with the missions of your organizations?

4. How do you evaluate the overall effectiveness of the Army personnel in the Camp in comparison to their mission? What would you suggest in order to be better prepared in terms of their interaction with the hosted population?

5. Are there any sections where you cooperate with the Army in the camp? How do you evaluate this cooperation? What would you suggest in order to facilitate a better cooperation?

6. Do you believe that the presence of the Army supports or obstructs the tasks of your organizations?

7. Do you believe that the Army’s presence is necessary in the Camp? If yes, until when and why? If no, what would you suggest alternatively?

8. Do you believe that co-training is essential? What do you suggest?

9. Did the military personnel win your trust? Yes/no and why?

10. Do you notice any change in your opinion about the Army after your cooperation? Where do you attribute it?
ANNEX F:
Transcript of the Civilian Organizations/Institutions Focus Group

[The coordinator assigns numbers to the participants.]

Coordinator: First question: Have you cooperated with the Armed Forces in the past? If yes, how do you feel about that experience? Under which circumstances did it occur? If no, what was your general view about the Army?

1: I have cooperated in the past. Again it was in a refugee Camp. I have a good opinion over our cooperation. Our roles were clearly defined.

Coordinator: Whoever wants to express his opinion is free to do so; we don’t have to strictly follow the order of numbers. If it helps you.

10: I never cooperated with the Armed Forces in the past. Due to my family professional background though, I had the perception that the concept would be a bit strict and their way of conduct would be more inflexible.

7: I have cooperated many times in the past. One of the top moments was outside the Greek borders. Again it was in a disaster relief context and especially concerning refugees. From there I had formed a very good opinion cooperating with the Armed Forces. I was reminded of that when I started working here.

3: Where was that?

7: In Bogradec of Albania.

11: My only cooperation with the Army was in the Military hospital when I was conducting my practice as a volunteer for the Nurse Corps of the Red Cross. I had positive impression. The context of course was quite different, since this was a medical institution, but overall I had a positive view. The military doctors are considered very good and I had a good impression. That was my previous experience.

9: It didn’t occur to me to cooperate directly with the Army except in one case where I had a contact with the NATO base in Kosovo, while conducting my thesis for my MA studies. Of course the context was totally different there for many reasons. Exactly because I never had any other contact, what I perceived was that there the professional context was really strict. So, nothing, the feelings I got was that of discipline and order.

4: I never had any experience and generally I didn’t have any view as I was not concerned about the Army.

3: I didn’t have any past experience with a similar context to this one. The only case I cooperated with Army personnel was with a colleague of mine in clinical laboratories. The cooperation there was indifferent to a typical professional cooperation of our specialty. Apart from that he would just describe conditions and situations in the Army as stories which I heard from the rest of my acquaintances who served their military service. Thus I came here carrying all the known prejudice towards the Army where
things are supposed to be inflexible, where discipline is supposed to be totally strict, where decisions are not under discussion and such things. So I believe that the only full picture I had was from our cooperation here, which again I don’t believe is complete since it is the only one I had.

2: I have never cooperated in the past. The perception I had was from neutral to negative.

6: I have never cooperated. The perception I had was that people working for the Army are on a hard and strict context and they are not flexible concerning their rules.

12: Me too, I have never cooperated before. My only experience was during my military service, which I fulfilled in a military hospital in Alexandroupoli. My experience with the military doctors was really good.

Coordinator: Which were your initial thoughts about the Army setting up the Camp, as well as their presence here and why?

1: I believed it was a good turn out that the Army was setting up the Camp as I knew that the Army had the capability, credibility and experience in Crisis responding operations, to fulfill the task which they were committed to, to perform it on time and with the technical description that they planned.

Coordinator: What about their presence?

1: Concerning their presence, though they have a bureaucratic structure which often seems unnecessary, it turns out that it is this very structure that guarantees the good results mentioned before.

10: I was very positive when I was informed that the Army took up the task to construct some refugee sites. Mainly due to their experience and the training they have, but mainly due to the fact that the situation was such, that things had to run really fast. Concerning their presence later on, due to the emergency of the situation, I believe it was totally necessary, so I felt good.

5: I was really anxious and in doubt, because the role of the Army was not clear to me nor how the Camps would be set up. So we were afraid of a militarized Camp. From the first day of its functioning though, as I happened to be present, I realized something totally different, very organized, and very organized in terms of behavior towards the refugees also, which was impressive and exceeded my expectations.

12: Me too, when I was informed that the Army would take over many aspects of the functioning of the Camp, I was worried of how they would respond to this task, and what kind of behavior they would have towards the refugees. Though when I arrived here, since the opening of the Camp, I came across an incredibly good behavior towards them.

7: I was sure that they would be organizing and methodical as I had seen that before. I had seen those people working exceptionally on the ground before. That’s why I made the specific comment on the previous question. Here their tasks were more human
centered, which made the big difference from just having machinery working. Instead you had the participation of its personnel.
Coordinator: We will refer to that more extensively later on.

8: I will agree with 5. My doubts mainly concerned the interaction of the Army personnel with the incoming population. Many of them came from war torn countries and they have suffered a lot from military forces. For me though the interaction of the military personnel with the population has been a very pleasant surprise, especially here in Diavata.

11: I was very positive to the information that the Army would participate in the construction of the sites. Having experienced the situation in Idomeni where there was no control from anybody, a total absence… generally a chaos, made me think that the aid of the Army would be good, as it bore both the capacity and knowhow of working systematically. And indeed, when I arrived here I noticed that this was the case exactly. I know that maybe we will refer to some issues later on, but I wish to state this: On the first days of my arrival here, some Americans described with the kindest words our Army personnel and praised their work, given that in the US the Army is of a high esteem among its people. That was something really nice.

9: Speaking about the construction of the site, reality was not far from my expectations. I was sure I would meet order and immediate actions on that task. Concerning their presence, I was in doubt as the previous participants mentioned. My view changed on the first day that we arrived here and gathered for the first meeting of the organizations. Before even seeing what would follow in action, I was convinced about the outcome, just due to the way that the meeting and the contact with the Army personnel were conducted. I formed a very positive opinion, I was given the sense that they are fare and they inspired in me the perspective of a very positive cooperation.

4: I also agree with 5 and 8, concerning the presence of the Army personnel though, my perception has totally shifted concerning both the relationship and interaction between the Army and the refugees as well as between the Army and the civilian personnel of organizations.

3: Initially, when I was informed that the Army would construct the Camps I was skeptical too because I was thinking about the way that they would interact with the population. On the other hand I believed it was necessary because they had the operational capability to perform it. If they wouldn’t do it, who would take up the task after all? That was it, I was just waiting and watching to see how things would turn out.

2: I believe that the Army has to support the social interest with its services, especially in peace time. Thus I perceive very positively it’s presence via the construction of the Camps. Concerning their presence, yes, I would be a bit worried of how they will interact with the population. I shouldn’t analyze why at this point, correct?

Coordinator: Its ok.

6: I didn’t have a view in prior, positive or negative about the Army’s presence here as I am newly arrived in the Camp. But concerning its presence here, as I have experi-
enced it the past two months in the Camp, it is very positive. They are very cooperative.

Coordinator: Do you believe that the Army’s mission is clear in the Camp? Do you feel that it overlaps or competes the mission of the organizations you represent?

1: Their role is clear. I don’t see any overlapping or competition; I would rather name it support…

3: Complementarity, yes

1: …in parts of the work that had to be done here and it was positive that it was provided. With the credibility of the Army, many things ran more smoothly.

10: Initially, due to the situation and the hosted population of Camp Diavata, its role was not that clear. But what I can state is that due to that situation there was high interaction and support among partners and it was necessary in order to be able to make some things happen. During the course of time, when things got into an order, its role went clearer.

5: On our field, there was by no way, overlapping or anything. What I observed though, among the rest of the actors, was that it was necessary for different partners to sometimes step into the fields of others, but from my point of view it was a form of cooperation.

12: On our sector, during the first months, where the needs were overwhelming in the Camp, as we had a newly arrived population with which we, as health related organization, were not familiar, the Army supported us many times. Especially in night shifts which it conducted here. That was a population that we hadn’t scanned before. It didn’t arrive from places like Idomeni. Thus there was a need for support with several hours of medical coverage until we could record all the medical cases and be able to regulate their treatment. That’s why I believe that the Army in the medical sector, stood by our side.

7: I believe that we supported each other, at least as far as it concerns the distributions sector and general support through the initial days of functioning. I can’t recall at that point having a specific role as they were everywhere, anywhere needed. Given time, they achieved a clearer role, but even we, apart from our medical sector, we were in a bit of a quest to fix the functioning. I think, overall, there was a very correct complementarity as time went by. We didn’t feel that they were stepping into our fields.

8: I believe that their mission was clear from the very first moment, and I believe that they helped define the mission of the rest of the organizations inside the site. That was mainly due the fact that they possess the knowhow of setting up a Camp. I believe that there is no overlapping or competition, but very good cooperation. Not only with the organization I represent, but with all the partners with which they cooperated in the specific site.

10: The presence of the Army in the initial phase was much more intense, but in no case did it overlap or compete. The way it was introduced was very correct and its role
was strongly co-ordinational and that was a very good thing. It did not interfere, in any case in the functioning of any other organization. On the contrary, it coordinated, and achieved it really well, which of course has to do with the personnel also. In general it was a very positive presence. I didn’t notice any competition. Moreover, the official state’s representation in the Camp was initially very weak, and it was a good thing that the Army was given the role that it had. In time, some things changed for different reasons. I believe there was nothing threatening to any side. It was a very good presence and I believe that it played a very good role on that part.

9: The truth is that nor I, could clearly define the role of the Army for quite a time and that was mainly due the fact that I noticed in other sites its role was not that active. It started clearly, in the process it was lost, but in absolutely no case there was overlapping or competition. We can only speak about complementarity here.

4: I am quite new in the Camp, so when I arrived the role of the Army was quite clear. Though I noticed that the Army’s role in this site was much more active than others and it bore a co-ordinational task also, which according to my perception was a good thing. I never felt competition by their presence, only in terms of help, support and complementarity.

3: Supportive and….basically the role of the Army was supportive. That’s the way I perceive it. Clear in the initial phase…I guess it was not, but that was due to the fact that at that point they were filling in the gaps, state gaps mainly, and that was something all of us did more or less. All of us went into that procedure in order to facilitate the functioning as smoothly as possible. Yes it was definitely supportive. There was no case of competition. Let 2 speak [laughter]

2: Definitely as far as it concerns my case there was no competition, I can’t answer honestly whether the Army’s mission was clear to me, but what I need to stress is that it supported us very much in terms of coordination and to facilitate our work. Under these terms, its presence was very positive.

6: The Army’s mission in the Camp was and still is clear. Our cooperation was flawless and I believe it’s way of conduct did not overlap the tasks of other organizations.

11: I would like to add though that having a really small experience from other Camps….Number 11 wants to overlap Number 10!!..[laughing due to confusing of the numbers].I noticed a big difference from our Camp as we maintained the same army personnel, in contrary to other Camps where the personnel would rotate every 2 weeks or a month. At that point I believe I noticed a difference. The standard physical presence of fixed army personnel was much more efficient and important.

2: I agree with 11 on that one.

9: I agree also with this stability.

10: Number 10 also [most participants call out their number amid laughters that they agree].
Coordinator: Let me remind you that it is allowed to intervene; this is not an interview. But ok…

11: You can clap your hands when you agree, it’s ok.

Coordinator: The next question is susceptible to such interventions, so please listen to it and then you can start. How do you judge the overall performance of the Army personnel in the Camp, concerning their mission? What would you suggest in order for the personnel to be better prepared for interacting with People of Concern (POC)?

10: What could be done and I clearly suggest, is that due to the fact that the Army personnel come from different units, they could have a common training concerning the interaction with refugees. Thus they could achieve a common line concerning the behavior.

1: I perceive their performance very positively judging by their overall presence. But I am referring to particular personnel of Diavata Camp right? Cause I don’t have personal opinion for other personnel in other Camps.

Coordinator: Yes, each one can speak about his own experience. I for example didn’t have any other personal interaction with other personnel from other camps.

11: Yes, not only generally, but the individual itself plays important role.

1: Yes, I refer to the individual. I believe that the Army, concerning its mission now which is more managerial, and not that of the construction, has responded correctly, it could have done better. Concerning the interaction with the refugees I believe it has to do again with the character and personality of each army individual. The whole situation and concept needs to be described to them that brought them in our country. For the civilians applies the same. I mean whatever applies to each civilian, needs to be applied to the army personnel also. They need to be briefed clearly and understand for which reasons and what factors triggered this movement of population.

2: Concerning their performance I believe it is very positive. Of course it has to do…I agree with 1 and 11, that individuals play a key role. What does that mean? That means that individuals who have a developed social sympathy and the sense of social justice can perform better, especially when dealing with groups like refugees. For that reason I would suggest, in order to be better prepared, to train the personnel which deals or will deal with the refugee issue.

3: Despite the fact that 2 has covered my point of view … [laughing]

12: Completely?

2: Almost, ok. Please let me speak so that were done...

11: 2 please don’t molest 3. Come on 2 continue...

3: The performance of the Army personnel in the Camp, from my point of view, was very positive. Of course we were more privileged than the other Camps. I believe we were lucky because, if I’m not mistaken, we had a team which was trained in Civilian
Military Cooperation. That had a big impact. I mean the way their leadership interacted as well as the rest of the personnel, obviously had its significance. Thus, it is rather an issue of training. That’s all.

4: I was covered by 2 and 3.

9: I believe also that the performance of the army personnel in the camp was very positive in accordance with the mission that they were given and in comparison with any other military team on different sites. This I don’t know...it is quite strange what has happened here...I am not fully aware whether it is due to people that have served in the Camp being fully prepared individually on the refuge issue. I don’t know. But I surely too believe that it is an issue of training and familiarization with those vulnerable groups. This training is something that cannot be achieved in prior, if we don’t have first a need like a refugee crisis, for example. Now, you are generating questions in me, in comparison to other Camps, the behavior and overall performance of the military personnel cannot be compared with the team working in Diavata Camp.

11: I believe their performance and presence in the Camp was perfect. I don’t know whether the army personnel that were working in other Camps were coming from CIMIC units. But I believe that here, it made the difference. The fact that the people in charge were coming from that team, because they seemed to have a much better experience concerning the cooperation with the state actors.

9: I need to add that I consider very important the fact that the personnel was fixed in the Camp. The constant interaction of the army personnel with the rest of the actors, who theoretically are acquainted to working with vulnerable groups, helped very much. All the military personnel who serve here were eager to learn from the rest of the organizations as well as teach. Essentially it was an exchange of knowledge.

11: The only thing that I noticed, and I don’t know if it will be included on the following questions, would be a suggestion to include interpreters in their teams. This was a need that came up pretty early, was covered by “METADRASIS”, but maybe it would help them little bit more.

8: I agree with 3 and 9. Having experience in other Camps in Northern Greece, I believe that their performance in this specific Camp was exceptional. I don’t believe that this was only due to the training that they received, but it was also a matter of the individuals with which we had the opportunity to cooperate here with. Apart from the typical military training they had other skills also, to mention specifically, they were trained in first aid, they had medical skills which could not be covered in any other way, and above all they had a big will to work beyond their working schedule and even beyond their capabilities.

7: I believe there was an excellent relation between their mission and the outcome. By outcome I mean the results they had on the ground. I believe they showed professionalism, and by that I refer also to the staff that on early stages, carried, built until late at night. Low ranked military personnel who under guidance gave shape to something that was not formed till that moment. They gave guidance. Of course I have to say that it also has to do with the professionalism of the persons who led the team until now and were exceptional. There were moments during which that professionalism was
fighting the sentimental self and humanitarianism inside him. We, the professionals on the field, by that I refer to my social service background, can many times totally relate to what was happening inside of him, concerning what had to be done and what he wished he could do.

12: I think the Army’s presence was totally efficient in this specific Camp. I don’t know what happened in other Camps, so I refer to this one. I need to stress that the Army covered many times certain shortfalls that came up, either by NGO’s, by public actors, or the police. It made indeed the work that is being conducted here, much easier in several occasions.

5: I find the cooperation excellent. I do believe that it is mainly due to the training of the army personnel that served here and not to its social sensitiveness. I could understand that by observing how other Camps worked. My job has to do with reaching out to the people, and the really serious training is there. On details like whether you are allowed to touch, how you touch and etc. On our part the cooperation was excellent.

Coordinator: That part of interacting with the hosted population…

7: I would like to add upon that because I forgot to mention it. Until now we have conducted 43 reports. On none of them did we mention that there was something to report concerning the relationship between the Army team and the hosted population [laughing] and let’s state this to the Army service. Like hostile relationships or other kind of relationships and that’s why I mentioned professionalism at the beginning. You can correct me if I’m wrong, but I never noticed anything. I felt that there was a professional distance which helped facilitate what was happening.

6: I believe the performance of the Army was very satisfying. Concerning the second part of the question I was mostly covered by the answers of 10, 1 and 2. Of course I believe it is also a matter of the character of the army personnel who serve here. I believe we are lucky because most of the people wished to contribute to the site and helped a lot.

1. Concerning the performance I would like to add that I found very positive the seriousness of the approach which they showed on the matter of providing hospitality to refugees as well as the procedures. Commonly, there was never a case where a subject was discussed or treated lighthearted or with lack of seriousness.

11. Concerning the relationship of the Army with the hosted population I would like to add that I noticed that our Army personnel, who serve in this Camp, I don’t know about other Camps, may have provided another view of what Army is about, to people who have arrived from other places where the Army had a totally different role.

Coordinator: Are there any tasks on the field were you cooperate with the Army in facilitating the Camp? How do you find this cooperation? What would you suggest to enhance this cooperation?

1: We do cooperate with the Army in specific sector. I estimate that our cooperation is positive and I believe we can do better, not referring to this Camp only. The fact that the Army has taken up the food provision is not a very good development. I believe it
could take up other sectors with much more... anyway I believe the Army has the knowhow of running such a task and make the appropriate suggestions in order to cover the needs. I am referring to food provision. Now in order for someone else to take up the task... It is positive of course that due to the fact that the Army is considered a more serious organization, the companies that cooperate with him might try to do their job more effectively as they understand that cooperation and its development with the Army may be positive for their business in terms of whether they will be granted other contracts. I believe that in order to promote the cooperation with other organizations, the Army needs to select personnel, which I believe it already does, who can speak foreign languages, who perceive the multicultural environment in which they are involved and... that’s all.

10: From the beginning till today there have been sectors in which we cooperated with the Army. Initially it had different responsibilities, which changed in the course of time. It initially had to do with responding to immediate needs, like handling the shelters or providing medical personnel. So, we have a picture of a perfect cooperation. I dare to say that in many cases their performance was totally efficient and they indeed responded very well to every task they took up and to all the responsibilities they had. What I could suggest concerning the cooperation is to build it up. Again, in this Camp we had a specific team. What could be done is to involve the organizations in some kind of training programs with the Army, in order to build up in prior a picture, collaboration and trust with each other. That’s what I can say.

12: I believe that the Army cooperated with us as long as it should. I mean that during the period that the needs were overwhelming it was there and supported us in the medical sector. Apart from the training of the Army personnel, I believe that the Army could also train the personnel that are working in the Camps on how to respond more effectively on crisis situations.

7: I will add in terms of cooperation, that it helped our team many times to continue working in the Camp when it came to security issues, it supported our team in difficult occasions in the medical sector, and again in difficult occasions of providing voluntary help. I would say that we were taught cooperation on the field. I would prefer, like 10 mentioned, to have it tested in prior, before the need arose.

8: We have cooperated with the Army while they were handling the shelter sector. The cooperation was direct and it helped a lot in terms of protection. We also cooperated for some time on the food provision. I need to stress that the specific team in this Camp was the first one to build up a bridge of communication with the hosted population. This fact limited the impact we had concerning the problems we faced with the food sector in the Camp.

11: We had a very good cooperation in my sector, the distribution sector. It fits my personal style and I like things to be clear and clean-cut, without curves and roll over’s. I think my cooperation with the Army on this sector was excellent. I didn’t have any delays, I didn’t have any postponements thus I had a very good relationship. I like that style, I would rather like to cooperate more with Army personnel.

9: We cooperated from the first day with the Army, mainly by covering their needs for interpreting. Our cooperation was excellent. I was impressed to the fact that they real-
ized maybe even before organizations, our code of conduct and our professional limits always with respect. What I would suggest to promote our cooperation….nothing more than the Army giving a brief on the newcoming army personnel about our way of cooperating. Meaning that those who already have the knowledge, to pass it over to the new comers.

3: I would say that the cooperation with the Army was clearly supportive and reliable when needed. In my section, our work could not exist if there was not a context, if there was no order in the site. Thus it was necessary.

Coordinator: Any suggestions…

3: Concerning suggestions…I guess I was covered by the previous speakers…I am forming a thought right now, as it lays in the Army’s capabilities. It is always a matter of the personalities involved, so maybe they could choose with caution the personnel and teams that they are sending on the field, at least their leadership.

11: That’s what I wanted to say…

9: Evaluation you mean.

3: Yes, evaluation.

11: Are you talking about leadership? Because here we had an Army which had both leadership and…. 

3: Isn’t it like that in the rest of the Camps?

11: In terms of leadership, yes it was very good, concerning the rotating personnel, yes, maybe they could function better or could it be military personnel which either way…

3: First of all I don’t know how it works in other Camps. I guess that there is a team which has leadership, and that there are subordinates. When the leader is trained upon certain issues, especially in our sector were things are very sensitive, an Army person needs to understand that you need to have resilient skills, flexibility, we will get too often in a position of negotiating…I’m not sure whether it happens too often in the Army. We had it. I don’t know whether it existed in other Camps. And what I am saying is that I believe it lays in the capabilities of the Army to foresee. To send in teams which, beyond their Civilian-Military Cooperation training, they need to examine the personalities of the staff, at least of those in charge.

11: Yes, I agree.

8: I would like to add that in similar cases in other Camps we had serious protection incidents, exactly because the leadership of that specific Camp was insufficient, not only for the hosted population but for the working personnel itself.

3: There you go.
6: We cooperate with the Army on the food sector and in fuel provision. Our cooperation is excellent. What I would also suggest is to train all the personnel of the Army in interacting with the hosted population.

Coordinator: Nice, let’s move on...

5: In the specific Camp we didn’t have direct cooperation with the Army, except from some cases where it was an emergency for the whole Camp where we cooperated with such roles. I think it would generally help all the actors in all the Camps for the Army to have a clear role and be homogenous on the tasks that it has taken up in the Camps.

11: So you didn’t notice it?

5: No. Its role was different and as well as the way of conducting it. It was clearly upon the character of the person in charge.

9: But nowhere else would you notice this concern. You wouldn’t see the express of such concern for any matter. It was as if they were trying to avoid any responsibility. So the mandate of the Army was not clear between different Camps.

5: So a common line among all the Camps would be very...

1: I would like to add that it is very different when the Army is assigned to a specific sector of the functioning of the Camp and when the Army is the authority in charge of the Camp. When it takes up a specific role it responds very clearly, as it has the corresponding chain of report and responsibility. When it takes up the management, which I believe is a task that should be granted to civilian personnel...because the Army does not have the flexibility or the knowledge to fully respond to that.

11: Do we know whether in other sites they had military teams which came from the same unit as ours? Here we had from a specific Unit.

10: No.

Coordinator: Shall we move on?

11: Let’s keep this with a question mark.

Coordinator: We can discuss it at the end. Do you believe that the presence of the Army supports or hinders the work of your organization?

1: The presence of the Army...I will repeat the same thing. When it takes up a specific sector it supports. I believe it supports and in terms of procedures. The reporting system of the Army is very useful and needs to be adapted by the Camps. I believe the Army...fits in managerial context. Managing a military Camp and managing a refugee Camp...I believe there are certain aspects of knowhow which could be adopted and be very useful in functioning the Camps. As it concerns other issues...the Army has also things to learn from the refugee Camps, mainly as it concerns the psychosocial handling of the hosted population. It does perplex the situation at the point where the Army cannot perceive the difference between an army Camp and a refugee Camp.
10: I agree with 1 100%. I do believe that the Army’s presence supports, but the responsibilities have to be a little bit clearer in order to achieve better cooperation with everybody. From our own experience, it is true that we had excellent personnel and excellent cooperation, so I cannot say …ok in the specific case I need to say that their presence was necessary. Maybe in the future, as I mentioned in all 5 previous questions, there is a need to have a clue of what all the different organizations do, in order to have a more immediate responding to emergency situations.

7: You can keep that it clearly supported. “Supports” is a different thing [Laughter]. I noted target, role and time limit. These are some things that I thought right now and which would make clear whether it supports. Meaning to support a clear presence in crisis situations. When, for which tasks, with which role and when I will move out from the field. Which is the duration?

Coordinator: You mean it helps to be in a certain context.

7: A certain context.

11: I cannot have a generalized view about the Army…. The opinion that I have formed comes from our point of view and it is very positive. It has helped very much. I am in doubt whether the question applies to the Army in general or the fact that…

Coordinator: We are referring to Diavata.

11: …here we had a specific team from the Army, which has specific experience and is trained accordingly, here, and this goes to 1, it made a very good job.

2: I will absolutely agree with 11 on what she said.

9: In Diavata I wouldn’t say that the presence of the Army is only helping. Instead it supports the tasks of the organizations. I mean the presence of the Army motivates you for extra activities in safety and order. This is something that I repeat doesn’t happen in the rest of the Camps. From my experience on other places the role of the Army may sometimes have caused trouble in the activities of the organizations on the contrary to Diavata.

4: I have a good experience from Diavata and a small experience from another Camp, where the presence of the Army was just nonexistent. It neither helped or hindered, it was indifferent. In Diavata I did not have a direct cooperation with the Army, but whenever it had to intervene and I happened to be present, its intervention was determinant and sometimes relieving.

6: I believe the presence of the Army surely helps, but I will agree with 9 who stated that it supports the work of the organizations. I believe its presence is positive as its work and role here are clear.

3: I will repeat what I have stated before. If the Army hadn’t provided the context, I believe many of us wouldn’t be able to conduct our work. That’s it. Supportive and...

9: And motivating...
3: motivating and always reliable. That.

Coordinator: Everybody has replied, 12 has left. Let’s move on. Do you estimate that the presence of the Army in the Camp is necessary? If yes, until when and why? If no, what would you suggest instead?

1: The presence of the Army is necessary, for very specific tasks. Mainly to respond to crisis situations, to situations where an immediate response is needed, due to the procedures it has, to the access as well as the status it holds towards the other official actors like municipalities, fire brigade, police and etc. I believe it should hold on to a supportive role which needs to be clearly stated in order to be able to unblock procedures and support the refugee sites in sectors and for issues that others cannot perform either due to bureaucracy reasons or inefficient organization or role confusion.

10: I believe that the Army’s presence in the Camps is needed, and I agree with 1. Generally the refugee issue is a field that you cannot control, nor to forecast. There are constant fluctuations and needs which you cannot foresee. I believe they could take up specific sectors in order to be involved on more issues. I mean their role has been limited a lot. I think it would be good to increase a little bit their tasks, maybe to increase their personnel depending on the amount of hosted population accordingly, because the Army, beyond the emergency needs, sometimes may fill in some security gaps which are not covered by another service. So it would be good for the general security inside a Camp.

5: I will agree with 1. I find the presence of the Army inside the Camps very useful, as long as this presence is clear, with specific role and on specific cooperation protocol and whatever this may mean. Not as long as it is based on personalities and persons, a confusing role which you don’t know how to handle.

7: Its presence is needed, as long as it handles the emergency phase. Material and man capacity, knowledge, knowhow and of course a percentage of security, at least on the initial phase. I think that when these are no longer needed because it has been replaced, then you enter other roles which it has selected.

8: Yes, under the condition that its presence will consist of trained personnel, like the one we had all this time, here in Diavata.

11: I absolutely agree with 8. I believe the Army’s presence is necessary because the Army holds status, works in a very particular way, meaning fast track procedures and that is helping. But it needs to stay in the same context that it worked in Diavata, with personnel which has been trained appropriately. I will also go back to the psychological issue that our hosted population comes from an environment where they are acquainted with the Army’s presence.

9: I agree with 1, 5, 8 and 11. I don’t know if there would be an alternative if it decided to withdraw. Maybe more presence. Meaning, instead of a permanent presence...

Coordinator: Thus necessary
9: Yes, necessary.
4: I agree with 1. But I believe that the Army’s presence should gradually decline and not be reinforced. Yes, could 10 please not interfere?

11: So, do you think it is necessary or not?

4: I think it is necessary but through 1’s point of view. That maybe some procedures could speed up, that the Army possesses status, but I believe that the active presence of the Army should gradually be limited and not boosted.

Coordinator: And alternatively?

[Laughter's]

4: Did 10 justify why it has to be boosted?

10: Of course, I stated why it has to be boosted.

Coordinator: The question is if no, what you would alternatively suggest. You are not obliged to answer.

4: There you go.

[Laughter and teasing among big number of participants]

Coordinator: Please move on.

2: I will agree with 8. As it always has to do with the personalities and how they conduct their work. Now, for an institution, the Army for example, its necessity is evaluated by its effectiveness and the amount of work that it produces. Concerning the issues of knowhow, security and structure that the Army possesses, if it could be replaced by other actors, and when I refer to actors I mean state actors, yes, something like that could be feasible. I believe that the Army also has some bureaucratic procedures, which the state actors unfortunately also have. And I am speaking as a state employee. To sum up, it really has to do with the personalities which provide the footprint of the institution.

9: To sum up...

2: To sum up…I really like this expression.

9: Sounds like a high school essay.

2: Let 3 now speak

3: I agree with 11, which absolutely agrees with 8 and...

9: And with 9?
3: And with 9 of course…and with 2, alas…yes that! It has to do with personalities, the Army’s presence needs to be under conditions, and the continuance of the work of the Army has to be evaluated depending on the context of each site. That’s all.

6: I agree that the presence of the Army is necessary. I agree with 1 and 10…

[Laughter]

Coordinator: Courage. Let’s go! Do you think co training of organizations and institutions could be beneficial, how do you imagine it?

10: We agree.

9: We agree.

11: We Agree.

1: Should I frame a general concept and if someone disagrees state it?

Participants simultaneously: Yes, yes.

1: Through the process of co-training each actor could benefit from the others. Because each one approaches the refugee issue from another point of view, a social service has one way, more humanitarian oriented to run a refugee Camp. The Army which is very good at procedures and effectiveness has another way. A political actor has a way which has to do with its contact with the society. Both could benefit from that, from the co-training and at some point this should occur.

[All participants yell that they agree]

10: From 1 to 11 we agree.

Coordinator: Little bit to the next question. Did the military personnel win your trust? Yes, or no and why? At this point let’s agree to focus on aspects of personality which we find positive. Meaning which aspects of personality promoted winning our trust and which did not?

4: 2 is bullying me! I would like to say that the personnel totally won my trust.

Coordinator: And personality aspects?

4: Personality aspects…flexibility, knowledge upon the subject, and of the structure and functioning. Organizing…that’s all…and accountability.

2: I will unfortunately have to agree with 4. A total trust towards the persons which were present from the Army. Why…Because I saw that they were people with great social sensitivity, great professionalism which also means great organizing…and because some things fit my way of thinking, that some problems should be solved methodically, with organization and targeting to a result. Thus.
11: I would like to add, beyond agreeing with 2, that there was a good combination. From one side there was efficiency and capability, but it was combined with a good character which had the characteristics of being accessible, polite and there was something important...there was no arrogance. The person was asking and was willing to know. It wasn't an arrogant person pretending to know everything. And that was a very good compilation. On the process it became obvious that whatever it undertook, it completed it with a great efficiency.

8: I agree and I would like to add loyalty and self-sacrifice. Especially during the first months the exhaustive working hours didn't decrease neither their performance, nor their behavior or politeness.

4: We are talking specifically for Diavata, right?

Coordinator: We are always referring to Diavata, for aspects of personality we can state what we have seen or what we would like to see anyway.

10: I agree from 1 to...[Laughter] what I would like to add is that what personally won my heart is that it made me believe that we could do it. It worked like a bridge among all and even when we didn't know what to do it would lead the way and we would follow. Thus yes.

11: Thus inspiration.

7: I will agree with all the characteristics that were mentioned and I will add consistency and diligence. To the point I was surprised. And of course a will to find solutions...and neither to hide problems under the carpet, nor to bypass it...the will to find solutions.

10: Exactly. I would like to add to what 7 said, that it has to do with the army personnel that generally served in Diavata. Both the personnel of the Army as well as the organizations, I don't know which the situation was in other sites, maybe it was from the best. We were always connected.

9: I agree with the rest. I would like to add to the characteristics the immediate adaptation and the respect towards the way each organization works. Without second thoughts. That. From the first moment.

3: Yes they totally won my trust. It is very difficult Mr. president, for us here, to speak in general. Because this is what we met here..thus...at least I'm not aware of something else.

6: The Army personnel totally won my trust. I agree with all the rest and I will add that the willingness of the army staff here was very important.

Coordinator: Let's move on to the last question. Do you notice change of your perception towards the Army after your cooperation? Where do you attribute that?

4: As I mentioned in a previous question, I didn't have a picture before. Now the perception that I have formed is very positive and I hope it remains such.
Coordinator: And where do you attribute it?

4: To the personalities that we had here in Diavata site.

1: For me essentially what has changed my perception is the human face of the Army, which was something I had not seen while doing my service.

[Laughter]

1: Yes, it was the human face that surprised me as well as the solemnity. On some of the specific persons which were placed, sensitivity as well, without generalizing it though, cause I have come across behaviors which have no place in the management of refugee sites.

10: I would say, concerning the perception I had of how disciplined and absolute the Army personnel were, the only thing that changed is that I met and another face of the Army. But again I believe it has to do with the person, thus I cannot generalize it. Maybe it is the exception, yes. Maybe later we have more examples.

11: I would say that in the specific site I was pleasantly surprised. I cannot generalize it either. What 10 said about Diavata site, is the human face of the Army as said before. With great sensitivity, with great devotion and without any misuse of power. That is the perception that changed in me. I had the perception of an austere Army who is also misusing its power. I didn’t see that, and on the contrary I saw great respect and it was very pleasant.

7: Improvement I would say because I didn’t have a negative perception. Many years ago there were some guys who were working very professionally. Here it arose in my perception some characteristics which I didn’t expect to meet. Thus I agree with 11 that it added to what I believed.

2: I agree with 7 and 11. I will add a thought. Whether the persons who were here in Diavata site made their work very well, which was a political decision of the Army, in order to express that specific face. Is that feasible and is it something that is not happening with other Army personnel on other sites? Meaning that, yes, I believe the personality plays a key role, but it is also a political decision in order to show a more human face of the Army, against the stereotypes we may have. Thus through this spectrum the people who were here conducted their work very well and they fulfilled the purpose for which they were sent.

5: There is no comparison with the services of the rest of the Camps…

2: Yes I agree, I agree

5: So it is up to him to handle this Camp in such a way. So it is rather the person according to me, so I need to say that my perception towards the Army has not altered.

2: What I would say that in a general context, there is a political will as a state to show a different face and as you know very well the Army is stuck on some kind of older practices…
[Fuss in the room]

5:.. In other Camps it’s a mess…

2: So the scheme goes as follows: The political will is for the Army to show a more humane face. Now that political will, is a decision of the politicians, right? Do the Army representatives execute that will correctly? For example the commanders of the refugee sites together with their personnel? If yes, it is due to their personality on one hand, but it is also a political choice on the other. Do you understand?

11: The question was…

2: The question is whether I notice a change in my perception. In that context, because I believe that there is a political will for the Army to show a humane face, my perception for the Army has changed, but it is due to those people who execute that political choice.

11: You mean specific people which you have experienced?

2: Yes, yes, I mean the specific people. And I want to state this, those people have successfully performed this political choice of showing a human face while in other Camps failed to so?

Coordinator: 9 is awaiting to speak.

2: Excuse me a little bit. Please clarify that a little bit, maybe something is elusive.

11: The question remains because some of us have experience from other places also. Some small, me smaller, some bigger. The question that I would like to put on hold and receive an answer at some point is: Does the Army have a physical presence to all the Camps through that specific team?

2: No,no..

11: At this point I want to ask: Maybe this makes a difference?

2: The physical persons?

11: The specific team. We are sure that the personalities make a difference. But is it the team also?

2: Yes of course. I believe what you say.

Coordinator: Those that haven’t spoken please do, so that they can be released.

9: In order not to generalize I will refer to Diavata. I was given the chance to see the Army for the first time, inside a miniature of the society essentially. Very important experience because it was feasible and let me put it that way: a free exchange of ideas between two different worlds which we had never had the opportunity to do before.
6: I didn’t change my perception. It was and still is positive. I don’t have any experience from other Camps, and I attribute it to the personal contact and experience which I had here.

Coordinator: Please be a little bit patient for 5 more minutes. 3 and 8.

3: I wouldn’t say that the stereotypes which I have in my head have changed exactly. It is true though that the picture I had in my mind about the Army has been enhanced, and I witnessed capabilities some of which I could imagine, some I no-way did. I believe the team that was here gave another meaning to being mission ready and gave a prestige to what the Army stands for and how they can perform. That.

8: I agree with 5 and 3 that the person was the suitable one for the specific role.

3: Nobody agrees with 1 and 2…

Coordinator: Are we done? Thank you everyone, for your patience. Next time I will be better [laughter].