The Enemy of My Enemy Is My Friend:

The Role of the American Press in Shaping U.S. Public Opinion regarding
(Western) Germany from 1945 until 1950.
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To my grandfathers Christos, Nikos and my grandmother Penelope.
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Introduction and Theoretical Framework

V-E Day, on May 8, 1945, marked the end of World War II in Europe and supposedly the beginning of world peace and reconstruction. Germany had lost the war, a war which caused millions of casualties and a devastated Europe. However, the treatment of postwar Germany was a major question for the winning powers, which wanted to avoid the mistakes of the First World War, like the crippled German economy, the lack of a German sense of responsibility for causing the war and related resentments that laid the foundation for Hitler's dictatorship.¹ The once hostile and aggressive Nazi Germany was destroyed and defeated but Germany’s economic potential laid under the rubble. Its land was still valuable, its geographical position between East and West was still strategic, and its industry could be rebuilt on the basis of its educated and skilled workforce. The land was controlled by victorious Allied occupation troops, but the division into zones in the midst of growing Cold War tensions set the stage for rivalry and power-brokering to win over the hearts and souls of defeated Germans to one side of the Cold War or the other. Importantly, the Cold War made Germany more than a valuable piece of land, whether agriculturally or in terms of industrial resources.

Germany’s western zones were, under the hegemonic leadership and tutelage of the United States, to become a western bulwark, while the Soviets had designs on making Germany more of an eastern bulwark, or at a minimum a neutral country in Central Europe. The Soviet Union did work toward winning over the eastern zone, while, as initially agreed upon by all the Allies, simultaneously dismantling key parts of German heavy industry as restitution for the heavy losses it and the Soviet people had suffered. The goal of winning over hearts and minds may have been

similar for the Soviets and the Americans, but the former pursued punitive policies far longer than the latter, increasingly finding themselves restricted to receiving reparations from the eastern zone only rather than from all zones as agreed upon in the 1945 Allied treaties and due to this and its own ravaged country was far less capable of spearheading any German economic recovery. With a strong focus on reconstruction and economic recovery, thanks to American aid from late 1946 onward, the western zones of Germany that became the Federal Republic of Germany transformed rapidly from an enemy of the United States into a friend and a potential enemy of a greater enemy.²

Now in 2021 there is a substantial amount of important, well-documented literature on the Cold War. During the Cold War, the two superpowers that liberated the world from Nazism, the US and USSR, became two of the most demonized enemies in the history of the world and transformed their former common enemy from a dangerous entity into a beneficiary ally.³ In the current literature, there is a notable lack of information regarding the role of US newspapers and periodicals in justifying to the American people this rapid and extreme shift of American foreign policy toward (West) Germany. As the prolific political analyst Walter Lippmann wrote: “The analyst of public opinion must begin, by recognizing the triangular relationship between the scene of action, the human picture of that scene, and the human response to that picture working itself


out upon the scene of action.”⁴ As such, the hypothesis of this study is based on the fundamental idea that public opinion is a diverse and continuously changing form of social expression; in other words, people judge, react, and interpret their surroundings based on their unique perceptions of reality.⁵ In this thesis, the triangular relationship is formed between US foreign policy toward (West) Germany, the representation of this policy by the US press outlets, and the public opinion of the American people on this foreign policy. Specifically, I ask whether the American press was the medium that changed American public opinion in order to garner support for a transformed US foreign policy, or whether public opinion was the medium to change the position of American foreign policy.

Each part of this triangular relationship has already been studied. For example, there is a substantial number of studies on the shift of American foreign policy toward (West) Germany’s economic and political recovery,⁶ as well as on American occupation policies and propaganda in (West) Germany.⁷ There also exists a significant number of studies on US public opinion of its

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foreign policy. As Abraham Lincoln noted in 1854, “public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment, nothing can fail; without it nothing can succeed. Whoever can change public opinion can change the government, practically just so much.”

Thus, influencing public opinion in favor of the government’s political, domestic, as well as foreign policies is no contemporary phenomenon and is a necessary act for every government in order to survive politically. As such, since at least the 1950s, there have been studies of the impact of US propaganda in radio, television, and the print press on its citizens both at home and abroad during the early years of the Cold War in order to influence, navigate, or even manipulate public opinion, while there even exists a study on the failed campaign launched by a group of prominent US opinion-makers aimed at convincing the American public of the need to enforce a harsh peace on Germany.


studies have also assessed public opinion on foreign policy-making in the aftermath of WWII,\(^\text{11}\) as well as American attitude toward West Germany (although referred to a much later time period than covered by this thesis).\(^\text{12}\)

The exact relationship between public opinion and presidential policy making is controversial. Some analysts strongly believe that the latter consistently relied heavily on the former through much of the 20th century,\(^\text{13}\) while others restrict this impact to some contexts rather than others.\(^\text{14}\) Additionally, a number of analysts and political operatives consider the relationship between public opinion and policymaking as


\(^{12}\) Angus Campbell (1992), *Attitudes Toward American Foreign Policy: West Germany, 1962*, Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor].


responsible for the emergence of a “permanent campaign,” which emphasizes the role of political strategists and pollsters as mediators between citizens and their government.\textsuperscript{15} Ultimately, despite the abundance of literature on the three parts of this thesis separately, to the best of my knowledge, these components have never been examined in reference to each other and to specific US press outlets with the goal of elucidating whether there existed a methodical and consistent propaganda campaign by US press outlets in favor of the pursued US foreign policy toward (West) Germany between 1945 and 1950, let alone on the basis of a day-by-day analysis.

The first axis of the analysis

Foreign policy is made in the United States by its federal government. Even though the President has the executive power and the leading role in the making of American foreign policy, the Congress (the House of Representatives and the Senate), and through it the American people, holds the legislative power and pursestrings and can have a potent influence over the shaping of foreign policy.\textsuperscript{16} In the case of this study throughout the entire period of study the US President was a Democrat, while the Congress was a Democratic one until the November 1946 elections, from January 1947 until January 1949 it was controlled by the Republicans, and it became Democratic again until the end of the time period under examination, the end of 1950. So for the six years under examination here the Republicans held Congressional majorities for only two years. On the one hand this means that the US President had the support of the Congress for the biggest part of this six-year period (four years) when creating and enacting laws, and on the other


hand the fact that during two of the most critical years of this time period the Democratic US Administration still managed to pass bills for the economic support of foreign countries despite the Republican control of the Congress demonstrates the strength of bi-partisanship at that time. The Congress, representing the voice of the American people with elections every two years, had to represent and answer to the opinion, and thus votes, of the American people, which included public reaction to the foreign policy of an Executive elected every four years, but one whose costs were dependent on Congressional approval.\textsuperscript{17} Congress through its Senate and House Foreign Affairs Committees and subcommittees not only debate foreign policy, but initiate legislation involving foreign aid programs and military spending at home and abroad, which is then voted on by Congress. In this way, the Founding Fathers preserved the balance of power within the government of the United States.

The executive or Cabinet agency with the portfolio for foreign policy is the Department of State.\textsuperscript{18} In the period of 1945-1950 the State Department acted in close cooperation with the Department of War, at least until the latter was split by the National Security Act of 1947 into the Department of the Army and Department of the Air Force.\textsuperscript{19} The State Department and its various subdepartments along with other cabinet secretaries asked to study and advise on the situation in Germany worked in close partnership with the President, while for those who did not support the administration’s strategy there was no place. For instance, when in 1946 the Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace did not approve of the confrontational policies against the Soviet Union pushed by the containment policy advocated first by the State Department’s Foreign Service officer in Moscow, George F. Kennan, Truman requested and received Wallace’s resignation.

The first axis of the triangular relationship under examination in this thesis will include the examination of American press outlets and their reaction toward significant events (conferences of the victorious Allies, the USSR, USA, Britain and France and of their Foreign Ministers, key political policy speeches, directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office Of Military

\textsuperscript{17} How representative the US electorate was is another matter. In 1940 only 3\% of eligible African Americans in the South were registered to vote. Jim Crow laws like literacy tests and poll taxes were meant, and worked, to keep African Americans from voting. As cited by: American Civil Liberties Union, \textit{Voting Rights Act: Major Dates In History}, Retrieved on 5/14/2020 from https://www.aclu.org/voting-rights-act-major-dates-history
Government-US zone in Germany, the Berlin Blockade and Airlift and elections and the formation of West Germany, NATO and German rearmament, etc.) in the formation and development of American foreign policy toward Germany. In order to make this study as objective as possible the majority of the press outlets chosen for this study (presented on pages 25-28) at least claimed to be impartial, because one of the factors that is known to affect the persuasive influence of a source on an attitude is credibility. The more credible the source of information the more persuasive the communication of the information it is for the reader. However, the source might even resort to the employment of a specific persuasion technique, that of fear. Many theories have been developed about the fear appeal. The content of a fear appeal can create emotional tension in the subject, who will be compelled to adopt the message’s recommendation in order to reduce that tension or evoke a cognitive appraisal of the danger involved.²⁰ Given that the United States policymakers shortly, or even immediately, after the end of the Second World War feared they might have to fight another war, one against the USSR and the threat of the expansion of communism, the issue of how the US-USSR evolving relationship affected the handling of Germany by the US and in turn how it was used by the policymakers, how it was represented by the press outlets and how it affected public opinion must be taken into consideration.

Even though freedom of speech and of the press is constitutionally protected by the First Amendment of the American constitution, this dynamic between the press and governmental policy is a delicate and at times contested matter both for politicians and journalists. Also today we know that despite the outraged reaction of some journalists regarding the practice of propaganda by the US government during and after the First World War, the picture was quite different after the end of the Second World War.²¹ Even though the US President Harry S. Truman himself claimed not to aim for short-term popularity, but to make decisions that would best serve what he considered to be in the US’s national interest, declaring in a press conference on January 27, 1949 —as well as in his memoirs years later— that he did not regard public input as an important ingredient of foreign policy decisions, in the early Cold War years many journalists openly

advocated for an American propaganda campaign.\textsuperscript{22} Among those that did was also the nation's most noted newspaper, \textit{The New York Times}, which also urged the passage of the US Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948.\textsuperscript{23} Commonly known as the Smith-Mundt bill, this bill represented “the first peacetime propaganda program in the United States,”\textsuperscript{24} which “enable[d] the Government of the United States to promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries, and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries.”\textsuperscript{25} Even though the bill was passed as law by Congress in 1948, its promotion started in 1946 when Secretary of State James F. Byrnes in collaboration with the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs William Benton utilized the support of newspaper journalists. “Benton's solicitations” of the press went beyond the level of advice to providing them with financial backing in order to lobby them, among which was also the American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE).\textsuperscript{26} ASNE at its 25th anniversary convention in 1946 appointed an eight-member committee (one of them was a \textit{New York Times}’ editor) to examine the issue of “dissemination of news” and concluded that “the present uncertainties in international relations justif[ied] an effort by the United States Government to make its activities and its policies clear to the people of the world.”\textsuperscript{27}

Additionally, one should keep in mind the domestic situation of the United States in the time period under examination here. One shall not forget that because of the war and its demands on equipment and manpower the American economy blossomed. The factories had converted their production into war production and hired more personnel to keep up with the pace of the demanding production outcome. Unemployment had also decreased due to conscription. In


particular, in 1943 the US armament production was 37.5 billion dollars compared to the Soviet production of 13.9, the British of 11.1 and the German of 13.8 billion dollars. Additionally, that year the US tank production was 29,500, while in 1944 the US tank production was 17,500 compared to Germany’s production of 17,800, the Soviet production of 29,000 and the British of only 5,000 and the aircraft production of the US was 96,318 compared to the Soviet production of 40,300, the German of 39,807, and the British of 26,461.\textsuperscript{28} However, when the war was over and production returned to its peacetime products and production rates, the working hours and wages were reduced, and a large number of employees let go which increased the unemployment rate along with the soldiers returning from the battlefield, who also needed jobs and at the same time, according to the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, commonly known as G.I. bill, were provided with funds for college education, unemployment insurance, and housing.\textsuperscript{29} Additionally, inflation hit the markets resulting in an increase of prices.\textsuperscript{30} As such, what affected the American people most was the domestic situation and the effect of the war’s end on their everyday life, which included an increase in labor unrest and strikes. Therefore, conducting foreign policy, let alone bringing it into the foreground rather than focusing on domestic issues and requesting the spending of large amounts of money for the reconstruction of countries thousands of miles away, could easily affect the domestic political situation and even cost an administration the Presidency.

So, to what extent did the American press publish the real reasons behind the change in the US foreign policy towards Germany or to what extent did they try to set the focus of the American public on the new enemy by camouflaging the necessity of this change of policy? Did the journalists or editors of the newspapers or magazines after the end of the Second World War until


the end of 1950 criticize the government, or did they align themselves with the government’s decisions? Was there uniformity or did the press outlets’ attitudes change over time?

The second axis on the analysis

As already mentioned, the press in the 1940s and 1950s played a significant role in the war of words and often counted on the conformity of their journalists, a conformity which was equated with loyalty as those who did not display such elements were regarded “‘irresponsible,’ ‘ideological,’ or otherwise aberrant,” and fell by the wayside, while those who adapted and defended the interests of “privileged groups that dominate[d] the domestic society and the state” were free to express their opinion and were not pressured to conform.31 Nevertheless, that was not the picture the American public, especially after the end of the Second World War, had of its print media. The American public was not fully aware of governmental influence over the press outlets and generally believed that the news was delivered to it as objectively and freed from such influence as possible.32

Therefore, after studying the representation of foreign policy on Germany in the press outlets, public opinion polls and the reaction of the readership toward foreign policy on Germany will provide the public view; the second axis of my study. The main element will be the public-opinion survey results provided by the American Institute of Public Opinion, later to be called the Gallup Poll by its founder, George Horace Gallup. The Gallup organization combines analytics and advice to conduct surveys of public opinion in order to help leaders and organizations identify opportunities, create meaningful change and solve their most pressing problems.33 The caveat to be considered here is how representative the sample was, the limits on who was asked and who responded. As a supplementary source of public opinion are the letters to the editors printed in the various press outlets. However, some limitations apply in this study, as the “Letter to the editor” section is limited and includes only a small number of letters. Furthermore, the letters which were

published were selected by the editor(s) and there is no way to know the volume or content of the letters the editor received, which were not selected for publication. As such, the letters to the editor/s will be included in the study of each press outlet as a unscientific sample of public reaction in order to examine their alignment with the general position of the press outlets, but will not be used to draw a definitive conclusion as to whether the American public opinion was influenced by the press in reference to US policy on Germany. So, in other words, what were the attitudes of the American public during these years of intensive and constantly changing policies? Did the press outlets try to amplify or downplay any deviation of public opinion from the American foreign policy in order to increase the likely influence of the political leaders on the public opinion?

The third axis on the analysis

The third axis of my analysis will bring the study back to American foreign policy toward Germany and question whether the foreign policy was adjusted according to the survey results, or whether those making US foreign policy intentionally influenced or shaped American public opinion in ways, including influencing the press outlets that suited the pursued American foreign policy toward Germany. A political leader, namely the US President and in this study primarily Harry S. Truman, can either seemingly inherently have the support of the public for himself and his policies or think he is acting in the best interest of the public and then try to persuade the public of the importance and necessity of the policy, no matter whether he would be judged later by the public or whether his decisions would be labeled “correct” even long after his administration. As already mentioned, Harry S. Truman falls under the second category as he believed that the public's support was not necessary for the pursuit of a successful foreign policy and made decisions based on his perception of national interest, while he might try later to educate the public and cultivate its support. He believed that if he made the right decisions the public would follow him because he relied on “the long-term judgement of history.” Truman might turn to the public to win their support, but he would not change his mind to “suit public support.”

That Harry S. Truman himself played down the importance of the intervention of public opinion into foreign policymaking, does not mean that he did not need the public support. His administration oversaw the end of the Second World War, when he inherited the position of the 33rd President of the United States, succeeding as then vice president upon the death of President

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[^34]: Foyle (1999), pp. 13-14, 182-184, 190-191.
Franklin D. Roosevelt. He ran for President in 1948 and, in one of the most surprising comebacks in presidential election history, he was elected in November 1948.35 His administration managed to turn the western part of defeated Germany, the aggressor of a second world war, into a pro-western, prosperous and profitable democratically-run country with the aid of money from American taxpayers. As such, regardless of his assertion that it was not necessary to listen to the public will and take it into account when he decided what was in its interest, this does not mean that he did not need the support of Congress, and those that elected its members, to pay for the foreign policy, especially in the midst of the United States becoming involved in an as of yet undeclared but potential war against USSR. Furthermore, under Truman (at least western) Germany would within a short time stop being the enemy and become instead an ally of the US while the role of enemy would convincingly be replaced by the USSR. So, did political leaders and foreign policy makers align themselves with public opinion or did they shape their strategy? Did they do it alone or with the help of the press outlets? And if so, was this help intentional or coincidental? Covert or overt? Did the press outlets attempt to reverse the polling results so that public opinion would end up in the administration’s favor?

The Transformation of US Intervention Policy and the Study for a Potential Propaganda Model

In the 1930s the United States Government enacted a series of laws, which prevented it from easily getting involved in a foreign war by clearly stating the terms of US neutrality, like even barring American ships “from transporting goods to belligerent ports.”36 Additionally, survey results of the American Institute of Public Opinion revealed a similar non-interventionist, if not isolationist wish by the American public. In particular, in April 1940, after Germany's march into Denmark and Norway, 96% of Americans polled did not wish the US to declare war on Germany and the majority of the American people expressed their support toward a President who would promise to keep the US out of the war, but would be willing to give England and France all the help they wanted, except sending in the US military. Nevertheless, in 1940 American determination not to enter the war began to waver. The combination of the American belief that Germany was militarily more advanced than other countries in the war, the signing of the French

armistice with Nazi Germany in June 1940, the German Luftwaffe raid against the British Royal Air Force (RAF) in August and the bombing of the Buckingham Place in September 1940 caused a split among the American people polled. For the first time in September 1940 a majority thought that the US would have to help England even if it was running the risk of getting into the war (52%) instead of staying out of the war (48%) even though in October 1940 their deepest wish was still to stay out of the war (83%).

From January until April 1941 the great majority of the American people still did not wish to get involved in the war (85%) or violate the Neutrality Acts (61%) or send US troops to Europe to help the British (79%), yet 67% of Americans polled thought it most important for the US to help England while 68% of Americans polled believed that the future safety of the US depended on England winning the war, with 79% of them believing in January that England should keep fighting and not make peace with Germany. Regardless of the obvious unwillingness of the American people to enter the war against Germany in May (80%), June (76%), and July (79%) 1941, 82% of American polled in April 1941 believed that the US would eventually have to go into the war sometime before it was over. The military co-operation between the Japanese and the Vichy French governments on July 29, 1941 “in case the security of French Indo-China should be threatened” and Roosevelt's embargo on the export of oil and aviation fuel to any country excluding the British Empire and the Western Hemisphere, which basically targeted Japan, changed dramatically the mind of the American people surveyed. The American people, who now indicated they would send the US army to Europe to fight (65%), believed that the American navy should be used to convoy ships carrying war materials to England (52%), would not vote for a “Keep-Out-of-War” candidate (84%), approved of the shooting of German submarines or warships on sight by the US navy (62%) and of a change of the Neutrality Acts (72% in October, 81% in November). Nevertheless, the US did not declare war on Germany but the other way around,

four days after the military strike of the Japanese Navy Air Service upon the US naval base at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

The US clearly transitioned from a foreign policy of non-intervention in the 1930s into one of global intervention in the 1940s and then again in the 1950s. Press reports of Nazi atrocities, the experience of combat against Germans once American troops entered into Europe and then when the harsh reality of images of Nazi concentration camps were brought into American homes through photos of the lifeless bodies of inmates, and stories of witnesses verifying the war crimes of Germany convinced the American people that they were fighting the “good fight.” But then within less than two years following the end of the war an abrupt transition away from the desire to punish Germany for its crimes to one to reconstruct it as a bulwark against Soviet and communist expansion occurred.

The success and positive reception of this abrupt and radical switch of the US foreign policy by both the press and the public opinion that comprise the aforementioned triangular relationship may be interpreted by employing, to the best of my knowledge for the first time in this topic, the “propaganda model” that was coined by the renowned theorists Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky. Their propaganda model suggests that media outlets represent the news in a way that aligns with the interests of political and economic elites and serves to “manufacture consent” for these elites. In other words, how public opinion is manipulated through propaganda. The primary ingredients of their “propaganda model” are: 1- the “size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth, and profit orientation of the dominant mass-media firms,” 2- the “advertising as the primary income source of the mass media,” 3- “the reliance of the media on information” coming from business leaders, politicians and government officials typically considered as credible and unbiased sources of information, 4- the “flak,” varying from complaints to government sanctions, as a means of disciplining media outlets that stray too far outside the consent and lastly, 5- “anticommunism’ as a national religion and control mechanism,” an external enemy or threat that will mobilize the public opinion against a common enemy. Through the study of this model it will be answered whether the US press outlets under examination in this thesis manufactured the consent of the US public toward US foreign policy on Germany. Even though their model was only published in 1988, the idea of manufacturing consent was founded already in 1922 by a very

\[43\] Herman & Chomsky (2008), pp. 2-4.
important influence on me in this thesis, Walter Lippmann. In his book *Public Opinion*, Lippmann wrote:

Where masses of people must cooperate in an uncertain and eruptive environment, it is usually necessary to secure unity and flexibility without real consent. […] Provided [the political leaders] think publicity will not strengthen opposition too much, and that debate will not delay action too long, they seek a certain measure of consent. They take, if not the whole mass, then the subordinates of the hierarchy sufficiently into their confidence to prepare them for what might happen, and to make them feel that they have freely willed the result. […] The creation of consent is not a new art. It is a very old one which was supposed to have died out with the appearance of democracy. But it has not died out. It has, in fact, improved enormously in technic, because it is now based on analysis rather than on rule of thumb. […] Persuasion has become a self-conscious art and a regular organ of popular government. […] Under the impact of propaganda, not necessarily in the sinister meaning of the word alone, the old constants of our thinking have become variables. It is no longer possible, for example, to believe in the original dogma of democracy; that the knowledge needed for the management of human affairs comes up spontaneously from the human heart. Where we act on that theory we expose ourselves to self-deception and to forms of persuasion that we cannot verify.44

According to Lippmann, powerful elites with self-serving interests forge the truth to manipulate public opinion to their own ends. This will also be the pursued conclusion of this study after the analysis of the aforementioned triangular relationship and the application of Herman’s and Chomsky’s propaganda model.

Structure of the Dissertation and Comments on the Sources

The chronological breadth of the study goes from the end of World War II in 1945 up until and throughout the year 1950, as a watershed in German-American relations, because of the formal division of Germany into two states in mid-1949 and the creation of NATO the same year followed by the US’s encouragement of Western Germany’s rearmament following the start of the Korean

War. I consider this thesis part of the study of the so-called German question, a question in historiography that traces the modern history of Germany to determine when and where Germany took certain paths toward democracy versus authoritarianism, a question that became particularly pressing during and immediately following WWII as opponents of Nazi Germany tried to analyze both where Germany ‘went wrong’ but also how it could best be directed toward a right path. In this case my study is examining US newspaper and magazine articles and their role in the interaction between the American people and American foreign policy toward Germany. The literature used to support the theoretical background of this thesis includes both contemporary analyses of US foreign policy in the US and specifically key players in policy toward Germany and “older” literature, which is employed to the degree it serves as either primary source material or is recognized by the contemporary literature as fundamental. For instance, in the chapter on public opinion, 1940s assessments of public opinion are employed. Several of these works were written by George Gallup, probably the man most responsible for establishing the foundations of modern polling, and in turn these books are regarded also as the foundations of this chapter.

There are six chronological chapters that make up the body of this dissertation, with chapters 1-4 covering an entire year, while chapter five only covers from January to October 1949 and chapter six from October 1949 until December 1950. Each chronological chapter of the main body of this thesis will begin with the presentation of the most significant events and developments that took place in the area of US foreign policy toward Germany each year. Additionally, the papers of the US Military Governor of the US Office of Military Government in Germany, General Lucius D. Clay, are used to help provide background and context from the perspective of the highest US official implementing US foreign policy in the US zone of occupied Germany. Some 700 highly classified letters and cables sent by Clay from Berlin to various American officials in Washington and Germany, collected and edited by his biographer, the political scientist Jean Edward Smith, provide an insightful source of information of a US statesman in this critical position in Germany.

Then I will begin my analysis of the events of the year by introducing US President Harry S. Truman’s annual address in April to the American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE), examining the content of the address, the tone and the language he used with the editors. Then, before moving on to the analysis of the various press outlets, American public opinion will be studied through the questions and answers of the Gallup polls. The frequency of questions asked about Germany or the time when these were asked can tell as much as the answers of the people who participated in the surveys.

Then the study of press outlets in each chapter will be divided in two sections. The first section will address briefly the articles of the syndicated columnist Walter Lippmann, which appeared in two of the press outlets under examination here, *The Washington Post* and the *Los Angeles Times*. By 1931 Walter Lippmann, the father of public opinion theory in the United States, a journalist and political philosopher, who dealt with the responsibility of the reporter, the role of the media in presenting information and the mature of public opinion in a democracy, who wrote for the *New York Herald Tribune Syndicate*, had begun his syndicated newspaper column *Today and Tomorrow*. At that time “Americans needed guidance on the complex economic, political and social issues they could not avoid.” As such, the lack of credible columnists sufficiently well versed in 20th century Germany and US foreign relations and the financial inability of some press outlets to pay for trained political commentators on foreign affairs was covered by Lippmann. “Overnight he became not only an authority, but a sensation, and even a household word;” a position which he held also in later years as no one seriously ever challenged him. In the late 1940s and the 1950s Lippmann was known for employing “intellectual detachment” in his political analyses, even though, as it will be demonstrated in this study, the two press outlets that carried his columns usually used him as a straw man.

Lippmann did not try to patronize his readership, he believed that the news and the truth were not synonymous terms, and supported candidates for public office regardless of party

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46 The syndicate is an agency that offers reprint rights of writing and artwork by notable journalists, authorities, and cartoonists mostly to smaller weekly and daily newspapers at low prices to help them be competitive. Press syndicates sell the exclusive rights to a feature to one subscriber in each territory. Newspapers with especially strong resources syndicate to newspapers outside their own communities -e.g., the *Los Angeles Times*– *Washington Post* syndicate.


49 Steel (1999), pp. xiv, xviii.
affiliation as long as their ideas and positions pleased him. He usually rejected the invitation of various professional bodies, like associations of economists, political scientists, sociologists, historians, lawyers, humanists, and even classicists and poets, that pursued him as their member to avoid at some future time being in a position in which he would have to “take issue with their views publicly.”

According to his biographer Ronald Steel, Lippmann “was beholden to no party, ideology, or faction.” He “had the mind of a scholar and the pen of a reporter. [...] He had a graceful style that made words sing, he could explain the most complex idea in a way that an average reader could easily grasp,” and provide his readership with a “dispassionate analysis.” He could have been “a philosopher, a professor of history or even [...] a mathematician since his qualities and intellect were rarely attracted to journalism.” His high sense of responsibility of what a reporter authored is reflected in his description of the destructive nature of propaganda:

> Just as the most poisonous form of disorder the mob incited from high places, the most immoral act the immorality of a government, so the most destructive form of untruth is sophistry and propaganda by those whose profession it is to report the news. [...] When those who control [the news] arrogate to themselves the right to determine by their own consciences what shall be reported and for what purpose, democracy is unworkable. Public opinion is blockaded.

Walter Lippmann was, however, not the only significant syndicated columnist at that time. The brothers Joseph and Stewart Alsop jointly authored the most heavily syndicated column in the United States -over 300 newspapers-, the three-times-weekly “Matter of Fact,” from 1946 to 1958. They were both notable political newspapermen. Stewart Alsop was more liberal, while Joseph Alsop more conservative, while both were heavily influenced by militant anti-communist feelings. Nevertheless, the Alsop brothers will not be studied separately from their columns when they appeared in the press outlets under examination in this thesis. Like Lippmann’s column their column appeared also in *The Washington Post* and the *Los Angeles Times*, but it was not always signed by both brothers and it mostly carried a combination of facts and opinion, which especially

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51 Steel (1999), p. xiii, xiv, xvi.
at the beginning of the time period under examination were not as strong as Lippmann's. Additionally, Lippmann's study of, if not establishment of, the term *public opinion*, and Lippmann's philosophical and psychological attribution to the analysis of political affairs were, in my opinion, not met by any other journalist in the time period under examination.

The second part of the study of the press outlets under examination will begin with the newspapers of wide circulation, then will move on to the mass-circulation magazines *TIME* and *LIFE*, and finish off with the magazines and newspaper of specific interest. In the part of the analysis of every press outlet there will also be included an analysis of a number of published readers' letters to the editor of the press outlet. This is not unrelated to public opinion, but is much less representative than polling surveys. These letters are part of the press outlets under examination here and cannot be neglected. What letters were chosen for publication, and whether these letters aligned with the position of the press outlets are definitely interesting to analyze. At the end of every chapter then the reader will find a summary of all the information in reference to the topic of this study, and an analysis of the triangular relationship and interaction between US foreign policy on Germany, US press outlets, and US public opinion.

It is also important to understand how the press outlets selected for this study were chosen. They include a number of print media top-ranked by their circulation numbers in the 1940s in the United States, as well as some smaller circulation print media, dailies and weeklies, which were likely to take special interest in the future of postwar Germany and US foreign policy towards it. The press outlets under examination are the large circulation newspapers *The New York Times*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *Los Angeles Times*, *The Washington Post*, and the smaller circulation *Human Events*, and the somewhat more intellectual news and culture magazines *The Nation* and the more popular, mass-circulation weeklies, *TIME* and *LIFE*. The last two magazines are included not only because of their popularity and intent to be easy and quick to read, but also due to their richer visual content. The inclusion of the conservative *Wall Street Journal* provides a different insight, from the perspective of US big business, the stock market, fiscal policy and commerce, into the economic handling and the financial importance of Germany at a time when money was needed at home for peacetime conversion of the economy but also when there was growing demand for postwar reconstruction in Europe that might well have implications for multi-national corporations and investors but also for the establishment of world peace. Besides it had been during
World War II that the US really entered into a whole new category of debt: starting at 45 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 1941 federal debt zoomed, reaching almost 119 percent of GDP in 1946, leaving the US with the biggest annual federal deficit (24%) in its history and millions of dollars of obligations domestically and internationally.⁵⁴ For a more special interest point of view the study includes the conservative newspaper Human Events, founded in 1944, the magazine of conservative American Jewish thought and opinion Commentary, founded in 1945, and the oldest continuously published weekly progressive magazine The Nation. The purpose of the study of the latter three press outlets is to point out potential differences from the other press outlets, which formally claimed to be impartial, and examine whether press outlets with a specific interest provided the reader with crucial information and related perspectives that were not included in other media. For instance, even if a journalist from The Nation may have had equal access to the same source material or people as a journalist from The Los Angeles Times, who the media outlet approached or who approached it and what questions were asked certainly varied.

Regarding a more detailed view of the selected press outlets, The New York Times was and still is a daily newspaper, the most respected of American dailies, both for its national and international coverage. Its publisher from 1935 to 1961, Arthur Hays Sulzberger, was a Reform Jew who supported the American Council for Judaism, known for its opposition to Zionism.⁵⁵ The Los Angeles Times was and still is a daily newspaper originally mostly covering issues of the West Coast. Particularly in the mid-1940s, despite fierce competition among the local newspapers, the LA Times became the leading newspaper in Los Angeles. Its publisher from 1944 to 1960 was Norman Chandler, has been credited with its transformation from a local conservative newspaper to a highly influential newspaper both nationally and internationally. Norman’s father, Harry Chandler, the former President of the Los Angeles Times was the owner of the largest real estate empire in the US and a notable eugenicist.⁵⁶ The Washington Post was and still is a daily newspaper. Its publisher Eugene Meyer, the former chairman of the Federal Reserve, bought the newspaper out of bankruptcy in 1933. His parents were Jews from Alsace, but he avoided

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identification as a Jew until later in life. Meyer’s son-in-law, Phillip Graham, a lawyer by training, became publisher in 1946. The Post's political orientation under Graham was defined by its connection to the “Georgetown Set,” a group of people, including the brothers Stewart and Joseph Alsop, who played a part in the early postwar Cold War development of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

*The Wall Street Journal* was and still is a daily newspaper focused on big business and its managing editor as of 1941 and then its CEO as of 1945 was Bernard Kilgore, concurrently general manager of the Dow-Jones, which owns The *WSJ*. Even though *The Wall Street Journal* probably had a more narrowly defined readership, it was in the postwar US the financial newspaper of record. The economy of the US was immensely affected and reorganized by the war and by the postwar US policy and finance specialists had a particular interest in foreign and national trade. Hence this newspaper could not be excluded from the study. For instance, Eugene P. Thomas, the president of the National Trade Council and chairman of the Exporters Advisory Committee for the Export-Import Bank of Washington, advised already in 1941 the resuming of relations with business men of other countries, including also those of the Axis countries and favored “a world economic order undivided by continental barriers to freedom of international intercourse, and dedicated to the supreme task of merging all nations in the broad stream of industrial prosperity and continuing peace and security.”

*TIME* (founded in 1923) and *LIFE* (founded in 1936) magazines were -the first still is- weekly magazines founded specifically as an easier and quicker way to keep up with news than the stuffier and more verbose *New York Times*. Their publisher and founder, Henry Robinson Luce, was the son of Protestant missionaries who had grown up in China and an influential member of the Republican Party. *TIME’s* most famous feature was as of 1927 the annual “Man of the Year” cover story, in which *TIME* recognizes who have had the biggest impact on news headlines over the past 12 months. *TIME’s* first special issue with a cover showing an X scrawled over the face

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of a man or a national symbol was released on May 7, 1945 showing a red X over Adolf Hitler's face. *LIFE* magazine was founded as a picture magazine and its role in the history of photojournalism is considered its most important contribution to publishing.

*The Nation* is the oldest continuously published weekly magazine covering progressive political and cultural news, opinion, and analysis in the United States. Founded by abolitionists in 1865, its editor and publisher from 1937 on was Mary Frederika “Freda” Kirchwey an American journalist, who was strongly committed to liberal causes, including anti-Fascist.60 *Commentary* was and still is a monthly, explicitly concerned with Jewish affairs and culture but also as a conservative American magazine founded and funded by the American Jewish Committee in 1945. Its first editor, Elliot E. Cohen, was avidly anti-Communist, although he saw no essential difference between Nazism and Communism. The magazine was committed to maintain and cultivate the future of the Jewish people and explicitly Zionism and Israel and to stand with the West, in particular the US.61 American policy toward Germany was not mentioned often, but its articles added interesting perspectives on Germany and US policy. *Human Events* was and still is a weekly newspaper and its founders were the conservatives Felix Morley, who had been the editor of *The Washington Post* from 1933-1940, and Frank Hanighen, James Wick and Henry Regnery. *Human Events* claimed to provide “a weekly analysis for the American citizen,” as its own subheading indicated, from the conservative perspective in the form of essays and journal articles. All texts were signed by an author and at the end of the text the editor sometimes added a note on the educational or political background of the author, information of great value for this study.

**Study Restrictions**

Of course, there are a number of admitted restrictions to this study. First and foremost, it was impossible for the author of the dissertation to study all existing American newspapers and magazines in the United States published in English from 1945 to 1950. Thus, the author had to choose what she considered the most important of them based on their annual circulation and their availability nationwide as well as a number of smaller circulation but well-respected newspapers.

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and news magazines with specific interests and a targeted audience for a potentially alternative viewpoint.

Secondly, the study is based on the assumption that the American people were mainly informed by printed press outlets and that this played the major and catalytic role in the formation of their opinion on foreign affairs toward Germany. Nonetheless, radio broadcasting in the United States had started in the early 1920s as the first electronic “mass medium” technology, and radio stations, like newspapers, were protected by the First Amendment. By the end of WWII radio included both AM and FM broadcasting bands and 95% of all homes in the US had radios.\(^62\) Local and national radio stations generally left news and the analysis of the news to the print media until the advent of the Second World War when, according to Stephen Drury Smith, the executive editor and host of American Public Media (APM) Reports website, they “willingly joined the crusade, producing patriotic dramas and variety shows and giving over valuable air time to programs produced by federal agencies.”\(^63\)

Social scientists in the 1940s and onward debated how significant radio’s impact was on the decision-making process of the American voter; some “argued that radio was powerfully influential and others contended that radio broadcasts on behalf of a candidate or party merely reinforced preconceived opinions.” The what we now call “infotainment” aspect of radio as well as its use for public broadcasts by government officials differ from the reporting and commentary about the news of most press outlets, especially those under examination here. Additionally, the time period between the end of World War II and the mid-1950s, when television “drew creative talent, listener loyalty, and advertising revenue away from radio,” was a transitional area for the role of and popularity of the radio.\(^64\)

Third, public opinion will be examined through the survey results of the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup Organization) even though at that time there was also another survey


organization, the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago. However, in contrast to the Gallup Organization which had been founded in 1935 to survey Americans’ views on political and economic trends, the organization NORC was not chosen for this study as it was only founded in 1941 as a somewhat more academically and social science and health research-oriented non-profit organization rather than focused like Gallup on public opinion per se. Ultimately the author decided George Gallup’s longer experience and expertise in the field of public opinion research might well produce more relevant survey results for this particular study.\textsuperscript{65} Additionally the Gallup survey results were more readily available.

\textsuperscript{65} NORC at the University of Chicago, \textit{Our History and Future}, Retrieved on 1/26/2021 from \url{https://www.norc.org/About/Pages/our-history.aspx}; Roper Center For Public Opinion Research, \textit{George Gallup}, Retrieved on 1/26/2021 from \url{https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/pioneers-polling/george-gallup}
Theoretical Background

Before moving on to the main body of this study it is important to discuss the theoretical background of some terms, which the reader will encounter in the analysis or are significant for the understanding of the bigger picture, like the term national stereotypes and their influence on one’s attitude, the term public opinion, as well as the correct use of the term Soviet Union and what this symbolizes and includes territorially. Following the reader will be provided with a brief presentation of the nature, form and role of the two types of US press outlets under examination in this study, newspapers and magazines. Last but least, the reader will be informed about the German American relations and the American attitude toward the Germans in the United States until 1945.

A. National Stereotypes

stereotype= a standardized mental picture that is held in common by members of a group and that represents an oversimplified opinion, prejudiced attitude, or uncritical judgment

stereotype = stereós (from the Greek word στερεός=firm, solid) + túpos (from the Greek word τύπος)

According to Walter Lippmann, who introduced the term stereotype to behavioral science in 1922, stereotypes are “pictures in our heads” which form one’s mental map of social reality. For Lippmann the people are not only being molded by the perception of reality but at the same time they mold it as well. The real environment is altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance. “Each of us lives and works on a small part of the earth's surface,” and inevitably we see at best only a phase and an aspect of any public event that has wide effects. Nevertheless, “our opinions cover a bigger space, a longer reach of time, a greater number of things, than we can directly observe” and so they have to be “piece[d] together out of what others have reported and what we can imagine.” The systems of stereotypes are “the core of our personal tradition, the defenses of our position in society and are highly charged with the feelings that are

66 Stereotype [Def. 2], In Merriam Webster Online, Retrieved on 8/3/2018 from https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/stereotype
attached to them.” Although they are not a complete picture of the world, they are a “picture of a possible world to which we are adapted,” which “we fit in,” where we “find the charm of the familiar, the normal, the dependable [and] any disturbance of the stereotypes seems like an attack upon the foundations of “our” universe.” Thus, people need stereotypes in order to double-filter the stimuli; one filter for perception and one filter for action.68

Even though stereotypes refer to personality attributes and behaviors, the process of stereotyping is being influenced by social factors (e.g. Americans stereotyping Germans during the second World War or the Soviets during the Cold War) inevitably leading the person to a generalization. These attitudes which are based on too little experience or knowledge about the unfamiliar individual tend to be overgeneralized when ascribed to a group of individuals.69 Hence stereotypes are a quick, vital, social explanatory device to justify potential prejudice. The categorization process which is accomplished with the use of stereotypes help the individual organize and simplify their environment and explain social events in order to justify one’s actions and achieve self-positivity by discriminating against another group. Although the birth of a stereotype is an individual socialization process through which members of the same group are being perceived as similar to each other and more dissimilar than members of different groups, once it is created it lives on its own, is attributed to a group as a whole, influences social behavior and becomes a shared perception of reality.70

When this shared perception refers to people with psychological traits or features characteristics of a certain nation, then we refer to national characteristics. Even though the term “national character” is equivocal due to the individual attribute of the word character and the collective attribute of the word national, the connective element is culture and the mentality expressed in the cultural products. A national characteristic is guaranteed by the identity of the

culture, is related to the frequency distribution of personality patterns within a society, and is restricted to the systems of attitudes, values and beliefs. These psychological traits explain the relation between national character and national stereotypes when the latter serve as instruments for maintaining or reacting to an existing social order. In an international scale, national stereotypes can even reflect the power relations between countries. Of course, due to validity, generalization and differentiation problems a national stereotype does not correspond to a complete description of a national character. Thus, the study of the content of stereotypes and of the historical and political interrelations between the various countries will offer insight into the psycho-dynamic functions of national stereotypes.  

However, here lies the question of how people are supposed to form a stereotype, a mental picture of a national group which they probably have little to no contact with? “Most researchers seem to assume that the members of the mass media audience simply absorb what is portrayed in the media.” Since “stereotypes are formed through the observation of behaviors performed by members of the stereotyped group,” Americans who have never interacted with Nazis or Germans who lived in Germany before the Second World War would totally rely on behaviors delivered to them through the means of information (e.g. through the press outlets) in order to form their stereotypes.

B. Public Opinion

*vox populi* = The opinions or beliefs of the majority.  
*mid-16th century*

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“Our government rests in public opinion. Whoever can change public opinion can change the government, practically just so much. Public opinion, or [on?] any subject, always has a 'central idea,' from which all its minor thoughts radiate. That 'central idea' in our political opinion, at the beginning was, and until recently has continued to be, the equality of men.”\textsuperscript{75}

\textit{Abraham Lincoln, 1856}

“In this and like communities, public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment, nothing can fail; without it nothing can succeed. Consequently, he who molds public sentiment, goes deeper than he who enacts statutes or pronounces decisions. He makes statutes and decisions possible or impossible to be executed. [...] Public sentiment is everything.”\textsuperscript{76}

\textit{Abraham Lincoln, 1858}

Since public opinion is the main focus of this study, we need to first explore how the term \textit{public opinion} came into existence. In the early twentieth century, the science of public opinion studied crowd psychology, where a \textit{crowd} was defined and driven by its collective emotional experience. At the turn of the century, the term \textit{crowd} was replaced with \textit{mass}, which was defined as a heterogenous group of individuals with little interaction but with a common focus of interest or attention. Finally, both terms were replaced with \textit{public}, which added the features of thinking, self-awareness, and reasoning to both confront and engage in discussion over an issue. The term \textit{opinion} has been debated over the years as well. Beliefs and values are the foundation of a person’s opinions, where beliefs define the cognitive components that make up our understanding of objects and actions, and values are our representation of how this understanding should be. In turn, attitudes and opinions can be built on this foundation. Specifically, attitudes are the deep, mental step in the formation of an opinion and consist of one’s feelings toward a person, object or issue, while an opinion is the verbal or behavioral expression of an attitude.\textsuperscript{77} Ultimately, the term \textit{public opinion} is not defined by a single explanation. However, perhaps the definition proposed by


Merriam Webster, “what most people think about something,” provides the simplest and most fundamental summary of this huge sociopsychological term.78

However, public opinion is not just the sum of individual opinions. The eighteenth century ushered an era where people, namely the middle class, placed enormous value on community and public opinion was translated as the general will of the citizens when they think about the whole of the community.79 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, public opinion was associated with the press outlets and their contradictory role as a reflection and guide of the public opinion. According to Walter Lippmann, public opinion could also be a symbolic phrase and employed by orators in arguments with each other. Furthermore, Lippman argued that all people should have public opinions even if they do not have opinions on all public affairs, as they will inevitably be required to make decisions on issues with which they may not be familiar. Thus, regardless of whether the opinions are informed or not, the subsequent decisions lead to a definitive result. In addition, because feelings are more ambiguous than ideas, a leader is able to make a homogeneous will out of a heterogeneous mass of desires by combining an intensification of feeling and a degradation of significance.80 Additionally, George Gallup, the American pioneer of survey sampling techniques and inventor of a successful statistical method of survey sampling for measuring public opinion (Gallup poll), argued that a true statesman will never change his ideas or principles based on the opinions of any group. In fact, a successful statesman will try to persuade the public to accept his own views and goals.81

Even though the relation of the public to a problem is external and cannot control the executive act, the relation between public opinion and policymaking is fundamental for understanding how democracy functions in the United States.82 According to George Gallup, the public opinion implicated with democratic ideas is tangible and dynamic, arises from the day-to-day experiences of individuals, and is formulated to working guides for the political

representatives. As such, the success of every political action depends on the strength of the supporting public opinion, and the art of interpreting and influencing public opinion is key to the democratic society of the United States. Therefore, political leaders should take advantage of the tremendous wisdom that is present in the collective experiences of the people they represent. Moreover, polling should be made public for the sake of democracy, as it provides citizens with an understanding of the collective opinions of their community on key issues. From 1935 to 1979, public opinion-policy congruence was greater than 50%. Hence, public opinion needed to follow the changes in policymaking and vice versa. Through public opinion, political leaders waged their battles and the journalists got feedback from the public. Public opinion, however, is not protected from propaganda. On the contrary, it listens to its conflicting and contradictory messages and according to George Gallup it can debate to separate the true from the false and to be molded through criticism.

After identifying the main characteristics of the term public opinion, we need to study the possible ways to measure it. Despite the hypothetical nature of the term attitude, there are instruments to measure a person’s attitude, to infer a person’s attitude from his or her responses, and to translate a person’s attitude into an opinion. Verbal responses seem to be the most relevant manifestation of attitude and can be derived from polls. Polling is the “application of scientific principles to the challenge of understanding and extracting the insights, emotions, and attitudes of millions of people aggregated into a common society. Polling is by far our best, most efficient, and most productive way of extracting this wisdom.” It allows people to both express their opinions and gauge the views of their community. Ultimately, the science of polling has not only demonstrated that public opinion can be accurately measured, but also that public opinion must be measured. Furthermore, the significance of polling lies in the fact that every individual opinion is given the same weight and we can trend the directionality, intensity, and stability of the collective

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87 Newport (2004), pp. ix, 1, 2.
88 Gallup & Rae (1940), p. 6.
opinion over time.\textsuperscript{89} Despite the fact that polls are often used by spokespersons to persuade the public that they speak on behalf of the majority of society, polling organizations are merely fact-finding agencies and their responsibility begins and ends with the ascertaining of facts regarding public opinion; they have no rightful concern whatsoever with what is done about these facts.\textsuperscript{90}

The polling methodology focuses on the individual and makes him/her part of the methodology when forming the questionnaire. For example, a pollster cannot directly ask “Have you voted?” or “Have you voted yet?” as these imply that the individual should vote. This should instead be rephrased in a more unbiased way to say “In the election, did things come up that prevented you from voting, or did you happen to vote?” This increases the likelihood of obtaining an accurate answer, although there always exists the possibility of receiving an untrue response. In another example, in cases where an individual does not understand the question, the “no opinion” option may be perceived as uncomprehending, uninterested or undecided.\textsuperscript{91}

In the “yes” or “no” questions, the individual is provided with the opportunity to qualify and elaborate his answer if desired. In the open or free answer questions, the individual is able to express his views without limitations, which in turn reveals to what extent the individual has given thought to a particular issue, the depth of information the individual has obtained, the intensity of his or her feelings, and the directionality of his or her thinking. Lastly, there are the multiple-choice questions where the individual is given three answers, each of which expresses a different degree of feeling or conviction on either side of an issue. The answers do not include extreme views and tend to gravitate toward middle positions. Of course, the possibility of error is also not excluded in this case, as the individual may not correctly remember all answers. Regardless, democracy does not require that every individual be a political philosopher, but merely that the “sum total of individual views add up to something that makes sense.”\textsuperscript{92} To further minimize the chances of making a mistake, the pollster first asks the individual whether he or she has heard or read about an issue and then to explain it in his or her own words. The knowledge of the individual on a subject is counted in the methodology of polling. According to Gallup's quintamensional approach, the individual with more knowledge about a topic is differentiated from one with the less

\textsuperscript{89} Glynn (1999), pp. 26-27, 69.
\textsuperscript{91} Fenton (1960), pp. 18-20.
\textsuperscript{92} Gallup (1944), pp. 35, 43, 74-75.
knowledge. Gallup’s approach filters the respondents’ awareness and general knowledge, overall opinions about the topic, views on specific aspects of the problem, the reasons why they possess their views, and the intensity with which they hold the opinion.\(^9\)

C. Russia or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics?

Since 1922, and until its dissolution and the collapse of its communist government in 1991, the formal name of “Russia” was Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Therefore, the use of terms “Russia,” “Russian,” “Red,” could be indicative of anti-Communism and anti-Soviet bias. The person who uses these terms, instead of USSR or Soviet Union, or does not at least identify Russia as Soviet Russia, does not recognize the Russian Revolution, the abolition of the monarchy in 1917 and the establishment of the Soviet Union in 1922, since the territory of the Soviet Union of the time period in study here did not just include Soviet Russia but also Ukraine, Georgia, Belorussia, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.

During the first year of this study the United States was led by two different Presidents; two different personalities with different approaches of US foreign policy. From the beginning of 1945 until his death on April 12, 1945 the US President was F.D. Roosevelt, who guided the US through the wartime, and from April 12, 1945 until the end of 1950, when this study is completed, the US President was H. S. Truman who guided the US through peacetime and the early years of the Cold War. Before Roosevelt's election the US refused “to recognize the Soviet Union and send an ambassador there” mostly because of the repudiation of debts to the United States incurred under the preceding Tsarist government, the authoritarian Soviet regime and the fear that Bolshevism would spread into Western Europe if not contained.\(^9\) Although the relationship between the US and the Soviet Union had subtly but significantly changed over the years, mostly through the gradual expansion of trade following the lift of economic wartime restrictions in July

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1920, it was F.D. Roosevelt who established official ties between the two nations; a reversal the Soviet Union was eager to encourage.\textsuperscript{95} Although the reasons for doing so were complex, this decision was mostly based on geostrategic and economic incentives. Specifically, Roosevelt hoped that by establishing official ties between the two nations, US would constrain Japanese expansionism in Asia (e.g., Japan's annexation of Manchuria in 1931), while it would promote Soviet-American trade.\textsuperscript{96} After the Soviet Union was attacked by Germany, Roosevelt extended Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union. Roosevelt not only was not threatened by Communism, but also “didn’t care whether the countries bordering Russia became communized.”\textsuperscript{97}

His successor, H. S. Truman, on the other hand was not that positively inclined toward communism or the Soviet Union. In 1941 as Senator Truman had said: “If we see that Germany is winning the war, we ought to help Russia; and if that Russia is winning, we ought to help Germany, and in that way let them kill as many as possible.”\textsuperscript{98} After Roosevelt’s death Truman inherited Roosevelt’s national security team, but proceeded with the replacement of the Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius (the administrator of the Lend-Lease Program, which supplied the Soviet Union and other US allies with food, oil, and military materiel since 1941) with Supreme Court Justice and War Mobilization Director James F. Byrnes. Three months after being President of the United States Truman attended the Potsdam Conference and encountered Stalin for the first time. On July 17, 1945 he wrote in his diary about Stalin: “I can deal with Stalin. He is honest but smart as hell.”\textsuperscript{99} The following day Truman wrote:

Stalin’s luncheon was a most satisfactory meeting. I invited him to come to the US. Told him I’d send the battleship Missouri for him if he’d come. He said he wanted to cooperate with the US in peace as we had cooperated in war, but it would be harder. Said he was grossly misunderstood in

\textsuperscript{95}William E. Leuchtenburg, \textit{Franklin D. Roosevelt: Foreign Affairs}, University of Virginia, Miller Center, Retrieved on 5/18/2020 on https://millercenter.org/president/fdroosevelt/foreign-affairs
the US and I was misunderstood in Russia. I told him that we each could help to remedy that situation in our home countries and that I intended to do my part at home. He gave me a most cordial smile and said he would do as much in Russia.100

Truman expressed similar opinions both in a letter to his wife “I like Stalin. He is straightforward, knows what he wants, and will compromise when he can’t get it.” and addressing his press secretary “Stalin and I were able to get along all right. We had no disagreement whatever except over the treatment of our [diplomatic representatives] in Bulgaria and Rumania.”101 Truman appears to have retained his positive opinion about Stalin as, later that year (October 1945), he confided to his Secretary of Commerce, Henry Agard Wallace that “[Stalin] wasn’t well at Potsdam, and he wasn’t well now; and he was afraid that he was so tired he wanted to retire. [Truman also] said this would be very unfortunate both for Russia and the United States, because then it would be a struggle for power between Molotov on the one hand and Zhukov on the other. He didn’t like the prospect with either one of them. He returned to the fact that Stalin is an honest man who is easy to get along with— who arrives at sound decisions.”102

Nevertheless, this opinion did not go a long way. The Soviet pressure for the establishment of a Communist-dominated puppet government in Poland signalized the Soviet expansive intention and along with the US possession of the atomic bomb, whose successful use contributed significantly to the end of the war, drove Truman toward the adoption of a firmer policy when dealing with the Soviet Union. On July 25, 1945 Truman wrote in his diary: “It is certainly a good thing for the world that Hitler’s crowd or Stalin’s did not discover this atomic bomb. It seems to be the most terrible thing ever discovered, but it can be made the most useful.”103 This ascertainment and the final impression of the Soviet leader and his intentions after the Potsdam

100 ibid. p. 139.
Conference would trigger Truman’s already existing distrust toward the Soviet Union and would lead to a series of gradually firmer US policies toward the country as we will observe in the upcoming chapters. Returning to the use of the term Russia or Soviet Union it will be interesting to observe which term was used by the press outlets, in the questionnaires of the Gallup surveys, and by the American people in their letters to the editors of the press outlets, as well as whether there was a change of the use of the term in reference to the change of the US foreign policy.

D. American Press Outlets

The freedom of speech and of the press is protected in the United States by the First Amendment of the American constitution. “Congress shall make no law [...] abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” The purpose of the press outlets, and by that I mean newspapers and magazines, is to inform the readers by providing them with facts, statistics and opinion columns. However, this is not always the case, hence the plurality of different newspapers and magazines. If the purpose of the press outlets is only to present the facts a single nationwide paper would be enough. The true task of the press outlets is to represent the facts, meaning to interpret or explain the news to the reader by representing the opinion of the author or of the editor/manager. Consequently, the more representations of the facts a reader is provided with the more objectively can one be informed.

Even though the American press outlets are a relatively free private enterprise system, which is able to simultaneously and publicly transmit a message or an image to large, heterogeneous and mostly anonymous audiences throughout the country, there has to be a connection between the press outlets and the reader - a shared pointed of view. According to the idealistic attitude of the press outlets, they are expected to give the news impartially and independent of political parties or interests, while the editorials are expected to present the viewpoints of the editors. In newspaper editorials the editors attempt to mold the public opinion either by interpreting the news in a certain way or by arguing for or against a controversial subject

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with the purpose of making the reader adopt their position. Even the structure of the newspaper can influence the reader who spends daily between fifteen and thirty minutes in the reading of a newspaper. Interestingly, the Americans in 1947 read more newspapers and magazines than any other nation worldwide. In fact, 80% regularly read daily or weekly newspapers, 50% read magazines, and 90% of them relied on the press and the radio to obtain their information on matters of foreign affairs. Of note, the newspaper was the preferred source of information by social groups with higher income, better education and a special interest in foreign affairs. Thus, the responsibility of the press as a means of information, awareness, and public education was enormous. However, despite how impressive these percentages may sound, it should be noted that the average American newspaper reader of this era devoted only 30 minutes of their daily time to read a newspaper. Furthermore, it is unknown how much of these 30 minutes they spent actually reading news regarding the foreign affairs of their country.106 As such, it was not only the text of the article that carried importance, but also the headlines, location of the article, and accompanying images. The articles which are placed in the front page or pages of the issue will most likely be read. The images which accompany an article can visualize and intensify the point of view of the author or even prevent the reader from reading the entire article and lead them to draw a conclusion depending on the impression of the image. Nonetheless, no matter how argumentative a journalist or a press outlet can be, it is not necessarily effectively influential. For instance, the percentage of the press outlets that was against the successful presidential candidate was approximately 60% in 1932, 64% in 1936, 77% in 1940, 78% in 1944, and 80% in 1948.107

Nevertheless, the press outlets were not the sole medium of information in the mid Forties. Radio broadcasting had been introduced to the United States since the early 1920s exceeding the number of 765 of radio stations in 1940; the majority of the urban US households and more than half of the rural US households owned at least one radio.108 In the mid Forties television was also introduced to the public. The common ownership of multiple media sources by a single person or corporate entity, the so called “media cross-ownership,” did not, however, change the scenery of

information as fairly or objectively as one might think. In particular, in 1940, 23% of the broadcast outlets (radio at the time) were owned by newspapers in the same market, while 28 of the first 60 television licenses were applied for by newspapers. Between 1945 and 1950, six news-intensive years, the total circulation of newspapers grew by 31%. In 1945 the total circulation of US daily newspapers was 48,384,000 weekday newspapers and 39,860,000 Sunday newspapers increasing in 1950 to 53,829,000 weekday newspapers and 46,582,000 Sunday newspapers. The newspaper industry was quite competitive as in 1947 the concentration ratio of the four largest firm in publishing industries was 21% and for the eight largest firm in publishing industries 26%, while the ratio was even higher for the periodicals 34% and 43%, respectively.

The second printed source of information which is under examination in this dissertation is the magazine or periodical. “A magazine is defined as a publication that appears [...] on a regular basis with a minimum frequency of four times annually under a common title.” Its role is (a) to provide an inexpensive and open marketplace for an exchange of ideas, opinions and information, (b) to enlighten the public about issues which might draw the mass attention years later, (c) to communicate a popular culture, (d) to inform about a wide range of diversion and (e) to offer instruction on daily life such as food recipes or construction ideas. The magazine is put together with less haste and more care than the newspaper or radio program and meets the “requirements for a medium of interpretation for the leisurely, critical reader as it was suited for introducing new ideas, examining them critically, and assessing their worth.” The magazines are even more popular than the newspapers because they do not have to carry up-to-the-minute news and rely more on leisurely delivery systems especially to rural areas. In 1947 the Magazine Advertising Bureau found 32,300,000 magazine reading families when according to the census, the number of periodicals had grown to 4,610 and the combined circulation of all magazines reached the number of 384,628,000 an issue. In the meantime magazines probably took a bigger blame than the

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112 Pew Research Center, Newspapers Fact Sheet (July 9, 2019), Retrieved on 11/20/2018 from https://www.journalism.org/fact-sheet/newspapers/
newspaper for creating a pseudo-world, a picture out of focus, which readers sometimes confused with the real thing because of the direct relation between magazine and advertising; a relation inevitably vital to the existence of the primer especially after the drop of magazine share from 13% in 1945 to 9% by 1950.\textsuperscript{114} Regarding the content of these two press outlets a newspaper contains various sections (news, politics, business, sports, science, classifieds etc.) in the form of articles, while a magazine has a narrower range of sections in different forms (articles, stories, interviews, essays, product reviews, features, survey reports, advertisements, etc.) and targets a specified group of people.

The foundation of press outlets is report. Nonetheless, even if all reporters and their unofficial assistants from all around the world could work on a 24-hour basis, they would not be able to witness and report everything that happened in the world. Even if this were possible, it would be unrealistic for the information to be accurately transmitted. The word count of the initial information would have to be trimmed, in order to fit into the space a journalist holds in the paper, running the risk of tampering the initial content. Furthermore, the news needs to be represented to the audience in a way so that they allow the participation of the reader in the news by personal identification. Still in that case the words of the final text could not have the same meaning in the mind of the reporter, of the editor and of the reader. Every individual command a finite number of words and most likely s/he does not use them all when expressing ideas. Furthermore, discipline directs the journalist’s mind when “he passes from the news to the vague realm of truth. There are no canons to direct his own mind, and no canons that coerce the reader's judgement or the publisher's.” If the newspaper is charged with the duty of translating the public life, so that every individual can arrive at an opinion on a topic, then the news and the truth are two different words.\textsuperscript{115}

\textbf{E. German American relations until 1945}

The German American interaction had always been strong. The Germans had not only been one of the largest immigrant groups in the United States, but also contributed largely to the formation of integral parts of the American society in the nineteenth century, such as religion,

education and farming as well as the development of important figures of the American political and financial life who enrolled in German universities in order to obtain a higher education. In addition to that, most Americans had formed an idea of Germanness from Americans of German origin, who had immigrated to the United States over the past three centuries and have earned a high degree of respect for their ethnic group and “national character.” Attributes like “hard-working, productive, thrifty, reliable, honest, frugal, patient, industrious, virtuous” were often assigned to Germans. However, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the American participation in the First World War disturbed this balanced relationship and the American impression of a technically talented, hardworking and respected for his extensive contribution to music, science, philosophy and literature German was compromised by the “Hun” image.\textsuperscript{116}

Even though the US President from 1913 to 1921, Woodrow Wilson, and the American public in 1914 strongly supported the notion of American neutrality, the German authorities were not entirely convinced that the United States was able and willing to stay out of the First World War. On the one hand President Wilson attempted to mediate between the hostile powers, while entrepreneurs and major industrialists supplied the British, French and Soviet forces with millions of tons of weapons. On the other hand attachés to the German embassy to the US and the German Information Service worked to maintain cordial relations between Berlin and Washington and cultivate a positive image of Germany within the US, while German military attachés campaigned of their own within the US, opened the War Intelligence Bureau and organized sabotage operations, such as withholding military and naval instructions received from Berlin, passport fraud, instigation of the German staff who worked in ammunition factories to quit their job etc. Furthermore, on May 7, 1915, six days after leaving New York for Liverpool, the British-owned steamship \textit{Lusitania} was torpedoed without any warning by a German U-boat, resulting to the death of 1,128 people among them 128 Americans, and setting off a chain of events that prepared the US public in case the neutrality scenario failed and led the so far neutral US to enter World War I, while by the beginning of 1946 the majority of the American people was already asking for a larger regular army. Moreover, both events provoked a public anti-German sentiment and increased the fear of conspiracy in the American public. Even without the evidence of German illegal action or outright sabotage, the American press outlets, often relying on rumors spread by

pro-Allied supporters, continued to harass German agents in the US who were determined to represent Germany’s interests in the US.\textsuperscript{117}

The diplomatic relations between the United States and Germany were further strained by a series of events and statements from the US side. In particular, on August 9, 1915 when Germany sunk the British ocean liner \textit{S.S. Arabic}. In February 1917 the British intelligence deciphered the so-called Zimmermann Telegram - a message from the German foreign secretary Arthur Zimmermann to the German ambassador to Mexico proposing a Mexican-German alliance in the United States- which declared war against Germany and promised to restore to Mexico the lost territories of Texas, New Mexico and Arizona.\textsuperscript{118} Even though President Wilson kept insisting for a few years after the \textit{Lusitania} incident on his “keep us out of war” slogan other members of his party saw a greater necessity in preparing the land for a war. On October 12, 1915 the former US President Theodore Roosevelt, who were in anything but good terms with President Wilson, spoke openly to the \textit{Knights of Columbus} in New York City about the phenomenon of the ‘Americanism’ and the necessity of the preservation of unity among the American citizens. His speech was an attempt to prepare the Americans for a fight against Germany and instill a sense of unity and patriotism in the American people. The term ‘hyphenated American’ was used by Roosevelt to characterize “the man who puts German or Irish or English or French before the hyphen,” the man of foreign origin, “who calls himself an American citizen and who yet shows by his actions that he is primarily the citizen of a foreign land.” This man was “to be a traitor to American institutions.”\textsuperscript{119} In front of 2.500 enthusiastic members of the Catholic fraternal service


\textsuperscript{118} Zimmermann Telegram as Received by the German Ambassador to Mexico; 1/16/1917; 862.20212 / 57 through 862.20212 / 311; Central Decimal Files, 1910-1963; General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. [Online Version, https://www.docsteach.org/documents/document/zimmermann-telegram-as-received, February 27, 2018] See also: Telegram from United States Ambassador Walter Page to President Woodrow Wilson Conveying a Translation of the Zimmermann Telegram; 2/24/1917; 862.20212 / 57 through 862.20212 / 311; Central Decimal Files, 1910-1963; General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. [Online Version, https://www.docsteach.org/documents/document/translation-zimmermann-telegram, February 27, 2018]

organization Roosevelt pointed out the necessity of the preservation and protection of the American spirit from the hyphenated American, who does not embrace the American ideas and way of living.

In his afternoon speech of March 31st of 1916 at St. Louis titled “America for Americans” Roosevelt spoke again about the danger of divided allegiance as a man who tries to remain with a dual allegiance, with a divided citizenship, he merely ceases to become an American without thereby becoming a German or an Englishman or anything else. He becomes a man without a country who has forfeited the right to be stirred by the feeling of patriotic devotion to any land, or to have a special and peculiar kinship with any people.\textsuperscript{120}

Only through a whole-hearted and undivided loyalty to the United States could a man overcome such a danger. To that cause President Woodrow Wilson established the Committee on Public Information (CPI or the Creel Committee by its chairman George Creel) in 1917 to influence public opinion in favor of an American participation in World War I. The government was able to communicate with every citizen and managed successfully to mobilize public opinion, popularize the notion that the struggle was a great crusade to save democracy and prompt a national ideology, an American democracy, an American nationalism.\textsuperscript{121}

Perhaps the most successful move of this committee was the establishment of an army of speakers; volunteer speakers who would deliver patriotic talks in motion-picture theaters vested in large degree with the authority of the government. The national organization was called “Four Minute Men” and numbered 75,000 speakers, who gave more than 7,550,190 speeches to a fair estimate of audiences of 134,454,514 people.\textsuperscript{122} Furthermore, Roosevelt denounced the German-American alliance and any alliance of foreign interest as treason and Anti-American alliance. Nonetheless, this bond of loyalty which was the core element of the Wilsonian idea of Americanism in conjunction with the rural categorization of the German Americans into “soul Germans” and “stomach Germans”, where the “soul Germans” were the exception and included the immigrants who emotionally and ideologically embraced the ethnic life of their new country,

\textsuperscript{122}George Creel (1920), \textit{How We Advertised America: the First Telling of the Amazing Story of the Committee on Public Information That Carried the Gospel of Americanism to Every Corner of the Globe}, New York, and London: Harper & brothers, p. 84-85.
became a trap for some Americans of German origin when the USA entered the war.\textsuperscript{123}

On Flag Day of 1917, June 14, 1917, President Wilson himself assured his nation that “the military masters of Germany” had “filled the unsuspecting American communities with vicious spies and conspirators” in order to corrupt the opinion of the American people, only to claim a year later that the Americans are the champions of democracy and then “solemnly beg that the governors of all the States, the law officers of every community, and, above all, the men and women of every community in the United States, all who revere America and wish to keep her name without stain or reproach, will cooperate--not passively merely, but actively and watchfully--to make an end of” this disgraceful evil of the lynching events.\textsuperscript{124}

This polarization led the American people to perform humiliating actions on German-Americans, which were regarded by the first more as ‘patriotic’ exercises. Robert Prager in Collinsville, Illinois, was tarred and feathered and hung because he was considered a German spy, John Meintz in Luverne, Minnesota was tarred and feathered for not supporting war bond drives, Morris Gotler in East Alton, Illinois was forced to kiss the American flag because he ignored a merchant’s agreement to close the door during a demonstration promoting Liberty bonds, John Rydners in Athens, Illinois was forced to swear allegiance and to kiss the American flag because he refused to contribute groceries for a dinner associated with bond selling, John Schmidt in Saint Charles, Missouri was fired because he refused to buy Liberty bonds, Reverend A.F. Meyer in Pinckneyville, Illinois was tarred, physically abused and forced to flee with his family to Kansas. Even the German language and the German-language services were forbidden in many states, such as Louisiana, Iowa, Illinois, Kentucky, South Dakota, Montana, California, Minnesota, Connecticut. German American banks, vereins, churches and the German-language press were

\textsuperscript{124} W. Wilson, (1917), Address of President Wilson delivered at Washington, D.C., Flag Day, Retrieved on 4/12/2018 from https://archive.org/details/addressofpreside02wilsonw. See also: U. S. President (1918), My fellow countrymen. I take the liberty of addressing you upon a subject which so vitally affects the honor of the nation and the very character and integrity of our institutions that I trust you will find me justified in speaking. Washington: Library of Congress, [Pdf] Retrieved on 4/12/2018 from https://www.loc.gov/item/rbpe.24101800/.
forced to merge, change their name or erase ethnic marks. Individuals also changed their names to similar American ones, for instance Schmidt became Smith, Koch became Cook, Schwarz Black, Strauss Stratford, Rosenstein Rose and Morgenwerk became Morgan. However, the public sentiment was not guided by individual feelings and preferences alone.\textsuperscript{125}

The press outlets at that time also seemed to align with the public sentiment. For instance, regarding probably the most horrific incident, the death-murder of Prager \textit{The New York Times} of April 5, 1918 published an article titled “German is lynched by an Illinois mob,” when actually the German was a German American who had been murdered by a mob. Furthermore, the author of the article described the incident without any comments let alone expressing their disapproval as if such incidents were common or even expected due to “a recent wave of patriotism which swept over many Illinois towns.”\textsuperscript{126} The language of the front-page article of \textit{Chicago Daily Tribune} was similar but shorter. In this case there was also no comment against the act of lynching. On the contrary, the title of the article declared disloyalty as the cause of his death.\textsuperscript{127} \textit{The Washington Post} language was even harsher. Regarding Prager’s death the author of the article included rumors that Prager had been hoarding quantities of powder in a mine, referring to his status in the US the author wrote not only that Prager was single but also that he had no relatives in this country and it was clear that the author used this incident to express his opinion for the formation of a law against disloyalty.\textsuperscript{128} A week later, the \textit{Post} became even more extremist, finding a “plausible explanation in the fact that the open and ingenuous American mind had been fed up on German lies to the point where it broke out in fierce revolt” and even encouraged “a few lynchings if enemy propaganda” were to be stopped.\textsuperscript{129} The front-page article of the \textit{Baltimore Sun} was more objective. “Lynched for speech. Mob hangs Robert P. Praeger claiming he made disloyal remarks” was the title which seemed closer to the truth. Even though, nothing was written regarding his speech or the claimed disloyalty remarks, the author of the article at least called the mob “the local \textit{loyalist} committee.”\textsuperscript{130} Furthermore, the Germans were called \textit{Huns} and the journalists wrote openly for the ban of German language and the wide approval of this movement.

\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{125} ibid.
  \item\textsuperscript{126} “German is lynched by Illinois mob,” \textit{The New York Times}, (1918, April 5), 4.
  \item\textsuperscript{127} “Illinoisan Lynched for Disloyalty,” \textit{Chicago Daily Tribune}, (1918, April 5), 1.
  \item\textsuperscript{128} “Sift lynching of alien,” \textit{The Washington Post}, (1918, April 6), 3.
  \item\textsuperscript{129} “Stamping Out Treason,” \textit{The Washington Post}, (1918, April 12), 6.
  \item\textsuperscript{130} “Lynched for speech,” \textit{The Sun}, (1918, April 5), 1.
\end{itemize}
by State governors and leaders of the political, industrial and commercial life of the US.\textsuperscript{131}

In contrast, President Woodrow Wilson's 14-point program for world peace emphasized a non-punitive policy towards Germany exemplified by stating that “We do not wish to injure [Germany] or to block in any way her legitimate influence or power.”\textsuperscript{132} The USA did not wish to “fight [Germany] either with arms or with hostile arrangements of trade if she [was] willing to associate herself with [the US] and the other peace-loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fair dealing.” On the contrary, the USA wished Germany “only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world, -- the new world in which [the US] live[d], -- instead of a place of mastery.” Nonetheless, the peace treaty, which was negotiated between January and June 1919 in Paris, was written by the Allies with almost no participation of the Germans. Germany’s treaty specified its new boundaries after depriving the land of important financial areas such as the Saar Basin for 15 years and the Rhine-Meuse Canal for 25 years, reduced Germany’s armed forces and established large reparations in the form of reconstruction materials and numerous financial obligations towards the Allies, giving the Allies the right to take all military or other measures of coercion, which they considered appropriate in the event of Germany did not fulfill the obligations imposed to her by the Treaty of Versailles.\textsuperscript{133}

Nonetheless, not all voices spoke in favor of such high and strict financial obligations considering that these would damage the nation’s economy and would affect that of the wider world. For example, the British economist John Maynard Keynes in the autumn of 1919 wisely remarked that

“If we oppose in detail every means by which Germany or Russia can recover their material well-being, because we feel a national, racial, or political hatred for their populations or their governments, we must be prepared to face the consequences of such feelings. Even if there is no moral solidarity between the nearly related races of Europe, there is an economic solidarity which we cannot disregard. Even now, the world markets are one. If we do not allow Germany to exchange products with Russia and so feed herself, she must inevitably compete with us for the produce of the New World. The more successful we are in snapping economic relations between Germany and Russia, the more we shall depress the level of our own economic standards and increase the gravity

\textsuperscript{132} The National Archives, President Wilson's Message to Congress, January 8, 1918; Records of the United States Senate; Record Group 46; Records of the United States Senate, Retrieved on 5/5/2018, from https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=62
Moreover, the deeply rooted American liberal dichotomous conception of governors and the people dictated the condition of the freedom of the German people from an autocratic leader. Many progressive-minded intellectuals, among them the political analyst and columnist Walter Lippmann, supported the idea of the American participation against the military-autocratic elites in Germany in order to liberate the ordinary Germans from Imperial Germany and in turn allow them to radically change their political system.135

The presidential elections of 1920 revealed the weary of war American public. For the Americans Democrats symbolized everything that had gone wrong with the war, while the Democratic nominee for President of the United States at the 1920 presidential election James M. Cox was probably the worst political choice at that time, even despite Roosevelt’s support. As such the Republicans’ slogan “A Return to Normalcy” gave the party the crushing victory of 60.3% to 34.1% and the German Americans, who also supported the party in 1916, an opportunity for ethnic regeneration.136 Nevertheless the German Americans had given up many elements of their ethnicity in order to “americanize” themselves during the World War I; a tendency, which was intensified by the appearance of Hitler and the Second World War.

During the interwar years the American public was provided with a variety of opinions on the German problem. The feelings of the American journalists during the interwar years varied from anti-Bolshevist to anti-Nazist. From the city of Berlin Edgar A. Mowrer of the Chicago Daily News blamed the continued German authoritarian political culture for the creation of “a people conditioned to obedience” and presented National Socialism as a “collective religion,” while his colleague John Gunther attempted to explain the Third Reich to the Americans using a psychological approach and relied on the authority complex of the German people to submit to dictatorial rule. William L. Shirer of CBS attributed the German lack of resistance to the Nazis to the people’s cowardice and actual support of the new regime. The New-York Tribune syndicated newspaper columnist Dorothy Thompson137 rooted wholeheartedly against the “Hun” in World

137 In addition to that she wrote for a range of newspapers and magazines including the New York Herald Tribune, the New York Post, the Saturday Evening Post, the Ladies’ Home Journal and Foreign Affairs. In the New-York Tribune her popular column On The Record reached an audience of almost ten million readers.
War I, but hoped for the acceptance of a reformed Germany after the end of the war and expressed
the necessity for outside intervention against Nazism, which she recognized as a disease of the
German obsession regarding “injustices” committed by Germany’s enemies such as Jews,
communists and the Allies. In the US the American multinational mass media conglomerate Hearst
Communications saw Nazi Germany as a bulwark against communism and spoke out publicly
against anti-Semitic attacks. Henry Luce’s magazines *Fortune* and *Time* accepted Nazism as an
antidote to communism and only after the outbreak of the war in Europe did the publisher
campaign against Nazi Germany in order to bolster his own country’s role in the world. Lastly,
*Saturday Evening Post* shifted from publishing articles by foreign correspondents, such as
Thompson, to arguing that the Versailles Treaty had caused Hitler
and supporting the open administration of the neighboring German
people, and the *New Republic* and *The Nation* saw Germany as a
victim of an unfair treaty, however, focused on the anti-Semitic
persecution by publishing reports from emigrants and exiles and even
engaging in a tireless crusade for a more compassionate immigration
policy.\(^{138}\)

This ambiguous attitude of the American press outlets puzzled
the American people. In September 1939, 66% of Americans polled
declared no confidence in the news from Germany, 33% had some
confidence and only 1% showed complete confidence. Furthermore,
the interwar propaganda pointed at another enemy that time. In 1938
the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC, or *Dies Committee* by its chairman Martin
Dies Jr.) was created in order to investigate alleged disloyalties and activities with communist or
fascist ties -but actually focused on communists. Despite that in late 1939 the majority of
Americans declared no confidence in the news from Germany, the focus of the *Dies Committee*
was accordant with the point of view of 70% of the Americans, who at the beginning of 1940
considered the communist activities more threatening than the Nazi activities.\(^{139}\)

In turn, this communist fear affected the American attitude in the US. In contrast to the
domestic situation prior to the US participation in World War II, in December 1939, 91% of the

\(^{139}\) Gallup (1972), Vol. I, pp. 182, 199.
Americans polled disapproved of a ban of German music in the US and 88% of them disagreed with the ban of the German language in American colleges and high schools.\textsuperscript{140} Franklin D. Roosevelt’s role as Assistant Secretary of Navy under Wilson and later as President of the US helped to balance American impression of Germans between the postwar German image and the “Hun” image. Roosevelt held to an ambiguous view of Germany and showed patience and restraint during the formative years of the First World War. His knowledge on international affairs rooted in his early education from his European trips before the age of 14, his attendance of a German summer school for five weeks and the five summers he spent in Bad Nauheim with his family as well as his firsthand experience and observations of German war conduct and espionage during the First World War. His German perception, however, altered through the English translation of \textit{Mein Kampf}, which led him to the conclusion that Nazi Germany was an economic military and ideological threat to the United States. Nonetheless, prior to Pearl Harbor he chose to keep the US out of the war and at the same time contain Nazi Germany by aiding the Allies.\textsuperscript{141}

During the interwar years it is clear that the American public could not form a clear opinion about the German problem. Furthermore, local or religious organizations made the situation even more blur, as Hitler and Nazism were regularly equated with Ku Klux Klan in the South. The Lutheran press welcomed Hitler as Germany’s savior from communism, while tourists, students and businessmen, who visited Nazi Germany, praised the cleanliness and orderliness of the Germans towns, the absence of homeless and jobless people, the moderation of Nazi officials and the friendliness of the German people. In addition to that, the American public was familiar with anti-Semitism. Obviously not to the degree of persecution but prejudice against Jews and the conviction that Jews had too much power in the US shaped public responses to the early events in Germany. Specifically, in November 1939, 66% of the Americans believed that the German people was not in favor of Hitler.\textsuperscript{142} At the end of 1941, the Japanese attack on the US naval base of Pearl Harbor, which caused the damage of nearly 20 American naval vessels, and over 300 airplanes, the death of more than 2,400 Americans and injury of another 1,000 people totally, changed the scenery and left the United States with no other choice but to enter the war.\textsuperscript{143} Nonetheless,
country which forced the United States into the war was Japan and not Germany. *Our Enemy: The Japanese* was a 1943 short film produced by the US Navy and Office of War Information to provide knowledge on the enemy. Quoting the US ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew, whose narration in the film was to be considered his testimony, the Japanese were “different from the Americans as any people on this planet.” Their “real difference was in their mind, in their sense of logic; they were thinking 200 years out of date.” The “primitive, murderous and fanatical enemy was filled with discipline of total war, [...] wreaking pitiless destruction on unarmed cities and their helpless people by slaughtering all those who stand in Japan's way.”

In addition to this propaganda, the Office of War Information (OWI), which acted between 1942 and 1945 through radio broadcasts, newspapers, posters, photographs, films and other forms of media, followed a strategy of identification of the Americans with the Germans by separating the Nazi regime from the overwhelming majority of the German people, who were depicted as a victim which suffered under National Socialism, and by deciding against the use of the information on the Holocaust as a way to define the enemy. Specifically, in June and December 1942, 79% and 74% of the Americans, respectively, believed that their chief enemy was the German government and not the German people as a whole. Thus, they even proposed the hanging or shooting of Nazi leaders after the war and suggested a strict supervision of the country. It, literally, seemed as if the American public ignored the fact that the same country launched another world war within less than twenty years. Furthermore, the atrocities that took place during the Nazi regime were kept from the public or had the form of rumors, which could explain why 34% of the Americans would favor a peace treaty with Germany. Moreover, the main concern of the American people, from the time point of their participation to the war and on, was to readjust their way of leaving, since the majority of it believed that the war would last 2-3 years, and to show their support by drafting, agreeing to work overtime or change their job according to the government's needs, buying war bonds and stamps, favoring daylight saving time and agreeing to a car tire, gasoline and food rationing.

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Chapter 1

“The US Confrontation with Nazi Germany and Military Occupation Planning”

1944-1945

The introductory part of this first chapter will be divided into two time periods; until the war ended on V-E day and after the war’s end until the end of the year 1945. The reason for this division is that some US policies and directives for Germany formed in 1944 influenced the US foreign policies actually applied in the year 1945. However, the part of the study of the press outlets under examination here will be divided into two different time periods; from the beginning of the year 1945 until V-E day and from V-E day until the end of the year. The analysis of the former time period will be brief and will serve to report the attitude of the press outlets during wartime, as the actual time frame of this entire thesis expands from V-E day until the end of 1950.

The Period until May 8, 1945

In February 1944 the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) was created in England to command both British and American forces as they planned their invasion into German-occupied continental Europe, and led by US General Dwight D. Eisenhower. For the information and guidance of all those British and US officers to be involved in the military occupation of Germany within the Supreme Commander's area of control, SHAEF authored a handbook of guidelines, which was to be applied in the period of defeat or surrender. The handbook was released in December 1944 and functioned as a basis of training for all officers who were to be employed in the Military Government of Germany. The primary objectives of the handbook forbade the economic rehabilitation of Germany, the import or distribution of any relief supplies for the German population, the retention in office of any active Nazis or ardent sympathizers, because, as the Handbook stated: “Germany will always be treated as a defeated country and not as a liberated country.” As soon as the SHAEF troops entered northwest Germany in September 1944 signs on the Autobahns warned against fraternization with the Germans using slogans like

“Soldiers wise don't fraternize”\(^{148}\) and instructions like “In heart, body, and spirit [...] every German is Hitler! Hitler is the single man who stands for the beliefs of Germans. Don’t make friends with Hitler. Don’t fraternize. If, in a German town, you bow to a pretty girl, or at a blond child [...] you bow to Hitler and his reign of blood [...] you caress the ideology that means death and persecution. Don’t fraternize.” warned the US troops “against a false sense of familiarity.”\(^{149}\)

The first official inkling of what US occupation policy might be based upon was the _Suggested Post-Surrender Program for Germany_ or commonly known as the “Morgenthau Plan” authored by the United States Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr. in 1944. The plan, which President Roosevelt even took with him to the historic Conference in Quebec, where the policy of the military government in Germany was defined in view of the rapid Soviet war advances and the possibility of a forthcoming German defeat, suggested a number of guidelines. According to the Morgenthau Plan Germany would be deprived of the ability to be aggressive again, through the complete demilitarization of Germany in the shortest possible period of time after surrender, by weakening and taking control of the Ruhr Area, which Morgenthau described as the “German industrial power, the cauldron of wars” so that it could not in the foreseeable future become an industrial area, the dismantlement and removal of all industrial plants and equipment within six months.\(^{150}\) The Morgenthau Plan was based on the idea of a deindustrialized and thus agricultural Germany, in order not to allow the Germans to launch a war ever again. Morgenthau was aware that his program would reduce the Germans' standard of living to the lowest in Europe, which in turn could threaten up to fifteen million people with starvation.\(^{151}\) Morgenthau was driven by “a deep and honest hatred for Germany and a sense of moral outrage,”\(^{152}\) since he himself admitted to believe that “the Germans collectively shared the moral responsibility for the crimes committed by Hitler's Third Reich.”\(^{153}\)

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\(^{149}\) Cora Sol Goldstein (2009), _Capturing the German Eye: American Visual Propaganda In Occupied Germany_, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p.22.


Despite the severe critic of the Morgenthau Plan by the Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson who stated in his memorandum to the President that Morgenthau's proposals were “punitive” and not “corrective or constructive,” and that enforcing poverty would “destroy the spirit not only of the victim” but would also debase the victor and “it would be just such a crime as the Germans themselves hoped to perpetrate upon their victims-it would be a crime against civilization itself,” the Morgenthau Plan received initially some strong support from important government officials like the United States Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy and the former United States Secretary of Commerce Harry Hopkins, but it was eventually not adopted.  

American Public Opinion as Evaluated by Polling

Prior to moving on to the second time period of this chapter it might be interesting to take a brief look at a question asked by the American Institute of Public Opinion, or else the Gallup polls, at the end of the year 1944. In particular, in December 1944 the American people were asked if they believed the stories that the Germans had murdered many people in concentration camps. The vast majority (76%) of the people polled believed them even though only 4% of them guessed that more than 6 million people were murdered. The survey result confirmed the access of the American people in the 1930s and ‘40s to what was happening to the European Jewish population and other groups of people targeted by the Nazi regime, like the blaming of the Jews for Germany's defeat by the Nazi Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels, or the Nazi discussion about the sterilization of Jewish citizens, or Goebbels' exhortation “from half the platforms and over all the radios in Germany” “THE JEWS ARE TO BLAME!” on the TIME cover of July 10, 1933. When polled about an equally brutal penalty for the Nazi criminals, there was support for execution in poison gas chambers, by hanging, electrocution or firing squad.

May 8, 1945 – December 31, 1945

After the defeat of Germany and its administrative division into zones of allied occupation, the Allies had a task of utmost importance in front of them; to restore and maintain peace, democracy and economic stability in the European theater. This meant the main focus was on defeating Nazi Germany and preventing a resurgence of German aggression, the reason the Allies fought the war in the first place. However, Germany was not the only point of interest for US foreign policy. Increasing postwar distrust of the Soviet Union and fear of the spread of Communism led to a revival of attitudes from the interwar period, which saw the Soviet Union as the political and ideological enemy from the East. This came to the fore during the quadripartite administration of Germany and greatly influenced postwar US foreign policy and occupation policy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff directive to the Commander in Chief of the US Occupation Forces (JCS1067) and the decisions reached at the Potsdam Conference directed the behavior of the US Military Government in Germany during the first months of the occupation. Despite the fact that both sets of policies, addressed all aspects of political, economic, and administrative life in Germany as well as the reparations it had to deliver to the devastated countries, their implementation was more quantitative than qualitative like that of the denazification policy, or their implementation, like that of decartelization or that of reparations, had as prerequisite the treatment of Germany as a single unity.

As mentioned already the Morgenthau Plan was never officially adopted by the US policymakers, but it had some influence on the US planning for the occupation of Germany and set in April 1945 the foundations of an alternative program; the directive of the Joints Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the US Occupation Forces, JCS 1067. The US occupation directive was made public in October 1945, two months later it was the basis of the US position at the quadripartite conference that concluded the Allied treaty ending the war in Europe, the Potsdam Agreement.

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159 James P. Warburg (1947), Germany—Bridge or Battleground. Harcourt, Brace, p. 279.
The tough regulations of the JCS directive instructed that Germany was to not be treated as a liberated nation but as an enemy state. German ruthlessness was blamed for destroying the German economy and thus Germans would have to live in the chaos and suffering they had brought upon themselves. The US zone did not regard the non-fraternization policy as a result of the acceptance of a collective German guilt, as Morgenthau would have wished. The non-fraternization policy was mostly applied to discourage personal and sexual relationships between Allied soldiers and German women and restrict the development of sympathy feelings and of sexually transmitted diseases. To avoid the development of relationships between the American troops and the German women, the military governor of Germany Lucius D. Clay even “invited stateside wives and dependents to join their men in Germany.” Furthermore, the supplies provided to the German people would have to serve the prevention of “starvation or widespread disease or such civil unrest as would endanger the occupying forces,” the consumption of the German resources would be held to the minimum and surpluses might then be made available for the occupying forces.

The non-fraternization policy is not to be identified as part of the denazification decision of the Potsdam Agreement. Denazification was one of the four main objectives of the Potsdam declaration, also known as the “4 D’s,” but closely related to the objectives of demilitarization and democratization. The denazification process referred to the restitution of democratic values in the German society and to the creation of conditions under which a democratic way of life could be established in Germany. Therefore, actions like the liquidation of the Nazi Party and its affiliated organizations, the arrest of influential Nazis, the removal of Nazis from positions of influence like schools, public offices and private enterprises, the eradication of Nazi symbols, the elimination of Nazi books, the seizure of Nazi property, and the punishment of Nazi war criminals took place. Nevertheless, apart from Nuremberg Trials of the major Nazi war criminals, “the some

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8.5 million members of the Nazi Party (NSDAP),” and the “many more millions out of a German population of 70 million” who belonged to some Nazi organization made the denazification process very complicated for the Allies, while there was no mutually agreed political cleansing method on how the denazification process was to be carried out in all four occupation zones.\(^{163}\)

Therefore, in 1945 the military government proceeded with the denazification process according to the Supreme Headquarters (SHAEF) directive of November 9, 1944 which instructed the removal from public office of all persons who had joined the Nazi Party before Hitler became Chancellor in January 1933. On July 7, 1945 a directive from Headquarters United States Forces, European Theater (USFET) instructed the mandatory removal or exclusion from positions of “more than minor importance” in public offices and “positions of importance in quasi-public and private enterprises,” as well as in commercial, agricultural, and financial institution of those with membership in the Nazi Party prior to May 1, 1937, while another USFET directive on August 15, 1945 instructed the definition of those in private business, the professions, and those “of wealth and importance” who were unemployed as persons in “positions of importance in quasi-public and private enterprise.” On September 26, 1945 Law No. 8 of the US military government extended the denazification regulations over the entire German economy except agriculture.\(^{164}\) This classification separated the Nazis from the non-Nazis and anti-Nazis, who were either “opposing military government or supporting practices that offended their political principles and their social and economic ideals.” Even though the task of denazification was taken very seriously by the American occupying forces and as of August 1945 sixty thousand people had been stripped of their positions in the US zone, many of them were returned to their former positions or at least to subordinate positions because they were “more than nominal” Nazis.\(^{165}\)

Regarding the classification of a person as anti-Nazi, as the Military Government Political Advisor Murphy described in the Political Considerations for the Guidance of MG Officers in Making Appointments in Germany “old political and organizational labels” like “former trade unionists, Social Democrats, members of the German Democratic Party Independent Social


Democrats, and many members of the Center Party” were “reasonable pro-democratic and anti-Nazi.” Nonetheless, not all non-Nazi and anti-Nazi were necessarily believers in democracy, as they could have simply been denied membership to the Nazi Party, and if the military government officers agreed to make “a completely clean sweep of the party members, they were going to have to run the country with old men until the next generation grew up.” Additionally, west Germans “seemed to suffer from a generalized historical and moral amnesia” the first postwar years and insisted that they had known nothing about the Nazi crimes and complained that they had been “unfairly victimized and humiliated” by the Allied denazification processes and of the “victors' justice.”

The denazification of the German people as a way to achieve democratization was also related to a program of re-education and impartation of the western democratic values. A campaign to reveal the Nazi concentration camp atrocities began in April 1945 when US General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the commander of SHAEF, visited the liberated German concentration camps along with some members of Congress, journalists and a group of Hollywood personalities. Nazi criminality was visualized through the first film of OMGUS (Office of Military Government, United States) especially produced for Germany; a twenty-two-minute film titled “Death Mills,” which was produced by the War Department and shown in the US occupation zone for a few weeks. The occupying forces also had other ways to teach the German people of the Nazi atrocities. American field commanders forced local Germans to visit the concentration camps regardless of their age, gender or social status and view the piles of corpses on carts or examine the torture devices. In German towns and cities they placed posters of atrocity photographs with captions such as “German Culture” or “These Atrocities: Your Guilt” or even forced German civilians to bury the bodies. Speeches delivered to the Germans by US field commanders intended to make clear the difference between the Americans and the Germans, in other words the civilized people and the Germans. Regarding the third “D” (decartelization), the economic rebirth of the country was

169 Goldstein (2009), pp. 1, 30-32.
to take place under strict controls. The German economy was to produce only enough to provision the occupation troops, whose standard of living was not to exceed that in neighboring U.N. countries. Even though Truman returned to the United States with the feeling that the far greater problems of Versailles had been avoided, everyone in his administration knew that the possession of the atomic bomb would change the West’s relationship with the Soviet Union.

Lastly, the Secretary of State James F. Byrnes on December 12, 1945 stated, or in fact restated, the US economic policy toward Germany for the guidance of the United States occupying authorities, which instructed:

A softening of American policy toward the feeding of German civilians and toward the allocation of coal exports from Germany, … [which] would ease the difficult task of the four occupying authorities, [and] could largely be at the expense of the liberated areas. … German industry which [was] permitted to remain [would] be gradually reactivated and the broken transport system revived. … Coal exports from Germany … should begin to approach a level where they [could] finance necessary imports and gradually to repay the occupying powers for their outlays in the present emergency period. … The resources left to Germany … [after the completion of the reparation removals by February 2, 1948 would] be available to promote improvement of the German standard of living to a level equal to that of the rest of continental Europe other than the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. … In general, the German people [would] during this period recover control over their economy subject to such residual limitations as the occupying powers decide to impose.

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171 Michael Neiberg (2015), Potsdam: The End of World War II and the Remaking of Europe, EPUB edition, Philadelphia: Basic Books; James L. Gormly (1990), From Potsdam to the Cold War: Big Three Diplomacy, 1945-1947 America in the Modern World, Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, Inc., pp. 29-36. On July 16, 1945 at 5:29:45 am a nuclear test carrying the code name Trinity performed the first detonation of a nuclear device at the Alamogordo Bombing and Gunnery Range as part of the Manhattan Project, a nuclear research program of the United States Army with the support of the United Kingdom and Canada, which was launched in 1942 and included German scientists, who were refugees from Nazi Germany. Vincent C. Jones (1985), Manhattan, the Army and the atomic bomb, Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, US Army; Atomic Heritage Foundation, Trinity Test - 1945, Retrieved on 1/4/2021 from https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/trinity-test-1945; Ferenc Morton Szasz (1992), British scientists and the Manhattan Project: the Los Alamos years, New York : St. Martin’s Press, pp. 3-8; Campbell Craig & Sergey Radchenko (2008), The atomic bomb and the origins of the Cold War, New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 75-81.
Before moving on to the study of the press outlets, I would like to refer to the position of the US military governor General Lucius D. Clay toward or against these directives. Clay had expressed to the United States Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy his reluctance regarding the effectiveness of the non-fraternization ban and in a broader sense the de-Nazification process. Even though Clay was not in conflict with the JCS1067 directive, he was of the opinion that the directive could be interpretable in various ways. His own interpretation was that it required a “realistic and firm attitude toward Germany.” Acknowledging that the winter conditions would be hard in Germany, Clay believed that “some cold and hunger would be necessary to make the German people realize the consequences of a war which they caused,” but not cold and hunger which would bring about “human distress” and would threaten the people’s “strength and willingness to cooperate.”

Moreover, almost a month and a half after Germany’s unconditional surrender Clay confidentially reported to the War Department that the non-fraternization policy was a failure since it was “extremely unpopular” with the American soldiers who could not resist a “pretty German girl” and in mid-July he informed all elements under his command in the US occupation zone in Germany to “engage in conversation with adult Germans on the streets and in public places” as an additional means toward denazification. This modification had been welcomed by occupation troops as well as by Germans. According to Clay’s secret report to the Chief of the Army’s Civil Affairs Division John H. Hilldring, the Germans blamed the Nazis for losing the war but felt “no war guilt or repugnance for Nazi doctrine and regime” and protested their ignorance of the regime’s crimes and shrugged off “their own support or silence as incidental and unavoidable.” Clay stated to the Secretary of War Robert Patterson that apart from the large cities of the American zone like Stuttgart, Frankfurt and Kassel there was no “political activity and the German masses” were observed “to be entirely unready for self-government and ignorant on democratic processes and responsibilities, no mass sentiment of a revolutionary political nature” was observed and the “relatively slight political activity was largely led and inspired by holdover leaders of pre-Hitler parties.” Clay sought Hilldring’s permission to limit mandatory arrests to “active members” of organizations being tried or to be tried by international tribunal, dangerous

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175 ibid. p. 47.
security suspects, and those individuals against whom specific evidence was available as to their participation in war crimes.” 177 US facilities “were overcrowded and with winter conditions” they would “become quite bad” and the de-Nazification process was “malfunctioning”. In addition, Clay was aware of the fact that the military government officers could be retained for a period of six months and that it would be perceived as “unfair” not to be entitled to return to the US was from them, thus he was already working in the direction of a civilian occupation government and a “sharp reduction and eventual elimination of military government detachments” and suggested to McCloy that an officer from his Personnel Branch, who was “thoroughly familiar with the requirements” of the military government, be sent to Washington to assist in the collection of suitable persons to staff occupation posts. 178

According to Clay’s letter to McCloy, even though not more than 25-30% of Germany’s industry had been physically destroyed, the German economy was so severely damaged that the physical restoration of its industry would require many years. 179 Nonetheless, a minimum economy should be developed for the prevention of mass starvation and sickness, an initiative which should not be misunderstood with a step to a soft peace with Germany. In a cable to the War Department regarding the reparations he did not send, Clay advised against “a divided responsibility which would result in further misunderstanding and delay.” 180 Additionally, in the fall of 1945 Clay kept informing the War Department of his opposition to Calvin Hoover’s study on the need to maintain a “minimum German standard of living in relation to the level of industry;” a study which reflected for Clay Hoover’s lenient, personal and contradictory to the Potsdam agreement views. 181 Clay also expressed his concerns about a potential failure of the quadripartite government in Germany to the War Department and suggested either a “tripartite government of Western Germany” or that the US should go alone in its own zone. 182 Even though the Soviets had set up a complete German administration for their zone, Clay was reluctant to create any such German agencies for the US zone “for fear it might impede the treatment of Germany as an economic entity.” 183 During his meeting with representatives of the State and War Department at Washington in November, Clay

178 ibid. p. 95.
179 ibid. p. 41.
180 ibid. pp. 73-75.
183 ibid. p. 92.
attempted to resolve a variety of issues facing US military government -like the reparations, restitution, German external assets, and the German economic situation. Regarding the internationalization of the Ruhr-Rhineland area the US awaited the French proposal for the area in order to determine its own policy, something that also affected the creation of a central German administrative machinery. Clay not only believed that the USSR would be willing to support the internationalization of the Ruhr-Rhineland but also that the “acid test” of the US “ability to work effectively with the USSR would come when German central administrative machinery was established, when the zonal barriers were lifted and when it became necessary to work out policies for all of Germany on matters such as the public debt and the currency issue.” Furthermore, Clay stated that the Russians had done much more in terms of democratization than the French who permitted the employment of Nazis and refused to permit trade unions, and thus supported the reparations removals to Russia. Furthermore, he pointed out that Russia was “willing to cooperate with the other powers” in operating Germany as “a single political and economic unit” and concluded that the US relations with Russia regarding Germany were of “decisive importance” in the foreign policy of the US and that unless the US relations “succeeded in working effectively in that laboratory,” the entire US “foreign policy with respect to Russia would be in jeopardy.”

The labyrinthine communication between Washington and the American zone of Germany and the mixed channels of instructions forced Clay to ask in a personal letter to the Chief of the Army's Civil Affairs Division General Hilldring for clarification on how the State Department instructions would reach him; namely would they come through the War Department or directly to his office; a need he had expressed also earlier regarding a clear-cut decision on whether the Office of Military Government of the United States representative on the Reparations Commission would determine the amount of reparations removals and on which plants were to be removed and which to be maintained for the German peacetime economy. Clay also insisted “that no outside [US] agencies” should deal “independently” with matters for which the military government was “ultimately responsible” and thus disapproved of the job of F[ield] I[nternal] A[gency] T[echnical] on technical investigations of German science and industry. At the year’s-end Clay wrote a statement summing up the efforts of the US military government in Germany, which would

184 ibid. pp. 111-117.
186 ibid. pp. 131-132.
be broadcasted by the US Forces in the European Theater and commander in chief and at the same time military governor of the American occupied zone in Germany in Frankfurt General J.T. McNarney. The largest part of the speech referred to procedures already in process like the denazification and disarmament of Germany, as well as the repatriation of displaced persons, the restoration of law, the reeducation of the German people through American press, radio and public schools. However, much more needed to be done, like the reopening of damaged mines, the overcoming of financial problems, the decentralization of economic power, the completion of the denazification process and of the war crime trials. McNarney concluded with the warning that the winter would be “severe as no coal was available for spare heating” but the tasks of the US military government was to “destroy war potential in Germany while concurrently building a belief in democratic ideals.”187

The US President Harry S. Truman

In 1945, and specifically after the end of the war in Europe, there was no conference of the US President Harry S. Truman with the American Society of Newspaper Editors, thus the President’s news conference and his personal notes as delivered through his memoirs will be used to examine the President’s contact with the press outlets. As Harry S. Truman confessed in his memoirs, Roosevelt’s death was so unexpected to him that he was “unprepared for it.”188 Truman was sworn President of the United States on April 12 and held his first press conference five days later on April 17; five days in which he felt as if he had “lived five lifetimes.”189 Truman recognized that “the President’s relations with the press [were] of the utmost importance.” From what the reporters asked the President could understand “what [was] going on in the minds of the people, [since] good reporters [were] always in close touch with developments and with what the people want[ed] to know.” However, Truman distinguished the reporters, who were doing “an honest job of reporting the facts,” from the editors and publishers, who had “their own special interests.” Furthermore, Truman was well aware of the journalistic technique190 of changing “an expression

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187 ibid. pp. 141-143.
189 ibid. p. 53.
190 If the President says anything that is off the record, that means it may not be used at all. Anything else may be used, but may not be directly quoted; it may be paraphrased. For example, ‘he said that,’ but it may not be put
of opinion [on a pending matter] to a final commitment” so he knew that he had to “be reluctant to answer or even to suggest a clue that might reveal his line of thought.”

According to Truman's public papers he held no special conference with the American Society of Newspaper Editors in 1945. Therefore, it would be of interest to see what messages Truman delivered in his press conferences in regard to Germany in 1945. On the day of his 61st birthday Truman also celebrated in his press conference “the flags of freedom [which flew] all over Europe” and was thankful that the world was “rid of Hitler and his evil band.” After the Japanese surrender, the US would have to “work to bind up the wounds of a suffering world--to build an abiding peace, a peace rooted in justice and in law, [...] [and built a peace] by hard, toilsome, painstaking work--by understanding and working with [the] Allies in peace as [the US] have worked with them in war.” Moreover, Truman emphatically agreed with the report of the Chief of Counsel for the United States in the prosecution of Axis war criminals, Mr. Justice Robert H. Jackson and with his proposal that it was the “inescapable responsibility of [the US] Government to prosecute these war criminals, even if [the US] Government had to do it alone,” without, however, implying that the US Government had to do it alone, and awaited the Soviet and French suggestion for a military tribunal. Truman also agreed with the personal opinion of General Eisenhower that “a free press and a free flow of information and ideas should prevail in Germany in a manner consistent with military security,” since the US was “not going to lose the peace by giving license to racialist Pan-Germans, Nazis and militarists, so that they [could] misuse democratic rights in order to attack Democracy as Hitler did.” “The all-important thing which confront[ed the Allies was] that the unity, mutual confidence, and respect which resulted in the military victory should be continued to make secure a just and durable peace.” Truman also stated that “the Russians [were] just as anxious to get along with [the Americans] as [the Americans

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within quotation marks. If, however, he says that a particular thing may be quoted, then of course it may be. Generally speaking, what he says must be paraphrased, not put in quotation marks.” As cited by: The American Presidency Project, *Harry S. Truman, The President’s News Conference at Olympia, Washington*, June 21, 1945, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/231935

Truman (1955), p. 47.


were] with them” and thought that if “[all kept their] heads and [were] patient, [they would] arrive at a conclusion.” The President also explained that the upcoming meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Potsdam could not “be held in the limelight because [they were] trying to get ready for a peace conference” and that was why the presence of the press would be restricted. Regarding the punishment for the German General Staff, Truman refrained from commenting since “that would be judging them in advance, and they ha[d] not been tried.”

The announcement of the Soviet declaration of war against Japan was laconically delivered to the press (“Russia has declared war on Japan! That is all!”), but was enthusiastically received by it (“Much applause and laughter, as the reporters raced out”). Lastly, regarding an alleged “lack of accord” between the US and the Soviet Union a reporter asked Truman if that was caused by the possession of the atomic bomb by the US and not by the Soviet Union as well. Truman categorically denied the allegation and answered that it was “a matter of understanding between [the US] and Russia […] principally because [they did not] speak the same language.” Truman acknowledged that they were “facing the greatest era in the history of the world,” but was not “alarmed at the difficulties that [would] be in the way of arriving at the consummation of that era,” “because there [had not] been a war in which [the US] fought that [it] finally [had not] come out in much better shape than [it was] previous to the period, and [he did not] think there [was] going to be any change from that.” These statements probably did not reflect exactly what Truman would have said to the newspaper editors directly, but it is not absolutely certain that the tone or content would differ very much. It is important to keep in mind that Truman in 1945, even at the end of the year, was President for only a few months during an unstable and flowing time period too close to the end of the war and still quite far from a struggle for power over Germany, when foreign policy was one of the issues his still rearranging administration had to handle.

American Public Opinion as Evaluated by Polling

The American Institute of Public Opinion revealed not only the people’s attitude toward the US foreign policy, but also that President Truman and his Democratic Party enjoyed the American people’s trust and preference all the way through 1945. In particular, in May 63% of the Democrats polled would have liked to see Mr. Truman elected President of the country in the next election in 1948, in July 87% of Americans polled approved of the way Harry Truman was handling his job as President and in September 55% of them would like to have the Truman administration follow a middle-of-the-road policy. Furthermore, in October 53% of Americans surveyed would vote for a Democratic Congressman and in December 63% of them would vote for a Democratic Candidate in the Presidential elections.

The support of the American people surveyed toward their new President did not provide an one-dimensional interpretation; the support of the President could probably boost the support of his policies. The American Institute of Public Opinion delivered through its survey results in February 1945 the willingness of the American people polled to assist their government with the feeding of the European people in any way possible. From February until April surveys revealed that Americans polled were more than amenable to any kind of rationing and were also willing to accept any rationing even after the war ended. Some 64% of Americans polled admitted that they had made no real sacrifice for the war; with the greatest sacrifice, for those who answered positively, being the absence of a relative who was in the armed forces. Even though the American people asked found it harder to cut down on sugar than any other food, butter and meat, in April 65% of them were willing to put up with rationed food products for a whole year after the war in Europe was over. Some 70% even agreed to eat about one-fifth less than they were eating in order to prevent famine in Europe and to give food to people who needed it in Europe, without explicitly excluding the Germans; while the percentage increased to 85% in June.

The possibility that the American government did not take into consideration when forming its foreign policy the readiness of the American people to contribute to the European recovery effort, or underestimated the significance of this message, might have been a reason for the failure

198 ibid. pp. 533, 547.
of its Germany policy during the first months of the occupation and especially as the food crisis and the threat of the winter started to arise. To this situation probably also contributed Truman’s hesitation to allow private organizations like the humanitarian organization Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) to provide relief packages, known as CARE packages. The CARE organization was founded in November, 1945, but did not accomplish the shipment of packages before May 1946, when the first CARE packages were delivered in Le Havre, France, due on the one hand to the general disorganization of the US zone in Germany caused by the damaged transportation system and the lack of personnel in the post offices, and on the other hand due to the lack of the option for the sender to mail packages individually to an individual address in Germany.201

Regarding Germany’s future the American people who participated in the Gallup surveys had mixed feelings. In January 1945 92% of the Americans polled believed that Germany should be kept permanently disarmed.202 In February 1945 75% of the American people asked required an unconditional surrender of the enemy, while surprisingly in April 1945 the majority of Americans (56%) proposed only a close supervision and control of German industry after the war.203 This opinion might imply that the German industry was not complicit with the Nazi policies by the American people, or at least by the majority of it. In April 1945 40% of Americans polled approved of a permanent split of Germany into a number of smaller countries.204 In June 46% of the American people surveyed favored supervision and control, disarmament, elimination of Nazis and control of industry, and 34% approved of a very severe treaty and the political destruction of Germany.205 The attitude of the American people polled gradually changed in reference to the punishment of Germany. It was not necessarily getting milder, but more realistic. It cast off any vindictive emotion and prioritized the measures that would eliminate its sources of aggression. Regarding the official US policy for occupied Germany, Americans did not express an opinion

203 Ibid. pp. 488-489, 499.
204 Ibid. p. 501.
205 Ibid. p. 506.
targeting a specific one, most likely because the average American could not predict the dead-ends the Potsdam agreement would encounter or the threat of an Allied disunity.

Regarding the de-Nazification process, in April 42% of the Americans surveyed found imprisonment as the most appropriate punishment for the members of the Nazi party who defended themselves by claiming that they committed crimes under orders of higher-ups in the party, while 19% suggested killing. After the war ended and the extensive publication of photos and stories of the concentration camps, which almost all Americans polled (95%) believed to be true, the feelings against Nazis became more harsh; nearly half of them (45%) would have liked to see Gestapo agents and Nazi Storm Troopers quickly destroyed, about one fifth of the people polled would punish them without designating the form of punishment, half of them would try the Gestapo and Storm Troopers first, and one in ten wanted the Gestapo and Storm Troopers to die slowly, they wanted to torture them, some even suggested “hard work and starvation” as the means. For instance, 67% of Americans asked would have liked Hermann Goering to have an unpleasant death. Additionally, some 60% of the American people polled found it a good idea to have movie theaters throughout the country show pictures of all the horrible things that had happened in concentration camps run by Germans, 87% thought that such pictures should be shown to all German prisoners of war in camps in the US and 89% to all German people in Germany.

The issue of fraternization appeared in the polls only after the failure of the policy and the lifting of the ban. When the American people were asked in June whether American soldiers should be allowed to have dates with German girls 59% of them replied negatively. Gallup himself commended on the surprisingly sharp split of opinion the American Institute of Public Opinion revealed on the subject of fraternization. In his article in the *Los Angeles Times* George Gallup explained that while the vast majority of the American women were “dead set” against the idea, almost half of the men asked were of the opinion that American soldiers should be allowed to have dates with German girls. Gallup attributed this split of opinion to the assumption that the American women did not wish for their man to “fall for a girl in a foreign land,” especially women of the enemy who had killed so many American men; the wives, girlfriends and daughters were also

208 ibid. p. 505.
among the Nazi supporters and the American mothers were worried that their son would “get into trouble” if they dated German girls. In June Americans polled were also asked whether they thought that the Germans approved of the killing and starving of their prisoners in the concentration camps, and 31% of them replied entirely, and 51% partly.

Regarding the post-war international role of the US and its relationship with the Soviet Union, the vast majority of the American people (83% in April and 71% in October) polled felt the isolationism mentality belonged to the past and thought instead that the US should have an active role in world affairs. Nonetheless, the majority of American people asked was not influenced by either a stronger or milder attack of the Soviet foreign policy some of the press outlets pursued. As measured by the American Institute of Public Opinion, in March the American attitude toward the USSR was favorable. Some 55% believed that the USSR could be trusted to cooperate with the US after the war and 65% thought the Soviet Union would assist the US in the war against Japan. Additionally, in April, one out of two Americans (49%) asked agreed with the possibility of the formation of a permanent defense alliance between the US and the Soviet Union. A small drop (45%) in trust of the Soviet Union in all educational and political classes was noted at the beginning of June, even though the majority of the Americans (77%) surveyed still wanted the Soviet Union to join forces with the US against Japan. The percentage of trust in the Soviet Union increased, and in fact significantly, (54%) in early September. After that question there were no more questions about whether the American people would trust and cooperate with the Soviet Union until the end of the year. Only one question about the Soviet Union was asked and referred to the possibility of approving of a loan of six billion dollars to help the Soviet Union get back on its feet which the vast majority (60%) of the people polled in October rejected. This question alone could be interesting and could indicate American distrust of the USSR, but the same disapproval (60%) was expressed by the people surveyed when asked in September if they would approve of the US making a loan of three of five billion dollars to

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212 ibid. pp. 497, 534.
213 ibid. p. 492.
214 ibid. p. 499.
216 ibid. p. 523.
In this first chapter the study of the press outlets under examination will be divided chronologically (until and after May 8, 1945) and thematically (the non-fraternization policy and the decisions reached at the Potsdam Conference).

**Press Outlets**

**January 1, 1945 – May 8, 1945**

Before the war in Europe ended on May 8, 1945 the articles in the newspapers and magazines focused on in this study referred mostly to the advances of the Allied armies. The majority of the correspondents published similarly enthusiastic reports from the battlefields, which included not only US achievements but also these of their allies, highlighting particularly the role of the USSR and its “historic force,” which “no Allied campaigns of World War II compared with,” as seen in the determination of the Soviet “end-the-war campaign” and the effectiveness of the “Carpathian bulwark.” A Soviet soldier who was even celebrated on the cover of the *LIFE* issue of February 12, 1945 and a full-page photo of the 550-lb., 6-foot tall cake “from the American people” to honor the Soviet Army's birthday at a time of food rationing in the US were few more samples of the American appreciation toward the Soviet Union. The reports of the *Los Angeles Times* represented an exception to this appreciation of the special Soviet contribution to the war effort. They referred to the Soviet contribution to the war in a more reserved way; as if the Soviets were just another army fighting in the European theater. For instance, even though the title of an article read in bold capital letters “RED TROOPS INSIDE BERLIN!,” the text of the article reported on “the historic junction of powerful US and Russian armies in mid-Germany” or restricted to plain reports on the location of the “Red Army” troops.

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219 “Last Days of the Ardennes Salient,” *LIFE*, (1945, February 5), 18(6), 21-27. *Kraut* is an offensive slang for a German person. It was used by British soldiers in World War I as a derogatory term for a German soldier. The term derived from the German traditional food Sauerkraut, cabbage cut fine and fermented in a brine made of its own juice with salt.
220 *LIFE*, (1945, February 12), 18(7), cover. See also: *LIFE*, (1945, March 5), 18(10), 33
Furthermore, in his daily column “By the Way,” the *Los Angeles Times* political columnist Bill Henry shared his and some US officials’ reluctance to trust the Soviets, questioning whether the US actually knew what the “Russians” were doing on the eastern front.\(^{222}\) Even though the US could count on their striking the enemy hard, the “Russians” were, nonetheless, “peculiar people” and their military co-operation would have been much more “useful” if the US had “complete understanding” of it. The columnist tried to illustrate the Soviets’ behavior as that of a nation which “considered themselves as the world’s No. 1 nation, as if they won the war more or less singlehandedly” and as if they regarded the US “as their only near parallel.”\(^{223}\) The newspaper’s distrust toward the USSR was not only palpable in such articles but also in its illustrations. An editorial cartoon depicted the renaming of the main Berlin boulevard *Unter den Linden* to *Unter den Sickles* when the Soviets entered Berlin, while another depicted a bear’s foot along with an eagle’s claw next to a shredded Nazi flag, something that could symbolize the strong co-operation of the Allies and the relentless defeat of the enemy if the caption did not read: “All Germany is now divided into two parts.”\(^{224}\)

One point, however, that all press outlets under consideration here agreed upon were the horror of the Nazi atrocities and the necessity of the Nuremberg trials. By the end of January 1945 all magazines and newspapers reported extensively on the war crimes, condemning the conditions the concentration camp prisoners had lived under, the methods of extermination practiced in the concentration camps, and describing the trials of superior and inferior Nazi officials and the Nuremberg trials trial testimonies of the prisoners at concentration camps were sometimes even published word for word. The newspapers also accompanied their articles with photos of the camps and the prisoners at the time of their liberation. Many of these photos depicted piles of dead skeletons of persons who had died from starvation, or human remains in the gas chambers. The photos were so graphic that, nowadays, they would carry the “Parental Advisory” warning label; they would not be published in the news and if broadcasted the people would be warned beforehand. In 1945, however, the reality the G.I.s faced was sent home uncensored. *LIFE* and *TIME* magazines sometimes published such photos only with a short caption or no text, as the

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\(^{224}\) “All Germany is Now Divided Into Two Parts,” *Los Angeles Times*, (1945, April 28), A4. See also: “Unter den Sickles,” *Los Angeles Times*, (1945, April 24), A4.
images could certainly tell more than any words could. Hence there could be no doubt that the American people had been informed by the press outlets about what the Nazis had done.

May 8, 1945 – December 31, 1945

German People and Non-Fraternization Policy

*The Washington Post*

*The Washington Post*'s approach of the non-fraternization policy was clear-cut and did not waver to express its disapproval of the collective guilt of the German people even before the war’s end. Even though the first reaction of the G.I.s who had witnessed the Nazi atrocities in the concentration camps or their buddies laying dead at the hands of German soldiers was total obedience to the non-fraternization rule, propounding the theory that the successful fulfillment of the purpose of the military occupation depended upon the minimum creation of friction with the inhabitants, *The Washington Post* doubted how a policy of “polite but frigid hostility [...] toward all elements of the conquered populace”\(^{225}\) would be of help to the administration and government of Germany.\(^{226}\) *The Post* also reported that the US soldiers had no “abiding hatred for the Germans”\(^{227}\) and that they found it “difficult to understand the relationship between smiling pretty German girls in colorful dresses and the character of German people reflected in atrocities.”\(^{228}\) Not even the Aachen scandal did not manage to disturb the newspaper’s disbelief in this policy. On the contrary, *The Post* stated that “means” had to be found of “protecting those Germans” who were “willing to work in good faith with the Allied authorities in bringing some order out of the chaos which has followed the German military collapse.”\(^{229}\) Furthermore, the everyday administrative life away from the frontlines brought the US soldiers in contact with Germans among whom one could find frank and moral persons.\(^{230}\) However, due to the rising rate of venereal diseases and the fear of remaining Nazi thinking despite the dissolution of the Nazi Party the Army kept reminding

the GIs of the “new enemy,” namely the pretty German girls and the “innocent” looking and acting Germans, which was reported by *The Post* even though the newspaper insisted that the non-fraternization ban was held as “vain” as the prohibition was, and it was an “example of failure to profit by experience.”

*The Post* not only reported the relaxation of the fraternization ban but also the first reaction at home and in Germany. While the GIs themselves admitted that life was “more bearable” in Germany after the relaxation of the non-fraternization ban, a survey by the Gallup organization and one by *The Washington Post* revealed that the Americans polled were divided on the lifting of the fraternization ban, naturally because the American women who had their loved ones in Germany found the fraternization “perfectly disgusting” or believed that the US soldiers should be “ashamed of themselves,” while the men polled believed that a “smile or a little talk” would not mean anything to the US boys. Obviously *The Post* applauded not only the relaxation of the ban, but also the initiative of the Psychological Warfare Division of the United States Forces European Theater (USFET) for considering the creation of a program which would enable the US troops to acquaint the German people with democratic ideals, and the simultaneous raids by the US troops “in every corner of the American zone” so that the relaxation of the ban would not be misinterpreted by the German people as “a sign that the Americans were getting soft and could be taken advantage of.”

*Los Angeles Times*

On the other hand, *Los Angeles Times* drew a different picture regarding the non-fraternization policy in an attempt to find a balance between the violation of the non-fraternization ban and the way the violations were being presented. For instance, the newspaper published the warning to the G.I.s that they were not invited into Germany as guests but as conquerors.

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newspaper also made clear that Eisenhower was asked to rule the American zone of Germany “with an iron hand with the unshakable objective of rooting out the last traces of Nazism,”238 but should not turn a blind eye to the violations. In particular, General Eisenhower “cracked down sharply on senior American officers for their reported friendly treatment of high German war prisoners,”239 while US women employed in the clothing and equipage shop had been dismissed after receiving a warning about fraternizing with German war prisoners.240 Furthermore, when a LA Times correspondent condemned Germans’ lack of any feeling of guilt or any sign of conscience about what the Germans should have done against Nazism, the newspaper strongly endorsed the condemnation.241

Even when the newspaper reported that many G.I.s fraternized mostly with German women shortly after the war ended, it seemed as if the reporting was intended to point out the G.I.s’ observation, gained from this fraternization, that the Germans did not feel any guilt for the war and the Nazi atrocities, which shocked the American soldiers.242 In fact, some of the G.I.s interviewed expressed themselves with extremely bitter words about the Germans, saying Germany was “a nation of killers, sadists, perverts and degenerates” and “every German, man, woman and child” was America's “enemy.”243 Furthermore, a LA Times' correspondent “went fraternizing” with G.I.s and found the German girls dull and that the G.I.s were not actually interested in what the German girls had to say.244 Other various correspondents in Europe interpreted the fraternization of the G.I.s with the German people as a natural after-effect of the casual life style and friendly demeanor of the American youth, who were not familiar with “pushing people around.”245 They also blamed the occurrence of fraternization on the fact that the American soldiers who had fought the war had been replaced with men in the occupation who did not fight in the war and hence were not harmed by the Germans or disturbed by them as long as they behaved. When US military government lifted the non-fraternization ban the newspaper

243 “Every German a War Criminal,” Los Angeles Times, (1945, June 18), A4.
244 James F King, “Fraternization Found Dull By Correspondents,” Los Angeles Times, (1945, August 6), 2.
supported this decision on the grounds that it would be best if the German people saw what a great people the Americans were by mixing with them.\textsuperscript{246} The only time \textit{LA Times} appeared worried about the fraternization of G.I.s with Germans was when those G.I.s, who had not been in combat, fraternized with girls who not only supported Nazism but still hoped for its revival. They feared the occupying G.I.s might be vulnerable to such views, because they neither distrusted nor disliked the Germans.\textsuperscript{247} \textit{LA Times} tried either to diminish the negative effect the fraternization of the US soldiers with Germans could have on the first, or to deprive the fraternization of the US soldiers with Germans of the element of danger or loss of US prestige. \textit{LA Times} as well made no distinction between collective and individual guilt and seemed to accept the policy of banning the fraternization with an entire population.

\textit{The New York Times}

Somewhere in the middle seemed to be \textit{The New York Times}, which tried to deliver the news with as little comment as possible, by providing the reader with the results of the non-fraternization policy as well as with the possible reasons for its failure. For instance, on the one hand the newspaper published excerpts from the booklet the “Pocket Guide to Germany,” that was handed out to the G.I.s to guide their job in Germany, like “There must be no fraternization. This is absolute! [...] You are in enemy country!”\textsuperscript{248} It also reported on the friendly approach of German civilians in Gardelegen toward the American troops, which was rejected by the latter, or the fact that some Germans averted their eyes when they passed the Americans.\textsuperscript{249} On the other hand, the newspaper did not try to cover or argue reports of the “open or through ingenious subterfuge violation of the not only unenforceable but undesirable” non-fraternization policy, which reached \textit{The New York Times} before as well as after VE-Day.\textsuperscript{250} Despite the reports of other NYT European and international military affairs correspondents, the European correspondent of the newspaper Gladwin Hill reported that there were days when there was no sign of “any concerted effort by German femininity to beguile the G.I.’s ideologically or otherwise,” as the Germans were so much

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\item \textsuperscript{246} “Patton Backs Fraternization With Germans,” \textit{Los Angeles Times}, (1945, September 23), 2.
\item \textsuperscript{247} Drew Middleton, “German Girls 'Yawn' For New Nazi Fuehrer,” \textit{Los Angeles Times}, (1945, October 22), 4.
\item \textsuperscript{249} Frederick Graham, “300 Burned Alive By Retreating SS,” \textit{The New York Times}, (1945, April 22), 12.
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preoccupied with the search for food, clothes or a house that fraternization was the least of their problems. The representation of the violation of the fraternization policy using the words “concerted effort” and “beguile” indicated the intention of the correspondent to blame the German women and victimize the American soldiers; an attitude which was not generally representative of Gladwin who did not use to represent a situation so partially.

Generally, the newspaper appeared to balance its reports on the initial steps of the lifting of the non-fraternization ban, and reported the official reason for the lifting with General Eisenhower’s statement that the lifting of the restriction was due to the “rapid progress” of denazification in the American zone, as well as the clarification of the G.I.s’ viewpoint that talking to someone did not mean that they liked them. The NY Times, and specifically Hill Gladwin, attempted the representation of the news on this issue by both sides - the official and the actual - because, the newspaper believed in the necessity of the formation of a democratic program to reeducate the Germans and restrict teaching Nazism in schools and in the importance of showing them individually the responsibility they carried, and not in punitive policies that did not allow Germans to fraternize with the Americans or have free press and radio or to become economically or politically strong.

Three months after the unconditional surrender of Germany a very positive and optimistic article was published on the impression the Secretary of War gained during his visit in Germany. According to his inspection the de-Nazification process was a “gratifying success,” a possible food crisis could be handled during the winter months and the G.I.s had proved themselves America's “foremost unofficial ambassador.”

Nonetheless, in September 1945, following the lifting of the non-fraternization ban, interesting facts came into the light, as displayed in a different approach of the issue by the newspaper. Regarding the attitude of the Germans, the NY Times correspondent Drew Middleton was quite derisive and ironic when describing the combination of the “doleful attitude” and “sickening docility” of the Germans who still failed to understand what Europe suffered at the hands of Nazis and why they had been treated so harshly. Furthermore, the lucky ones who were

not in the Soviet occupation zone dared to even complain about the Americans whom they saw as “good-natured, but inclined to be lazy and very sentimental.” Middleton found “pathetic” the fact that the Germans blamed the Americans for their starvation since the latter did not allow Germany’s plants to run.255 Another NY Times’ correspondent reported, the whole subject of fraternization has been treated too long as a joke. Even the G.I.s' magazine Stars and Stripes never treated the subject seriously. On the contrary, interviews of German girls on why they like American soldiers were published in the magazine. The fraternization of the G.I.s with German girls was growing as the G.I.s lost their focus on the actual reason for their stay in Germany and their interest focused either on returning home or on German girls. Things got more serious or even dangerous as the correspondent reported of the acceptance of German propagandistic lies by the Americans regarding the reason the Germans had to declare war against the US.256 By the end of September, the fraternization of G.I.s with German girls and women was no longer news, as it was no longer a violation. Instead, there was concern with male “German waiters at American messes giving arrogant replies to requests making it hard to tell who was in charge, Americans or Germans,” while it was usually the “democratic” G.I. who chose to fraternize with the tempting German girl.257

Letters from US soldiers in Germany reflected the “sad and somber state” of the occupation methods and procedures. The article was supported by excerpts from stories of confusion, administrative “imbecilities” and a waning “American prestige.”258 The German disapproval of the US occupation and the management of the German people was not only obvious but was also publicly reported. According to NYT reports, the German people agreed neither with the war crime trials259 nor with the “American fraternization with what the Germans call women of low character”260 and their attitude “swung from apathy and surface friendliness to active dislike.”261 The newspaper also reported the results of a survey submitted to officials of the United States Forces in the European Theater and revealed the “resentment and deep disappointment” of the

Germans, who blamed the looting of German homes on Eastern European displaced persons and American soldiers, while the threat of a Soviet invasion and rumors about the creation of an illegal military formations started to grow.\textsuperscript{262} Even though The NYT reported the issues of the non-fraternization policy quite objectively acknowledging the reasons of its difficult implementation, there was no implication that the newspaper condemned the non-fraternization policy due to the nature of collective guilt of this policy.

\textit{The Wall Street Journal}

Despite the financial nature of the newspaper and its focus on the economic role and power of defeated Germany, the newspaper published a report of a WSJ journalist who actually visited Germany at the beginning of July. The WSJ correspondent left Germany with a quite sympathetic feeling about the Germans. He lamented the fact that they were “mute” because they had no newspapers, magazines or radio to express themselves, because the non-fraternization policy prevented them from speaking with the occupation armies, because there was no telephone or telegraph for civilian use, and because the workers were not allowed to appoint delegates. On top of the terrifying atmosphere of censorship the correspondent added the war’s physical ruins, skeleton buildings and demolished bridges. Although the correspondent confirmed “the observation of every G.I.” that among the Germans there were both well-fed and -clothed men and women, he also stated that the overall picture was that of “devastation of property and migration of humanity.”\textsuperscript{263}

\textit{TIME}

\textit{TIME} magazine not only disapproved of the collective guilt of Germans and reported on the futility and ultimately the failure of the non-fraternization ban in the US occupation zone, but it also observed that British “Tommies” as well as American G.I.s not only did not regard all Germans as Nazis but also “came to realize that there were distinctions even among admitted Nazis.”\textsuperscript{264} During the summer months of 1945 the non-fraternization policy was also threatened by the German girls and women who were wearing fewer and fewer clothes and so the G.I.s had found their way around the policy of “verboten.” “If you leave your hat on, and don't smile,” the

\textsuperscript{264} “International. The Undefeated,” \textit{TIME}, (1945, June 25), 45(26), 22.
G.I.s said, “it's not fraternization.” Even the $65 fine for fraternizing did not work. Thus the lifting of the non-fraternization policy did not come as a surprise to the *TIME* correspondents. In particular, *TIME* reported on the lifting of the non-fraternization ban along with several stories of American soldiers and their young German girlfriends as well as a photo of a soldier fraternizing with a barely dressed German girl. By the fall of 1945 fraternization with the Germans was not only allowed but seemed to be protected, as indicated by the case of a German, who was sentenced to nine months imprisonment, because he demonstrated against the lifting of the non-fraternization ban by attempting to cut the hair of a German woman who was talking to a G.I.. This *TIME* approach of the German women, of course, ignored the fact that during the war prostitution was tolerated as it was regarded as “a welcome diversion from the pressures of either the battlefield or the home front” as the correspondence from up to fifteen different women with a single unmarried Wehrmacht soldier revealed after their capture by the Allies. Additionally, the sex imbalance caused by the war's casualties led to resentful behaviors against the German women after the war's end by returning POWs, who envied them for holding a job or enrolling as students in universities. The frustration that the German men could not restore “the old domestic order,” along with the fact that many of them returned crippled or sick made the German women an easy scapegoat.

For *TIME* the failure of the non-fraternization policy was explained by the magazine using General Eisenhower’s wise acknowledgment that the policy of de-Nazification “was easier said than done” as well as the confession of the military governor of Bavaria, the “Old Blood and Guts” former military governor of Bavaria General George S. Patton Jr., that in order to “get things going,” the Allies had “got to compromise with the devil a little bit.” *TIME* again omitted to clarify something important; that, at the time of the publication of this article, General Patton was already relieved of his duties for his aggressive statements towards the Soviet Union and for comparing Nazis and anti-Nazis to Democrats and Republicans.

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Keeping in mind that there is a certain degree of bias -small or big- in every published article and photo, one could argue that perhaps the most close-to-reality reports regarding the fraternization issue were provided by LIFE’s photos depicting the situation in Germany during wartime and peacetime. One day before the unconditional surrender of Germany it seemed like LIFE magazine wanted to remind the American people of the atrocious nature of the enemy. On the cover of the issue were three German male adult civilians, whose faces were “unhappy but hard and arrogant,” and in the main body of the issue were two articles about the atrocities which took place in the concentration camps and the reactions of the Germans to defeat.\textsuperscript{272} LIFE portrayed the German “barbarism” that reached the lowest point of “human degradation” to the American people in the way only LIFE knew best, through photos which spoke for the thousands of prisoners who died in the camps. These included a small boy strolling down a road lined with dead bodies, imprisoned slave laborers deformed by malnutrition, political prisoners burnt alive, hundreds of naked dead men with whip marks on their body, emaciated backs and rumps, prisoners squeezing their heads and arms under the wooden door of a warehouse to escape the flames, German SS officers “knee-deep in decaying flesh and bones” forced to haul bodies and dig pits to bury the scattered corpses, while the still alive prisoners cheered as hard as their feeble strength would permit.\textsuperscript{273}

The first impressions of the conquering American troops, according to LIFE, was that the majority of the German people did not feel guilt or shame at the sight of the camps. Most of them seemed shocked, some used the opportunity to get things they had lacked for years and “plundered” warehouses, freight trains and stores while “smiling apologetically” to American soldiers, others committed suicide instead of surrendering, older men were almost uniformly anxiously friendly, while in the eyes of some women one could see “bitterness” or “hostility” and for a few it was an outright sense of liberation.\textsuperscript{274} LIFE did not omit the Germans who literally lived for the moment of liberation like Wilhelm Holbach, the former editor of the liberal Frankfurter Zeitung, who became Frankfurt's temporary mayor or the pastor of the Confessional Church, who, following his church’s unwillingness to go along with the Nazis for the mainstream Lutheran church during the

\textsuperscript{272} “Atrocities,” LIFE, (1945, May 7), 18(19), 32-37. See also: LIFE, (1945, May 7), 18(19), cover.
\textsuperscript{273} “Defeated Land,” LIFE, (1945, May 14), 18(20), 103-110.
\textsuperscript{274} “The German People,” LIFE, (1945, May 7), 18(19), 69-76.
third Reich, carried out the fearful task of the resurrection of Germany through the re-education of the youngest ones. However, it was not just the former Nazi officials one needed to be afraid of. The bigger threat were the unconfirmed Nazis, the ones who had not actually joined the party and misrepresented historical facts, pointed out the good that National Socialism did in Germany and felt no sense of guilt or responsibility because they never had to do anything against their conscience. That, according to LIFE’s commentary, probably explained the fact that even moments before the war was over no real uprising, no attempt to break the Nazi bonds took place in Germany, as if the people were not able to understand what was wrong with Nazism.

The dilemma of fraternization came as soon as the American Army came in contact with the German people. LIFE represented the chasm of attitudes very vividly when in early July 1945 describing a scene where a GI was giving candy to a little German girl while another GI said that he would shoot all the pregnant women, because he knew that what's in their bellies would someday be shooting at his children. According to the LIFE correspondent the G.I.s either believed that such a non-fraternization policy was against the actual role of the occupying forces or simply against human nature. Neither the penalty of $65 to $325 dollars nor the six-month hard labor discouraged the US soldiers from fraternizing with German women. A month after the lifting of the non-fraternization ban LIFE spent a day with an American G.I. in Bavaria. Apart from his military duties, the G.I. was depicted to interact with the German people on three occasions (giving gum to a young girl, shopping at a local store and giving his dirty clothes to a German girl who provided laundry service to the G.I.s). LIFE’s strong photos definitely had the power to deliver to the American homes the situation in Germany; of course always keeping in mind that what was being photographed was chosen by the person who held the camera, and that the photos that were being published were chosen by the editor.

276 “The People,” LIFE, (1945, May 14), 18(20), 34.
278 “German Girls,” LIFE, (1945, July 23), 19(4), 35.
279 “Life Spends a Day With A GI Occupying Germany,” LIFE, (1945, October 22), 19(17), 142-145.
Regarding the treatment of the German people and the non-fraternization policy, even before the war’s end, *The Nation* disapproved of an unconditional surrender and a total “annihilation of the country” and “slavery of her people,” which it felt would only promote their Nazi instinct to fight to the death.280 On the contrary, the magazine proposed that the post-war policy toward the German people should allow them the chance to “atone for their crimes, renounce aggression and oust their leaders in order to be readmitted to the family of nations.” Furthermore, food rationing in the US for the purposes of feeding the European “friends” of America was welcomed by *The Nation*.281 In fact the rationing percentage would not be that high, according to the magazine, and the Americans who understood the contribution of the liberated countries to the Allies’ cause would not begrudge them a portion of their bounty. Even though there was no exclusion of the German people from the European people the title of the article referred to the feeding of America's “friends,” and admittedly it would have been a little provocative to call the Germans friends. The fact that *The Nation* addressed the issue of the unconditional surrender from the perspective of the attribution of a collective guilt to all Germans was definitely remarkable in a time period when the issue of Germany’s surrender was undeniable not only among the Allies but also among the peoples which suffered in the Second World War.

**The Potsdam Declaration**

**Walter Lippmann as Political Commentator**

Before the unconditional surrender of Germany, the major concern raised by Walter Lippmann was achieving its post-war administration in a spirit of unity by the allies and with the levels of reparations and de-industrialization low enough to allow the country to reconstruct herself and restore its economy. Furthermore, the fact that Germany, in his view, had totally surrendered to Nazism for twelve years, and hence no organized resistance had been created during the Nazi era, made Allied cooperation even more imperative.282 On V-E Day Lippmann brought into light

a few harsh truths about the difficulties the Allies would face in occupied Germany. First, he pointed out the lack of the sentiment of guilt or responsibility in the German society in contrast to the Italians, for instance, who delivered justice by punishing their dictator by themselves. Second, he doubted whether the Allies would be able to occupy and govern the remains of a state efficiently since there were no precedents in the whole political experience of mankind for solving such a problem. Lippmann concluded that in the event of a failure the consequences would be so terrible that it would not matter who would be to blame for the failure.283

Before the Potsdam Conference Lippmann reported the political organization of Eastern Europe not in an effort to warn against Soviet expansionism, but to point out the dangerous lack of organization and agreement between the countries of western Europe and the United States. Specifically, Lippmann emphasized the importance of a settlement between France and Great Britain on the fate of the Saarland, Rhineland and Ruhr valley. Lippmann also advocated for the formation of an American policy that would “constructively and permanently” resolve the conflict between Great Britain and the Soviet Union—a conflict which extended “from the Adriatic through the Middle East to the Persian Gulf”—if their occupation forces were to leave Germany at some point, having achieved a lasting peace.284 On the other hand, Lippmann’s focus on the first post-war meeting of the Allies was on the resolution of the German frontiers. Settled frontiers would not only allow the Allies to know what they would be working toward but also prevent any potential disagreement among them.285

By the fall of 1945 Lippmann saw no actual solution of any of the urgent issues of postwar Germany, like the shipment of food to the Germans to survive the upcoming critical winter, and no action was taken on the issues of reparations and deindustrialization, on which there was allied disagreement.286 Nonetheless he admitted that the complex system of foreign policy, which

derived both from the State Department and the War Department, made the conduct of foreign policy by the Secretary of State not an easy task, who from the time of his appointment had little time to prepare for the Potsdam Conference; it created a divided America, which was not provided with a crystal clear policy, while the US was trying to be popular with the US public through its policy rather than make popular among the US public a “consistent national purpose.”

Regarding the feelings of American fear and suspicion toward the Soviets Lippmann painted an alternative picture, a picture with which US policy could work. The journalist expressed his disbelief in the likelihood of a war and laid emphasis on the unity of the Allies to solve the German problem. For Lippmann the world was “big enough for two profoundly different social orders to live side by side”; an idea, he felt, which should be adopted by the Soviet Union as well as by the western countries. Prompted by the upcoming French elections, Lippmann declared his belief that either in the form of a “Soviet Europe” or a “Utopian dream,” communism could not be imposed upon Europe. Nevertheless, according to Walter Lippmann, the American policy should not fall into the trap of the imaginary fear of the Soviet expansion westward but rather focus on strengthening European democracy. Even though the US and the USSR had never been at war against each other, old “cultural divisions” did not let the western and eastern powers reach “tolerable working compromises” in the effort to organize a world under a common law. Lippmann's beliefs were attacked from all sides; in the US by a Polish official for allegedly “wishing to deliver his country to the Soviets” and by “the newspaper Pravda in Moscow as seeking to promote a combination of the western world against the Soviet Union.”

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291 Walter Lippmann, “Soviet-American Relations,” Los Angeles times, (1945, November 29), A4. However, receiving contradictory accusation is, in my opinion, a sign of wisdom and as Winston Churchill said: “You have enemies? Good. That means you've stood up for something, sometime in your life.”
Little and mild criticism came from *The Washington Post* toward the US policy in the American occupation zone. Despite the reports of the immediate implementation of the Potsdam Agreement by the Soviet government after the end of the war and the Soviet preparedness at the conferences, like their claims regarding the eastern borders of Germany, the western delegates were not judged harshly by *The Post* for their contrary results. The newspaper seemed to go along with the official US foreign policy as defined by the Potsdam Agreement. The few articles which presented a different opinion were those of the former United States Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles and those of the political commentator Walter Lippmann, as already observed, whose *New York Herald Tribune Syndicate* articles were also hosted by the newspaper in his *Today and Tomorrow* column. According to the United States Under Secretary of State during FDR's presidency Sumner Welles, reeducation and the establishment of political parties under the leadership of Wilhelm Pieck, a German Communist already familiar to Moscow, had already started in the Soviet zone, something the American people also awaited and longed for in their occupation zone. However, the trial of war criminals, the issue of food for the Germans, as well as that of reparations and borders needed to be resolved first in order for the liberties of the German people to be preserved and for Nazism to be permanently destroyed; this was an opinion *The Post* as well as the American government shared.292

“The peace and prosperity of the world as a whole” would be the main focus of the American delegates at the Potsdam Conference as regarded by *The Post*, but at the same time it was the perfect opportunity to eliminate any sphere of influence; a mission which did not succeed.293 Despite the fact that no Ally agreed to withdraw their troops from the other liberated countries and that the question whether the issues of reparations and decentralization of the political structure of post-war Germany could be “wisely implemented,” “ably administered” and “consistently carried out in practice”294 by all big powers further split the western zones from the eastern zone, *The Post* saw in the Potsdam agreement the outline of an effective peace. The terms

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of the agreement would not destroy or enslave the German people but would establish a system of control to deindustrialize, demilitarize and completely decartelize Germany, while at the same time it would dismantle and reconstruct her.  

On the other hand, the well-organized eastern zone under Soviet administration and the Soviet sphere of influence in the Balkan and Asian regions together with the French election results, which brought the French Communist Party to power within a coalition government, led US foreign policy makers to reconsider their Soviet policy. Nonetheless, The Washington Post’s focus remained on the cooperation of the occupying forces. The newspaper insisted on the fulfillment of the Potsdam Agreement despite the difficulties which arose due to the diverse ideas of occupation on German exports, reparations, production level by the Allies. By the end of the year Secretary Byrnes delivered a speech before the New York Herald Tribune Forum, clarifying the American support of the Soviet Union’s legitimate interests in the Balkan region as long as it did not intervene in the domestic affairs of the nations within the region or go for complete Soviet control of central and eastern Europe. The post-world-war world had to make a “choice;” it would be a world of true “good neighborliness” for all powers or there would be no world for any power. Byrnes’ statement of the US policy toward the gradual recovery of the German economy in an effort to “prevent disease and unrest” in the country, hit the front page of The Washington Post and was fully transcribed and published in the same issue. The Post generally welcomed Byrnes’ statement but criticized the fact that the Germans would be better off than the peoples of liberated lands, since the former would be provided with food while the latter would have to buy wheat from outside sources or depend on the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA).

Only one letter was to be found in The Washington Post in which a college professor suggested that Germany should be made a trust territory and administered as such until its people

298 “Good Neighborliness,” The Washington Post, (1945, November 2), 8
were again capable of enjoying autonomy without risk to themselves or their neighbors.\footnote{Letters to The Times. Trusteeship Advocated,” The New York Times, (1945, August 12), E8.} Another reader suggested teaching English in the occupied zone in order to expand the readership of American and British writers, to benefit the trade and the English-speaking teachers, as well as keep an eye on German scientific advances because the newspapers would be written in English.\footnote{Letters to the Editor. English For Germany,” The Washington Post, (1945, October 5), 10.} In an effort to explain the urgency of resolving the food problem, especially in Germany, a reader related the feeding of the Germans with US national security; a hungry German would revolt against the occupying forces, while the other liberated countries were not a US problem as they would revolt against their own governments.\footnote{Letters to the Editor. Whom To Feed?” The Washington Post, (1945, November 9), 8.} Even secondary measures, such as the conversion of Nazi flags and buntings into material for the manufacture of clothing and the taking away of any military uniform which could potentially give the feeling of superiority to the ones who wore them, were proposed by the readers.\footnote{Letters to the Editor. Clothing For Europe,” The Washington Post, (1945, May 12), 4.}

The Post readership highly related the process of de-Nazification to that of reeducation.\footnote{Letters to the Editor. Germans Are Nazis,” The Washington Post, (1945, May 6), B4.} As part of the education of the Germans a reader suggested also that memorials should be built where the Germans tortured and where the US soldiers died, so that new generations would hold to the “ancient virtues of honesty in word and deed, kindness toward men and humility.”\footnote{Letters to the Editor. For Mankind’s Dignity,” The Washington Post, (1945, June 17), B4.} Moreover, a Washington Post reader identified the failure of the American policy for focusing on the reeducation of the individual and not of the masses. To the reader the Germans seemed helpless and unable to think critically as individuals, instead needing to take orders on how to think democratically.\footnote{Letters to the Editor,” The Washington Post, (1945, August 18), 4.}

The natural distrust of the enemy’s motives could be explained by the self-serving friendliness of, at least, some German women toward the US soldiers in order to have access to goods like chocolate, coffee, cigarettes - the unofficial currency-, or even the opportunity for a new life in the US. An American sergeant, in his letter to The Washington Post editor, revealed that he was appalled by the non-fraternization policy which made the American people no better than the Nazis who discriminated against people based on their origins. Instead he emphasized the
importance of education and reeducation of the coming generations about the equality of all men.\textsuperscript{308} Lastly, definitely fewer were the readers, who supported Morgenthau plan-like policies and identified the development of a saner and sounder balanced German civilization with the existence of an agricultural Germany.\textsuperscript{309}

The \textit{Washington Post} mainly agreed with American foreign policy and insisted on the fulfillment of the Potsdam Agreement. A voice that expressed a different opinion was that of the political commentator Walter Lippmann, who did not fall into the trap of the imaginary fear of the Soviet expansion and emphasized the importance of tolerable working compromises in the effort to organize a peaceful world. The readership of the newspaper mostly focused on the management of the German people without revengeful feelings.

\textit{Los Angeles Times}

The \textit{Los Angeles Times} right after the war in Europe ended expressed an outright and apparently unprovoked distrust against the Soviet ally long before any post-WWII expression of the West-East tension; an attitude which was consistent with the newspaper’s wartime position against the eastern ally. The majority of the articles published in the newspaper reflected this attitude and wanted the West to believe that “the most outspokenly anti-imperialistic country in the world” was actually acting in an imperialistic way by indoctrinating the peoples of the Soviet Union that “democracy and Fascism were one and the same thing.”\textsuperscript{310}

Before the Potsdam Conference the newspaper and Lippmann appeared skeptical about the readiness of the US foreign policy. They each expressed this concern, however, in a different way. As already observed Lippmann reported on what the US could improve, while the \textit{LA Times} correspondents reported on concerns regarding US policy, as much as on Soviet initiatives, which they felt conflicted with the US policy. The \textit{LA Times} appeared more concerned about the American administration of its zone in Germany when less than two weeks after the unconditional surrender of Germany the US occupation forces hand-picked the first 200 “non-Nazis,” like “Germans identified with the Social Democratic and Catholic Centrist parties before 1933,”\textsuperscript{311} to

form the first provincial government in their zone.\textsuperscript{312} In contrast to the unspecified and unfocused American, and western, occupation policy in Germany, the newspaper acknowledged that the Soviet policy for its occupation zone was quite clear and calculated already a month after VE-Day.\textsuperscript{313} Nonetheless, the reparations expected to be extracted from the German industrial production in combination with low wages and long working hours in the Soviet Zone would make the German products very competitive and might eventually make Germany the most prosperous country of Europe; something the Allies wanted to avoid. Furthermore, the newspaper was worried by the Soviet tendency to take for granted what the western powers had committed to toward the Soviet Union in the previous Allied conferences at Tehran and Yalta.\textsuperscript{314}

The US policy was not only described in the articles of the newspaper, but also in its illustrations. Among the very impressive, striking and meaningful editorial cartoons of the newspaper were those of a strong, tough and powerful man sitting on a globe surrounded by clouds, as if this image belonged to the past, and in front of him he had himself wearing prisoner’s clothes with a “war crimes report” ball chained to his leg, as well as the image of an old, fat German sowing the seeds of the “lack of war guilt feeling” to harvest the future militarism.\textsuperscript{315} Whether focusing on Germany or on the USSR one thing was clear for the LA Times: Isolation no longer had a place in American foreign policy. A very representative illustration of this notion showed a man (isolation) walking the “biggest plank,” which started from the earth and led into space.\textsuperscript{316}

Regarding the newspaper’s expectations from the post-war meetings of the Allies, the LA Times comprehended the difficulties of concluding peace treaties in Europe since the peace treaties of “Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and to a certain extent, Finland,” which the reporter characterized as “surviving Nazi satellite countries,” would regulate the European peace and the peace in Germany would regulate the Allied relations as they would be acting as the government of the

\textsuperscript{312} Raymond Moley, “Terrorism In Germany,” Los Angeles Times, (1945, April 29), B4.
\textsuperscript{313} Polyzoides, “Reich Testing Ground For Economic Theories,” Los Angeles Times, (1945, June 7), 5.
\textsuperscript{314} Polyzoides, “Extend Of Red Control Of Germany Surprises,” Los Angeles Times, (1945, June 8), 4.
German state. The newspaper also acknowledged the importance of German industries to the European people and the domino effect consequences of their destruction.

The first reaction of Los Angeles Times toward the Potsdam Agreement on Germany was positive regarding both the treatment of Germany as well as the handling of Germany for the benefit of the European countries. A big and imposing 3 with the flags of the American, British and Soviet flag landed on German soil was the editorial cartoon of the day after the Potsdam Conference was completed. Furthermore, the newspaper praised the decisive and straightforward way President Truman dealt with foreign affairs as well as his determination not to solve the problems of the other countries but to help them solve their problems.

The newspaper’s attitude toward the Potsdam Agreement and the deindustrialization of Germany did partly change, but in the direction of the US government’s policy, after the publication of Calvin Hoover's report to the Allied Control Council about the need for Germany's economic recovery in order to be able to make payments and to reach the standard of living agreed upon for the German people. The correspondent was clear that if Germany was to be kept harmless, it should be by “military and political, not by economic” force. Besides, due to the consistent support of Los Angeles Times for the US government, the foreign policy it was pursuing and the belief in the diplomatic abilities of the President and the Secretary of State, the newspaper had no reason to doubt, to question, or let alone to disapprove of any of the policies and directives declared or even pursued by the American statesmen in Europe.

The newspaper’s support of American foreign policy was reinforced by the fact that the Soviets attacked US foreign policy. For instance, the most complete report on Germany on what the US was trying to do there was by the daily columnist of LA Times, Bill Henry, who basically reported what was already achieved, like the division of Germany into temporary zones and the establishment of a US military government in the US occupation zone, which would eventually

help the formation of a German government. According to Bill Henry, the biggest problem of the four-power occupation to be faced in occupied Germany, was the often use of the veto power by the Soviets. Regarding the problems in the US occupation zone of Germany, the author referred to the food crisis as the biggest and most urging problem. This was a problem, however, against which the US had already formed two policies; a short-range policy which was to feed the Germans and a long-range policy to set up Germany as a democracy. The practical realization of these policies was to be achieved through industry. However, there was no actual settled plan for this except for the concept to try and get the factories going in order for Germany to export goods, earn money and pay the cost of occupation.\(^{323}\)

In other words, according to the newspaper everything the US had done in its occupation zone so far was the best pursued policy and things could only be better if its Allies would let her. Not at all surprisingly, Byrne's reaffirmation of a policy of “stern peace” with Germany on December 12, which clarified the economic policy toward the country for the guidance of the United States occupying authorities after the request of the War Department, was not given much attention by the newspaper -it was merely reported- probably due to the fact that it was regarded by the newspaper as a re-affirmation of the US foreign policy and not as something new.\(^{324}\) A few weeks later, in view of the Moscow Council of the Foreign Ministers, the columnist ridiculed the US effort to decode the Soviet behavior towards the Allies at their meeting by saying that the US was trying to make a “form chart” on the Soviet Union so that in the future the Americans could know if the Soviets mean “maybe when they [said] no and no when they [said] maybe, and where to go for a sedative if by some chance they [said] yes.”\(^{325}\)

A few days before the end of the year an optimistic editorial cartoon depicted a hook in the shape of the number 3 lifting the globe “out of the depths of despair.”\(^{326}\) Two days later, the last day of the year, the pessimistic editorial cartoon depicted a baby, which was the upcoming year, trapped in a hourglass about to be drawn in the sand of the unsolved problems of 1945 falling upon it.\(^{327}\) At the same time the newspaper’s attack on the USSR continued. *LA Times* accused the Soviet

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Union of isolationism, which inevitably led to suspicion toward the western powers and called
Moscow to stop this “offending attitude and understand that this was still a co-operative world in
which to live and let live.”

Regarding the readership’s opinion, on the one hand, there were the eyewitness reports of
Germans, who had not lost anything in the world and only worried about who was going to water
their plants once the Americans had taken over their homes and on the other hand, their “poor,
innocent victims,” who had lost everything, made the American people inclined to want the
“complete disarmament” of Germany and the annihilation of the “ruthless, cruel, brutal” Nazis, if
world peace, co-operation, freedom and security were to be established. Surprisingly, toward
the Soviet ally there was no sign of suspicion from the LA Times’ readership.

The attitude of the Los Angeles Times was clear before the end of the war. The Soviet
Union was a potential enemy and a threat on German soil. The newspaper did admit that the
American foreign policy lacked a well-defined plan for Germany but most of the time defended
any negligence or shortcoming of the American policies. The newspaper accused the Soviet Union
of isolationism, which inevitably led to suspicion from the side of the western powers. Surprisingly, the LA Times readership was not influenced by the newspaper’s attacks against the
Soviet Union and still regarded the German people as the dangerous one.

The New York Times

The New York Times did not rush into an early anti-Soviet distrust and focused more on a
well-formed treatment of Germany for the benefit of world peace. Two days before the
unconditional surrender of Germany The New York Times expressed the Allied concerns of the
German problem. First and most important was to make sure that Germany could not start a third
world war. Related to this was provision for the punishment of the Nazis; these two points were
quite obvious. Further almost prophetic concerns expressed in the article were that the division of
Germany would hinder its economic reform or pose the threat of starvation, since the Soviets
occupied the predominance of food-producing regions, or that the Soviet reparations would have
to be extracted by the western zones. Even though the newspaper did not believe that any of these

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issues would pose a great challenge to the Allied cooperation, the article concluded that what happened on German soil carried a “very heavy meaning for all the countries engaged in making a security organization.” A day before the unconditional surrender of Germany, The NY Times called for the support of the American public toward the US playing a significant role in world affairs regarding the prevention of German rearmament, the preservation of American security and the promotion of a period of peace as long as possible. The newspaper emphasized that various occupation problems were expected to arise due to the size of the occupation area and the lack of democratic values in the German society.

The NY Times also expressed its reservations about the American foreign policy at the Potsdam Conference as the US had “very uncertain plans and no carefully established policy.” The newspaper was most concerned that there would be differences of approach between the Allies. It expressed uncertainty about the Soviet intentions in Europe and the role of the US delegation at the conference, which would not be led by a President who liked to “dominate foreign policy” as Roosevelt had done. One sure thing was, according to The NY Times, that this time the US did not have to worry about the support of the American people but about delivering to them “a good and honorable settlement.” Shortly before the beginning of the Potsdam Conference the editorial article attacked the German people. The choice of words had an aura of revenge and superiority; the editor saw in the Potsdam Agreement the opportunity for a continuous lesson to be taught to the Germans who failed to learn that “those who stirred up whirlwinds would reap whirlwinds and those who took the sword should perish by the sword.” What the newspaper mostly expected from the Potsdam Conference was decisions leading to an immediate economic integration of Germany and the setting of the future German frontiers, a balance between dismantling of war plants and leaving adequate industrial potential for the production of goods and for the payment of reparations, along with the establishment of a re-education program. The newspaper suggested that the US should act so as to achieve successful cooperation of the Allies and the “inner harmony of administration in Berlin” during the first months of the occupation. It

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also advocated for US support to enable Soviet effectiveness in the management of their occupation zone.337

As soon as the Potsdam Conference ended, the newspaper's viewpoint on the decisions agreed upon was clear and constant. In fact the newspaper predicted that “no man living now, certainly not the three men who signed [the agreement],” would “see the effects of the decisions made at Potsdam.”338 On the same date, however, The NY Times published excerpts from editorial comments of newspapers339 from various places in the United States, which more or less agreed with the decisions reached at Potsdam, attributing the positive editorial comments to the fact that the programs announced at Potsdam dealt more with the “drab business of cleaning up the wreckage of a war already won by the United States and less with the conflict which some of them have yet to conclude.”340

According to the majority of the quoted editorials, the success of the conference depended “on the vital interests of the Big Three nations” (Christian Science Monitor) achieving “a greater degree of Allied political unity” (The Plain Dealer), giving “hope that the war against Adolf Hitler was not fought in vain” (The Courant), and resulting in “a hard peace” (The Sun, The Chronicle, The Oregonian) that would leave Germany “without claws” (The Tennessean) in order to “prevent a resurgence of German aggression” (The Star) and might provide “an avenue to a better and happier life for the German men and women” (The Herald Tribune). The newspapers which did not regard the Potsdam Declaration as “nemesis” (The Evening Bulletin) did not oppose the decisions reached but either wished that “the smaller Allies” had “sit in on this task, too” (The Courier Express) or that this “highly useful gathering” would “conduce to continuing good relations” so that many other important questions could be decided. Nonetheless, there were a few


which believed that the Soviet Union was either “chiefly responsible” for the outcome of the conference (*The Globe-Democrat*) or “the greatest beneficiary” (*The Post*) of it.\textsuperscript{341}

Even though the Potsdam Declaration required “much more than a first hurried reading to pass any intelligent judgment,” the initial editorial comments of *The NY Times* were that the plan despite not being “specific or carefully worked out,” was “impressive,” expressing the “war aims of the American people” and setting “the beginning of the most prodigious task of modern history.”\textsuperscript{342} Nevertheless, the editor expressed his concern about the economic aspects of the agreement and apparently after several readings thought he understood the connection of the economic fate of Germany to that of Europe, the “throttling” of Europe's industry, but lamented the lack of a plan for the displaced persons and “unwanted minorities” and the “disregard of the principles of private property” for the sake of reparations. He also doubted whether the agreement would leave the German people in a condition to govern themselves, once the occupation was over.\textsuperscript{343} Nonetheless, the editor's tone was not aggressive but he hoped that the President would eventually dispel any skepticism the Potsdam Agreement had provoked.

Corroborating this a *NY Times* report by Werner F. Bruck, a historian of German cartelization, who fled Nazi Germany to Britain in 1933, the decentralization of the German economy agreed upon at Potsdam was impossible due to a concentration of control in German industry which roots back to the late 19th century.\textsuperscript{344} The futility of the venture was not only predetermined by the fact that there was no parallel to this task of decentralization in economic history but also by the reality that the Allies had no experience in such an economic system. Moreover, the newspaper published a lengthy article on the points agreed upon at Potsdam, which was also accompanied by three large drawings from other newspapers.\textsuperscript{345} The images, which represented the sum of the agreement, were so large that they were very hard to miss. In one image there was a very strong man banging away with a three-pronged hammer the Nazi swastika symbol,\textsuperscript{346} in the second image there was an old, weary but quite fat man (Germany) walking

\textsuperscript{346} “‘Into ploughshares ... Neither Shall They Learn War Any More.’ Big Three Dealt Boldly With Great Problems,” *The New York Times*, (1945, August 5), 61.
toward the sunrise (symbolizing the community of decent nations), and in the third image there was a large hand (representing Allied peace and reconstruction program) scrubbing hard to clean the floor (of Nazism and Prussianism) while an old, weary, fat man (Germany) was bringing water.

According to *The NY Times*, there was a huge distance between theory and practice of the political rehabilitation and the economic reshaping of Germany. Specifically, the failure behind the denazification and deindustrialization processes in the American occupation zone was related by *The NYT* to the lack of suitable German civilians regarding the first and a lack of a clear industrial program regarding the latter. The “major disagreements as to the correctness” of the Potsdam policy and the “manner of implementing” the US policy in Germany was apparent by the end of the year and *The NY Times* did not try to sugar-coat the reality. The newspaper reported the “painfully apparent” degree of ignorance of the American government and military government in Germany on what actually occupation meant.

To the list of already existing problems *The NY Times* added the issue of homesick G.I.s, the lack of an indoctrination plan for the Germans, the failure to foresee the violation of the non-fraternization policy as well as the endless effort to form a reparations plan. Despite the “laborious but tangible progress” of the four-power occupation, the Soviets’ “shrewdly timed” methodology of turning over public administration to German hands by hand-picking Germans to lead the twelve administrative departments of the Soviet zone, whose jobs were expected to grow into state secretariat, or the more “pragmatic” denazification policy by temporarily allowing some “undesirable individuals [...] in some position until suitable replacements” were found, was acknowledged by *The NY Times*. The newspaper was also compelled to suggest that the Americans be taught a lesson by Soviets on how an “authoritarian government” could be more “suited in

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coping with immediate problems than a democratic government.” The newspaper’s prediction was confirmed when the first allowed tour of the Soviet zone showed that the Soviets were indeed far ahead of the Americans. A lot of processes such as the setting up of self-government and denazification of the Germans had been completed and in fact in a much more “pragmatic” way than in the American zone. In contrast to the Americans, the Soviets were trying to install a Communist party and not simply implement the Allied agreements and withdraw, a strategy which also worked efficiently for the maintenance of the positive morale of the occupation soldiers.

Eisenhower's positive report on the progress of the social, political and economic aims of the Potsdam Declaration was published on the front page of the newspaper as an answer to the accusation of the Soviet Union of merely nominal US support of the Potsdam agreement. But this was not enough to camouflage the threat of failure of the fulfillment of the Potsdam agreement by the US side. The US military government as well as the Potsdam Agreement were harshly criticized by the newspaper. The first was characterized by the newspaper as an “intricate, interlocking and often overlapping system of delegated authority,” while it also pointed out the harmful consequences of the elimination of Germany’s reparations and foreign trade for the liberated countries and warned the Allies against policies created by wartime psychology or post-war disillusionment. Consistent with Truman’s urgent call for the revision of the Potsdam Declaration and of the JCS1067 directive as well as of the elimination of the remaining Morgenthau plan policies, the newspaper acknowledged the importance of the revision of the Potsdam agreement and remarked that the difficulties in Germany were caused by the lack of cooperation between the Allies, such as the disagreement on the deindustrialization and reparations level. It also warned of the potential chaos the upcoming winter would create in Germany. However, that was not the only reason the Potsdam Agreement should be revised. The focus on


the 4 D’s of the American policy in Germany was, according to *The NY Times*, a “purge” on which a policy could be based, but not a policy by itself.\footnote{Anne O’Hare McCormick, “Abroad. Rule in Germany Leaves Much To Be Desired,” *The New York Times*, (1945, December 5), 24.} By the end of 1945 *The NY Times* suggested a re-examination of the German problem in the light of the current conditions in Germany as opposed to the pre-occupation theories. The hungry German people and the ruined cities were part of a bigger problem, the European problem, as the German weakness would create “a dilemma almost as dangerous as her aggressive force.”\footnote{Anne O’Hare McCormick, “Germany, Weak, Is Still A Great Problem,” *The New York Times*, (1945, December 16), SM3.}

From the readership of the newspaper the editor received mostly criticism for the US foreign policy toward Germany. A reader expressed the opinion that if Germany had to pay for the First World War, it should pay much more for the loss of the Second World War.\footnote{“Letters to The Times. Germany Must Pay,” *The New York Times*, (1945, May 1), 22.} An Associate Professor of politics at the University of Notre Dame stated that the policies of the Potsdam Conference were inspired by “extremists” and would “start out with misery for innocent millions in Europe, [...] continue with inefficiency, and [...] lead to disaster.” The author concluded that the Potsdam policies “violated in their adoption and propagation” the “democratic process itself.”\footnote{“Letters to The Times. Potsdam Plan Debated,” *The New York Times*, (1945, November 18), 70.} The non-fraternization policy received also severe criticism from the readers of *The NY Times*, as they found no re-educating element in that policy. On the contrary, such a policy charitably paved the way to a new Versailles-type failure.\footnote{“Letters to The Times. Non-Fraternization Approved,” *The New York Times*, (1945, June 1), 14. See also: “Letters to The Times. Non-Fraternization Opposed,” *The New York Times*, (1945, June 15), 18.} Excerpts from G.I.’s letters revealed that the average GI had “no idea” why he was prohibited from fraternizing with the Germans, or was not aware of his rights “in apprehending the Germans or at least questioning their presence” on the streets after the curfew hours, which in parts of the American-occupied zone of Germany had harmed the respect the Germans felt for the American military due to the lack of discipline of the US Army toward the non-fraternization policy.\footnote{Hanson W Baldwin, “US Policy in Germany Held Costly,” *The New York Times*, (1945, July 9), 4.} On the other hand, a reader commented that no American should ever “incur German gratitude.” He argued that the Germans knew, most likely better than...
any other nation, what democracy meant and nonetheless they chose to burn the books through which they gained their education.363

The successful cooperation of the Allies as well as the acknowledgement of apparent Soviet effectiveness in implementing the Potsdam agreement in the management of their occupation zone was supported by The New York Times during the first months of the occupation. The newspaper doubted whether the US was pursuing a stable and feasible foreign policy and its fear was proven by the big distance between the theory of a policy and its application. Besides, this was the way the newspaper regarded the Potsdam agreement; a good basis for a policy, but not a policy itself. The NYT readership expressed mixed feeling about the US policies applied in Germany and about the fate of the German people.

The Wall Street Journal

Even before the end of the war, The Wall Street Journal pointed out the necessity of German participation in the post-war administration of German cities under the supervision and control of the Allied occupation forces, as it would not be possible to rely completely on the Allied military government for administration in postwar Germany, but instead Germans would have to be relied upon; a conclusion drawn by the US government and military government in Germany only months after V-E day, when the process of de-Nazification turned out to be much more complicated than probably expected.364 Regarding the de-Nazification process, after the war’s end, the newspaper focused mostly on the “diabolical cleverness of the German professional military class,” which bore guilt in two wars. According to the newspaper, in order for peace to be secured in Europe, Germany should be policed, its schools, its industries and governmental institutions should be inspected no matter how long this process would take.365

Due to the focus of The Wall Street Journal on US financial interests the majority of the articles referred to the economic handling of Germany, such as plans for American-Soviet trade. According to the newspaper, American-Soviet trade was a matter of “high expectations and of billions of dollars worth of commerce.” Specifically, there had been reports about contracts that were signed “by the International Telephone and Telegraph Company for the modernization of the

Soviet communications system, by the duPont Company for the manufacture of synthetic rubber, by the General Electric Company and the Newport News Shipbuilding Company for nine huge turbogenerators for the reconstructed Dnieper River hydroelectric power plant.”

The interest payment alone on the lend-lease, that the US would receive, would be more than four times higher than it would have received five years before the outbreak of World War II. However, all these would only be possible if the USSR could overcome the bottleneck of political control in commercial and financial relations. The newspaper also promoted the possibility of an American-Soviet collaboration on the grounds that “America and Russia [had] never come into serious conflict, that both would stand to gain from the atmosphere of friendship [....] that would lead to extensive economic intercourse,” that the Soviet Union needed “foreign technical aid” which could be provided by the US and that the Americans had “no hostile prejudice” against the Soviets.

This ambitious plan was delicate, however, because the US could not ignore the Soviet position on the issue of the German-Polish borders and of the disputed territories along with the displaced persons the annexation of German territory to Poland would bring. Moreover, the overcoming of this bottleneck was questionable due to the socio-political differences of the two parties. The review of the book The Yogi and The Commissar and other Essays, published in the newspaper, criticized the so-called “humanitarian society of the Soviet Union,” where Soviet citizens were not only paid the 1/100 of what a lieutenant in the “Red” Army got, not only possessed “no freedom of movement within their own country,” but could be sent to exile or even executed along with their family if they chose to flee abroad to avoid military service.

The newspaper was not driven by a disgust for the German people, but by the plain reality that after a six-year war Germany would be drained of manpower and natural resources. Hence the Allies would have to come to terms with the fact that they would get no more than what they could get as reparations, which was a rational observation and at least a lesson learnt from the previous world war. Thus after the end of the war the newspaper advised that the first step should be the

368 A collection of essays by Leftist Arthur Koestler written while Koestler was working as a scriptwriter for propaganda broadcasts and films at the British Ministry of Information and published in 1945. The collection of essays proposed philosophies for social changes from the materialist Commissar, who used any external means necessary, to the spiritual Yogi, who focused on the spiritual individual.
restoration of transportation and the return of labor so that the mines could start coal production immediately.\textsuperscript{371} For the newspaper German coal was the key material for reconstruction, but the Allies had to work on how they could use coal in the interests of world peace without allowing Germany to revive. Nonetheless, the newspaper gradually acknowledged the fact that the handling of Germany’s economic power was not only of utmost importance for the Germany but also for the entire continent.\textsuperscript{372} Hence, on the one hand, there was a series of questions on whether Germany should be reduced to the rank of a minor industrial nation, or whether it should be allowed to recover its former industrial capacity, or whether its recovery would be a prerequisite for peace and prosperity of entire Europe. On the other hand, there was the inevitable necessity of the rapid industrial revision and economic reconstruction of Germany, which could be achieved even sooner than in any other country, according to The Wall Street Journal, due to the willingness and eagerness of the German people to work hard, cooperate and collaborate.\textsuperscript{373}

This dilemma kept appearing in the newspaper, emphasizing Germany’s economic importance for the entire continent.\textsuperscript{374} The loss of Germany's eastern agricultural territories emphasized even more its industrial production, which would allow the country to pay for agricultural imports. The restoration of their machinery after part of it had been removed for reparations, would help pay for foreign investments and would give Germans a chance to work in peaceful industry. The line between direct military and political control by the occupiers on the one hand, and economic control based on certain restrictions based on the military potential of production was clearly drawn and supported by the newspaper since the end of the war.\textsuperscript{375} By the end of 1945 The Wall Street Journal readership had the chance to read a concise but pithy report on the major economic and reparations policy the US had agreed to at Potsdam, namely aiming at a German reactivation of remaining resources after the agreed upon industrial dismantling.\textsuperscript{376} However, the fact that Germany's pre-war and surviving industrial installations were usable both

in peacetime as well as for military purposes in war time was a problem which the newly appointed Secretary of State J.F. Byrnes had to resolve.377

The Wall Street Journal readers detected the German problem in Germany's still existing economic war potential and emphasized the urgency of its elimination.378 Germany’s ability to democratically rule herself was based on the thorough liquidation of her war materiel and “her General Staff, her S.S.”379 Even though few believed that no military defeat would ever deter a true German from awaiting the coming of a new prophet who would lead the people to world domination,380 the majority of the readers supported that once the liquidation had been completed, it was felt the occupying forces could find reliable Germans to form a provisional government. In the meantime, however, the German people must be given a chance to live.

A Wall Street Journal reader concerned with the importance of the maintenance of world peace pointed out, in his well-structured and reasonably-argued letter, that the priority of the establishment of a “German provisional government composed of the best elements of the former Socialist and Liberal parties, [...] protected by the United Nations' occupational forces” would be to teach the German people that a “peaceful policy free from the oppression and expense of militarism was possible.”381 In reference to this opinion and commenting on The Wall Street Journal articles regarding the prospects of US-Soviet trade a reader expressed his disbelief about Stalin's intention, no matter how much the Soviet people would want such a cooperation.382 Another reader clearly turned against Communism, which was an already existing thread in the US, presuming it was now threatening Europe. A few rhetorical questions, asked by the reader to the editor, might encourage one to wonder why the US soldiers poured out blood to prevent Nazism while the “lies and hates” of Communism were encouraged, and stressed out the obligation of the US toward the spread of American liberalism and democracy.383 Surprisingly this letter was sent barely a month and a half after Germany’s unconditional surrender, when the anti-Nazi and anti-German distrust was not yet restored, let alone replaced by an anti-Communist one.

383 “Letters to the Editor. We Must Save Europe, but...,” The Wall Street Journal, (1945, June, 27), 6.
The *Wall Street Journal* acknowledged the actual status of Germany after the war, namely the economic importance of its industry to the entire continent, and did not pursue the punishment of the German people but the economic restoration of the country and the relationship of that to continued American economic prosperity and trade. With few exceptions the majority of the letters to the editor published in the newspapers represented the same opinion.

*TIME*

*TIME* magazine most of the time seemed as if it was trying not to comment in any overt way on the information it provided to its readers. The texts had an informative character and sometimes the articles consisted only of photos accompanied by a descriptive caption. However, there were times that *TIME* clearly provoked the reader to read between the lines like for instance before the war ended, when the Soviet Union’s continuous military success provided the basis for *TIME* to strongly advance the hope for an upcoming peace and at the same time to raise “the question of future control of Germany” and its importance for the European continent and the world. “Since Germany was the strategic and economic key to Europe, so was the future of Europe and the world. Who could control the conquered Reich -the Soviet Union and the western Allies (who so far had barely dented the German frontiers) or the Soviets alone (who might soon be in Berlin)?” The quote is part of a paragraph titled “Bisection of Europe” in main article titled “Russia,” which was followed by numerous extensive reports about Stalin’s life and his “long way [...] from the Tsar's jails, police files and fingerprints to revolutionary triumphs and apotheosis.” The author concluded with a commentary paragraph titled “The Stubborn Factor,” questioning whether the Soviets actually intended to liberate “half of continental Europe from Finland to Greece.”

Undoubtedly the USSR wanted peace, but it also needed money for its reconstruction and the socialization of its economy. The Allies’ inability to decide what to do in Europe in combination with the USSR’s ability to occupy Eastern Germany alone could jeopardize the Allies’ joint will for a united peace. The article also carried a *Daily News* illustration depicting World War I and II as female skeletons relaxing and gossiping about the name of the next potential

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world war. Even though the author’s way of writing gave the reader the impression that the purpose of this article was to inform about the country and particularly about the man, Stalin, who was bringing the long-awaited peace to the Allies, it also seemed like it wanted to create a questionable atmosphere around them through these interstitial references to a potential World War III. Furthermore, the author used a lot of rhetorical questions, which created an atmosphere of fear and distrust toward the Soviet Union and its post-war intentions (“Did Russia mean to exclude its allies completely from this sphere?”, “Did the Russians intend to occupy eastern Germany alone?”, “What did Russia want, [...] a just and durable peace?”). Nonetheless, TIME magazine did not omit President Roosevelt’s comments on the “responsibility for world collaboration and the existence not only of strategic integration but of tactical, day-by-day coordination between the western Allies and the Red armies.”

A day before the beginning of the Potsdam Conference, the chief of TIME’s London bureau, after completing a tour of western and southern Europe, extensively documented the rapid rise of “a dictatorship of the left, which was far from a democratic revolution by the people and the popular forces with the promise of freedom and a better life,” and insisted on the necessity of maintaining British and American troops all over Europe. Furthermore, he reported that as soon as the Berlin pie was divided the Soviets started running trade unions, cultural organizations as well as a political party in their section, all of which had of course a Communist or Social Democratic character. In addition, the Soviets had already dismantled the majority of the industrial power of their sector. Nonetheless, according to a TIME correspondent from Berlin, the Soviet Union was neither trying to convert the people to Communism or anything else nor did they desire to administer Berlin and Germany alone. On the contrary, the Soviets were so proud of their victories that they wanted to show the Allies the same effectiveness and preparedness during peacetime. The TIME Berlin correspondent’s report on what had really happened to German industry must have come to the reader's surprise as the editor himself took a tour of southern and western Germany only to report that Germany's main body of plants and industrial zones were slightly damaged and capable of turning out the majority of their production due to “selective

bombing." Apart from these detailed reports regarding the productivity of the Krupp, IG Farben and other steel and aluminum plants, the magazine pointed out the importance of the Ruhr coal, which ruled out the need for the complete closure of German industry.390 Furthermore, the TIME editor after a tour of southern and western Germany stated: “The people of the industrial Ruhr cannot live without their steel plants and coal mines. And the rest of Europe cannot live without the coal which the Ruhr produces. […] To get out the coal, the railroads must be rebuilt. This means that steel plants must open. A host of smaller industries must start up. Where will it stop? No one yet knows. The danger is that it will never stop.”391 Was it a prophesy or just the plain, visible truth which inevitably rearranged the cards on the European deck -one might wonder?

Even though the magazine did not openly and directly oppose the Potsdam Agreement, as some other newspapers or magazines did, it provided its readership with examples of its misapplication or failure. TIME's prophetic caption of a photo depicting a Berlin housewife bartering for shoes in an Allied-approved second-hand market read: “Needed: an economic miracle.” The text below pointed out the importance of a single administrative unit for Germany in order to get the Potsdam agreements on non-war industries and on a limited, controlled import-and-export trade running for the sake of a minimum economy for Germany.392 In contrast to other newspapers and magazines TIME did not publish the complete Potsdam Declaration but only a few fragments such as the dismantling and reparations policies prompted by the Soviet dismantling progress. Furthermore, the readers of TIME never heard of the US non-fraternization policy until the G.I.s broke it and started to fraternize with young German women or of the German postwar level of industry until it was briefly mentioned in a section regarding the export-import trade of post-war Germany.

The magazine did not refer to the management of Germany in terms of an official foreign policy directive but in reference to the use of Germany for the sake of the handling of the unraveling West-East conflict. TIME ascertained that the balance between the “two recently isolated giants,” the US and the USS.R., was clearly disturbed by the demobilization of the Soviet Army, the territorial translation of the Potsdam Agreement and the competition about who (the West or the East) would provide the European peoples with security, all of which jeopardized the

392 “Foreign news. Germany,” TIME, (1945, October 1), 46(14), 32.
US “one world” post-war vision. Furthermore, the magazine stated that the report of the US military government to the Allied Control Council, in which economist Calvin Hoover “required all existing steel capacity in Germany’s west, and some of the destroyed plants to be rebuilt,” was interpreted by the Soviets as “a capitalist plot to rebuild Germany as a bastion against Communist Russia.”

On the other hand the Soviet occupation zone was being organized much more rapidly and effectively. As the magazine reported, by the end of November 1945 their industrial production was at 20% of the 1938 level as compared to 5%-10% in the US zone. Automobiles, gloves, stockings, underwear, pots, pans and tiles for the German roofless homes were being produced while about half of the factories were run by worker's councils.

Along with the reconstruction of the Eastern occupation zone, the restoration of the faith of German people was taking place, promoting a German inclination toward the USSR. The failure of the treatment of Germany as an economic unit by the Allies worsened the trade between the zones, while the hungry and cold post-Potsdam Germany and the possibility that a lot of Germans would not survive the winter, due to the minimum level of diet which was just high enough to prevent disease and unrest, added to the list of concerns about US foreign policy in Germany.

In a TIME letter six distinguished combat officers characterized the Germans as “cold, brutal and trained from childhood as killers,” disagreed with the coddling treatment of German POWs in the US camps and requested that they be “treated justly but firmly, not pampered and handled like naughty children.” Other US servicemen favored the building up of a large reserve of trained soldiers and maintaining conscription in the US. Nevertheless, this position was not embraced by all servicemen. Education and not conscription as the most practical instrument of defense was the solution suggested by another group of US servicemen and a Navy officer. Specifically, these men spoke against hating Germans and depriving Germany of its vital economic sources.

To all these points a lieutenant added the importance of the intermingling of the

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American citizens were also aware of the tremendous consequences the victors faced trying to oppress Germans after the First World War and recognized their moral responsibilities to “feed the bodies of Europe's people” in order to “be able to feed their minds” and prevent another war.\footnote{400}

The problematic issue of de-Nazification was also acknowledged by the \textit{TIME} readership which underlined the effectiveness of using some of the old team for your own purposes until you can get your team functioning. Referring to the Soviet effectiveness of neutralizing the Nazi mentality which was primarily “based upon emotion, not reason” by implementing methods like playing the music of the German Jewish Felix Mendelssohn, without revealing his identity, and discovering that, after the revealing of the identity of the composer, the Nazis “were not only ready but anxious for facts” about the Jews.\footnote{402}

Regarding the alliance between the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, a reader stated that if the opportunity for this “mighty union” among these powers was lost that might “sow the seed of World War III. Less selfishness, more tolerance and co-operation” would bring the United States “toward a better world,” another reader believed. A \textit{TIME} reader, who clarified that he was no communist and did not believe in the Soviet-like supreme control, not only believed in a friendship with the people of the Soviet Union, but also proposed a program through which Soviet plays, history and exhibitions would promote this friendship, while an Army Sergeant still regarded the Soviets as friends and comrades.\footnote{403} Another reader wrote against the de-Nazification and de-industrialization policy which would destroy “nations by removing their means of existence” and would produce chaos and conflict between the “Communist Heartland and the Capitalist Citadel,” obviously misunderstanding the purpose of the denazification process and its independence from the industrialization process.\footnote{404}

As soon as the war ended the magazine recognized the importance of Germany to the economic recovery of the continent, but also the imperativeness of the elimination of its war

potential for the safeguarding of peace. Even though *TIME* magazine wondered, even before the war ended, about the actual Soviet intention of liberating versus occupying and bringing into a Soviet sphere of influence the countries of central Europe, the magazine did not cede to the idea of a premeditated primary Soviet intention to convert the German people to Communism. Nonetheless, the ineffectiveness of the American policy on Germany regarding the application of the Potsdam decisions or the non-fraternization ban, on the one hand, and the effectiveness of the Soviet policy of de-Nazification and administration on the Soviet occupied zone of Germany and the further constant Soviet claims about reparations regardless of whether the Soviets had fulfilled the Potsdam decision of the treatment of Germany as single unity, on the other hand, made the magazine skeptical toward both sides. The majority of the letters to the *TIME* editor selected for publication reflected a much more realistic approach to the German problem than that of their own administration and press outlets; fair treatment and democratic re-education of the German people and cooperation among the occupation forces.

*LIFE*

Before the war ended *LIFE* readers had the chance to be extensively informed about Germany’s natural resources and industrial production, which could enable it to launch a world war for the third time authored by the then Harvard President, James B. Conant, who urged the strict control and inspection of German industry. Conant, a renown chemist who worked on the development of the atomic bomb, stressed the necessity of Germany’s disarmament for a generation and of the redistribution of European industry. Without belittling the contribution of international trade to a peaceful future, he insisted that the effective disarmament of the enemy would have to be the absolute first condition for world peace, even if that would result in a reorientation of the economic balance of the world and the rebuilding of European economic life on an altered basis. Such a peace, he argued, in turn would be preserved through the establishment of an association of nations.405 Additionally, in an editorial article *LIFE* tried “to pierce the veil of secrecy,” as the editor described it, which covered Allied postwar policy and the settlement of the German problem, and make a few deductions. The editor mentioned four points, the punishment of war criminals, slave labor, the disposition of German industries and German territory, and the reeducation of the Germans. Furthermore, the magazine believed that disease and unrest in Europe

that would be caused by starvation should be prevented even if charitable action to prevent it would be at the expense of American citizens.406

After V-E day LIFE focused on the issue of food, alleging that the future of world peace was related to the future of Europe's children who had to be fed by the Allies in order to survive.407 The liberation of Europe meant one thing to the Allies, cooperation for the sake of the preservation of peace. Characteristic of this was a photo in LIFE depicting two flags on a pole in front of the Communist party headquarters in Berlin, the Soviet flag above the American, along with a banner which read “The unity of all anti-Fascists is the guarantee for the construction of a democratic Germany.”408 No matter how hard the American people were opposed to a war against the Soviet Union, the only dynamic power to challenge the American conceptions of “truth, justice and good life” and American democratic standards was the Soviet concept of democracy, which, according to LIFE, resembled more that of totalitarianism.409 The antidote to the American fear of the spread of Soviet totalitarianism into power vacuums in Eastern Europe could be the economic power of the USA, as the LIFE editorial writer suggested. The US was the most productive country and its economic power (loans, credits, gifts etc.) could be used as its persuasive card, as its own form of propaganda, toward traditionally imperialist countries of the East. LIFE did not provide the readers either with the text of any directive or agreement regarding US foreign policy or with any sense of the progress made toward the fulfillment of the US foreign policy. The magazine’s report on the Potsdam agreement extended only to three very short paragraphs, providing the outline of the conference: the abolition of German and Nazi military organizations, German reparations and the control of German assets and industry.410

Regarding the re-education of the German people as part of the de-Nazification process, LIFE published an article on the reeducation of the Hitler youth by the US army, which described boys, aged 12 to 17, living in a camp with unarmed American guards, whom the boys did not have to salute. American history and English were among the compulsory courses.411 In the winter of 1945 a quite harsh article referring to the arrival of thousands of displaced Germans in Berlin was

409 “America and Russia,” LIFE, (1945, July 30), 19(5), 20.
411 “Educating Hitler youth,” LIFE, (1945, October 8), 19(15), 75-82.
published in *LIFE*, describing the tragic condition of these persons as the majority of them walked to Berlin. No matter how sad one would feel seeing the image of a raped woman still in shock, or a skeleton-like child, or a German woman with bleeding, split-open feet, for the author “these people allowed themselves to fall so low in the eyes of the world that the world, seeing their suffering, found it hard to feel sorry for them.”  

The focus of the magazine on European economic recovery and its fears of the political effects of hunger alongside demilitarization did not necessarily contradict a view that German tragic postwar conditions, especially of Germans expelled from eastern Europe, were somehow understandable, if not deserved.

*LIFE* readership appeared less lenient toward the German people. A reader suggested the handing over of all German patent rights to the United Nations organization so that they would be available to all nations as public property. The Germans were the people who caused the war, another reader declared, and they were suffering, but they were not the only ones. All the European peoples were suffering, but the Germans deserved to suffer long and hard for the monstrous crimes they inflicted on the rest of Europe. Also the readers requested not only that these murderous enemies be “immediately and forever silenced” but also that photographs of skeletons of boys and concentration camps be enlarged and placed in the American POW camps, as well as in the room in which the peace conferences would take place. Another reader sent the editor three photos (which were published as well) of a man victimized by the Germans who was digging his own grave before being cut down by German rifle bullets. One *LIFE* reader even suggested to rerun these pictures in 1965 to celebrate the 20th anniversary of V-E day so that no one forget. If the American soldiers could stand witnessing the atrocities of a German concentration camp they liberated, the American people could stand looking at these pictures. Lastly, some Americans appeared shocked by the failure of the non-fraternization policy, as they could not comprehend how the G.I.s who fought in those bloody fights found it so hard not to flirt with Germans instead of wait and come back home to the American girls.

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413 “Letters to the Editor. What to Do With Germany,” *LIFE*, (1945, April 30), 18(18), 2.
Cooperation for the sake of the preservation of peace and the prevention of the revival of Nazism—as shown in the horrific images of what Nazism had wrought in the concentration camps was the main point in LIFE’s articles, an attitude that changed after the war’s end, when the magazine directed its attention to the spread of Soviet totalitarianism. Probably due to the large amount of photos depicting the Nazi atrocities all letters to the magazine editor about Germany referred to the punishment of Nazis and the imperative need not to forget what the Nazis had done.

The Nation

Even before the war’s end the Leftist magazine The Nation had not supported the idea of the Morgenthau plan and did not associate a hard economic peace on Germany with a penalty for its defeat. On the contrary, the magazine remained loyal to the condemnation of a revengeful treatment of Germany and insisted that a policy that would result in the devaluation of the mark would land on the shoulders of the working class while the big landowners and industrialists would benefit. Moreover, The Nation pointed out that justice must not be confused with Germany’s economic suffering if the victim countries expected to receive reparations from Germany. The magazine also argued as early as January 1945 that following the end of the war, the consequences of an inflation would not be restricted in Germany but would influence others as well. The Nation also warned that in the event that the US failed to learn from its previous mistakes, the inflation would not only “heighten social and political tensions” but it would also feed any remaining underground Nazi remnants and “discredit democracy.”

Almost a month after the unconditional surrender of Germany The Nation warned remarkably presciently that “serious differences between Russia and the West” might erect a wall across Germany, which would “increase the danger of a policy applied by one of the great powers being interpreted as a strategic threat by another.” The magazine argued that “the best chance of permanent agreement with Russia” laid “in the creation of an economically healthy Europe, which should include a militarily impotent but economically functioning Germany.” Surprisingly the article’s attitude was not predominated by the political orientation of the magazine and numbered the economic advantages of an effective cooperation of the western powers with the Soviet Union.

regarding the economic administration of Germany; for instance, the fact that the Soviet zone had cereal surplus and undestroyed Silesian industrial areas. The author did not argue that the US government had no foreign policy or that the government objected to a common program with the Soviets, but that the US occupation zone had not worked out the specific policies for the quadripartite rule that the Potsdam agreement had committed it to.421

Even though The Nation did not publish any reports on the non-fraternization policy, it did publish on the de-Nazification process. The Nation’s authors were the only ones who included the industrialists, who helped the Nazis not only rise to power but also to fight the war, in the big list of war criminals. These industrialists had and would continue after the war’s end, according to the magazine, to have ties with some leading American industrialists, offering their services to the Allies, hence the magazine questioned whether the German industrialists would come under the War Department’s “iron-fist regulations.”422 Furthermore, The Nation wrote about “private information” and “stories into the newspapers” which revealed that the US military were “moving in the direction of rebuilding German industry” as “bulwark” against the Soviet Union, without however providing any specific information.423 According to the magazine, if the US intended to be pro-capitalistic and anti-Soviet in order to raise a strong Germany as a bulwark against Communism, the use of Nazi generals and industrialists would be the only way to achieve such a policy, which totally explained why the magazine had high doubts about the punishment of the German industrialists for their support and involvement in the Nazi regime.424 In fact, The Nation recognized the efficiency of the Soviet approach of the denazification and advised the Western Allies to join a common program on this aspect, as the Soviets had every intention to kill the Nazis but no intention to discriminate the anti-Nazis.425

Specifically, regarding the temporary maintenance of many of the Bürgermeisters (Mayors), who had not fled the country, in their positions either due to “overlapping jurisdictions” or “inadequate understanding” of the role of the military officials “as facilitators of democratization” or due to the continuous pressure “to keep military operations going” regardless

421 “Occupation in Germany,” The Nation, (1945, June 16), 160(24), 664.
424 “Let’s Finish the War,” The Nation, (1945, June 9), 160(23), 635-636.
425 “Occupation in Germany,” The Nation, (1945, June 16), 160(24), 664.
of whether the military government was aware of their own political ideologies or their orientation “more toward the status quo than towards democratic reforms.”426 The political analyst Saul K. Padover, who also worked as an intelligence officer for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)427, reported in *The Nation* not only the use of Nazi officers like Franz Oppenhoff in Aachen, who “was a believer in the Standestaat, the authoritarian corporate state with a paternalistic small-scale industry based upon a hierarchical, unfree labor system” and his “anti-Allies” and “Austro-fascist” successor Pontesegger, but also that they had the clearance by the American army to hire anybody they chose, like the “ antidemocratic and anti-labor and anti-Russian” men around Oppenhoff.428

According to *The Nation*, the defeat of Nazism and the achievement of democracy and of a decent way of life for the European people were complementary elements, which would indeed contribute to the prevention of disease and unrest, but a guarantee of a long-term peace could be provided by the economic restoration of the devastated countries, and the nature of the peace pursued in Europe could be shaped by reviving production in the mines of the Ruhr and the Saar which had been only 15% to 25% damaged. The prevention of disease and unrest could start from Germany, as the German prisoners who were expected to work in the mines would receive more calories per day in order to accomplish the hard work needed. “Without this coal, as the magazine stated, the economy of Western Europe would stay stagnant, and the civilization of Western Europe might collapse.” Nonetheless, the author did not imply that the industrial production of Germany would be used for Germany as well, except for the coverage of the needs of the occupying forces. On the contrary, he stated that it would solely serve the needs of the reconstruction of the European countries destroyed by Germany.429 The well rounded opinion *The Nation’s* readership could form was a result of the plurality of voices heard through *The Nation’s* essays, like that of Saul K. Padover, a historian and political scientist, that of I. F. Stone, a politically progressive investigative journalist, that of Reinhold Niebuhr, a Reformed theologian, that of Max Hirschberg, a German Jewish criminal defense lawyer, and that of Fritz Sternberg, a

427 A World War II intelligence agency of the United States and a predecessor to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
German Marxist economist; namely people who had an expertise on a subject or knew the economy and society of Germany.

In contrast to *The Nation*’s fear that the Potsdam agreement did not sufficiently provide for “creation of positive conditions which would encourage peace and friendly dealings among nations, the final destruction of German military power” was, according to *The Nation*, a job “well planned at Potsdam.”*430* For *The Nation*, the “absolute military rule of the four victorious powers in Germany” would ensure the “mental and emotional disarming of Germany,” which would be accompanied by the removal of any war machinery. Toward democracy *The Nation* welcomed the occupiers’ permission for Germans to form “political and trade-union activity among anti-Nazi groups” under foreign military control. The magazine even compared the Potsdam Agreement with the Versailles Treaty and found the first “harsher” but more realistic since it would most likely “result in the actual extraction of reparations.” Specifics on the reparations would be decided by the Allied Control Council but the magazine found it “encouraging” that Germany would be treated as an economic unit and that the payment of reparations would leave enough resources to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. By the fall of 1945 the magazine appeared to be more or less in favor of the Potsdam agreement and mostly of the future prospects of the management of Germany as a single economic unit. The magazine, however, did not share the same feelings for some of the American occupation authorities, who sabotaged the directives and focused on the reconstruction of I.G. Farben and not the liquidation of the plants; an initiative that was not taken by the military government, as it should, but by the United States Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, a man who operated on the assumption that the US needed “a strong Germany as a bulwark against the USS.R. and communism.”*431*

Lastly, a lecture on Liberalism and its hoped-for true application in Germany was published by *The Nation*. First, the duty of liberalism was to restore discriminating judgement and execute or imprison for life confirmed individual criminals and not regard the Germans “from the standpoint of an inverted racial theory,” or collective guilt, like some American liberal journalists did. “Efforts to guarantee the peace by maiming the beaten enemy could have only short-range efficacy.” The true application of Liberalism would focus more on the prevention of the possible

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increase of the “economic chaos” in Europe and the consequences of the forced migration of Germans rather than on apprehensions about the American failure to “destroy the political and economic power” of the country. Additionally, Germany could not be turned into an agricultural state but it could be prevented from manufacturing war material while reactivating its industry under careful supervision. The importance of finding and following a clear policy on Germany, like the Soviet Union had done, was as immediate as the transfer of the responsibility of establishing democracy from the army to the civilian officials. Furthermore, justice should be stripped of “the megalomania of a very powerful nation” and served by the Allies since there was no world “which had been organized upon a basis of universal law.”

By the end of the year, the magazine expressed its total disappointment over the implementation of the economic section of the Potsdam agreement. For instance, it critiqued the relationship between export trade, low German wages and the strict limitations on the German metal and chemical industries, which would harm Germany's role as importer and was very essential especially for southeastern Europe. Three and a half months after the Potsdam agreement was signed The Nation urged for the actualization of the directive that Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit. The fact that industry remained practically dead, communications were tenuous, unemployment and homelessness were increasing, while the calorie rationing allowed the Germans barely to survive bred the danger of disorder and of a “Germany falling into a state of economic chaos.”

Further suggestions on the management of Germany were provided by the readers of The Nation. A reader, presumably a true believer in the democratic values of the working class at home and abroad, wrote in their letter that the “mass support” of the Nazis came from the “German middle” class, while the upper classes financed the party. Therefore the reader proposed that the Allies asked for the cooperation of the German workers, who were a “great latent force for democratic progress” and could verify who was or was not a Nazi. For the establishment of democracy, another reader absolutely believed that democracy “was a government built [...] equally on all members of the community, to safeguard impartially the individual liberty of each person, each minority of one.” Among the letters of everyday people there was also the voice of

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433 “Germany's Drifting Economy,” The Nation, (1945, November 17), 161(20), 513.
the intellectuals like that of the political émigré’ Thomas Mann. It was an actual message to the German people, broadcast to them in the hour of Nazism’s catastrophic defeat. Including himself, Mann addressed the disgrace and shame every German should feel as foreign commissions reported home on the horrors they had seen in the concentration camps. For him it was not just a small group of people who committed these atrocities but hundreds of thousands of a so-called German elite. Concluding, Mann asked his fellow German readers, although he had fled Nazi Germany for Switzerland once they came to power and then spent more than a decade in the US before returning to Switzerland, where he died, not to regard the Allies as enemies, but as liberators and encouraged them to regain their greatness through the respect and admiration by the human contribution.436

Despite The Nation’s smaller number of issues and pages as a weekly, the magazine managed to provide the reader with a solid and quite unbiased critique of the American policy on Germany. Its writers, who included a number of emigres who had experienced Nazi Germany firsthand, proposed a realistic approach to the issues of de-Nazification and deindustrialization, which would eliminate Germany’s war threat, while promoting the contribution of the economic unity of Germany, which could result in the restoration and maintenance of peace in Europe. The magazine as well as its readership pinned their hopes for Germany’s democratic and industrial restoration on the working class.

Human Events

The newly created conservative Human Events managed to sum up in a single article the situation in Germany and to make clear which policy toward the country would not result in a world war again. Specifically, the conservative author journalist Henry William Chamberlin emphatically doubted the success of the Potsdam agreement and radically criticized American intervention in European issues, which it felt would not result in any improvement of the current situation.437 Moreover, he quoted Britain’s most influential journal, The Economist, for its critique of the Potsdam Agreement: due to its lack of “a single constructive idea or hopeful perspective for the postwar world, the Potsdam agreement would break down leaving behind nothing but the razor-

436 Thomas Mann, “Address to German People,” The Nation, (1945, May 12), 160(19), 535.
edge balance of international anarchy between civilization and the atomic bomb.” Chamberlin declared that the ruthlessness of the victorious powers had no historical precedent. By indefinitely depriving of their “sovereignty one of the largest, highly educated and industrialized European peoples to sub-colonial status,” the Allies would fail to instill democracy. The treatment of Germany was guided by the “obvious cross-purposes of the Soviet Union and the Western Powers” and Chamberlin called on America to strongly oppose “sphere-of-influence politics” and the American people to choose between “indiscriminate revenge and world reconstruction.”

According to the Human Events’ editor, a rival of foreign interventionism, that America was heading toward such a dead-end was no surprise to the newspaper since in its view many Americans did not actually know what constituted a democratic form of government since they were not taught in schools and colleges what democracy means in political and not emotional terms. By the end of 1945, Human Events published one more article against the Potsdam agreement, claiming it had left Germany without food and houses, with millions of displaced and homeless persons and an administration of vindictive directives. Moreover, the anti-Nazi German author, as the Human Events editor himself called him, Alexander Boeken argued that the industrial level approved at Potsdam would only worsen an uncontrollable inflation, that better denazification could be achieved through an exchange of ideas by reopening the mail service to Germany, that the German economy was an organic part of the European and world economy and not an isolated entity and that the reparations policy should be adapted to Germany’s capacity to pay.

Regarding the role of the Soviet Union, before as well as shortly after the end of the war in Europe, Human Events published alarming reports about the military and political control which the Soviets had started building up in their occupation zone and in the Balkan area. The newspaper wrote about western and eastern Germany, and in turn about Western and Eastern Europe, even before the war ended or before any official US statement acknowledging the separate

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treatment of western and eastern Germany and Europe. Furthermore, the answer to the question of in which sphere of influence would Germany be embodied after the Nazi defeat, the newspaper feared it would more likely come from Moscow rather than London or Washington.443

Due to the orientation of the newspaper, *Human Events* failed to draw the entire picture of the situation in the occupation zones of Germany. The newspaper’s assumption that the Soviet Union started running its zone immediately after the war end without any “reference to the rest of the country” was translated by the newspaper as a process of “easternizing” Berlin and Eastern Germany, while the Western Allies' attitude reflected unity. Furthermore, the author pointed out the view that vast quantities of foodstuffs were in the Soviet zone and in order for the Western zones to balance that they would have to resort to a “huge re-industrialization.” The development of an agriculture in the Soviet section of Germany was easier than in the western zones due to its landscape. The potential ability of the Soviet sector to produce more foodstuff was presented by the newspaper as if the Soviet Union possessed “Europe's only food surplus areas,” while it would “not permit shipment of Eastern Germany's ample food resources” leaving millions of Germans to either “die of starvation in the next year” or be allowed to increase their pre-war industrial production by “100 per cent.” No mention was made about attempts at cooperation, communication and assistance among the occupation zones, whether successful or not. Lastly, the author highlighted the importance of the administration of Germany by “native leaders of unquestioned integrity” and not “an alien ruler” in order for chaos and Communism to be prevented.444 Exactly a month after the unconditional surrender of Germany all these were speculations, which the newspaper presented as if they were predestined to become true; an assumption clearly premature as occupation of Germany had just began and the Soviet Union had not expressed any of the today-known future opposition or unwillingness to cooperation with the other allied powers.

*Human Events* was against the principles of the Potsdam Agreement from the very first moment of its application, since the ruthlessness of the agreement would immensely influence the financial status of Germany and would not instill any democratic principles into the restoration of Germany. Due to anti-communist and anti-Soviet prejudice the magazine failed to acknowledge

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444 Alexander Boeker, “Germany: Chaos or Convalescence?” *Human Events*, (1945, June 6), 92-95.
that the Soviet Union handled the first post-war months much more effectively than the western zones and rushed to report on the Communist threat and the threat of Soviet expansion in central Europe.

Conclusion

Looking back to Truman’s press conferences the President did not seem to expect a certain attitude or support from the press outlets or at least he did not imply something like that. On the contrary he was very careful what he chose to say in his press conferences so that an opinion or assumption of his was not regarded as a statement probably due to his lack of familiarization with this task. Therefore, it will be interesting to see the position of each press outlet toward Germany and the US foreign policy in Germany in the months from V-E Day until the end of the year.

The opinion of the syndicated columnist Walter Lippmann was that the western powers had to collaborate efficiently with each other and subsequently urged for eastern-western cooperation, as he did not believe that Communism could dominate Europe and thus strongly advised against a derailment of the US policy by the communist fear. His opinion was more or less shared only by a few press outlets under examination.

Starting with those who opposed Lippmann’s position, even though The Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times carried his syndicated articles, the latter probably even more explicitly than the former ruled out the possibility of quadripartite cooperation, put the cart before the horse and accused the Soviets of imperialistic intentions. Surprisingly the LA Times credited the Soviets with the effective management of their zone based on their economic model and expressed its concern about economic conditions in the US zone of occupation, but throughout the year it mostly attacked the Soviet policies in Germany. Both press outlets generously provided support for the US foreign policy and the Potsdam Agreement, but The Post probably more unquestioningly than any other press outlet believed that the agreement would not harm but reconstruct Germany.

Soviet distrust is already tangible only a few months after the significant contribution of the Soviet Union to the termination of the war in Europe and in the Pacific as there were press outlets which took this feeling of distrust to the next level and rushed to replace the fear of German aggression with that of Communist expansion, like LIFE magazine and the newspaper Human
Events. Both press outlets represented the imperialistic intentions of the Soviet Union. On the one hand *LIFE* suggested that the US counterattacked the Soviet influence with money and products, the most efficient western persuasive tool against the communist expansion, while *Human Events* attacked the ruthless Potsdam Agreement for its colonial and undemocratic character and depicted the Soviet Union as the one making suspicious maneuvers influencing its German occupation zone according to the communist sociopolitical system. Both preferred the Soviet Union in the role of the scapegoat to justify the misimplementation of the American foreign policy or even to support US foreign policy without truly questioning all Potsdam decisions. Whether this anti-communist approach was so obvious from so early on and the way of thinking of these press outlets was so ahead of its time or their anti-communist attitude made them exaggerate and preconceive the future of the East-West relation is, however, very hard to know.

*The Nation* and *The New York Times*, on the other hand, recognized that the management of Germany would be a challenging task, but they were not discouraged. On the contrary, realizing the flaws of the Potsdam economic agreements and the condition in which Germany would be left after the withdrawal of the US troops, they compared the way the Soviets managed their occupation zone and their application of the Potsdam agreement to that of the Western powers and concluded that the US should be exemplified by the Soviets. *The NYT* believed that the US and the Soviet Union had no clear plan at Potsdam and that was reflected in the final agreement. On the same page was also *TIME* magazine, which, however, did not criticize the Potsdam Agreement but pointed out the critical parts of the Potsdam agreement so that it could succeed, like for instance the treatment of Germany as a single unit; the failure of the fulfillment of this condition which inevitably left the industrial development of the US zone behind compared to the Soviet one. Lastly, *The Wall Street Journal* also emphasized the tremendous economic profit from the US in case of US-Soviet trade in Germany. As such, the newspaper also encouraged Germany's industrial participation in the European restoration, but did not yet have all the answers as to what the level of industry would be in order to contribute only to world peace.

The failure of the non-fraternization ban was foreseen by the majority of the press outlets before it was observed by the American government, long before it was admitted by the American government, and much before the American government acted on the correction and even retraction of this policy. Hence all press outlets under examination, others more carefully other
more emphatically, disapproved of any severe and revengeful punishment of Germany and were in accord with the renouncement of the collective guilt of the German people. Even the depiction of this position, which was more efficiently accomplished through *LIFE*’s vivid photos, showed both sides of the coin; the atrocious Nazis and the average German who wished to be liberated, indirectly taking away from the German people the indictment of collective guilt.

Shortly after the Potsdam agreement, all press outlets also recognized the necessity of the German industry for the European economic recovery. Nevertheless, American foreign policy did not seem influenced by the critique and kept pursuing its policy until the “Morgenthau-ish” policies could no longer compete with the perceived threat of the Soviet challenges. In regard to the Potsdam agreement, I would like to point out the absence of an analysis of the US diplomatic history by the press outlets when dealing with a similar situation; namely the German treaty after the end of the First World War. The fact that the US was for the second time in the same position, could function as a guide of what to avoid and what not to compromise. Nonetheless no media outlet used the Versailles Treaty and its consequences as a blueprint to educate the American people on what was practiced the previous time a peace treaty with Germany was signed nor did they express an expectation from the US delegates at Potsdam regarding the American claims or the outcome of the Potsdam Conference and waited for a policy to be delivered to them.

Moving on to the part of the American people, even though at least half of the press outlets under examination strongly criticized the Soviet Union, this did not seem to affect the American people, who wished a fruitful cooperation between the two powers. Let us not forget that the Second World War continued until the end of the summer of 1945 and the Soviet contribution to the war against Japan was not only valuable but also necessary for the US. Toward the German people the Americans shared the opinion of the press outlets; refrained from adopting the mentality of collective guilt but awaited the prosecution of war criminals. Additionally, and interestingly, the American people welcomed and were willing to support food rationing for the sake of starving Europeans, without excluding the Germans. However, their willingness was taken not into consideration by the US Administration and had the administration used the spring and summer of 1945 for the collection of food the 1946 winter crisis in Germany might not have been so severe and might not have caught the US off guard. Whether this was a result of Truman’s belief that a president should best serve what he considered to be in the nation’s interest without being
concerned about the poll results or a result of his inexperience as president especially in such turbulent times is hard to conclude, but definitely was a big failure which could have been at least to a certain degree avoided.

Apart from that the main concern of the American people at that time was not their foreign affairs but that the war was over and that the US was victorious and stronger with more international respect than when it entered it. The US public also welcomed the keeping of the promise to *bring the boys home* - a promise that was fulfilled through a rapid demobilization and most likely skyrocketed Truman’s popularity. On the other hand, the domestic threat of strikes and unemployment had been prevented by wartime mobilization of the workforce. But once the war ended, re-integrating returning soldiers into society and the economy, and the potential for strikes and unemployment contributed to the reasons why the American people could be distracted from the foreign affairs of their country.

Returning to the main question of this study and the triangular relationship between US official foreign policy on Germany, US press and US public opinion from the end of the war in Europe until the end of the year 1945, the US administration decided some hard occupation policies, like the non-fraternization ban, and the economic decisions reached at Potsdam, which would deprive Germany of waging an aggressive war again but also Europe of recovering. On the other hand, the press outlets and the US public opinion appeared more mature than the US administration, as the former denounced German collective guilt in contrast to the administration which clearly failed to foresee the failure of the non-fraternization ban. A possible change in the people’s opinion toward collective guilt cannot be studied as in 1944 they were only asked about the punishment of Nazi war criminals. The relationship between the American press outlets and the formation of US public opinion in reference to the Potsdam Agreement’s economic decision on Germany cannot be studied, because US foreign policy was related in the questionnaires of the polls mostly with the Soviet Union and no question was asked about the Potsdam Agreement (regardless of whether the questions included directly the term ‘Potsdam Agreement’ or its decisions were simply and more comprehensibly described).
Chapter 2

“The year of priorities setting”

1946

German: from “the catalyst that held the Big Three together in the war into the reagent to drive them apart in the peace.”

The New York Times, September, 9 1946

The official directives that determined US foreign policy and US occupation policy in Germany in 1946 were the same as in the previous year; namely JCS 1067 and the Potsdam agreement were still in force. However, the labyrinthine communication between Washington and US Military Government in Germany resulting in the failure to immediately form solid and clear implementation of policies for the fulfillment of the Potsdam agreement, as well as the failure to treat Germany as a single economic unit caused by the lack of cooperation among the Allies, forced the US government to reconsider and reformulate its foreign policy.

For the first half of the year the US military governor in Germany Gen. Clay analyzed the condition of Germany’s industrial power in a series of communication between him and the State and War Department. Clay repeatedly supported his opinion that the economic management of Germany as a single unit was inextricably linked to the psychological and physical situation of the Germans. In particular, in January and in April he shared with Secretary of State Byrnes his strong belief that he should “tell the German people at the earliest possible date” which industries were to be removed and which not in order to prevent a revival of Germany's war potential, but also unrest and “a condition of permanent unemployment,” in which communism and totalitarianism could thrive. Clay also explained in his February letter to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas Hilldring how the annexation of the Saar to France would inevitably influence the

446 Smith (ed.) (1974), Vol. I, pp. 154-155, 192-201. Before the war for instance the Ruhr area accounted for approximately two-thirds of Germany's total steel and coal production, more than one-half of its metalware production, one-third of the pre-war German exports etc.
German level of industry, and unify all Germans, and made the “embryonic” prediction “with more future political significance,” that the Soviet military government and the Communist party had “placed themselves before the German people as the hope of a restored Germany, as a result of the unwillingness of the western occupying powers to take a position in this matter.”447 In his April memorandum to Byrnes Clay concluded with his proposal about the formation of boards of directors, under the supervision of the Allied Control Authority until they were replaced by a German government, whose authorities would control the Ruhr production in order to prevent the redevelopment of industrial war potential.448

Even though Clay repeatedly in April and May reported to the War Department the danger of Germany falling for Communism due to the food crisis, he did not overgeneralize his fear and did not target the Soviet Union.449 On the contrary, Clay declared in July to the US military governor in Frankfurt and also jointly responsible for the US food policy for occupied Germany General McNarney that it was “difficult to find major instances of Soviet failure to carry out agreements reached in quadripartite government of Germany.” Any difficulty was produced by the failure to agree on “interpretation and methods to carry out previous agreements reached at international conferences” and that occurred not due to the Soviet but the “French unwillingness to enter into agreements relative to governing Germany as a whole.”450 Nevertheless, on June 11, 1946 Secretary of War Robert Patterson confidentially communicated to Secretary of State Byrnes the “Ruhr-Rhineland problem in relation to the security of the United States” as the industrial concentration of the area “would constitute a great threat in the hands of an enemy of the United State,” whether that was Germany or the Soviet Union.451

In the meantime another important event was taking place; the second session of the Council of Foreign Ministers which was held in Paris in two parts, from April 25 to May 16 and from June 15 to July 12. At this meeting the Foreign Ministers of the US, Britain, France and the Soviet Union met to discuss the peace settlements for Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, and

450 ibid. pp. 243-244.
Finland as well as to discuss materials relating to the Council’s informal consideration of German and Austrian questions. With the US Secretary of State Byrnes and the USSR Minister for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov each regarding the other as an obstacle to peace the task of the second session of the Council of Foreign Ministers was not easy, but it was necessary and thus the treaties were finalized at the third session of the council in New York from November 4 to December 12, 1946. Even though the focus of the meetings in Paris was not Germany Molotov delivered on July 10, 1946 a very important speech on Germany’s political, economic and military future in the postwar area as well as the question of the peace treaty with Germany. Specifically, Molotov said:

One should bear in mind the fact that, … [Germany’s] industrial might, … is an important link in the whole system of world economy … [and] the foundation for … [aggressiveness]. … I think, therefore, that our purpose is not to destroy Germany, but to transform Germany into a democratic and peace-loving state which, next to its agriculture, will have its own industry and foreign trade, but which will be deprived of the economic and military potentiality to rise again as an aggressive force. … If the world is to be safeguarded against eventual German aggression, Germany must be completely disarmed, both militarily and economically, and the Ruhr placed under inter-Allied control exercised by our four countries, with the object of preventing the revival of war industries in Germany. … [Additionally] before talking about a peace treaty with Germany, it is necessary to solve the question of setting up an all-German [democratic] government, … which will … be able to fulfil Germany’s obligations towards the Allies.

A quite similar US reply on this Soviet proposal came a few months later through the speech of the Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, on the economic reformulation of the US policy on Germany, which took place in Stuttgart on September 6, 1946. The speech, also known as the “Speech of hope,” boldly reaffirmed America’s intent to remain in Germany and to assign “primacy to priming the West German economy in the interests of western European rehabilitation,” and introduced the conversion of the US economic policy in Germany from a

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policy of reparations and dismantling to a policy of economic reconstruction.\(^{455}\) He strategically repudiated the economic policies of the Potsdam agreement by not ruling out the issue of reparations from current production as long as Germany’s level of industry was increased so that it covered its needs as well.\(^{456}\) Byrnes’ speech emphatically declared that “the US, too, could pluck the strings of German nationalism”\(^{457}\) by favoring German retention of the Ruhr and Rhineland areas under control which, however, would not be subject to “political domination or manipulation of outside powers.”

Freedom from militarism will give the German people the opportunity ... to take an honorable place among members of the United Nations. ... The conditions which now exist in Germany make it impossible for industrial production to reach the levels which the occupying powers agreed were essential for a minimum German peacetime economy. ... Germany is a part of Europe and recovery in Europe, and particularly in the states adjoining Germany, will be slow indeed if Germany with her great resources of iron and coal is turned into a poorhouse. [...] Security forces will probably have to remain in Germany for a long period. I want no misunderstanding. We will not shirk our duty. We are not withdrawing. We are staying here. ... The German people must realize that it was Hitler and his minions who tortured and exterminated innocent men, women, and children and sought with German arms to dominate and degrade the world. ... The American people who fought for freedom have no desire to enslave the German people. ... The American people want to help the German people to win their way back to an honorable place among the free and peace-loving nations of the world.\(^{458}\)

Clay reported that he found Byrnes after his speech reveling in the support he was receiving from Germans, “signing autographs for Germans from the rear platform of his train at a station stop.”\(^{459}\) Clay himself, however, was not absolutely in accord with Byrnes’ speech. In his


November memorandum to Byrnes Clay on the one hand protested against his decision to “unilaterally” permit the treatment of the Saar as “a separate economic unit” and the establishment of “a customs [union] between the Saar and the rest of Germany,” and on the other hand he once more insisted on increasing about 15% the level of industry not only as it was “essential to Germany” but also to “the revival of European economy.” According to Clay, in case the investigation of such a proposal failed it would result in the “partition of Germany, with ultimate political and economic competition between Western Germany under [western] allied controls and Eastern Germany under Soviet controls.” Nonetheless, Clay concluded that the US had much “at stake in gaining the opportunity to fight for democratic ideals in Eastern Germany and in Eastern Europe,” and that this was an opportunity which would “result from the true unification of Germany under quadripartite control.”

The foundation of Byrnes’ speech was laid by the American diplomat George Kennan in his 8,000-word telegram to the Department of State, in which Kennan described why the Soviet Union could not foresee “permanent peaceful coexistence” with the West due to Kremlin's traditional “neurotic view of world affairs” and the “instinctive Russian sense of insecurity.” The Soviet Union was portrayed as “a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there could be no permanent modus vivendi” and therefore, Kennan stressed out the need to educate the public “to realities of Russian situation” not only through the press but also through the government, which was “necessarily more experienced and better informed on practical problems involved.”

Byrnes’ speech in Stuttgart was, however, not the only statement from members of President Truman’s Cabinet delivered to the American people regarding the options of US foreign policy. A few days later, on September 12, 1946, Henry A. Wallace, former vice president and Secretary of Commerce under Franklin D. Roosevelt, a post he continued to hold until September 1946 under Harry Truman, delivered a speech in New York’s Madison Square Garden criticizing Truman’s Cold War policies and promoting a more sympathetic understanding of the Soviet Union.

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and a notion of peaceful coexistence with it, especially in an era of atomic warfare was the best policy.

We most earnestly want peace with Russia—but we want to be met half way. We want cooperation. . . . On our part we should recognize that we have no more business in the political affairs of Eastern Europe than Russia has in the political affairs of Latin America, Western Europe and the United States. . . . The Russians have no more business in stirring up native communists to political activity in Western Europe, Latin America and the United States than we have in interfering in the politics of Eastern Europe and Russia. . . We cannot permit the door to be closed against our trade in Eastern Europe any more than we can in China. But at the same time we have to recognize that the Balkans are closer to Russia than to us—and that Russia cannot permit either England or the United States to dominate the politics of that area. . . . Under friendly peaceful competition the Russian world and the American world will gradually become more alike. The Russians will be forced to grant more and more of the personal freedoms; and we shall become more and more absorbed with the problems of social-economic justice.462

Wallace’s approach was clearly contradictory to the foreign policy Truman and his Secretary of State were pursuing. Whether Truman was aware of the actual content of Wallace's speech in advance is doubtful. On September 12, 1946 in a news conference hours prior to Wallace’s NYC appearance, Truman appeared either to avoid acknowledging Wallace's speech or its actual content or was surprised by the question he received regarding the speech.

Q. Mr. President, in a speech for delivery tonight, Secretary of State--I mean Commerce--Wallace- %[laughter]--has this to say about the middle of it, "When President"--

THE PRESIDENT. Well now, you say the speech is to be delivered ?

Q. It is, sir.

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I--I can't answer questions on a speech that is to be delivered.

Q. It mentions you, which is the reason I ask, sir.

THE PRESIDENT. Well, that's fine. I'm glad it does. What was the question? Go ahead. Maybe I can answer it. [Laughter]

Q. In the middle of the speech are these words, "When President Truman read these words, he said that they represented the policy of this administration."

THE PRESIDENT. That is correct.

Q. My question is, does that apply just to that paragraph, or to the whole speech?


Two days later, on September 14, the President called the journalists into his office at the White House and read to them the following statement:

There has been a natural misunderstanding regarding the answer I made to a question asked at the Press Conference on Thursday, September twelfth, with reference to the speech of the Secretary of Commerce delivered in New York later that day. The question was answered extemporaneously and my answer did not convey the thought that I intended it to convey. It was my intention to express the thought that I approved the right of the Secretary of Commerce to deliver the speech. I did not intend to indicate that I approved the speech as constituting a statement of the foreign policy of this country. There has been no change in the established foreign policy of our Government. There will be no significant change in that policy without discussion and conference among the President, the Secretary of State, and Congressional leaders.\footnote{ibid.}{464}

On September 20, 1946, a week after Wallace’s speech, clearing the air regarding his administration’s foreign affairs objectives Truman asked for Wallace’s resignation, which he “hated to do,” as he wrote to his mother.\footnote{Harry S. Truman, (1955). \textit{Memoirs By Harry S. Truman: 1945 Year of Decisions}, New York: Konecky & Konecky, p. 560.}{465} However, Wallace had informed the President about his point of view. On July 23, 1946, the Secretary of Commerce send a letter to the US President, which according to Truman’s memoirs the President not only read, but also replied to and sent to Byrnes as a copy.\footnote{Truman (1955), p. 557.}{466} The letter stated that:

We should make an effort to counteract the irrational fear of Russia which is being systematically built up in the American people by certain individuals and publications. The slogan that communism and capitalism, regimentation and democracy, cannot continue to exist in the same world is, from a historical point of view, pure propaganda. ... The real test lies in the achievement of international unity. It will be fruitless to continue to seek solutions for the many specific problems that face us in the making of the peace and in the establishment of an enduring international order without first achieving an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence.\footnote{Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace to President Harry S. Truman, July 23, 1946 In Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secretary’s Files, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri. Retrieved on 6/9/2019 from http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/6906}{467}
One might well argue that Wallace was responding not only to Byrnes’ speech but to the infamous “iron curtain” speech on March 5, 1946, which former Prime Minister Winston Churchill was invited to deliver, alongside President Truman on American soil, at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri. Churchill called upon his “American military colleagues” to shield “the awful ruin of Europe” from the “two giant marauders, war and tyranny,” by joining “a fraternal association,” and urged the US to “not let [the western world] take the course of allowing events to drift along until it is too late.” Churchill “felt bound to portray” to the American people the “shadow,” which “has fallen upon the scenes so lately lighted by the Allied victory” and warned them about the “iron curtain” which had “descended across the Continent,” “from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic,” and called upon the US to “play its part in steadying and stabilizing the foundations of peace.”

Even though Churchill’s speech was no official statement of US foreign policy, the mystery around the question of whether Truman had known and approved of the content of the Wallace speech beforehand, should be understood in the context of the already existing and escalating tensions with the Soviet Union and the Allies’ failure to treat Germany as a single economic unity, which Byrnes’ speech confirmed. Today the “Iron Curtain” speech is considered one of the most significant moments in the historiography of international relations and thus it is interesting to study whether Churchill’s speech was viewed by the US press outlets as a stepping-stone for the “smoother” acceptance of Byrnes’ economic proposals toward Germany.

Lastly, on October 20, 1946 elections took place in the state of Berlin and the win of the pro-western party Social Democratic Party of Germany (German: Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) and the ranking of the Soviet-controlled Socialist Unity Party of Germany (German: Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED) in the third place revealed the preference of the Berliners.

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President’s Address at a Meeting with the American Society of Newspaper Editors

In his special conference with the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 18, 1946 in the East Room at the White House President Truman did not make any statements before he received questions. He seemed relaxed and he appeared to enjoy his meeting with them. Before proceeding with the questions the President of the Society expressed to the members of the Society his hope that they were responsive and they presented their “burning thoughts” immediately. Truman stated that the need for food throughout the world, to avoid starvation, was greater than it had been pictured, and assured the editors that the government was “doing everything that [was] humanly possible” to “be able to organize and function fast enough to really save millions of lives.” An editor marked that he had “never seen any adequate account of what opportunity for self-help there [might] be in these countries,” which the President explained with the inability of any country to have a crop “coming in this early.” The President expressed his hope for voluntary rationing, his thought that the American people had got “a heart in [their] body big enough not to want children and people, who [were] not responsible for this situation, just to starve,” and his intention to make the famine condition public. Another editor asked specifically about Germany and Japan and whether any food that was to be sent abroad would, should or needed to go to Germany or Japan and the President responded that “some of the worst starvation areas [were] in Germany and Japan.”

The thing the President “was working for with everything” he had was the international control of armaments and stated that only if the United Nations, as “the peace-making organization for the world,” failed to take care of this issue, then the US would have to take care of the armaments. However, that would not be the only consequence of such a failure. In case the UN failed to maintain peace, there would be “reason for anticipating a war between the members of the United Nations [...] [since the world would] simply drop back to the old power politics and spheres of influence.” Coming closer to the hot question about the relation between the US and the Soviet Union, the US President replied that the US “relations with Russia [were] as cordial as they ha[d] always been. When two horse traders get to bargaining, they sometimes get pretty rough with each other, but they hardly ever wind up in a fist fight. They usually make a trade. That [was] what [the US] proposed to do with Russia.” The President also declared that he had “no feeling
but of the friendliest sort for Russia, […] but the United States [was] in the position where [it had] to act as a sort of umpire in this world situation, and [it] want[ed] to be friendly with all of them, [Britain and the Soviet Union]. But the interests of the United States of America [were] those first items in which [the US administration was] interested.”

Hoping that the western powers would find a pattern of cooperation with the Soviet Union Truman did not cultivate an atmosphere of suspicion toward the Soviet Union. Of course, he did acknowledge the existence of a tension which had to be handled, but he seemed to prefer the diplomatic way for the management of this situation. However, it is worth keeping in mind that the press conference was held in April, therefore after Churchill’s speech, but long before the Stuttgart speech, and that is probably why the President still believed that the US needed to play the role of the “umpire.” Therefore, I feel that it also needs to be mentioned what the US President stated in his regular news conference after Wallace’s resignation about the “fundamental conflict” between Wallace's views on foreign policy and those of the administration. Truman expressed his “full endorsement” and “complete confidence in Mr. Byrnes […] and the policies which guide[d] him.” Truman also stated that “the people of the United States [might] disagree freely and publicly on any question, including that of foreign policy, but the Government of the United States [had to] stand as a unit in its relations with the rest of the world.”

As such, the purpose of this chapter is to observe whether the press outlets disagreed or agreed on the US foreign policy “freely and publicly.”

American Public Opinion as Evaluated by Polling

The year 1946 the polls of the American Institute of Public Opinion were oriented toward the US occupation policy in Germany and the western conflict with the Soviet Union along with the transition of the latter from ally to threat. Regarding the failing US occupation policy in Germany and particularly on the issue of fraternization, American public opinion was split in half;

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470 The American Presidency Project, Harry S. Truman, The President's Special Conference With the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 18, 1946, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, Retrieved on 8/28/2020 from https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/232797
in March 44% of the Americans polled thought the army should allow soldiers serving overseas to marry girls who lived in occupied countries in Europe, neither excluding Germany nor specifying whether the question referred to Allied countries, while 48% disapproved of that.\textsuperscript{472} Additionally, in June 31% of the people polled and only 23% of the World War II veterans polled rated as good the job of the US in handling its occupation of Germany.\textsuperscript{473} The 1946 polls also raised the topic of food in the American occupied zone of Germany and the necessity of additional food shipments. In January half of the Americans (49%) polled -civilians and World War II veterans- thought that the German people in the part of Germany occupied by the US would get enough food in the winter, while in March 67% of the Americans surveyed were willing to consume less meat and flour in order to send more food to the people of Europe.\textsuperscript{474} Regarding the food condition in Europe and the possibility to send food to other nations during the next four months, in order to do so 59% of Americans polled were willing to go back to food rationing. In April even though the vast majority of Americans asked (92%) knew about the food crisis in Europe, almost half of them (56%) admitted that their family was actually doing something to save on food, mostly because 44% of them over 30 years old thought that it would do them good to eat less.\textsuperscript{475} The peoples’ response became even more positive toward food rationing during the year. Specifically, in May 60% of the people polled saved on food and 70% of them were willing to go back to food rationing while in June 74% saved on food and 65% were willing to go back to food rationing.\textsuperscript{476}

With regard to the benchmark of this chapter, Byrnes’ speech, a Gallup poll in September showed that 57% of Americans polled found Secretary of State Byrnes’ job in dealing with foreign nations excellent or good, while in October 42% of Americans surveyed had followed the arguments concerning Wallace’s and Byrnes’ contrasting ideas for dealing with the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the majority of those 42% (78%) agreed with Byrnes’ speech and believed that his attitude was more firm and clear about where the US stood in contrast to Wallace's speech, which was interpreted as more lenient.\textsuperscript{477}

\textsuperscript{473} ibid. p. 582.
\textsuperscript{474} ibid. pp. 553, 562.
\textsuperscript{475} ibid. pp. 569-570.
\textsuperscript{476} ibid. pp. 574, 576, 582.
\textsuperscript{477} ibid. pp. 598, 604.
The alarming reports on the attitude of the Soviet Union started to shift American public opinion in reference to America’s foreign policy. The percentage of 54% of Americans who in the fall of 1945 trusted the Soviet Union had turned in 1946 into 58-60% (March-August) of Americans who believed that the Soviet Union was trying to build herself up to dominate or run the rest of the world, and the percentage of 55% of Americans who the previous year believed that the Soviet Union could be trusted to cooperate had turned into 35% in March of 1946.\footnote{ibid. pp. 564, 565, 567, 581, 582, 591.} Furthermore, in August 1946 71% of Americans polled disapproved of the Soviet policy in world affairs, 44% favored a firmer US policy if the Soviet Union continued its course and 62% of the American people asked had a less friendly attitude toward the Soviet Union than they had a year ago. The days of isolation were left far behind with the rise of these concerns about the Soviet Union; this was confirmed by the American public when 72% of the people surveyed expected the US to be an active part in world affairs.\footnote{ibid. pp. 591, 599.} Surprisingly, this shift was not a result of Churchill's speech, which in March 68% of Americans polled had heard of but only 22% of those who had heard the speech approved it.\footnote{ibid. p. 567.}

On the other hand, the existence of Communism in the US, might also had influenced the American people negatively. Regardless of its small size and influence, it fed into the American fear that Communism was not only growing rapidly but also aggressively. In July 36% of Americans polled suggested that American Communists should be imprisoned or killed while another 16% of them felt that they should be curbed or made inactive.\footnote{ibid. p. 587.} This could be explained by some August survey results revealing that 48% of Americans surveyed believed that American Communists were loyal to the Soviet Union, while 69% believed that Communists should not be permitted to hold civil service jobs in the US, and 78% believed that the Soviet Union had spies at work in the US.\footnote{ibid. pp. 593-594.}

Despite the belief in a Soviet threat, the Americans appeared split in August over the possibility of finding themselves in another war within the next 25 years (39% positive, 34% negative).\footnote{ibid. p. 591.} This notion might be interpreted by the security feeling provided by the possession
of the atomic bomb by the US. In fact, 66% of Americans polled did not wish to allow representatives of other nations to watch their atomic testing.\textsuperscript{484} In addition, in May 61% of the people surveyed approved the continuation of the manufacturing of the atom bomb. In December 72% of the Americans polled did not wish the termination of the atom bomb production and the destruction of the already manufactured. In fact, 65% of them also did not care if such an action would prove their good intentions in asking for international control of atomic bombs, as in such a case 72% of the Americans believed that, even then, the Soviet Union would not agree to let the U.N. committee check to see that it did not make atomic bombs. Lastly, 52% believed that the termination of the production of the atomic bomb by the US would not even achieve the Soviet agreement regarding international control of atomic bombs.\textsuperscript{485} Nevertheless, the American people appeared to wish to be prepared for the possibility of a war. In March and again in May 63-65% of the Americans polled believed that Congress should vote the continuation of the draft for another year and in December 70% felt the US should keep its Army and Navy as they were for another two or three years despite the high taxes.\textsuperscript{486} In September the non-isolationist attitude of the American people surveyed persisted as 80% of Americans and 93% of World War II veterans approved of the maintenance of US troops in Germany.\textsuperscript{487} According to pollster George Gallup, the fact that the majority of the American people polled approved the maintenance of American troops in Germany, could be interpreted as a sign of support of the US government.\textsuperscript{488}

Regarding the effect the international situation had on Truman’s popularity, at the beginning of the year the majority of the American people surveyed would vote for the Democrats, if a presidential election were being held.\textsuperscript{489} In addition, 63% of Americans polled approved of the way Truman was handling his job and ranked highly his honesty, sincerity and friendliness, the fact that he was doing the best he could under the current conditions and the handling of foreign affairs as reasons for his approval, while the way the government was handling the German issue did not appear in the things the people liked least about the way Truman handled his job.\textsuperscript{490} Furthermore, between February and August, the vast majority of the Democrats preferred Truman

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as their leader.\textsuperscript{491} However, the domestic situation, namely the continuing strikes, the increase in prices and in the cost of living dropped Truman’s approval in the way he was handling his job to 43\% and the democratic preference in case of presidential elections to 52.5\% in May and to 49\% in July.\textsuperscript{492} Byrnes’ speech did not seem to affect Truman’s popularity to the American public. Byrnes’ speech served more as a warning against the Soviet Union than a maneuver to regain the public’s trust in reference to the US foreign policy. The polls before the Congressional elections in November of that year confirmed this assumption, and revealed that the domestic situation, namely things that affected the everyday life of the American people, played a bigger role and that the Democrats seemed not to be up to these tasks.\textsuperscript{493}

In particular, when the American people were asked about the most important problem the US was facing, 46\% stated that it was the control of inflation, 20\% the food and other shortages, and only 10\% the maintenance of peace and conducting of foreign affairs.\textsuperscript{494} Hence, in October regardless of how the Americans themselves planned to vote, 63\% of them believed that the Republican Party would control the House in the Congressional elections and they were right.\textsuperscript{495} In December, after the Congressional results, when the people were asked what would be the first problems the new Republican Congress should handle, the Americans polled replied that the Congress should first deal with control of strikes, prices and cost of living, taxation, the housing shortage; namely what had cost the Democrats the win.\textsuperscript{496} Even though Truman’s popularity had dropped to 32\% he was still preferred by other Democrats, as 78\% would not vote for Henry Wallace in case a third party was formed by him.\textsuperscript{497} The final blow was the percentage of 9\% that the Democrats reached when the Americans were asked which party they thought would win the presidential elections in 1948.\textsuperscript{498}

\textsuperscript{491} ibid. pp. 559-560, 577, 593.
\textsuperscript{492} ibid. pp. 580, 585-589.
\textsuperscript{493} ibid. pp. 603-605.
\textsuperscript{494} ibid. p. 590.
\textsuperscript{495} ibid. pp. 603-604.
\textsuperscript{496} ibid. p. 610.
\textsuperscript{497} ibid. pp. 604, 611.
\textsuperscript{498} ibid. p. 613.
Press outlets

Walter Lippmann as Political Commentator

As already mentioned in 1946 US foreign policy is associated with Germany as well as with the Soviet Union and its focus was interchangeable. So was also Walter Lippmann’s report on his trip to Europe, which was expressed in a simple but straightforward prose. The journalist reported on the absence of attention to making peace, as “all European governments, all parties and all leading men were acting as if there would be another war.” He concluded that a clear American position could alter the “demonstrably dangerous, utterly reckless and conflicting” attitudes of Britain and the Soviet Union towards Germany.499 Lippmann supported the idea that the British-Soviet conflict of who would rule Prussia, and in turn Germany and Europe, revealed that neither of them had learnt a lesson from the previous war and proposed an immediate American intervention “in order to avert what would otherwise most certainly be a catastrophe for the whole world” and would turn Germany not only to a “battlefield” but also to an “enormous part” of it.500

No matter how bad, crude, aggressive or rude the Soviet behavior was, that was no excuse for the American diplomatic failure.501 On the contrary, it was a win for the Soviets who had played their aces and expanded in central and eastern Europe and were pushing into the Middle Mediterranean. Moreover, Lippmann argued that the central diplomatic objective of the American policy should have been the unification of the western zones as a first step toward the settlement of the German problem. Another pitfall of the American policy of demilitarization pointed out by Lippmann concerned the failure to remove German military officers. Besides the disarmament of the old German army and the dislocation and destruction of the old German war plants, the Allies had not deprived Germany of the “professional staff officers, the creators of armies.”502

Lippmann also encouraged a US statement regarding the fusion of the British and American sectors, an act which he did not consider as the creation of a western bloc. On the contrary, he suggested that a fusion could be open to include Eastern Germany, and that it would be an advantage for Eastern Germany to join the “hegemony of the richest part of the whole European Continent.”

In support of his argument he provided the way the United States of America was created when only 9 of the then existing 13 States ratified the Federal Union, “trusting that the others would be induced to join later.” For Lippmann the power of the Soviet Union was not that threatening. On the contrary, the western powers could take the initiative and lead the peace settlement with Germany. However, such a position could be achieved only if the western powers could agree on a united policy toward Germany, which in turn would limit the Soviet power to veto. Otherwise, the Soviet Union would be capable of creating a situation where the Germans would “not look to the western powers but to Moscow for the fulfillment of their national ambitions,” such as their frontiers, their economic relief or the waiving of paying large reparations if they came to terms with the Soviet Union.

According to Lippmann, an American policy should pay careful attention to the Soviet German policy, which aimed for an eastern unified and strong Germany with the ultimate goal to have it as “their partner” and not “their enemy” when Germany revived. For Lippmann, Churchill was “one of the greatest of military strategists,” and his speech at Fulton was “no mere private utterance but [held] the inevitable implication that western Germany was a military bastion against Russia and the decisive influence [...] in determining the American policy to lead the resistance to the expansion of the Soviet Union.”

Thus, Lippmann's focus a day before Byrnes' speech was on the establishment of a power equilibrium as the basic condition for the settlement of peace. As the place for the establishment of this equilibrium, Lippmann pointed to the Eastern Mediterranean area and in particular the Dardanelles. He advised that it was time the US took “the

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calculated risk” and directed its military might to that area so that it could “compel and induce the
Kremlin to negotiate a general world settlement.”

Even though Byrnes and Molotov did in fact have the same objectives for Germany, according to Lippmann, the Soviet declaration was a “statement of policy which the government
could in the end carry out,” while Byrnes' declaration was an “argument and an appeal, which, if
examined from the point of view of Germans who intended to restore the power of Germany, made
it more necessary and more practicable rather than less, that they work toward an alliance with
Russia.” Lippmann harshly criticized Byrnes' idea of a federal structure of Germany as a
“caricature of federalism” and highly doubted that his economic proposals could actually work
due to two simple facts: that Mr. Byrnes' expectation for economic unity entailed the participation
of the other three occupation forces as well as the reorganization of the German state.

No matter what the reality was, nothing could be achieved, according to Lippmann, if the
American policy did not become clear on “what Germany could be in Europe,” which needed to
be based on a correct calculation of the real balance of forces. Thus, for Lippmann, Mr. Byrnes' win
against Wallace was no actual win for the American policy. Byrnes’ suggestions did not lack
“firmness, sincerity and idealism” but practicability as Byrnes’ “narrow objective attempted by
force of argument to induce the Soviet Union to yield power and influence in the territory which
the Red army had occupied.” For Lippmann the “strategic plan” of Byrnes' peacemaking would be
tested in the outcome of the German settlement and would definitely fail if Byrnes dealt with
Germany the way he dealt with Italy, Yugoslavia and Trieste, engaged “in an auction” with
Molotov “trying to outbid each other” and made “Germany nothing but a pawn in the rivalry and
competition of the three non-European powers.”

Lippmann concluded that no matter how well the procedural part of the upcoming meetings
was organized, insufficient attention to substance would result to failure. The political analyst

emphasized once more that Byrnes should not regard Europe as an “arena of conflict between the Soviet Union and America, but as an ancient, deeply founded political system which must be recognized, restored, revived and treated with great deference and affection if a good peace was to be made,” while the American policy should be a product of an Allied agreement after thorough negotiations with them. By the end of the year, Lippmann once more described in a straightforward and clear manner what the US role and power to decide and act should be with regard to a settlement with Germany. Lippmann clarified that the veto power of the Soviet Union was restricted to the Soviet participation in the benefits of a German and European reconstruction. Therefore, the US had to understand that they needed the Soviet approval only to complete a European settlement and not to make progress toward one. Regarding the unification of Germany, Lippmann suggested a western unification first which would leave the Soviets either isolated by choice or would force them to co-operate and the ace up the western sleeve would be the reparations, which could be taken out of increased production in the western zones. And once more Lippmann concluded that single but mandatory condition to achieve a “real balance of forces” was a specified and calculated American vision of “what Germany could be in Europe as a whole.”

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The position of The Washington Post changed in the year 1946. Even though the newspaper did not lack the usual articles about blaming the Soviets for lack of cooperation or the fulfillment

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of their obligations toward the Potsdam Agreement, the ineffectiveness of American policy on Germany as well as Byrnes’ ambiguous attitude, the US’s unsuccessful and fruitless participation at the Paris Conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers and the excessive interest in the settlement of “satellite matters” did not leave the newspaper with much choice but to acknowledge not only the dead end the American policy had reached but also that the question of Germany’s fate constituted the vital test of Soviet-American relations. While the importance of Germany’s role in the European continent was emphasized, the newspaper endorsed every opinion in support of Germany’s revival and against the Soviet Union. Every new US policy proposal was justified by the constant American urge to fulfill the Potsdam Agreement while every failed US attempt for cooperation with the East was mostly blamed on the Soviets.517

Joseph Alsop in his Post column Matter of fact held the problematic American policy on Germany accountable for dividing the American people between those who wished to punish and pastoralize Germany and those who wished to rebuild Germany as a free democracy. Nonetheless, he stated that the latter policy could not be based on “hunger, misery and oppression, but on full stomachs and freedom from fear.”518 Furthermore, he challenged the “pastoralizers” to think about the Soviet campaign to incorporate Germany into the Soviet system before criticizing the “unavoidable” American “struggle for Germany against the Soviet Union.”519 Alsop alternated between the use of the term “Russia” and “Soviet Union,” referring also to the “Soviet” “purpose” and “policy” of USSR. In his view, the Soviet aggressive attitude against Germany not only violated the Potsdam agreement because of their extreme approach toward an exaggerated deindustrialization and demilitarization, but also made it impossible for the other powers in Germany to cooperate with the USSR. Nonetheless, the newspaper saw an “opportunity to compete

with the Soviet ideology throughout all Germany” if the western powers could meet the Soviet Union half way on reparations.  

_The Post’s_ disappointment with US foreign policy lasted until Secretary of State James F. Byrnes no longer, as it expressed it, “remained passive and confused in the face of a determined Soviet campaign to gain control of Germany and formally repaired the errors of the past.” Byrnes' speech was of “utmost importance,” but represented no new policy for _The Post_. It was a step toward the fulfillment of the Potsdam agreement, no challenge so much as an acceptance of a challenge -Communist expansion challenge by the Soviet Union- and a response to those who accused the US of lacking a foreign policy. Byrnes' “magisterial” speech was the first truly “comprehensive and coherent” statement of American policy toward postwar Germany, the most “fateful pronouncement of American foreign policy” since the Potsdam Conference, “a workable program of action” which, however, did not represent any new policy, only the results of the American experience in occupied Germany and did not intend to make Germany anyone’s pawn. The only ones who could attribute to Byrnes’ speech the intention of bidding for German support in case of a war with the East, would be the suspicious Soviets. From the time of Byrnes’ speech until the end of the year more or less almost all articles in _The Post_ saw no divergence from the Potsdam agreement in Byrnes’ speech. On the contrary, Byrnes’ speech was regarded as an invitation to all the Allies (but especially to the Soviets) to fulfill the Potsdam decision for German economic unity. This point was fortified with the publication of a comparison of highlights of Byrnes' speech and passages from Molotov's statement to the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris that showed that both men wanted the same things for Germany.

Obviously, Lippmann's ideas were complete contradictory to that of _The Post’s_. Lippmann’s position was also countered by the professor of political science, who also served as

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the adviser to the American Military Government, James K. Pollock. Even though Pollock acknowledged the “valuable contribution” of Lippmann’s articles to the German problem, the political scientist disagreed with Lippmann's warnings against “a Russian type or even a previous German type of highly centralized government” in Byrnes' speech as more or less a centralized government already existed in all occupation zones. Furthermore, Pollock expressed that he had no worries about the “Germans themselves reestablishing a highly centralized government.”

Surprisingly The Post journalist Barnet Nover, who months ago, authored intense and scratching critiques of the Soviet Union shared Lippmann’s opinion. He warned against the misconstruing of Byrnes' speech as letting “bygones be bygones and wanting to be friends with Germany,” which some Germans, who were totally lacking of “any sense of individual guilt” for what Nazi Germany had done, had interpreted from Byrnes' words.

Corroborating The Post’s position Alsop identified several positive outcomes from Byrnes’ speech, like for instance that the western zones had a strong bargaining chip to pressure the Soviet Union toward the economic unification of Germany: the Soviet desire for reparations and the integration of the Ruhr into the western zone. The Post’s editorial also argued that Byrnes' plan could reduce the occupation cost, because the “38 million Germans and a half million refugees of the western blocs could work out a system under which the bills of the United States taxpayers would at least begin to drop next year.” In defense of Byrnes' speech came, according to the newspaper, the report of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, which underlined Germany as “the keystone in the economic revival of prostrate Europe.” Another positive outcome of Byrnes' speech pointed out by the Alsop brothers, Stewart and Joseph, syndicated New Deal columnists who together wrote the nationally syndicated column, “Matter of Fact” from 1946 until 1958, which appeared three times a week in over 300 newspapers across the US and shared the position of The Post, was not only that the Soviet Union was cornered on the issue of economic unity once the western zones had merged, but also that the aftermath of the Berlin elections had

533 “Byrnes plan can cut our bill in Germany,” The Washington Post, (1946, September 15), B5
forced the Soviet Union to “try other means to achieve its aims in the former Reich.” In fact, the newspaper predicted that a year after Byrnes’ speech the struggle for Germany would “be three quarters won by the West” and the living standard in western Germany would be good in contrast to the life in eastern Germany, where “misery” would be the rule due to over-exploitation and shipment of goods to the Soviet Union. To win the battle against the Soviet “danger and disquiet” Lippmann’s rival journalist, Alsop, called for the consciousness that the “heavy responsibility” laid with the United States because of its “resources, manpower and fortunate situation.” The success of the meeting of the Foreign Ministers in New York, where the treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland were completed, was also attributed to Byrnes’ speech and was praised by The Post along with its positive signs for the upcoming meeting for the settlement of the German peace treaty. Lastly, Wallace's speech was just a “singularly unfortunate statement of dark imperialist intentions never intended to be a frontal criticism” of the policies pursued by Byrnes.

After a three-week visit to Europe, Herbert Elliston, The Washington Post’s editorial page editor from 1940-1953, suggested that a complement to Byrnes' policy was a “five-year American-sponsored plan for controlled reconstruction in Germany based on social reform for combating the Russification” of Germany. The editor listed all occasions in which the Soviet Union had taken the lead in the negotiations. He also attacked those who opposed Germany's reconstruction, while emphasizing Europe's dependence on Germany's coal and the importance of Germany's economic unification. He called upon the American statesmen to fulfill The Post's policy of depriving Germany of “power” and not “profit.”

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540 Herbert Elliston, “Russia bent on shaping Germany; it's time for us to lead,” The Washington Post, (1946, September 22), B1, 3.
By the end of the year, *The Post* was convinced Byrnes’ speech was “the best way to revive the ailing continent,” except from the former Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, who disagreed with the relaxation of the US policy toward Germany as described in Byrnes’ speech and in turn also Byrnes’ political centralization plan; Welles declared that the speech implied “grave dangers” on the ground and that this was exactly what had led the Germans wage the Second World War and what would endanger the security of Europe once more.

Despite *Post’s* mostly positive comments on Byrnes’ economic proposals for Germany, according to the newspaper, the occupation atmosphere kept deteriorating. Even though the G.I.s were educated through the newspapers, radio newscasts, forums, moving pictures, pamphlets and discussion groups on history as well as on current events, the results of a very disturbing poll taken by the Army among American occupation troops in Germany and published in February in the newspaper revealed not only a “deterioration of morale” but also a tendency to believe German arguments on the good that Hitler had done before the war and on why they fought the war in the first place. Furthermore, the food crisis and the humanitarian as well as the subjective consequences of a famine in Germany were pointed out by *The Post*. Lastly, *The Post* agreed that the fusion of the British and American zone would lift some burden off of the American taxpayers’ shoulders but it was regarded as a half-way measure to fulfilling the Potsdam Agreement unless the Soviet Union and France participated.

As the published letter to *The Washington Post* editor revealed, the readership of this press outlet was split. Some readers supported a long-term occupation of Germany or reminded of the last time the people felt sorry for the Germans. Others asked for a “humane outlook on the situation [of the] homeless [and] foodless,” stated that there were “no enemy children” and

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wondered why they could not send food to their “starving friends in Austria and Germany, who [...] were never Nazis.” Some also asked why there was no bread ration in the US and why the American government assumed that the American people would favor a policy of “hate, despair and lust for revenge,” which would make the Americans comparable to “German managers of the concentration camps where helpless victims were slowly starved to death.” Some also criticized the “strange paradox” of hiring German scientists and wondered “under what authority the War Department could hire enemy aliens [...] to engage in confidential war work.”

In reference to Byrnes’ speech The Post published letters of readers, who held similar views to those inherent in Byrnes’ speech with regard to their attitude toward Germany even before Byrnes’ speech. They saw his speech as “a step in the right direction,” which should be followed by the establishment of a directorate comprised of all German parties except for the National Socialists and the Communists in order to separate the democratic Germany from a Soviet Germany. On the other hand, there were also readers, who were less enamored of Byrnes’ speech and felt reluctant toward the prospect of the establishment of a provisional German government. Some could not comprehend how an East-West conflict would contribute to world peace and were frustrated with “the imposition of the question “Fight or peace?,” while for others the Soviet Union was still their ally.

The problem of the unfitness of the G.I.s, was also mentioned by The Post readers. A sergeant focused on the fact that the majority of the G.I.s reenlisted for a period of a year for “the
sole purpose of seeing Europe.”\textsuperscript{555} A former soldier in Germany located the failure of the American policy in the fact that it was carried out by the Army that was “incapable” of this duty due to the “poor training, selection and indoctrination of the junior officers.”\textsuperscript{556}

Comments on the American occupation policy reached \textit{The Washington Post} from the German side as well. A reader translated a letter s/he received from Germany that raised the question whether the US could teach the Germans the true practice of democracy since the failure of the US policy had only created hunger and unrest among the German people, who was at the same time threatened by the remnants of the Nazi ideology, while yet another translated letter from Germany stated enjoying being able to be frank and sincere again and wondered how shall Germany ever be cleansed of the guilt.\textsuperscript{557} Furthermore, \textit{The Post} published a text by a group of former members of the German Reichstag of the Weimar Republic, now residing in the US, who, in a quite demanding way and on the grounds that “even a conquered nation had the right to be represented,” requested the creation of a German body which would represent at the peace treaty the German people and negotiate with the governments “on all matters commonly concerning these nations and Germany.”\textsuperscript{558}

\textit{The Washington Post} apparently refrained from harshly criticizing the entire US foreign policy and referred to individual issues, like the food situation and the GIs. For the expression of a more clear-cut opinion the reader had to turn to Lippmann’s articles, which insisted on the formation of a clear foreign policy and of a workable balance of power among the allies, and did not believe in anything but the existence of a threat from the Soviet side. The newspaper supported Byrnes' speech and reported how, in the newspaper's opinion, the speech positively affected the Soviet attitude, while Lippmann saw Byrnes’ declaration as an argument to restore the power of Germany failing to take into consideration the real situation the East-West conflict had created. It appeared either as if \textit{The Post} readership also focused on the same issues as the newspaper or as if \textit{The Post} chose letters which fitted its position.

\textsuperscript{558} “Declaration on Germany,” \textit{The Washington Post}, (1946, December 29), 84.
The LA Times all but ignored US foreign policy toward Germany in 1946 except when Sec. Byrnes gave his German reconstruction speech in Stuttgart and when Churchill gave his foreboding “Iron Curtain” speech in Fulton, Missouri. These exceptions stemmed from the newspaper’s aggressive, combative and confrontational attitude against the Soviet Union and the newspaper’s position that they represented either a new US foreign policy toward Germany or a call for one.

Churchill’s political entreaty was praised by the newspaper and was used by the Los Angeles Times as proof of the importance and forthrightness of his speech it deemed of “worldwide significance.” The newspaper referred to his expertness in “penetration and understanding as a result of a lifetime of observation and experience,” which enabled him to “foresee the danger of a third world war if the Russian problems were allowed to drift.”559 Moreover, Churchill’s speech was defended by the newspaper in a manner that tried to counter any criticism towards Churchill's intentions. According to the newspaper, the former Prime Minister did not seek war with the Soviet Union. On the contrary, the danger of war arose from what the Soviet Union might do and not from what the US, Great Britain or any other “peace-loving member of the United Nations” might do.560

The newspaper did not lose its focus in 1946; its focus remained on the Soviet policy toward Germany, the Soviet mistrust against the United States, the Soviet attempts for political expansion and the ineffective attempts of the United States to cooperate with the Soviet Union at the Paris meeting. However, it criticized the vagueness of Byrnes' policy and the “political and economic disappointments” of the US position in Germany, which showed “no prospects of improvement.”561 So it seemed as if the newspaper intensified the attacks against the Soviet Union by promoting, on the one hand, feelings of distrust regarding the rising Soviet hostility against the American policies and, on the other hand, the American repeated but fruitless requests for the economic unification of Germany; an opinion expressed also by the newspaper’s daily

international affairs columnist Polyzoides, the voice of the LA Times that commented on US policy in Germany and on the evolving situation and role of the western occupation zones of Germany.\(^{562}\) Moreover, this year the importance of Germany was a means to emphasize the Soviet threat. The relationship of the economy of central Europe to the economy of “predominantly, if not exclusively” Germany was among the few reports of the newspaper to the German issue.\(^{563}\) Besides the Soviet ultimate goal had always been Germany. As the syndicated columnist Alsop reminded in his syndicated article, Lenin said “Who controls Germany controls Europe.” Hence, according to the LA Times, the new American policy should have a maximum and a minimum objective, with the maximum being withholding reparations, which the Soviet Union desperately needed and the threat of the westernization of the Ruhr and the minimum objective being to bring western Germany back to life as a part of the western system in case the maximum objective did not work.\(^{564}\)

To familiarize the American people with the vital importance of Germany's economy and the danger of its “drifting into Soviet economic totalitarianism,” the newspaper called on the American people to imagine how the economy of the United States would be if “[s]tates [such] as Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa and Missouri were to be cut off from the rest of the Union and placed under foreign military control.” US foreign policy in the course of the year did gradually become more aggressive, and just as the newspaper was advocating, more blatantly firm against the Soviet Union. Extensive articles worked to create an atmosphere of fear, suspicion and uncertainty on the part of the American people against the Soviet Union, while they paved the way for the Secretary of State to gain acceptance by the American people of a total re-evaluation of the role of Germany in the European theater. For instance, a report by the Moscow correspondent of the NY Times, Brooks Atkinson, was hosted in the newspaper, which advised that if the US wished to “establish workable relations with the government of the Soviet Union,” it had to “abandon the familiar concepts of friendship,” even though “the Russian people [were] admirable people, genuine, hard-working and practical.”\(^{565}\)


Even California renown statesmen like William F. Knowland, a Republican US Senator representing California, were employed in this campaign. Knowland not only endorsed Byrnes' policy but also appealed to the nationalist feelings of the American public by attacking the opponents of Byrnes' policy and calling on everyone to support a foreign policy that put the American nation, and not a political party, first.\textsuperscript{566} Such articles were published until Byrnes’ Stuttgart speech “performed a considerable service to peace and to European stability,”\textsuperscript{567} and put the capstone to his foreign policy structure with the consistent official restatement of the American foreign policy toward Germany and the “blunt warning against making Germany a pawn or partner”\textsuperscript{568} in a military power struggle between East and West.

Wallace's talk was, of course, at least until Wallace's removal from office by the President, criticized by the newspaper and characterized as something that temporarily “cut the ground from under the foreign policy that Byrnes had labored for a year to develop and define.”\textsuperscript{569} The newspaper welcomed what it saw as the first positive results of Byrnes' speech when first the Soviet Union expressed its willingness to accede to the re-examination of Germany's permanent status by the western Allies or possibly to relax its interest in Eastern Europe as well as when the Communist party in the Berlin elections suffered a defeat.\textsuperscript{570} An attitude of appeasement on the part of the Soviets, which, however, did not last long and which was eventually interpreted by the newspaper as credible evidence and proof of the existence of an “iron curtain.”\textsuperscript{571}

Since the newspaper refrained from commenting on specific foreign policy issues beyond expressing a desire to rebuild Germany as a bulwark against Soviet or communist expansion, one


\textsuperscript{567} “Byrnes helps clear the German air,” \textit{Los Angeles Times}, (1946, September 7), A4.

\textsuperscript{568} “Byrnes' plan for Germany dismay Paris; Russ silent,” \textit{Los Angeles Times}, (1946, September 7), 1,2.


needed to resort to Lippmann's articles, which the LA Times carried, for a broader, more openminded and balanced viewpoint. Apart from that perhaps the only LA Times article that represented the dilemma of US foreign policy more accurately was an editorial article where the author wondered what the actual US foreign policy was especially after the more or less presidential approval of all major but “largely contradictory and partly irreconcilable statements” of the year; Churchill's, Byrnes' and Wallace's speech.572

In his letter a professor of political science, who had served in the Legal Division of the US Military Government, attempted in his letter to the LA Times to explain why the de-Nazification process failed. Before the occupation the Americans knew too little about the “German political psychology and how deeply the Nazi contamination had penetrated into the minds of the people.” In addition, the boards responsible for the de-Nazification process did not have “enough technically experienced personnel” and Nazism could not be held a crime since it was “legal under the regime party membership.” Hence, a more practical approach was needed; an approach that would focus on the elimination of Nazis from positions that form public opinion and distinguish the “socially prominent and professionally important former Nazis from the small fry.”573

Los Angeles Times remained loyal to their strong anti-Soviet attitude. Byrnes' speech was regarded as the American “Fulton” speech, which supported the vital importance of Germany's economy and the danger of its drifting into Soviet economic totalitarianism and confirmed the newspaper's fear of Soviet expansionism.

The New York Times

The New York Times continued in the year 1946 to report on the complicated and not so successful US administration of its occupation zone. Starting with the inefficient application of the de-Nazification policy The NYT provided its readers with articles, which were not only written by journalists and reporters in Germany but also by experts like a former member of the Psychological Warfare Division in Germany, a representative of the Western Newspaper Union, the Assistant Chief of Staff of the US Forces, European Theater or the general secretary of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ. All reported on the difficulty of the de-Nazification process as Hitler's

regime had become “the symbol of the good old time”\textsuperscript{574} and a lot of Germans accused solely the SS for the Nazi atrocities making the “growth of a nihilistic spirit”\textsuperscript{575} in the German people more dangerous than anything else for the future of their country.\textsuperscript{576}

The \textit{NYT} also reported that the failing American morale in Germany created the opportune environment for the development of a black market, which was mostly supplied by the American Army. Cigarettes, chocolate and coffee were among the top products of the black market, which were found in surplus in the American occupation zone. Furthermore, on the one hand, the fact that the US occupation force by 1946 mostly consisted of men who had not experienced combat against the Nazis and had not built up a personal bitterness against the occupied nation, or were not adequately trained for the task of occupation added to the already existing problem.\textsuperscript{577} In addition, the “international impasse” concerning the centralization of the German administration resulted in hindering the fulfillment of reparations, a policy which had become the political and economic program of the American zone.\textsuperscript{578} Both problems were addressed, according to the chief European \textit{NYT} correspondent C.L. Sulzberger, quite poorly and unprofessionally by the US government, which blamed either France or Congress and the American people who demanded that the boys be brought back home.\textsuperscript{579}

Six months later, and close to the end of the year, the \textit{NYT} foreign news correspondent Anne O'Hare McCormick drew a completely different picture. According to McCormick, the occupation had began to take shape with G.I.s who required “a greater variety of technical skills than the fighting force, trained for a complex and difficult duty of occupation,” with an American military government which successfully started to turn over the administrative responsibility to

\textsuperscript{575} “Humane attitude to Germany urged,” \textit{The New York Times}, (1946, September 26), 5.
Germans. This created a better atmosphere than in the rest of the western zones, which made the Germans “feel freer under the Americans” and initiated “self-expression and political discussion.”

Additionally, the German people welcomed the upcoming merger of the economic union of the British and the American zones. Despite the fact that the non-fraternization process was proven inadequate and fruitless during the first months of the occupation, when all “hate-the-Germans” Army training manuals, books and films were recalled, mixed messages about trusting Germans as a whole were being given.

The American policy, however, did not fail only in the democratization process, but also in its economic policy. The NYT agreed that the US strived to fulfill the Potsdam economic decisions and the unification of the German economy, nonetheless, the reality was that the failure to establish central administrative units in the economic field, led the occupation zones to take individual courses to maintain the economic life of their zone. Also, the newspaper pointed out that the famine problem was gradually burdened by the fact that the Soviets had stripped Eastern Germany of livestock, food and machinery, and by the fact that the American de-industrialization process had deprived the people of “agriculture implements, tools, fuel and fertilizers.” Lastly, the depopulation of “the food-surplus section of Germany” inevitably led to the rotting of the crops in the fields. Pointing to the statement of a Stanford economist about the urgency of the revision of the German economic policy, The NY Times called for the alteration of the US economic policy in Germany and the abandonment of the economic agreement of the Potsdam treaty on the grounds that it was not fulfilled by all Allies; namely not by the Soviet Union. In fact, the urgency caused by an economically and politically united Germany along with the fact that the situation would

have been completely different if the Potsdam agreement had been fulfilled, made Byrnes' speech “no news” for The NY Times.586

Therefore, the newspaper not only welcomed Byrnes' “unprecedented”587 and “important”588 speech but also anticipated such a statement due to the obscurity of purpose that had surrounded the US foreign policy from the beginning.589 Byrnes' rejection of the French claims in the Ruhr and Rhineland as well as his statement in support of the establishment of a central German government appealed to western Germans as well, according to the newspaper.590 Germany had been transformed from “the catalyst that held the Big Three together in the war into the reagent to drive them apart in the peace” but through Byrnes’ proposals “the line-up of the powers on the most crucial problem of European peace,” that of Germany, was becoming “fairly well defined.”591 That was the conclusion The New York Times drew after Byrnes’ speech. The NY Times summed up the reasons that brought the US, Britain and the Soviet Union to this point, by starting from the failure to cooperate and fulfill the Potsdam decision to treat Germany as an economic unity, and the contradictory definitions of democracy between East and West, while all along both sides were “wooing the Germans” by “inferentially blaming the other for the conditions in Germany. With Byrnes’ speech the struggle over Germany was “in the open.”592 The newspaper blamed only the USSR for the failure of the treatment of Germany as an economic unity and did not relate it to the decision to unite the British and US zones economically, which went explicitly against treating Germany as a single economic unit. On the contrary it made the fulfillment of the Potsdam agreement appear realistic only “within the framework of the unified United States and British zones.”593 The NY Times justified Byrnes’ speech by claiming the Secretary of State had to

587 Harold Callender, “Byrnes is expected to make 'important' talk in Germany,” The New York Times, (1946, September 3), 1,2.
draw a line between his “repeated efforts to enlist Russia's friendly participation in various financial and economic plans and an endless yielding of principle” which would merely “encourage higher, and potentially dangerous, demands.” Furthermore, Wallace's speech was characterized by the newspaper as an individual’s “momentary doubt” toward the “unchanged United States interests in Europe.” The NY Times expressed their preference for Byrnes' suggested policy, but no severe criticism of Wallace was expressed by the newspaper, in contrast to other Byrnes-friendly press.

From the time of Byrnes’ speech on, mixed reports were published in The NY Times regarding Soviet behavior toward the US and vice versa. On the one hand, according to a NY Times correspondent, Byrnes’ speech affected the German vote. The win of the Social Democrats in Berlin was a win “without money or a spectacular campaign,” in contrast to the “Communist-led Socialist Unity party which commanded resources for brilliant and persuasive propaganda and also for briquettes of coal brought in from the east and stamped with the party initials.” This win might not have been a vote for capitalism, but it was “a vote against Russia.” Addressing the issue of the tension between East and West, an Assistant Professor at the University of Geneva in neutral Switzerland argued that the role of Germany had been “exaggerated.” Even if Germany was to be wiped out of the European map, the Soviet fear would only be eased, if the Soviets had been convinced that the western powers had only “peaceful intentions.” Lastly, a behind-the-iron-curtain authenticated report revealed that the Soviets were draining Germany's industrial production for reparations while creating Soviet trusts. Specifically, the factories were working two and three shifts per day, shrinking the machines’ life from ten years to three or four years. Furthermore, the exploitation of nationalized natural resources like coal, potash and lumber was unlimited. On the other hand, the fact that the Soviets agreed to allow the Four-Power Coal

Commission to inspect the economic system set up in Eastern Germany was “a remarkable departure from the Russian attitude in the past,” as the newspaper wrote. The reduction of the Soviet armies of occupation, the possibility of the revision of the Polish frontiers, the successful ending of the four Foreign Ministers meeting in New York at the end of the year and the Soviet acceptance of the appointment of special deputies for Germany was regarded by *The NY Times* in December 1946 as a positive omen for the Moscow meeting the following year and the settlement of Germany's peace treaty.

The vast majority of the letters to the *NYT* editor, which were selected for publication, were against a vindictive policy in Germany. According to a former member of the Economic Division of OMGUS in Germany, instead of thinking that something would turn up to balance the German economy, the US had to choose between three options: the abandonment of the deindustrialization process, the reduction of the German population or a joint relief support of Germany at a continuing and perhaps increasingly heavy cost to US taxpayers; an opinion which also other readers shared. Additionally, the Potsdam agreement, the famine and the burning of Nazi books conflicted with American “ideals [and] interests,” while the unification of the occupation zones, the creation of trade unions “along truly democratic lines and in accordance with the wishes of the workers themselves” and their unification into a zone-wide federation was the beginning of the resolution of a problem the western Allies had created with their mistakes.

A committee of American educators even declared in a statement prepared for the State Department their views on the cultural and moral re-education of the Germans. The committee focused, among others, on policies that would relate the restoration of the “stability of a peaceful...

German economy with the recovery of a national unity and self-respect” and would establish “universally valid principles of justice, toleration between diverse cultural and racial groups, and a shared responsibility for public policy.” In addition, that neither the heads of the German universities nor anyone from the German Medical Association had not denounced the war crimes committed by Nazi physicians proved to a NY Times reader that the problem was rooted deep into the German professional ranks and that a “radical denazification” was the only solution.

Regarding the reaction of the NYT readership, the majority of The New York Times letters published did not express any suspicion feelings against the Soviets. A reader felt that the fear toward the Soviet Union did not derive from “any liking for American or any other kind of democracy,” but merely from a fear toward Communism, a doctrine “weak” and “negligible” in the US, while another reader urged that if the Soviet plans were indeed non-aggressive, a unification of the powers that shared a common ideology would be respected by the Soviets. Another NY Times reader stated his belief that Soviet-American cooperation during the war was based upon “convenience” rather than upon “any conceivable unity of purpose.” On another account, a veteran who had just come back from over two years in Europe, the G.I.s were not interested in the Germans, they just “needed a comfortable place to sleep, food at all times, a woman to do laundry, no Army duty requiring labor and a chance to fraternize as often as possible;” or in other word a “good deal.”

The New York Times reported on a variety of failed policies in the US zone of Germany - de-Nazification, democratization, the deindustrialization process- and emphasized their effect on the G.I.s' morale as well as on those Germans who continued to have Nazi sympathies. Byrnes' speech was approved by the newspaper and regarded, more or less, as the only thing left to do in order to fulfill the Potsdam agreement and to confront the Soviet Union on whether it truly wished a united Germany and a fruitful cooperation with the western allies. The newspaper’s readership

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neither wished nor approved Germany’s industrial and economic doom and did not undeniably adopt the notion of Soviet threat.

_The Wall Street Journal_

_The Wall Street Journal_ continued to support the importance of the restoration of industry and trade in Germany and the urgency of, what it called a realistic, consistent and intelligent policy toward Germany and not one based on petty and spiteful revenge.\(^{611}\) Furthermore, for the newspaper it was imperative that the German industries that had escaped destruction by bombing should work at full speed in order to prevent Europe from starving. Charity was no longer enough and a drastic revision of the American economic policy in Germany was necessary.\(^{612}\) The newspaper continued to publish on the economic importance of Germany for the entire continent. It supported the decision of the Military Governor Clay to seize all deliveries of reparations from the American zone until the Soviet Union delivered the equivalent payment or exchange in food, coal and other mineral products and until the country was treated as a single economic unit, as decided at Potsdam.\(^{613}\) It also published an extensive report on the catastrophic consequences of the amputation of key industries from Germany on Europe, like the impact on the port of Rotterdam, which had been built to service German heavy industry, the economies of the countries surrounding Germany, which were tied to the German economy as well as Sweden’s exports of high-quality steel to Germany.\(^{614}\)

Regarding the East-West conflict the newspaper believed that American foreign policy should handle its troubled issues with the Soviet Union with firmness and conciliation if truthful results were to be yielded in the American-Soviet relations.\(^{615}\) Churchill’s speech was published in a small paragraph on the frontpage of the newspaper mentioning his warning of a western division in case the Soviet Union managed to expand its power and doctrines.\(^{616}\) The relationship between the US and the Soviet Union was also on the frontpage of the newspaper but did not

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include any provocative language. The author reproduced the State Department's opinion on the American intention to fight against any Soviet move that jeopardized the security of the US and Great Britain, as Churchill already proposed, but at the same time mentioned that even the more pessimistic officials did not believe that the Soviet Union would wage war. As the reporter stated, this was the foundation of the new US policy of firmness to prevent a war with the Soviet Union and not to allow it to expand politically and economically over its borders.\footnote{Charles R Hargrove, “The Germany of today,” The Wall Street Journal, (1946, April 2), 6.}

The importance and imperativeness of a quadripartite administration was the main focus of the newspaper.\footnote{Charles R Hargrove, “Reich outlook,” The Wall Street Journal, (1946, March 8), 6.} However, less than a year after the unconditional surrender of Germany the United States was forced to reverse its policy towards Germany and pay heavy costs for food supplies and shipment or else Germany could not be put back on its feet.\footnote{Charles R Hargrove, “The Germany of today,” The Wall Street Journal, (1946, April 3), 6.} For the newspaper this was the inevitable result of the war but the alleged fact that the US shouldered alone this responsibility was due to the lack of cooperation and common policy in the four occupation zones. Furthermore, the newspaper supported the passing of the administration of the occupation from the soldiers to civilians; civilians who were willing to leave home and country and work among ruins to rebuild Germany.\footnote{Charles R Hargrove, “Reich outlook,” The Wall Street Journal, (1946, March 8), 6.} According to the newspaper the next step should be the centralization and the fulfillment of the Potsdam directive of the treatment of Germany as “a single economic unit” as well as the revival of its industry which would allow the country to minimize its needs for imports and earn its foreign exchange through exports.\footnote{Charles R Hargrove, “Reich outlook,” The Wall Street Journal, (1946, March 8), 6.} In other words the newspaper supported the Potsdam agreement and urged its implementation without the use of extravagant rhetoric or warnings about Soviet expansionism but simply acknowledging the threat of inflation and its consequences in Germany and internationally.

The only contradictory voice to the paper’s general position was that of anti-Communist and seemingly philo-German William H. Chamberlin, who held not only the US foreign policy but also the US domestic situation accountable for the situation in Germany. The journalist believed that what had confounded American foreign policy was its national policy; namely the fact that American public opinion did not seem to “recognize the complete incompatibility of

\footnote{W.C Bryant, “Russian relations,” The Wall Street Journal, (1946, March 13), 1,8.}
trying to re-educate the Germans along democratic lines and at the same time reducing them to hopeless pauperization.”622 Furthermore, Chamberlin used strong language and accused the American people of “mass murder through slow starvation on a gigantic scale” of the German people if they did not encourage Germany to become self-sustained.623 Shortly after the previous publication, a series of true but nevertheless melodramatic reports by Chamberlin about the ruined cities of Germany and the nostalgic illusions of their colorful past, as well as about the political, economic and social disintegration of the country, which was even worse than the post-World War I period, were published in the newspaper.624 Even though Chamberlin did not deliver any new information on an alternative to the foreign policy or the situation in Germany to the readership, his articles were published almost on a daily basis. Regarding US foreign policy, the journalist not only backed the fusion of the British and American occupation zones, which he viewed as a counterpoint against the influence and control of Eastern Europe by the Soviets, but also argued about what he saw as the impracticability of the Potsdam agreement, which might have been “a step in the right direction” but was not an answer to the problem of creating a self-sustainable German economy.625

The journalist kept repeating the same critiques in his articles about US policies causing the starvation of the German people, the importance of the economic development of the country and the fiasco of the de-Nazification process, but as Byrnes’ speech was coming closer his biting tone got milder. In a series of three consecutive articles Chamberlin summed up the situation in Germany accompanied by stories and opinions of local Germans, as well as the flaws of the American occupation policy up to the day of Byrnes’s speech in Stuttgart.626 The peace treaty with Germany would be, according to Chamberlin, “a searching test of the ability of the Soviet Union

and the western powers to reach a tolerable modus vivendi.”⁶²⁷ The agreement on the peace, however, would have to translate Byrnes's Stuttgart speech “into reality” and be a “sensible” and “constructive” agreement in contrast to the “Hitlerian peace” agreed at Potsdam, which subjected Germany “to drastic territorial mutilation” and its people to starvation.

A day after Byrnes’s speech its main points were simply and quite briefly reported in The WSJ without commenting, approving or criticizing any of them, and of Chamberlin’s position.⁶²⁸ Two days later, the newspaper called the readers' attention to the importance of Germany not becoming a satellite country of any power, and justified the lack of any commentary on Byrnes's speech in the newspaper by writing that it would take some time until anyone truly understood the significance of the meaning of this speech.⁶²⁹ Instead, the newspaper reported on the elections in the Soviet zone in eastern Germany, which, according to the WSJ correspondent, provided “an interesting lesson in political democracy as understood in the Soviet zone of Germany” as the winning coalition, which was a combination of Communists and Social Democrats, used the Soviet control of the economy to their advantage.⁶³⁰ Only a couple of weeks later, and using the Soviet demand for control of the Dardanelles and the situation at Trieste as an excuse, Chamberlin connected the hint in Byrnes’s speech regarding the Soviet plan to use Germany as a “very powerful pawn in power politics” to the wider philosophy of Soviet expansionism.⁶³¹ A month later the magazine called on the American people to decide whether they preferred one world or two worlds since the economic and political expansion of the Soviet Union continued regardless of the American sentimental pursuit of a “One World” policy, which was interpreted as “moral weakness.” On the contrary, the organization and assistance of the United National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), in Europe as well as in countries behind the iron curtain, which was financially supported by the US, did not receive “adequate appreciation” by the Soviet Union.⁶³²

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Mr. Chamberlin's warning that the treatment of Germany was based on the fallacy that the country could be stripped of its means of livelihood and that its industries could be transferred to other countries without a loss in efficiency, and Mr. Chamberlin’s suggestion that the reparations agreed upon at Potsdam caused the depression of the living standards of the Germans provoked the response of the Personal Representative of the President on the Allied Commission on Reparations with the rank of Ambassador, Mr. E.W. Pauley. Mr. Pauley not only accused Mr. Chamberlin of camouflaging the word “reparations” with the phrase “economic treatment,” but also of writing about untenable issues, such as the removal of industrial plants, when no such removals took place in the western zones, or the lack of adequate industrial productive capacity, when the actual problem was the damage of the industrial equipment, the shortage of manpower, the lack of trade etc. Mr. Pauley also attacked Mr. Chamberlin's so-called sensible and realistic method of collecting reparations, because it would in fact leave Germany with a surplus of war material.633 The contents of Pauley’s long letter to the newspaper was not aggressive but logically structured and documented. Mr. Pauley was one of the people who knew better than anyone else how the situation with the reparations unfolded, which gave his words even more credibility than Mr. Chamberlin. One might also think that the newspaper had to publish this letter, not to allow different opinions to be heard but solely due to the position of Mr. Pauley, since the newspaper scarcely ever published letters which criticized Mr. Chamberlin’s articles, let alone negated them. Until the end of the year, grant only one more week, and one filled with holidays, the newspaper published neither any response by Mr. Chamberlin nor any letter by a reader.

1946 ended with the economic merge of the British and American occupation zones in Germany. The creation of “Bizonia” hit the front page of the newspaper as soon as the pact between the two countries was signed and The WSJ briefly mentioned the importance of this merge, which was to make these zones collectively self-sustainable.634 Although this fusion was regarded as too little, too late, as a “belated attempt to repair the process of European recovery,” a few days later the newspaper focused on the benefit of this merge in the long run which would save the US government’s money and restore the German people to a self-sustaining basis. Nevertheless, the newspaper advised against granting the complete amount of US money at once and suggested a

six-months appropriation. The tone of these articles was very convincing and the argumentation was based on something that concerned the American people, namely how much would the restoration of the former enemy cost the American people.

Before completing the study of The WSJ two comments need to be made. Chamberlin occasionally referred to Russia as the Soviet Union. The content of the articles in which he chose to address the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the Soviet Union might explain his preference, as in these articles he either reported the “Soviet Union endeavors to dominate the economic life of countries in Eastern Europe” or described the “undisputed […] Soviet political hegemony” in nine European countries (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Finland and the eastern parts of Germany and Austria) probably attempting to connotate the term Soviet Union with Russia’s expansive intention in Eastern Europe as well as its earlier coercive inclusion of non-Russian republics into the union. Furthermore, Chamberlin wrote about the “imperative” need of “a self-supporting Reich,” without intending the term “Reich” or empire as being derogatory or ironic with regard to Germany, for recovery in Europe. His apparent attempt to revive the question of German boundaries as “Reich” boundaries fit in with his emphasis on the need of a Reich-like German contribution to European recovery.

The Wall Street Journal readership appeared split toward Germany and its people. Some of the letters chosen for publication mentioned that a hard peace would be like “kicking your former enemy after having beaten him into unconsciousness” or that no peace based on force could ever last and would soon enough launch another war. For another reader the US would not have been victorious if they had allowed children to scrape American garbage cans out for food -without specifying whether they referred to German children as well-, another reader promoted the ideals of “human freedom, justice and constitutional government.” In the middle was a Wall Street Journal reader who suggested hard labor paid in the regular way, taxes that would deprive the Germans of a luxurious living, and goods in the stores for the labor to buy as salvation from the

miserable everyday life of the Berliner.641 On the other hand, it was not obvious to everybody how the propagandist idea of the “complete disintegration” of Germany could affect the economy of Europe, while a returned veteran who spent over a year in all parts of Germany reporting having seen “husky” young Germans lying “idle” in every town and city, while agricultural machinery and farm animals looted from all over Europe remained untapped.642

_The Wall Street Journal_ urged the US to have a realistic, consistent and intelligent policy toward Germany and not one based on petty or spiteful revenge; it also supported the allied cooperation and the fulfillment of the Potsdam directive of the treatment of Germany as a single economic unit as well as the revival of its industry. Nevertheless, after Byrnes’ speech the attitude of the newspaper changed toward the Soviet Union and the way it could use Germany for its political benefit.

**LIFE**

*LIFE* started the new year with an article on the first postwar winter of Europe. The correspondent referred to the German people admitting that they were better clothed than most European people but that their food supply was below subsistence level. The *LIFE* correspondent reported that this winter might be even worse than the situation during the war, something the Allies would be blamed for. The correspondent went on reporting how low American prestige was in Europe and how high their ignorance was, since the American occupation forces failed to understand the European conditions. Punishing the Germans indiscriminately for the sins of their leaders was not the way to restore civilization. The article was, however, accompanied by photos of Germans winning the sympathy of the G.I.s.643 Furthermore, an editorial article disapproved of the internationalization of the Ruhr and viewed the Potsdam agreement as a negative program which focused mainly on reparations and disarmament, while the central error of the agreement was the fact that the German economy could be treated separately from Europe's.644

Churchill's speech, however, functioned as a triggering event for *LIFE* which stimulated the magazine’s interest against the Soviet behavior and proposed the essentials for a new world

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policy for the US In his article the former Ambassador to Great Britain, Joseph P Kennedy, insisted on the importance of the maintenance of military forces in Germany and the close cooperation with Great Britain for the formation of a Western European bloc against the Soviet ideological policy of a “worldwide extension of communism.” A month and a half after Churchill's speech a LIFE correspondent delivered his report on the extent of Soviet control on the political, economic and cultural life behind the iron curtain.

LIFE attacked the cartoon of The New York Times that depicted the US, Britain, France and the Soviet Union in discussions surrounded by a cloud of “misunderstanding” while smoking the pipe of peace; LIFE characterized such an interpretation of the peace negotiations as 100% wrong. For LIFE it appeared to be a fact that all four powers knew that they were not misunderstanding each other but that they were in intense conflict with each other. LIFE’s bold conviction was that this conflict would never end, peace would never spread normally and that the American people should learn to live with the existence of this conflict. Even though LIFE tried to state that the magazine did not promote a clash with the Soviet Union, the magazine published in two consecutive issues two extremely long reports on Soviet foreign policy and techniques written by the firmly anti-communist John Foster Dulles, who had opposed holding Germany responsible for WWI reparations while serving on the post-WWI US Reparations Commissions and Economic Council. Dulles claimed that the only way to eradicate the expansion of communist political philosophy would be to demonstrate to the American people that the freedoms the Soviets suppressed, had such vigor and value for the Americans that anywhere American influence prevailed such freedoms would remain deeply rooted. According to Dulles the Soviet techniques of non-intercourse and non-fraternization were not only applied by the Western allies toward Germans but also to the inner part of the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union -namely the satellite countries- as a way to effectively enforce propaganda and influence and promote the welfare of the proletariat. Nonetheless, the Soviet methodology of ruthlessness had a flaw, Dulles insisted. It underestimated the “Western world's repugnance to human suffering and its attachment to personal liberties,” which would evidently make the people of the West look behind the iron curtain.

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647 “Why kid around?” LIFE, (1946, May 27), 20(20), 36.
On this occasion as well Dulles used the term “Soviet Union” not only in reference to Soviet Russia but also to the Eastern European countries the Soviets were, in Dulles’ view, turning into satellites.

Hence Byrnes’ policy was endorsed by LIFE, which stated that the determination of the American people could put the missing and “the winning card in the hand of their Secretary of State.” 649 LIFE continued to attack the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Even though the articles were not directly connected to the management of Germany they nurtured the American public’s feelings of disbelief and suspicion. In LIFE Americans read that the internal problems of the Soviet Union were rooted in the Red Army and the abnormal minds of its marshals who pursued the expansion of Soviet territory, as well as the good physical state of the Red Army, implying that this was in contrast to the population as a whole, due to the sport programs of the Soviet government, which increased the height and weight of army recruits. 650 Furthermore, despite the sincerity and kindliness of the Soviet people, the lack of freedom inside the Soviet Union created an atmosphere of bitterness and tension that left Americans with no other choice but to put their hopes in an armed peace. Again the magazine clearly distinguished between the use of the term “Soviet” and of “Russian;” namely Russia was the Soviet Russia while Soviet was anything expanding out of its boundaries. The magazine added that the future of world security did not solely lay in the hands of politicians and Army men but also in the hands of scientists and in particular in the hands of German “brains” which the Soviet Union already approached with offers of a very good salary and freedom of research and of person, an initiative the US would compete with by offering citizenship and even higher US salaries commensurate with the talents of the scientists. 651 The recruitment of German scientists who had worked for the Nazis and their military and racial goals by the US was no secret. In fact, LIFE revealed the location where these scientists

649 John Dulles Foster, “Thoughts on Soviet foreign policy and what to do about it,” LIFE, (1946, June 3), 20(22), 113-126. See also: John Dulles Foster, “Thoughts on Soviet foreign policy and what to do about it,” LIFE, (1946, June 10), 20(23), 119-130.
650 “Mr. Byrnes’s new hand,” LIFE, (1946, June 17), 20(24), 34.
652 Charles J.V Murphy, “The state of the armed forces,” LIFE, (1946, September 2), 21(10), 96-108.
worked, the fact that they were not prisoners but employees of the US War Department and even that they were paid $6 a day.  

The benchmark of the year, Byrnes’s speech, was not transcribed verbatim by LIFE, but the magazine acknowledged it as a sign that the US was “determined to play [a] major role in the European affairs.” It signaled that European unity was the unstated premise of the American diplomatic actions in Europe and in particular the premise of the American policy in Germany for “a revived and united Germany.” If the Soviet Union did not wish to participate the only alternative would be a division of Germany “into western and eastern halves.” The magazine, of course, continued to support Byrnes’ speech and policy having the renown German-American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr write that Byrnes’s address at Stuttgart gave the democratic Germans the welcome assurance that America would take a continuing responsibility in the affairs of Europe and win the support of everyone, except the Communists, by providing the only real guarantee of security against Soviet expansion. Furthermore, the magazine pointed out that the current foreign policy did not suffice as the only solution and that a new political economic strategy, contradictory to that agreed upon at Potsdam, was also needed for Germany.

The next-to-the last article about Germany in LIFE for the year was a melodramatic report on the shattered city of Berlin, or in the words of the German émigré’ correspondent originally from Berlin, “the ghost of a city populated by the shadow of a people.” The report was accompanied by plenty of photos depicting old friends of the correspondent Walter Sanders picking up pieces of their lives among the ruins. While they did not like to talk about the war because “from fear or shame, they did not want to remember what had happened.” The Berlin report was one of two articles in the November 11 issue, which was apparently intended to create a feeling of responsibility in the reader. The second article praised the responsibility of the US Military Government to restore democracy in Germany and the successful job of the establishment of a “moral climate in which Germans would want to decide for themselves” through participating in a series of elections (on the city, county and state levels), the writing of new constitutions for

654 “Byrnes on Germany,” LIFE, (1946, September 23), 21(13), 42.
656 “War talk,” LIFE, (1946, September 30), 21(14), 34.
the three states within the US zone of occupied Germany (Bavaria, Hesse, Württemberg-Baden) as well as the cooperation of the Länderrat (council of the states within the US zone) in the de-Nazification process.\textsuperscript{658} Even the title of the article was provocative: “Our Germans.” This addressed the Germans who welcomed, endorsed and followed the policy of the American Military Government, the Germans on whom a new democracy could be built.

Regarding Germany, the \textit{LIFE} readership was split. In his \textit{LIFE} letter a co-worker of the German scientists, who were employed by the US, stated that these scientists had only been interested in the development of the V-2 rocket and not in politics or anything else, while another letter pointed out the irony of paying some Nazis to work for the US while hanging others.\textsuperscript{659} Regarding the \textit{LIFE} photos of GIs sympathizing with Germans, the magazine published only one letter which denounced it.\textsuperscript{660} Regarding the eastern ally, an article by the Republican John Foster Dulles in \textit{LIFE} referring to the democratic values and freedoms the Soviets suppressed was not only well received by its readership, but the readers congratulated the magazine for having the “courage” to publish his ideas and “enlighten the misinformed Americans.”\textsuperscript{661} On the other hand, there were also readers who could not understand how a conflict between East and West would serve world peace and were frustrated with “the poisoning of the public's mind,” or still regarded the Soviet Union as an ally.\textsuperscript{662}

\textit{LIFE} maintained its focus on critiquing the Soviet behavior and proposed the essentials for a new world policy, which eventually, in its view, came through Byrnes’ speech; a declaration that the US recognized their responsibility in the affairs of Europe and would play a major role on the world stage. On the other hand, \textit{LIFE} readership was confused with the American policy toward Germans and against Soviets, and the exchange of their role, from enemy into friend and vice versa.

\textsuperscript{658} “Our Germans,” \textit{LIFE}, (1946, November 11), 21(20), 34.
\textsuperscript{659} “Letters to the editors. German scientists,” \textit{LIFE}, (1946, December 30), 21(27), 2.
The first months of 1946 German reports in *TIME* were limited to short texts of one or two paragraphs. The first *TIME* article on Germany in 1946 reflected the situation in the country, and mostly that of its people, through the eyes of the German émigré novelist, Thomas Mann, the greatest living German writer, as *TIME* claimed. Mann’s indictment of Germany was even harsher than that of Associate Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson, chief prosecutor for the United States at the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg. Mann accused the German people of being arrogant, introverted provincials who never fought for the “liberty of the citizen.” Mann compared and condemned Germany in a larger European context. Mann claimed national egotism made the German idea of liberty “anti-European, barbaric” and “rational.” The German was not born to “get along with life or to guard unity of conscience and action,” but to regard politics as “falsehood and murder” and in this concept he pursued the “devil” in him. He warned that all those things must be bore in the mind of the victors and be comprehended in order to limit Germany. Mann even quoted Goethe's idea of a German Diaspora, the idea of scattering the Germans, like the Jews, over the world, hoping that the German could “fit into the pattern of nations and become a peaceable citizen of the world.”

Further articles on Germany referred to the still ongoing Nuremberg trials, but they were solely reports which the journalists did not comment on. For the magazine Churchill’s speech was a speech with two axes: the Soviet threat of expansion and the fraternal association of the US and British strength. *TIME* published several representative parts of the speech about the “iron curtain” that the Soviet Union had drawn across Europe. *TIME* claimed that even if Truman had not seen the actual text of Churchill's speech, Truman knew ahead of time what Churchill intended to say implying that he was in accord with it. Due to the alarming atmosphere this speech had created *TIME* felt compelled to provide its readership with reactions to the speech from both Congressmen and other newspapers. In the international section of the same issue, however, the magazine took a different tack. Just as world was shocked by this speech, the magazine published a shockingly large depiction of Churchill’s “iron curtain” as a chain curtain with the classic symbol of communism, the hammer and sickle, behind which *TIME* readers were given a view of the

countries that had fallen victim to communist expansion.\textsuperscript{666} In the following issue \textit{TIME} revealed Truman's initial enthusiastic reaction to Churchill's "iron curtain" speech, up until the moment the former British Prime Minister asked the US to join military forces with the British, while Secretary of State Byrnes explained the Truman administration's position that US military strength would be used to support the purpose and principles of the United Nations and not of an ally against another.\textsuperscript{667}

Even though at that time no one really believed the Soviet Union wanted to launch a war against the West, \textit{TIME} did little to prevent the creation of a hostile American attitude toward the Soviet Union. Specifically, the newspaper wrote about the Soviet will for power, prestige and security and the desire to infiltrate into any political vacuums left by the shattered industries and trading spheres of Germany. \textit{TIME} even added more fuel to the fire when it revealed that US officials had found in Germany a transcript of a Molotov-Ribbentrop talk before 1941 about the Soviet plan to add to its territory "the Baltic states, all of Poland, slices of Finland and eastern Rumania, to have complete control of the Dardanelles, a free hand in Iran and Iraq, and enough of Arabia to dominate the Persian Gulf."\textsuperscript{668} And yet when the opportunity arose to peek behind the "iron curtain" of the Soviet occupation zone, seven US newspapermen were happy to be escorted by Soviet officers, among them was a \textit{TIME} correspondent. When the reporter returned to the western sectors of Berlin, he proclaimed that the Soviet goal was to achieve socialism in Germany. The industrial establishments in the Soviet zone of occupied Germany had increased their production remarkably, the German people were well dressed and the food stores provided products such as bacon, sausages, cheese and eggs. Surprisingly, although the reporter's intention was to warn against Eastern Germany's 'sovietization,' he admitted that the Soviet zone was "far ahead of the other zones while the Western Allies continued to be vague and confused."\textsuperscript{669}

In the meantime, \textit{TIME} reported that the occupation cost the US $1 billion a year and the British taxpayers $300 million.\textsuperscript{670} The US (and \textit{TIME}’s) view was that the Soviet Union had violated the Potsdam agreement by pursuing separate economic policies in Germany, which was

\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{666} "International. Policies & principles," \textit{TIME}, (1946, March 18), 47(11), 24.
    \item \textsuperscript{667} "National affairs. The presidency," \textit{TIME}, (1946, March 25), 47(12), 19.
    \item \textsuperscript{668} "What does Russia want?" \textit{TIME}, (1946, April 1), 47(13), 27.
    \item \textsuperscript{669} "Foreign news. Germany," \textit{TIME}, (1946, April 1), 47(13), 34-35.
    \item \textsuperscript{670} "International. Potsdam product," \textit{TIME}, (1946, May 20), 47(20), 22.
\end{itemize}
supposed to be considered a single economic unit. The response was that either Germans had to work immediately toward more production in the western sectors, or the western zones should join forces, something already suggested by the Secretary of State, as TIME revealed. Subsequently a cabled report by a TIME correspondent in Germany revealed the problem was a lack of US policy in Germany, or in other words, a derailed US policy in Germany.\(^\text{671}\) The correspondent recognized that the denazification process was more successful in the US zone than in the other two western zones but more urgent questions like that of political influence were not answered. The US was striving to achieve a liberal democracy in Germany but a starved, dependent person could be drawn to become either a Democrat or a Communist. The correspondent reported that the German Berliners earned 100-400 marks monthly when they actually needed 600 marks for a pound of coffee and 400-500 for a pound of butter. No independent liberal democracy could be built on such foundations. Furthermore, information extracted either by overhearing casual conversations among Germans or G.I.s escalated the American suspicion against the Soviet Union, according to the correspondent. On the one hand, those attending the Soviet-controlled University of Berlin were required to provide a political statement supporting the SED (the Soviet-sponsored and communist Socialist Unity Party) and to be approved by a denazification board.\(^\text{672}\) The correspondent asserted that German students felt forced by the Soviets in the same manner that the Nazis had coerced them, because if they did not comply with the new rules, they were not given food, a place to sleep or were even promptly expelled. The correspondent also relayed the story a young German woman who moved from the Soviet to the US sector of Berlin to enter the US Military Government stenographic training school was actually a planted Soviet spy. She inadvertently confessed the truth when she fell in love with a US soldier and then was persuaded to work as a spy for the Americans.\(^\text{673}\)

Bearing in mind that a few weeks later Secretary of State Byrnes delivered on German soil one of the most important speeches on US foreign policy, all these foreboding TIME articles could be regarded as a potential prelude, or at least a setting of the stage. To what extent the magazine knew about the content of Byrnes’ speech beforehand is unknown but these articles certainly laid the groundwork. TIME on the surface generally seemed to try to represent the news as objectively

\(^{672}\) “Foreign news. Germany,” TIME, (1946, August 5), 48(6), 33.  
as it could, always publishing the names of its correspondents when it came to eye-witness reports and yet generally refraining from interpreting behaviors and decisions or using grave and extreme characterizations.

However, shortly after Byrnes’ speech in Stuttgart the magazine published a report from Berlin by the *New York Herald Tribune*'s conservative Republican columnist Joseph Alsop. This was the first interpretation evaluation of Byrne’s speech. The syndicated correspondent, associating Lenin's dictum “Who controls Germany controls Europe” with the Soviet policy and propaganda methods in Germany, described the plain truth and real motive of what he felt should be the American foreign policy: “To deny control of Germany, and therefore of Europe, to the Soviet Union.” 674 Byrnes’ tactic was simple and twofold but constructed in a way so that it would result in a win-win situation for the western powers. Alsop revealed and explained clearly Byrnes’ tactic. By playing the card of reparations and the fear that the Ruhr would be under western control he suggested that all occupation zones be unified. If the Soviet Union declined the proposal the British zone would join the American zone in order “to bring Western Germany back to life as a part of the Western system.” Because the Soviet zone was the first to plan and announce holding the first “free and democratic” elections the Soviets proceeded to more drastic tactics to win German support. For instance, as a *TIME* correspondent reported, they released 120,000 German prisoners of war and increased rations for invalids and expectant mothers. Even the slogan of the pro-Soviet SED's campaign was intimidating: “If the SED wins, the Russians will reward you; if the SED loses, life will be terrible.” And by “terrible” they meant more dismantling and delivery to the Soviet Union of German industries, reduced food rations, heavier reparations and stricter Soviet control. In the following issue the magazine openly expressed its own interpretation of the speech, which was as clear and direct as Alsop’s. *TIME* plainly explained to their readers that Byrnes’ speech invalidated both the Potsdam agreement by offering Germans a chance to reform as well as the Morgenthau plan and all its derivatives by allowing the restoration of German industry for the purpose of the maintenance of “average European living standards.” 675 Territorial changes were also proposed, with the Saar going to France and the Ruhr remaining German the two most important. Byrnes’ message was not only clear but also negotiable, with the US remaining in Germany until these terms were fulfilled. As the reporter commented, Byrnes

delivered a speech that Europe and Asia recognized as America's boldest move yet towards leadership of the world.

In addition, *TIME* supported Byrnes' fears trepidations by quoting the Deputy Military Governor of the US zone in Germany, Lucius D. Clay, who straightforwardly said that he could “not get along with the Russians very well-either with or without gloves on.” Furthermore, *TIME* published a detailed report on the total numbers of Allied troops, proving that the US kept the lower number of troops and in particular half the amount of the Soviet troops in Germany. *TIME* even revealed that the Soviet Army was “spurring production of war materials in Germany's Soviet zone” and that when the US and Britain suggested that an investigation commission check on arms production in all zones, the Soviets refused.676

A month after Byrnes’ speech *TIME* published extracts from three reports from Europe, one by *TIME*’s cultural reporter W. Sargeant, one by the editor of *Christian Century*, P. Hutchinson and one by the leading US Protestant theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr. *TIME* claimed that these three reports offered three widely different points of view. All three, however, shared a common concern with the spread of Communism in Central Europe. Sargeant’s report focused on two things: the “enormous evidence of intellectual energy that was still sprouting amid incredible physical devastation” in Germany and the association of Communism with the “domination by a backward and deeply distrusted nation.” Hutchinson, on the other hand, was convinced that the old Europe could not revive spiritually. Even if Communists prevailed, they at least “knew what they were trying to do,” and that they could not recover Europe. If the US was to fight against Communism, it would end up exhausted by the struggle. Lastly, Niebuhr was convinced that the Soviets were not, and would not be, “satisfied with any system of eastern European defenses but were seeking to extend their power over the whole of Europe.” He also confessed that “Russian terror” had “discredited Communism” and the US had to take advantage of this by providing Germany with a “clear-cut and creative economic policy” like the one proposed by Secretary Byrnes. He concluded that it was no time for “hysteria or sentimental illusions” but the time for a “creative policy.” The reports appeared in this order, leaving Niebuhr’s emotionally charged but at the same time quite

Despite what TIME would like its readers to believe, these were not three widely different reports; they were all concerned with a Soviet threat.

On top of that, in the same issue, TIME referred to the previous week’s non-Communist newspapers in Berlin, which ridiculed the “cure-all campaign of SED” in their “desperate attempt to win votes” for the municipal elections. Furthermore, TIME published its own expose on the illicit manipulative methods the Communist party employed to win votes, like the distribution of cigarettes and liquor to Berliners, the allotment of clothing and shoes to 60,000 children as well as the distribution of notebooks to children signed by the SED. Despite all the efforts, SED ranked third in the Berlin elections so TIME commented that the Soviet Union was forced to find another way to tighten their grip and created a top-secret German zonal police organization.

The Truman administration was not alone in this conflict for world power, as signs of bipartisanship revealed. TIME claimed the biggest sign of domestic American approval for the newly pursued US foreign policy was its support by the Republican political opposition. The anti-isolationist Arthur Vandenberg's “Say what we mean and mean what we say” in reference to the American foreign policy, was “supported generally by Republicans and Democrats alike.” TIME accompanied this story with a photo of Vandenberg whispering something to Byrnes, which seemed to seal the acceptance of this new American foreign policy expressed in Byrnes’ great September speech at Stuttgart.

Critiques of certain features of the occupation remained nevertheless in TIME. The remaining restrictions of the non-fraternization policy were attacked once more as the Army discipline in Germany felt like it was falling apart. Specifically, in Frankfurt there was a regulation which allowed officers to have German female guests inside their compounds over the weekend as long as the women left before Monday at 8:30 am. Beyond that timepoint it was considered fraternization. However, the non-fraternization policy of the previous year had failed, according to the magazine, not because of the pretty blond German girls or the fact that the majority of the G.I.s felt that this policy was against human nature, but it was also something more important,
namely as *TIME* put it so poignantly, dying in vain. The G.I.s who survived the war and had to stay in occupied Germany were asked to discriminate against Germans, an attitude completely contradictory to their inner sense of democracy. As reported in the previous chapter, many G.I.s felt and acted less as conquerors and more as liberators, especially those who arrived in postwar Germany to serve in the military government and had never fought the Germans. A representative story reached *TIME* in early October describing the initiative of a group of ten G.I.s who were willing to spend free time organizing a club for German boys between 10 and 17. The G.I.s had initially set a limit of 100 boys because they did not have very high hopes. To their surprise they received the astonishing number of 7,000 applications. Politics was not allowed, as well as taking food out of the club, begging or picking up cigarette butts in the streets, etc. The goal of the club was to teach the boys an independent and democratic way of life. The boys would elect temporary officers who would guide them and the selection of committees for the drawing of the club constitution.681 A further sign of the failure of any remnants of the non-fraternization policy was the approval of marriage among G.I.s or Army-employed civilians and German Fräuleins.682

Despite the readers’ letters to *TIME*’s editors expressing their worry about the food crisis in Europe and the possible lifting of rationing in the US, *TIME* published no relevant article about food supplies until mid-April when the problem resurfaced because the US had fallen behind on its promised food deliveries.683 The food crisis was a European problem. However, *TIME* only briefly mentioned examples of specific countries accompanied by photos. This was the case until the end of April when the precise calories per day in the occupied zones were published. In the French zone the ration was 940 calories per day, in the British 1,000, in the US 1,275 and in the Soviet 1,500. Along with this account there was an explanation by the US military government on what this calorie rationing practically meant. For instance, a man could stay alive on 700 calories per day if kept in a warm bed, on 1,000 he could walk around the room, on 1,300 he could perform light work. So, the Germans were neither starving to death nor functioning. They were simply, as *TIME* put it, being kept alive.684

Even though one *TIME* reader disagreed with the shipment of food to Europe and preferred for the European people to starve rather than to deny himself cake, the majority of the published letters recognized the urgent issue of food in Europe, and in turn in Germany, and wondered why the food rationing was to be abandoned in the US when peoples were starving (not excluding the Germans). One reader took a step further and focused not only on the raw materials like grain but also on the products produced with it, like cakes, and wondered why the government did not ration such products in the US. The reader admitted that every rationing would be a discomfort for the American people but not a displeasure. Among the readers, there were of course those who were disappointed with the US foreign policy, like a veteran who expressed his wholehearted disgust about the fact that the evil the American boys had fought to “erase forever from this earth,” which was once working for the Nazis was now working for his country, and a captain in the Army warned in his letter to *TIME* against an early de-occupation, as that was “precisely the goal for which the Nazis and German militarists were striving.”

The situation was more clear on the field because it continued to reflect the results of the unsuccessful fraternizing of US soldiers and the German people. A poll by the US Army’s Information and Education Division hosted by *TIME* showed that few G.I.s in Germany were spending much time hating their former enemies. In fact, 34% of the newly arrived had a good word for the Germans, 59% of those who had been in Germany for two months or longer found Germans O.K. and the German people were ranked second after the British when asked whom they liked best. It seemed that the G.I.s regarded the Germans as “clean, friendly and generally like” them. In corroboration of the serviceman’s opinion a shocking Army poll conducted among 1,700 US troops in Germany (published in *TIME* in February 1946 but conducted in the fall of 1945) revealed that 51% of them believed Hitler had done the Reich a lot of good between 1933 and 1939, 19% believed Germany was justified in starting the war, 30% preferred Germans to English or French, 12% believed some races were by nature superior or inferior and 22% believed...
the Germans had “good reasons” for persecuting Jews. The poll received a few unfavorable letters by the TIME readers who suggested showing to the “just and spoiled G.I.s” a few horrors of war, such as the concentration camps.

Regarding Churchill’s speech, a TIME reader “admired” Great Britain and envied its “boldness and spirit,” yet declined to accept that the US people would be given a policy to follow rather than form an equally firm one by themselves. The American people was not ready for another war, let alone for an atomic war, and understood the Soviet suspicion caused by the US having developed and dropped twice the atomic bomb. Moreover, the Americans saw Churchill's speech more as an expression of British agony and fear rather than a threat to the west, while the Soviet fear made one TIME reader point out the importance of the Ruhr for Hitler.

Close to the end of October TIME’s letters-to-the-editor section was inundated with letters of angry readers who supported Wallace's speech. The arguments varied. Some claimed that Wallace did not base his foreign policy on the British interest, in contrast to Byrnes, whom Bevin had “securely entrenched in his ample vest pocket.” Lastly, a great number of letters attacked TIME’s critical attitude toward Wallace and supported the right of the American people to make their own decisions, without being labeled as isolationists or leftists or communists if they disagreed with the government's foreign policy.

TIME reported on a few shortcomings of American policy, like the non-fraternization policy or the food crisis, but mostly focused on reports, which would increase suspicions against the Soviet Union. Therefore, Byrnes’ speech was supported by the magazine; it characterized it as a speech which Europe and Asia recognized as America's boldest move towards leadership of the world. Surprisingly the readers’ letters were not in accord with the magazine’s attitude. They criticized the US foreign policy, objected TIME’s attack against Wallace and appeared much more worried about the food crisis than the magazine itself.

Even though Morgenthau's 1944 plan for the transformation of Germany from an industrial country to an agricultural one was never adopted, *Commentary*, which had been founded in 1945 by the American Jewish Committee as a journal for conservative thought and ideas, published in early 1946 a review of his book *Germany is our Problem*, which had been published in early 1945. The reviewer pointed out not only the misleading and false data and calculations Morgenthau based his analysis on, but also focused on the realistic consequences of such a “step that would have been one of the greatest of disasters for Europe and would transform the heart of Europe into an industrially barren area.” The reviewer, targeting his Jewish audience, concluded “that Jews above all, [...] perhaps better than any others, know that an eye for an eye has never solved anything.”

According to *Commentary* a true test of Germany’s progress on democracy and decency would be the treatment of the German Jews who survived and decided to remain in Germany and start anew. After the implementation of the Potsdam agreement and the failure of the Allied cooperation and unity as well as after comparing the degree of de-industrialization in the western to the eastern sector of Germany, the magazine openly opposed the Communist exploitation of the Soviet occupation zone in Germany as well as the exhortation of the western Communists to suppress the German industry.

Despite being a Jewish, conservative magazine, *Commentary* did not express a vindictive attitude against Germany and opposed the exploitation of the Soviet zone. The magazine did not refer to Byrnes’ speech, but due to the attack of the Soviet way of deindustrialization one could assume that the magazine, at least to some extent, approved of Germany’s economic reformation. It also argued that a true test of German democracy would be the coexistence with the remaining Jews in Germany.

*The Nation*

*The Nation* openly disagreed with the establishment of an agricultural state in Germany. The newspaper, of course, did not suggest the retaining of the country’s “swollen war-time steel
capacity, but a production which would allow Germany to reconstruct its battered railroads which were the bottleneck for the whole Continental economy." Additionally the newspaper did not oppose the establishment of central German administrative organs for economic activities as provided by the Potsdam agreement and promoted Allied collaborative work in order to uproot nationalism from the policy making process. The Nation continued to support a quadripartite occupation of Germany and believed that the four powers should be freed from fear if Germany was to be united economically and politically as proposed at Potsdam and acknowledged the rights and wrongs of every zone, like for instance the focus on de-Nazification in the American zone in contrast to the focus on the economic reconstruction in the Soviet zone.

The Nation interpreted Churchill's speech at Fulton as stemming from fear, which dominated the international scene. It was the fear of attack that drove Churchill to talk about the “iron curtain” and to shut the door on bilateral negotiable compromises, like it drove the Soviets to desire the expansion of their territory or the French to request the internationalization of the Ruhr and Rhineland. According to the newspaper, the antipode of Churchill's speech was at least in part Byrnes' speech, which did not call for war or a change in the power relationships, but for the establishment of world peace. The Nation argued that it would be Churchill's words that would force the Soviet Union to intensify its unilateral pursuit of security while the relations between the Soviet Union and the Western powers would deteriorate. The problem, for The Nation, did not lie in the historic quarrel between the Soviet Union and the West but in the fact that Germany still possessed enormous economic and political assets which could again be utilized for war.

On the other hand, if the economic activity of the western zones was to remain at low levels, the threat of mass unemployment and of Soviet political influence would be unavoidable. Nevertheless, the newspaper did not imply that a West-dominated Europe would be better than a Soviet-dominated or vice versa, but that Germany's democratization did not solely depend on denazification and deindustrialization but also on the establishment of a secure German economy.

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700 Vera Michele Dean, “The four Germanys,” The Nation, (1946, March 9), 162(10), 281-283.
702 “Churchill's 'Union now',” The Nation, (1946, March 16), 162(11), 303-304.
703 I.F Stone, “Germany’s hidden assets,” The Nation, (1946, March 9), 162(10), 278-279.
Hence *The Nation* was sympathetic toward the economic unification of the American and British zones for the speeding up of trade and industrial reconstruction, not only with the ultimate goal of the economic reconstruction of Europe but also with that of the elimination of further decline in German morale.\(^{705}\) An agreement on German policy between the Soviet Union, England, the US and France was of unparalleled importance for the newspaper, which appeared convinced that otherwise the remaining Nazi sympathizers in Germany would become a potential ally of the West in a drive to stop the Soviets.\(^{706}\) Not always but sometimes the Washington editor, I.F. Stone, referred to the Soviet Union by its official name of either the Soviet Union or USSR in contrast to all other authors or editors of *The Nation*. Stone would use either of the terms in a single article and the reason for this preference cannot be assumed. Furthermore, Stone referred to Germany as the Reich in his article about its industrial assets, potentially correlating Germany's source of power with those it had acquired through Germany's territorial expansion throughout the years.\(^{707}\)

The mistakes of US foreign policy were pointed out by *The Nation* throughout the year. Its editorial articles intensely criticized the burning of all Nazi books by the Military Government in Germany, arguing that such an act did not represent either democracy or the restoration of the rights of which the Germans had so long been deprived.\(^{708}\) Regarding Germany’s economy, the postponement of all reparations shipments from the American zone in Germany was regarded by *The Nation* as the only option due to the failure of the economic unity of the country.\(^{709}\) Furthermore, it argued the industrial levels of the Rhine and Rhineland areas would have a decisive influence on Europe's future. Hence the newspaper promoted the socialization of the coal and steel production in these areas, which the majority of the German populace supported, along with the development of democratic and socialist (as opposed to communist) forces in Germany as a demonstration of a viable future to the Germans and as the only answer to Soviet expansionism.\(^{710}\) Nonetheless, the newspaper did not regard an East-West conflict as either fundamental or inevitable and warned that such a conflict would turn Germany into a battleground which could in

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\(^{707}\) I.F Stone, “Germany’s hidden assets,” *The Nation*, (1946, March 9), 162(10), 278-279.
\(^{709}\) Keith Hutchison, “Everybody’s business. The nullification of Potsdam,” *The Nation*, (1946, June 8), 162(23), 693.
time serve for the revival of German nationalism.\textsuperscript{711} Thus the newspaper was not in favor of Wallace's speech, expressing the opinion that Wallace should have “resigned and gone out on his own feet,” before delivering the speech. Being still a member of the US administration, however, and in case the United States accepted his challenge, the American people would “check the steady drift in America toward reaction and a new war.”\textsuperscript{712}

In the few letters \textit{The Nation} published from its readers, the people did not approve of the revival of German industry for the sake of Europe. They argued that since the western powers had already something in common, they did not see any harm in uniting the zones of the western democracies first, before the vacuum that American foreign policy had created would be filled by the Soviet “psychological” offense, while the rearmament of Germany, for the purpose of an alliance with it in case of a conflict between East and West, was considered a suicidal idea.\textsuperscript{713}

\textit{The Nation} dealt with the problems of the quadripartite occupation of Germany quite objectively acknowledging the rights and wrongs of every occupier. The newspaper objected to Churchill's speech, claiming it was caused by the fear that dominated the international scene and yet approved of Byrnes' speech, which did not call for war, but for the establishment of world peace.

\textit{Human Events}

The first issue of the year of \textit{Human Events} sternly criticized American foreign policy for not preventing the spread of communism across Europe and Asia. According to the editor of the magazine, a successful foreign policy depended on the “establishment and the attainment of objectives” by a government “in terms which carry meaning to its own and other peoples.” The Truman-Byrnes foreign policy was far from successful as it had failed to prevent the “forceful imposition” of a government by a foreign power resulting in the surrender of countries to “the Communist determination,” as happened in Yugoslavia and Iran.\textsuperscript{714} Furthermore, the defeat of Germany and Japan, the eastern and western nucleus of a potential coalition of great military

strength against the Soviet Union, and the dissolution of Germany’s economic strength through the Potsdam Agreement left Europe and East Asia with no counterpoise to the Soviet Union.\footnote{William Henry Chamberlin, “The Course of Soviet expansion,” Human Events, (1946, February 6), 3(6), 1-4.}

According to the magazine, the result of the ineffective US foreign policy was Churchill’s ‘Iron Curtain’ speech, which was of course the statement of an old but lasting strain in the Anglo-Soviet relations. According to the magazine, the Anglo-Soviet strain would have been lessened and Churchill’s speech would have included “less tense if America had not contributed, by its acquiescence in the Yalta and Potsdam decision, to the wrecking of the normal European state system.”\footnote{William Henry Chamberlin, “Behind the Anglo-Soviet tension,” Human Events, (1946, March 13), 3(11), 1-4.}

The alarming reports about Europe’s future by Human Events peaked in April, when the magazine wrote about Europe's “mortal danger of total disintegration.” If Europe were to live, the restoration of Western Europe's assets of industrial raw material to full production was imperative. The author indirectly even implied that the industrial material should come from Germany, as it was “irrelevant where these assets were and by whom they were owned” if the crisis was to be overcome. Furthermore, if an integration of Western Europe into a Soviet led-Eastern system was to be avoided, the dismantling and blowing up of factories in Germany had to stop and the economic provisions of the Potsdam agreement along with the reparations had to be postponed.\footnote{Alexander Boeker, “Save Europe now,” Human Events, (1946, April 10), 3(15), 1-4.}

On top of that the newspaper attacked the Soviet Union and compared the Soviet insistence on the Ruhr remaining under German control with Goebbels’ nationalistic propaganda, and it reported on the dismissal from employment of Nazi officials by the employment American Military Government and their employment by the Soviets. The newspaper also supported the return of the wholly German territory annexed by Poland.\footnote{Wolfgang von Eckardt, “Building Soviet Germany,” Human Events, (1946, June 12), 3(24), 1-4.}

Despite the ardent anti-Soviet attitude of the newspaper, Human Events did not turn a blind eye to the reasons the Soviet Union attempted to fill the political vacuum. It blamed the US for its insistence on the unconditional surrender of Germany and the “failure to give any encouragement to democratic elements [...] to a people who ha[d] lost everything.”\footnote{Felix Morley, “Russia fills the Vacuum,” Human Events, (July 24, 1946), 3(30), 1-4.}
political and psychological errors. One year after the agreement the newspaper drew up a parallel picture to the Americans by asking them to imagine how it would be if the US was in Germany's position and the country's production level was restricted to the level of the “worst depression year,” and if the millions of homeless refugees became an “unassimilable and dangerous social flotsam.” The US and British policies had once, *Human Events* claimed, “lifted Nazism into the saddle” and now they were “working overtime for its twin brother, Communism.”

Nevertheless the newspaper had no warlike attitude, as it believed that the United States could not afford a war with the Soviet Union. A war “against the strongest totalitarian power in history” would all too probably lead to “the final strangulation and dissolution of the American system of free enterprise,” would regiment management and “eliminate the right to [...] hard-won privileges of freely-organize[d] labor.” Even if the atomic bomb was to win the war for the US against the Soviet Union it would only mean that the US had become a totalitarian state, even worse than the Soviet Union. The only solution, according to *Human Events*, could come through a true statesman who could effectively limit Soviet imperialist expansion.

Not surprisingly the newspaper’s attitude towards US foreign policy markedly changed after Byrnes' speech in Stuttgart; “a belated yet timely response to the fact that one of the critical political struggles of our time was taking place in Germany.” The Secretary of State was now defended by the newspaper for having lived up, “under great difficulties, to carry on the foreign policy of Secretary Hull which President Roosevelt sponsored.” Furthermore, the newspaper attacked Wallace's speech and his “illogical defense of the insidious imperialism of Communist Russia.” The tone of the article was aggressive, derogatory and derisive, comparing Wallace to a prosecutor who was wearing the mask of a prophet whose will was to denunciate and whose function was to demolish. The newspaper’s position toward the Soviet Union and the importance of Germany’s role in an East-West conflict was clear and unchangeable. Byrnes' shifting of American foreign policy gave the newspaper the opportunity to literally draw its sword when writing that the war with Germany might have ended but “the struggle between Western democracy and Eastern totalitarianism for Germany” had just began. The newspaper vowed its support for the possibility of Germany being “integrated with the West.” It even took a step further.

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and, obviously forgetting why the American army was on German soil, suggested some essential changes in the American policy toward Germany such as encouraging the association of Americans and Germans “on terms of complete social equality,” the lifting of American supervision or of restrictions on German press, radio, mail and communication, the “vigorous promotion of German foreign trade” etc.\textsuperscript{723} The year 1946 ended with a melodramatic and in this author’s view, almost farcical article by the editor exalting the official lifting of the non-fraternization ban, or in the newspaper’s words, the end of ostracizing Germans for their “national degeneracy,” and the authorization of the marriage of American soldiers and German women “in good time for the celebration of Christ’s birthday.”\textsuperscript{724}

Recognizing Germany’s industrial power and the power the country would provide to whom controlled it in relation to the Soviet expansive intentions, the newspaper sharply criticized the American foreign policy. Therefore, Byrnes’ economic reformative proposals were longed for and of course welcomed by \textit{Human Events}. In fact, this position of the newspaper constituted a suggestion which could nullify the denazification and democratization processes at a timepoint when it was not safe to assume and let alone prove that these processes had borne fruit, yet \textit{Human Events} seemed to have no such fears.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The issue of Germany, the issue of securing a world from the country that indeed created chaos, destruction and millions of dead remained in 1946 an unsolved deadlock. One explanation could be unproductive and inconsistent policies in Germany due to the complexity and inconsistency of de-Nazification and the decreasing morale of the US troops, which reflected negatively on the potential for the democratization of the German people, while the US economic policy on Germany was a combination of inconsistency and instability in contrast to the Soviet policy, which kept receiving the reparations agreed upon at Potsdam from the western zones. Another explanation could be Byrnes’ own oxymoronic explanation in a news conference for the failure of putting the theory of US policy in Germany into practice, as that the “State Department


was a policy agency, not an operating one.” No matter what the explanation was, the fact was that Germany was no longer a threat but a benefit to whom would control her. Nonetheless, how was this fact delivered and explained to the American people, and in turn how was it digested by the American people?

Starting with the message the US President conveyed to the editors of the newspaper, after Byrnes’ speech, the first official shift of foreign policy in Germany after the end of the war in Europe, Truman asked ASNE to understand that the American people could disagree freely and publicly with the US administration, but the US government had to stay united toward US foreign affairs. Apparently, his wish was not followed blindly by the press outlets, which the previous year had also criticized the US occupation policies in Germany.

Recognizing the Soviet objective of having Germany as a partner and not an enemy after the successful revival of the country Walter Lippmann pointed out the failures of the US occupation policies and the need for the establishment of a power equilibrium as the basic condition for the settlement of peace. However, Byrnes' speech did not deliver such a policy and instead Lippmann suggested that the US took the calculated risk of unifying the western zones of occupation forcing the Soviets either to isolate or co-operate, believing more in the latter as it was also in the Soviet Union's best interest. Even though Lippmann’s position was not shared by the vast majority of the press outlets under examination, The Washington Post was the only one that straightforward attacked the position of the syndicated columnist.

Instead of urging quadripartite cooperation, like only The Nation along with Lippmann did, the majority of the press outlets under examination started to escalate in 1946 the anti-communist campaign, which was faintly launched the previous year by some of them. The Washington Post, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, TIME and LIFE planted the seed of distrust toward the Soviet Union blaming only the Soviets for lack of cooperation or the fulfillment of their obligations toward the Potsdam Agreement, like the management of Germany as a single economic unit, but did not use any provocative language. Nevertheless, the failing US occupational polices in Germany (the consequences of the unsuccessful non-fraternization ban of the previous year like the deteriorating GI morale, the failure of Germany’s democratization and the famine) did not

leave these press outlets with much choice but to also acknowledge the dead end the American occupation policy in Germany had reached.

For a more objective analysis of the rights and wrongs of every occupying force a reader had to resort to The Nation, while for a more biased one a reader could turn to the Los Angeles Times and Human Events. Both press outlets went full force with their attack against the Soviet Union utilizing the economic importance of Germany for Europe as a means to emphasize the Soviet threat. In contrast to the LA Times, the conservative Human Events also criticized the US Administration for the political vacuum created in Germany, which the Soviet Union would rush to fill in. Lastly, if one press outlet under examination would be, at least to some degree, justified to express feelings of anger against Germany that would be Commentary. Nevertheless, the magazine prioritized democracy over any vindictive feeling, it did not regard the entire German people as Nazis and did not comment on Germany’s past but on Germany’s future, in which the country’s actual test for democracy laid.

Since all press outlets more or less had been criticizing the US occupation policies in Germany since the end of the war in Europe, Byrnes’ speech was welcomed by all of them. It was regarded as a solution for the management of Germany’s economy and future so that it did not become anyone's pawn and its division was avoided. However, I cannot quite definitely conclude that the unanimous approval of Byrnes’ speech by all press outlets can be identified with the approval of the most appropriate next step toward Germany as well as against the Soviet Union, since, after more than a year of US failing occupation policies, it seemed more as a relief that the US had finally managed to form a clearer objective for Germany rather than the result of well evaluated strategy.

Before studying any relationship between the attitude of the press outlets to that of the American public, I would like to make two brief observations. First, in 1946 for the first time some press outlets alternated between the use of the term Russia and Soviet Union when referring to the USSR, and between Germany and Reich. The content of the articles in which he authors chose to address the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the Soviet Union might reveal their preference. The USSR was referred to as Soviet Union when reporting endeavors to dominate the economic life of countries in Eastern European countries (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Finland and the eastern parts of Germany and Austria) probably attempting to
connotate the term Soviet Union with Russia’s expansive intention in Eastern Europe as well as its earlier coercive inclusion of non-Russian republics into the union. Furthermore, Germany was referred to as the Reich in articles about its industrial assets, potentially correlating Germany's source of power with those it had acquired through Germany's territorial expansion throughout the years. Second, in 1946 also for the first time Walter Lippmann and The Nation made their (common) suggestion about a sociopolitical system for post-war Germany based on socialist ideals; proving that both clearly differentiated between socialism as democratic socialism or social democracy and communism.

In terms of the interaction between the US press outlets and the US public opinion toward US policies in Germany, the willingness of the American people to contribute to the feeding of the European people, without specifying if Germans were excluded, continued in 1946. However, this can hardly be attributed to the criticism of the press outlets toward the problem of famine, since it was the American people who first recognized the potential problem of food in Europe in 1945 and agreed to assist in its management. Regarding the shift of US policy toward Germany’s economy the American people supported Byrnes’ speech as they found it more clear and firm than Wallace's proposal. Consequently, this preference totally overturned the feelings of the American people of the previous year toward the Soviet Union raising their suspicion and distrust; but not fear. Besides one must take into consideration that the United States was the first among the Allies to possess the atomic bomb, which created a feeling of security to the American people, but insecurity elsewhere, like in the USSR. The fact that the Gallup polls focused their attention on the East-West conflict while Germany was hardly discussed and even when it was the American people polled declared satisfied with the handling of the US occupation, could possibly indicated either that the failing occupation policy was not a big concern for the American people, or that the ‘new enemy’ had overshadowed the old one. Taking into consideration the attitude of the majority of the press outlets one could draw the conclusion that the disappearance of Nazi Germany from the pages of the newspapers and magazine and its replacement by reports of hungry and devastated average Germans, who were not necessarily anti-Nazis, in combination with the anti-communist attitude of the majority of the press outlets under examination might have contributed to this change. Nevertheless, Byrnes' speech did not manage to turn the people’s attention completely, or probably as much as the US government would wish, toward foreign affairs, as domestic problems
like strikes, cost of living and the increase of prices were ranked first in 1946 in the list of the people's most important problems.

Returning to the triangular relationship between the new economic US policy in Germany as stated by its Secretary of State, the US press outlets and the US public opinion, I can say that both the US Administration and the press outlets recognized the important role of Germany in the continuously evolving East-West conflict and the latter managed successfully to raise the public’s awareness toward it. Studying history in retrospect allows me to know that the US Administration will need the public’s support for its pursued (and continuously beneficial) policies in Germany for many years to come, as such it will be interesting to study in the next chapters whether the press outlets functioned as an actual educator of the US public or created a fertile ground for the acceptance of policies.
Chapter 3

“The fear of communism”

1947

“The United States must run this show.”726


Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

William Clayton regarding the European Crisis (Marshall Plan)

As indicated in the previous chapter the focus of the American people was inclined toward the domestic problems the US was facing, while attempts for cooperation between the western allies and the Soviet Union remained unsuccessful. This combination made a settlement of the German peace treaty and the restoration of peace in Europe less likely, but change more imperative and urgent. Furthermore, the Republican Congressional win of the previous year left Truman with no other choice but to recalibrate his State Department by appointing George Marshall as his new Secretary of State and George Kennan, an American diplomat who had served in Moscow, as the Director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff. The new Secretary of State was a soldier and a statesman, possibly the most suitable combination for the establishment of a peace, which had been pending for a year and a half, and for the prevention of the development of the East-West tension into a war. Moreover, the Democratic Truman administration was not alone in this attempt. Quite the contrary. It had cultivated a strong bipartisan collaboration with Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, who was not only the Republican chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but also the President pro tempore of the United States Senate at that time, the second-highest-ranking official of the United States Senate after the US vice president.

Bipartisanship was quite strong at that time. The former Republican President of the US Herbert Hoover was also invited by Truman in March 1946 to be appointed as honorary chair of the President’s Famine Emergency Committee, and despite Hoover's initial opinion of Truman,  

who could not believe that the US was governed “by such a mediocre type of man,” he accepted
the position on spot. Considering Hoover’s experience from his work with the American Relief
Administration, an US organization that helped feed many countries during World War I, Truman
requested that he went to Germany and Austria to report on the food situation in these countries.
In his report, which he submitted to Truman on February 26, 1947, Hoover “displayed his usual
command of the logistics of agricultural production and international distribution” and
proclaimed that he faced “the grimmest specter of famine in all the history of the world,” as he
stated in a press conference after his return from Germany. He reported the bad situation of
Germany after it had exhausted all of its reserves and most of its stocks of consumer goods and
raw materials in wartime, as well as the situation of the country after her division in occupation
zones and the liquidation of its supplies for reparations. After completing his report on manpower,
housing, coal, agricultural production, food distribution, and nutrition, Hoover introduced his
program for the recovery of the country and what it would require in terms of imports from the US
and taxation of the US people. Lastly, after acknowledging the “great shock to American
taxpayers, that, having won the war over Germany, [they were] faced for some years with large
expenditures for relief for these people,” Hoover concluded that “if western civilization [was] to
survive in Europe, it [had to] survive in Germany” as well; or else the US flag would fly over the
German people only to symbolize the US military power.

In Germany the year started with the economic union of the American and British
occupation zones of Germany, which was agreed to in principle between the British Foreign
Secretary Ernest Bevin and the US Secretary of State James F. Byrnes in December 1946 in New
York, but came into effect on January 1, 1947. The German economy was most certainly the
key to the economic restoration of the European entire continent, and the promise of prosperity

729 ibid.
731 The National Archives, President’s Secretary’s Files (Truman Administration), 1945 - 1960, General Files, 1945 -
1953, Hoover, Herbert C., Report, The President’s Economic Mission to Germany and Austria, Report Number 1:
German Agriculture and Food Requirements 2/26/1947. Retrieved on 8/10/2020 from
https://catalog.archives.gov/id/159440798
was the alternative to communism, but the Congressional approval of huge amounts of money for the aid of foreign countries was a difficult task for the Truman administration especially at a time when the domestic situation did not support generosity for the benefit of others. Therefore, the pursuit of economic assistance policies to Europe would most likely create a domino of consequences in the US, unless it was handled efficiently and justified more firmly than in the previous years. President Truman’s speech on foreign economic policy at Baylor University on March 6, 1947, which was carried on a nationwide radio broadcast, reminded Americans that the US could not “escape the troubles of the world by simply staying within [its] own borders,” focused on the “inseparable” nature of peace, freedom and world trade, and proposed the setting up of the International Trade Organization.

Freedom of worship—freedom of speech freedom of enterprise … [;] the first two of these freedoms are related to the third. … Peace and freedom are not easily achieved. They cannot be attained by force. They come from mutual understanding and cooperation, from a willingness to deal fairly with every friendly nation in all matters-political and economic. Let us resolve to continue to do just that, now and in the future. If other nations of the world will do the same, we can reach the goals of permanent peace and world freedom.733

Increasingly throughout 1947 US foreign policy engaged in a series of reform initiatives to get Germany back on its feet and “save” it from communism. Truman’s speech to Congress on March 12, 1947, which presented what became known as the Truman Doctrine and asked for $400 million in military and economic assistance for Greece and Turkey in order to protect them from Soviet expansion and influence, was the first step to bring the threat of communism to the foreground. The proclamation of the “Truman Doctrine” was “a founding moment of the containment order, rallying Americans to a new great struggle […] for world domination.”734 It made clear that the US would intervene wherever freedom was threatened and defined the Cold War as “a battle of freedom against totalitarianism.”735 As it stated:

One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. [...] The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. [...] I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. [...] It would be an unspeakable tragedy if these countries, which have struggled so long against overwhelming odds, should lose that victory for which they sacrificed so much. Collapse of free institutions and loss of independence would be disastrous not only for them but for the world. [...] The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died. We must keep that hope alive.  

The second reform initiative to get Germany back on its feet and “save” it from communism was the creation of the European Recovery Program (ERP), more commonly known as the Marshall Plan, which targeted Europe's “economic disarray and political upheaval.” The plan was initially introduced to the public in Secretary of State George Marshall’s speech at Harvard University on June 5, 1947.

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737 President Truman established three committees to study the aspects and impact of the Marshall Plan: the Nourse Committee named after its chairman, Edwin Griswold Nourse, to study probable effect of anticipated exports upon domestic production, consumption, and prices, the Krug Committee, named after its chairman, Julius Albert Krug, to investigate the US resources and physical capabilities, and the Harriman Committee, named after its chairman, W. Averell Harriman, to analyze the volume of assistance required by the European countries in reference to the US domestic economy.

The truth of the matter is that Europe's requirements for the next three or four years of foreign food and other essential products - principally from America - are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she must have substantial additional help or face economic, social, and political deterioration of a very grave character. The remedy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole. [...] Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. [...] Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full co-operation I am sure, on the part of the United States Government. Any government which maneuvers to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. [...] It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of later support of such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so. [...] Political passion and prejudice should have no part.

The Marshall Plan was not only the proof of the lessons learned from WWI, but it also stood as “the epitome of preventive defense” by combining America’s world leadership and security along with the production of a postwar global economy and the promotion of European unity. The “generous economic assistance and commitment of ground forces” provided to the Europeans by the Marshall Plan would not only allow them to rebuild their shattered economies but would also make them into necessary and valuable partners of the US, who would promote a “relatively stable global order.” “Designed to solve the internal problems of Western industrial capitalism [...] by opening up the world to trade and investment” and building “Western solidarity through economic openness and joint political governance” the Marshall Plan did not directly target the Soviet Union as a European threat. Nonetheless, “mounting an economic recovery program of the magnitude of the Marshall Plan required a sense of overwhelming threat.”

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Therefore, the President “launched a massive public relations campaign and knowingly manipulated anticommutunist slogans to mobilize support”\textsuperscript{745} in order to be able to yoke together hope and fear to move the Marshall Plan forward.\textsuperscript{746}

The aim of the two plans, the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, was the same; the financial support of devastated European countries so that their independence and freedom could be safeguarded. Nevertheless, the profound difference in the argumentation of the two plans and the presentation of the bidirectional aspect of the Marshall aid program resulted in the “easier digestion” of the Marshall Plan by the American people and allowed the US to “run the show” of the European crisis. That is not to say that the “Truman Doctrine” was a diplomatic failure compared to the Marshall Plan, but one could argue that Truman’s approach went against the American mentality as it placed the recovery of two countries on the shoulders of American taxpayers making the Greek and Turkish problem an American problem and the US responsible for its solution. On the other hand, Truman’s approach did accomplish putting the communist threat on the map of American foreign policy and made the American public aware of the underlying reason why the American money would be worth spending for the development of the European economy.\textsuperscript{747}

In July 1947 an “anonymous” essay was published in the highly respected \textit{Foreign Affairs} journal carrying the title, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” which discussed the American fear of communism and ways to suspend Soviet expansion. The Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department George Kennan was easily identified as the author of the essay, which was basically a refinement of his long telegram to the Department of State the previous year.\textsuperscript{748} In his essay Kennan stated that “the political personality of Soviet power as we know it today is the product of ideology and circumstances: ideology inherited by the present Soviet leaders from the movement in which they had their political origin, and circumstances of power which they now have exercised for nearly three decades in Russia.” He also claimed that Soviet foreign policy “is

\textsuperscript{745} Leffler (2018, July/August).
a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal,” which “makes Soviet diplomacy at once easier and more difficult to deal with than the diplomacy of individual aggressive leaders like Napoleon and Hitler,” and advised that “the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”

The year 1947 included also two Councils of Foreign Ministers Conferences (the first in Moscow from March 10 to April 24 and the second in London from November 25 to December 15) to discuss among other issues peace settlements for Germany and Austria and to deal with the problems of occupation and control in both countries while the peace treaties were still pending. Moreover, the year 1947 included a Conference on European Economic Cooperation in Paris from July 16 to April 16, consisting of a committee of representatives from 16 European nations (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom) to accept the reconstruction aid program proposed to Europe by the US Secretary of State, George Marshall and to deliberate on the details of their participation in the Marshall Plan.

Before moving to the analysis of the press outlets under examination, it is prudent to briefly examine the position of the military governor of the US Zone in Germany, General Lucius D. Clay. On March 15, 1947 Lucius D. Clay replaced Dwight D. Eisenhower as Military Governor of the US zone of occupied Germany on March 15, 1947. Clay’s attitudes held more influence once he was promoted from Deputy Military Governor to Military Governor and thus head of the Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS). Clay believed that a peace treaty with Germany would “provide a guarantee of security against Germany” and would lessen “the need for security through economic restrictions and reduction of German industry.” As he suggested in his March memorandum to Secretary of State Marshall, a successful Council of Foreign Ministers Moscow Conference would allow for the reconsideration of “the level of industry to be left in Germany to

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contribute to a stable Europe,” while the quadripartite security guarantee by the treaty and the control of the Ruhr would not jeopardize the security. The failure of the conference, however, as well as the various attacks or accusations against the US administration by the Soviet press made Clay favor an outright not-yielding-to-the-Russian-war-of-nerves policy. “No apologies unless we say something which has no factual background,” as Clay wrote also in March to the New York Congressman Kenneth Keating.

Apart from Clay’s frustration over Soviet behavior in reference to reparations, Clay also expressed in April his frustration to the Director of the War Department’s Civil Affairs Division Daniel Noce about the contradictory nature of the policy pursued by Washington and the policy applied in Germany regarding the democratization of Germany. For instance, regarding “all claims for restitution” made by the Soviets Clay declared that he would continue to “require proof as to date of removal” and would not provide reparations as restitution if it “reduced the German economy below the planned level.” Before Marshall introduced his plan Clay warned Noce that he was not “exaggerating the penetration and growth of communism in western Germany,” which would be victorious in western Germany if the US continued to play cards the way she was.

Therefore, when Clay was instructed in May by Secretary of State Marshall during his visit in Berlin to summarize the problems of the US military government, Clay complained of: 1- losing of “all” of Germany's foreign balances “and other external assets and her gold reserves through reparations,” 2- the “starvation” diet in the combined US/UK zones which served only the purpose of prevention of “disease and unrest,” 3- and the financial inability of Germany to “bring in raw materials so that the available power, the highly skilled labor, and the remaining industries could begin to produce for export […] and build up a profitable foreign trade” and a “sound credit” on which Germany's self-sustainment could be based. Furthermore, Clay stated that the firm reparations set at Potsdam and at the Paris Reparations Conference could not be fulfilled by Germany. He claimed that no “monetary stimulation” could do any good unless there “were either goods immediately available for which that money could be spent or unless there were a sound political structure to inspire a confidence in the holder of the money that that government would make sure he would one day be able to buy at an agreed value the things he needed” at the present

752 ibid. p. 331.
time, but which were not available. Hence, Germany's tremendous need was the stimulation of an export program. Clay concluded that Germany was bankrupt and that as long as it could not “re-establish herself on a self-sustaining basis,” the burden would be on the US and U.K. taxpayer, unless they chose to return Germany to a “satisfactory trading position” or abandon it to “chaos.”

Marshall’s response to Clay was honest but disappointing. Marshall stated that it would be hard to get the people of the US to “understand the general nature of the situation in Europe, and in Germany in particular, and the complications” that were involved in Clay's particular responsibilities. Clay was loyal to Washington’s objectives and instructions, when he considered them clear and applicable. In his letter to former Secretary of State Byrnes Clay admitted that his Stuttgart speech had become a part of his “Bible” for Germany, since it was a living document of hope, and concluded stating his hope that in this political warfare with USSR, the US would not forget the 70,000,000 human beings of Germany and would not place Germany in a vacuum while the US solved world problems as if it did not exist.

After Marshall’s speech at Harvard Clay explained extensively to the Secretaries of State, War and Navy what he had summed up in his personal May letter to Marshall, but this time concluded with his suggestions that first a “peace treaty” and the “establishment of a German government,” and consequently the fulfillment of the “economic unification of Germany” should be pursued as parts of the goal of the European Recovery Program, since Germany had to be given “hope to early equality in treatment” and not be “relegated indefinitely to an inferior status.” Furthermore, Clay insisted that the only interim solution would be the placement of Ruhr mines “under a German trusteeship with public announcement that the trusteeship would continue until there was a central German government and the German people could freely determine under stable conditions the future of mine ownership.” In this way the Germans would feel and be “responsible to obtain maximum coal production.” Even if Clay was instructed to determine the German requirements for capital equipment in order to enable Germany to contribute to the European economic recovery, he kept requesting the “clear-cut objective” of a Ruhr policy, as on

754 ibid. pp. 346-349.
755 ibid.
756 ibid. p. 351.
757 ibid. pp. 377-381.
the one hand the British were pursuing the socialization of the Ruhr and on the other hand the French and Soviets opposed any economic recovery. In multiple confidential letters to Assistant Secretary of War Howard C. Petersen, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall and Director of the War Department’s Civil Affairs Division Daniel Noce from July until September Clay recognized the need to “proceed vigorously with the revival of German economy and increase in level of industry if the US were to save Germany from chaos and communism.” He believed that a “communistic Germany” was almost “certain” to result in a “communistic Europe,” but he declared that the State and War Department agreements made it “clear” that the US had “no fixed German policy” regarding the reparations, the level of industry, the coal production and the currency reform.

After the State Department’s request Clay drafted his suggestions to Royall, Noce and Drper on the resumption of reparations, the publication of plants available for reparations, the establishment of an international allocating board for the Ruhr, and of a trusteeship of Ruhr coal mines. Particularly, Clay favored the drafting of a list of the plants available for reparations, and the cessation of reparations deliveries to the Soviet Union until the London Conference scheduled to be held at the end of the year, when the economic unification of Germany was expected to be discussed. After the unification of Germany, the establishment of an international body for the allocation of the Ruhr coal mines could visualize the objectives of the Marshall Plan. Moreover, Clay warned that any action before the London conference would result in the inclusion of the Soviets in an international board for the allocation of Ruhr coal and their serious interference with the cooperative effort visualized in the Marshall Plan. Lastly, he opposed the state of North Rhine-Westphalia being granted possession of the Ruhr's assets “unless desired by the German people,” as this one state would then become the “dominant factor in the German political structure.”

Soviet accusations against the American government and the American way of life as well as the new policy of the US military government favoring the German people made the US press hunt for a biting statement of a new anti-Communist military government policy. Nonetheless, Clay’s answers in the few press conferences he delivered referred to the effort of the military government to explain to the German people why the US believed in its system, what it had done

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761 ibid. pp. 410-413.
for their country, and why the Americans did not believe in other systems. Clay pointed out the importance of democracy in “protecting the rights and dignity of the individual.” Despite the anti-Communist campaign launched by the US Administration Clay stated that he could “think of no more undemocratic thing to do than to suppress the Communist Party as such” and he had “no intention of doing so,” and even though he did not expect the officials of the military government to “engage in direct attacks on any other government,” he intended to abandon the method of attempting to explain to the German people the “broad principles” of democracy while trying to “avoid to make unfavorable comparison with other forms of political thought.” In fact, on several occasions Clay found it “increasingly difficult to meet with press and avoid their interpretations made by reading between the lines.” He explained to the State Department that statements of the military government or unsubstantiated leaks that had been misinterpreted by the press allowed for French and British “repercussions,” even if denied by the military government. Clay assured the Department of Army that even with Washington's approval he would not become a war-monger, but, at the same time, he would let no “Soviet attack go unanswered and have both the US press and the German people” believe that the US was afraid to answer. Besides, according to JCS1067, the military government was instructed to “further the objectives” of the US government and to “assist Germans to advance the American political and cultural objectives, hence to promote democracy” and “resist communism,” as Clay wrote in November to Secretary of Army Royall and Under Secretary of Army Draper.

By the end of the year Clay probably had no faith in an easy resolution of the German problem and was already working on his suggestions for the next step after the, in his opinion, most likely failure of the November/December meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London. Clay summed up the subjects of “greatest importance” for the State Department, like the abandonment of further dismantling on the ground that it prevented German recovery, the emphasis of “co-equal responsibility” of all Western powers, the importance of remaining in Berlin even though it was “surrounded by the Soviet zone,” as well as other objectives of US policy like

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762 ibid. pp. 452-453.
765 The War Department was dissolved on September 18, 1947 and was split into the Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force until it was succeeded by the United States Department of Defense in 1949.
767 ibid. pp. 463.
denazification, the connection between European recovery and access to the coal of the Ruhr, the destruction of the war plants so that the revival of German industry would not “raise a security threat,” and finally a halt to the Communist “westward march” in central Germany simply because the German people preferred “democracy.” Clay believed that the US military government should organize a western Germany and proceed with it, “first provisionally and then representative, quickly” in case the London conference failed to “produce an answer for all Germany” because an “economic rehabilitation” could be “successful” when “accompanied by sound political development.” Finally, Clay reminded Washington that the 42 million Germans in the British and American zone at his command represented “the strongest outpost against Communist penetration.”

All these events and the concerns expressed by General Clay pointed in one direction: that the year 1947 would need the American people to be aware of the Soviet threat to the European continent, and of the utility of American financial aid to the European countries to bring a stop to Communist expansion. The seed of fears of communist expansion in Europe had already been planted the previous year, but the prospect of giving away American dollars in foreign aid might potentially overwhelm the American people, not only because of the actual domestic economic needs but also because it was against the isolationist mentality that had prevailed for so many years. Therefore, it is interesting to study the contribution of the press outlets toward gaining popular support for the pursued US foreign aid policy.

President’s Address at a Meeting with the American Society of Newspaper Editors

On April 17, 1947 President Truman delivered a speech at the White House to the American Society of Newspaper Editors. Prompted by this being his one-hundredth press conference Truman expressed the thought that “the press had been extremely kind to [him], and that [it] […] had conveyed the facts as nearly and as truthfully as they could be conveyed under the circumstances, and that [he] was exceedingly happy that this country had a press that could say and do what it pleased under the law.” He also added that he did not “know of any country where the head of a state [was] willing to submit himself to a gang of gentlemen --[laughter]--who ask[ed]
him any sort of a question they please[d].” Truman again shared how “appreciative [he was] of the press this United States ha[d], and of its present management” and declared that he “didn't care much what was said on the editorial page if [he] got the facts on the front page!” -as had happened with regard to his Doctrine.

Retracing the major foreign policy maneuvers of his administration up until the Truman Doctrine he continued by crediting the bipartisan foreign policy to the Democratic former Secretary of State and Nobel Peace Prize winner Cordell Hull. Truman explained to the editors the policy “game;” namely that “everybody ha[d] a right to throw mudballs at the President, […] but in the foreign policy it is necessary that this country present a solid front to the world on the policy which [it] wanted to pursue.” “Being very frank with” the editors, he stated that the US tried to deal with “the Russian Government, […] but there [was] no way to please them. They [dealt] from day to day, and what [was] done yesterday ha[d] no bearing on what's done today or tomorrow.” Therefore, when Mr. Byrnes came back from the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in 1945 the administration made up its mind and “wanted only what [was] right- […] world peace--a just peace for all concerned; and […] to see [the US] borne fires kept burning so [the US could] meet the obligations created by this tremendous expenditure for war.” Truman concluded stating his belief that “the country [was] behind [the US] foreign policy,” and that the US should continue “that bipartisan foreign policy for the welfare of [itself] and the welfare of the world.” Concluding Truman asked the press editors to help him “catch up morally and internationally with the machine age […] in such a way as to create peace in the world, or it [would] destroy [the US] and everybody else.” Lastly, the President again linked US welfare with “the welfare of the whole world.”

In September 1947 President Truman also had a meeting with the editors of business and trade papers. The bottom-line of the President’s message in his special conference with editors of business and trade papers was to call for unified support behind the international role of the country. He also communicated the spirit of an open door policy to the Soviets. As he mentioned, he had “every kindly feeling in the world for the people who [were] causing [them] all the trouble now,” since “complete and wholehearted cooperation in meeting these situations [was imperative] if [the US] ever expect[ed] to get peace in the world.” However “certain specific agreements” had

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770 The American Presidency Project, Harry S. Truman, Remarks at a Meeting With the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 17, 1947, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, Retrieved on 8/22/2020 from https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/232909
been made, but “none of which ha[d] been carried out by the other party and that [was] the cause of the present situation.” Truman stated that there [was] “no opportunity for [the US] to blow up, at the present time, in the manner in which [the Soviets thought] that [was] going to take place.” Truman trusted in the words of General Marshall that “there were countries behind the Iron Curtain now trying very--very earnestly to be friendly to [the US].” He concluded in his speech that the editors would as well “find that [the US] motives open and aboveboard,” and restated the position that the US “tried to do anything but to make a peaceful and happy world. […] [The US] didn't ask for reparations. [The US] didn't ask for territory. But [the US was] faced with a condition and not a theory.”

In contrast to the President’s 1946 meeting with the American Society of Newspaper Editors, this time Truman delivered a speech and did not allow questions at the end of the meeting. Truman’s expectation from the US press outlets was made perfectly clear in his remarks. Regardless of the domestic situation and the way the administration was handling it, the US had to appear united on its foreign policy not only for the sake of its own country, but also for the welfare of the entire world. This objective obviously targeted the Soviet Union, against which the United States should display a united, solid and strong policy and unchanging position. To what extent the presidential expectation was fulfilled, at least in the view of the press outlets, will be examined in what follows.

American Public Opinion as Evaluated by Polling

Before moving on to the aforementioned examination, we should take a look at the results of the Gallup polls for the year 1947. Poll results revealed in January 1947 that 47% of the American people polled disapproved of the way Truman was handling his job as President, not a positive omen for the administration. Nonetheless, as soon as Byrnes was replaced by Marshall the President’s disapproval percentage dropped remarkably (39% in February, 23% in March, and 25% in June) and the majority of Americans asked declared themselves satisfied with the way he

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was handling his job.\textsuperscript{773} It was the first time a military man was appointed Secretary of State and that his appointment at this particular timepoint seemed so well received by the American people surveyed could possibly indicate their desire for further enhancing the firm foreign policy that Byrnes had introduced last year. This assumption was mirrored in the February survey results, which indicated that 57% of Americans polled thought that Byrnes did an excellent or good job in dealing with foreign nations, while 64% of them approved Marshall's appointment as the new Secretary of State and 51% of them expected an even firmer policy against the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{774} After Byrnes' replacement with Marshall the American people were asked to state the most important problem the US Government had to solve in the next year. Interestingly, the prioritization of the problems changed and even though the strikes and labor problems came first (40%), the international relations came second (26% compared to the 10% the previous year).\textsuperscript{775}

The same shift of opinion was reflected in the question regarding political party popularity. The best party to handle economic problems if hard times came again was deemed in March and in April the Democrats by a slight majority (51%) over the Republicans.\textsuperscript{776} The positive results on Truman's popularity were also accompanied by equally positive results within his own party, as compared to other potential candidates. Asked among Democrats, in April 79% of those polled found Truman as their best leader for next year's presidential elections, while in June 71% said Truman, 46% said Marshall and 43% said Byrnes was of Democratic presidential material, and in July again 71% of the Democrats polled would like to see Truman as their elected President in 1948.\textsuperscript{777} In July 68% of Americans polled would still not vote for Wallace in the presidential elections.\textsuperscript{778} Thus Truman’s position, and the positive response toward his policies, at this juncture seemed quite secure.

Regarding the resonance of the anti-Communist policy pursued throughout the year, when the American people were asked in January whether they believed that the Soviet Union would cooperate with the US in world affairs 43% replied positively and 40% negatively.\textsuperscript{779} After

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{773} ibid. pp. 623, 636, 650.
\item \textsuperscript{774} ibid. p. 628.
\item \textsuperscript{775} ibid. p. 623.
\item \textsuperscript{776} ibid. pp. 632, 638.
\item \textsuperscript{777} ibid. pp. 640, 655, 660.
\item \textsuperscript{778} ibid. pp. 657-658.
\item \textsuperscript{779} ibid. p. 617.
\end{itemize}
Truman’s speech 65% of Americans surveyed believed that a nation would like to dominate or run the world, and of those who answered affirmatively 52% pointed to the Soviet Union, while only 10% Germany, while after Marshall’s speech 71% of the American people polled believed that a nation would like to dominate or run the world and, of those, 78% pointed to the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{780} Even though still by August domestic problems like a higher cost of living and housing were acknowledged by 24% of the people polled as the most important problem of the American family, the international affairs of their country had not only started to trigger the awareness of the American people, but also dominated it. Thus, 43% of Americans surveyed regarded US international affairs as the most important problem of their country (22% named foreign policy and 21% the prevention of war).\textsuperscript{781} The American interest toward foreign affairs and the approval of foreign policies kept escalating until the end of the year. During and after the London Conference of Foreign Ministers the majority of Americans polled (in November 61% and in December 64%) had heard of the Marshall plan and of those 45% favored it.\textsuperscript{782}

As shown by the opinion of the American people polled, the majority of them was much more aware of their country’s international affairs and challenges and supportive of the objectives of the American administration, regardless of whether they were aware of the entire context of the policy or not. Interestingly, the suspicion of the American people that the US government was not giving them all the important facts about world conditions (59% of the people surveyed in August believed that) increased their suspicion toward the Soviet Union and not toward their administration.\textsuperscript{783} For instance, in April 75% of the people polled approved the Truman Doctrine, even though in July 49% of Americans surveyed had heard of the Marshall Plan and of those 57% approved it but only 41% agreed on increased taxes, if necessary, to raise money to fund the plan.\textsuperscript{784} In October, still 49% of Americans asked had heard of the Marshall Plan, however, of those who replied affirmative only one in five gave an essentially correct definition of it and 49% of them approved that Western European countries would be given five billion dollars per year for three to four years.\textsuperscript{785}

\textsuperscript{780} ibid. pp. 635, 664.  
\textsuperscript{781} ibid. pp. 642, 666.  
\textsuperscript{782} ibid. pp. 683, 691.  
\textsuperscript{783} ibid. p. 667.  
\textsuperscript{784} ibid. pp. 636, 661.  
\textsuperscript{785} ibid. pp. 677-678.
Even though the majority of the American people surveyed did not wish to be involved in a new war and thought that it was important to be on friendly terms with the Soviet Union or cooperate with it in the setting up of a world organization without making too many concessions to it, even if it was to possess atomic bombs, the seeds of suspicion against the Soviets had been planted and were taking root among the American people for other reasons as well.\textsuperscript{786} For instance, in April 61\% of Americans polled continued to believe that American Communists were loyal to the Soviet Union, 67\% of them thought that members of the Communist party should be forbidden to hold civil service and government jobs and 61\% of them stated that American membership in the Communist party should be forbidden by law.\textsuperscript{787} Furthermore, in December only 59\% of Americans surveyed believed that the American Communists were loyal to the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{788} Additionally, 88\% of the Americans believed that democracy existed in the US, 48\% of them believed it existed in Great Britain and only 9\%, 5\% and 4\% in Poland, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia respectively.\textsuperscript{789} Moreover, in August 56\% of Americans polled approved of the idea that the US should go ahead without the Soviet Union and make a separate peace with Germany and Japan in case the Soviet Union and the US could not agree on peace terms, and 82\% of Americans polled believed that the other European countries should go ahead with the Marshall Plan if the Soviet Union would not agree to it.\textsuperscript{790} In November 78\% of the people asked did not believe that the US was insisting too much on having its own way when dealing with the Soviet Union and other countries and in fact 62\% of them found that the US was being too soft in its policy toward the Soviet Union. In particular, 76\% of them thought that the Soviet Union was trying to build herself up as the ruling power of the world and the majority of the people named Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Albania and Finland as Soviet satellites, even though not even two in ten Americans knew where these countries were on the map. Furthermore, the American people interpreted the secretive behavior of the Soviet Union as either a preparation for war, Soviet nature, a Soviet way

\textsuperscript{786} ibid. pp. 649, 685-686.  
\textsuperscript{787} ibid. pp. 639-640.  
\textsuperscript{788} ibid. p. 690.  
\textsuperscript{789} ibid. pp. 642-643.  
\textsuperscript{790} ibid. p. 663.
to cover its weakness or as a Soviet attempt to hide from its people the outside world because they might become disoriented.  

The general atmosphere of American suspicion and fear toward the Soviet Union appeared to have such an effect on the American people that even though the majority of the Americans participating in the surveys had not heard the Congressional arguments for and against reducing the army-navy budget, they disapproved of the reduction of the money. Particularly, the majority of the American people (72% in February, 74% in June, 75% in July) believed that every able-bodied young man should be required to take military training or naval training for one year, 76% of the Americans found it a good idea that the US spend 2 billion dollars a year for scientific and military research, and 55% of the people thought the development of the atomic bomb was a good thing with 70% of them believing that the US should continue to manufacture it, and 50% of them willing to pay more taxes for it. This could probably be explained by the anti-Communist speeches of the US foreign policy statesmen, since in contrast to the previous year, from April 1947 73% of the Americans believed that the US would find itself in another war within the next 25 years, 53% of the Americans believed that the US would find itself in another war within the next ten years and the majority of the Americans polled believed that the US in cooperation with the U.N. should tell the Soviet Union that any further move into Greece would be considered a declaration of war against the rest of the world, especially since some experts predicted that the Soviet Union would have atomic bombs in about a year. Besides, 66% of the Americans asked did not regard America's involvement in the Second World War as a mistake as they thought it was the only way to defend their country, and they would probably feel the same way in the case of an indirect attack.

As is probably evident the fear of communism dominated the majority of the questions in the Gallup surveys. The American people appeared to favor any policy attempting to contain Soviet aggression even though their domestic problems were of a financial nature and one would assume that the average American did not think they could afford an additional tax burden.

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791 ibid. p. 661, 682-683.
792 ibid. p. 635-636.
794 ibid. pp. 641, 664, 675.
795 ibid. p. 679.
Exclusively about Germany only two questions were asked, which revealed that even though in January the borderline majority of Americans polled (52%) thought that it would be a bad idea to bring over to the US 1,000 German scientists who had worked for the Nazis, 73% of the Americans who approved this suggestion would even permit the scientists to become US citizens if they wanted to.\textsuperscript{796} Although 45% of Americans asked found the German people friendly as a whole, 58% of them did believe that Germany would not become a peace-loving democratic nation and would again someday become aggressive and start a war.\textsuperscript{797} Additionally, despite the fact that the polls revealed that Germany was ranked by the American people first (25%) in the list of the European countries doing worst off, the American people did not appear willing to cut back their own food for the European peoples any more. In particular in October 68% of Americans surveyed disapproved of a return to rationing in order to get enough food to feed people in Western Europe, while only 38% of the Americans were planning to follow ‘meatless Tuesdays’ and 22% of them were already doing it.\textsuperscript{798}

By the end of fall 1947 the surveys revealed the trust of the American people toward its administration. 56% of Americans polled would vote for the Democrats if a presidential election were being held, in contrast to the respective results in the previous year which gave Truman almost no possibility of re-election, while 55% of them approved the way Truman was handling his job.\textsuperscript{799} Nevertheless, as shown by the survey results, this change could also be attributed to the American people’s belief that the Democrats served the interests of unskilled (manual laborers) and skilled (electricians, plumbers etc.) workers and farmers, in contrast to the Republicans who were believed to represent the smaller numbers of white-collar workers (office workers) and businessmen. According to the Economic Background to Manpower Planning and Control Bureau of Labor Statistics of the Department of Labor in October 1947 the total number of workers in the US was 57,843,000 of which 41% were blue-collar workers (manual laborers skilled or unskilled), 35% white-collar workers, 10% service workers, and 14% farm workers.\textsuperscript{800} Furthermore, Americans polled in November chose the Democrats as the party that could best handle foreign

\textsuperscript{796} ibid. p. 618.  
\textsuperscript{797} ibid. p. 625.  
\textsuperscript{798} ibid. pp. 681-682, 686, 688.  
\textsuperscript{799} ibid. p. 680.  
affairs, domestic affairs and the problem of high prices during the next few years (33%, 35%, 35% respectively).\textsuperscript{801} Lastly, 55% of Americans and 65% of independent voters polled would vote for the Democrats if a presidential election were being held.\textsuperscript{802} These numbers confirm the support of a clear majority of the American people, at least of those polled, for the Truman administration, the Democratic Party and its policies.

Press Outlets

\textbf{Walter Lippmann as Political Commentator}

Despite the people’s support of its government the political analyst Walter Lippmann expressed his disapproval of the US foreign policy, pointed out the lack of “central direction” of the foreign policy due to its division across separate departments, as well as the danger that the “native communists” in Europe would follow Moscow without “being in clear conflict with the national interest” due to the existence of a “merely anti-Soviet” and not of a US “constructive” European program.\textsuperscript{803} Additionally, between the “‘appeasers’ and the ‘crusaders’” of US foreign policy, Lippmann chose the middle road; namely the prevention of the expansion of Soviet imperialism and of Communism without making the US imperialist or entangling it in a “conflict for the domination of the world.”\textsuperscript{804}

Lippmann also declared his doubt about the settlement of the German treaty as there was no German government that “could speak for Germany, or sign anything which was legally, much less morally, binding upon the German nation.” Additionally, he advised against the appointment of a government by the Allies as it would be regarded as a “puppet government,” and against an elected government as “no patriotic German government could honestly” accept the treaty. According to him “the rational and prudent solution” would be to “accept the consequences of the war by recognizing that a new central government had to be created gradually” and not “soon,” and in fact first in the separate German states and not at the level of the German nation as “one conglomerate mass.” Lippmann did not warn against Communism and found the establishment of

\textsuperscript{801} Gallup (1972), Vol. I, pp. 687-688, 690.
\textsuperscript{802} ibid. pp. 660, 692, 695.
a Communist, Nationalist, or Social Democratic government equally “nationalist,” as to him none of them would teach the Germans self-government.\textsuperscript{805}

Regarding the US policy at the Moscow conference, Lippmann pointed out that the Western Allies had first to co-ordinate and harmonize their ideas for the pursuit of the “big objective” - the German and the European settlement with the Soviet Union - as well as of the lesser objective of Marshall’s “sound” policy - a “settlement of at least three-quarters of Europe, designed eventually to include the rest. The era of American confusion was over.” As such the Truman Doctrine was not endorsed by Lippmann, who located its main flaw in the assumption that it was a decision by which Soviet expansion would be stopped at its source. Therefore, he suggested redirecting American power and influence “at key points” - Germany and Western Europe, Turkey, and Japan - in order to “exert a direct leverage upon Moscow,” instead of “resisting passively the Soviet expansion by subsidizing a dubious collection of puppet and satellite governments.”\textsuperscript{806}

According to Lippmann, replacing the old disputes with the Soviet Union with a “large project for the reorganization of Europe and the peace of the world,” as well as investing “a large sum over a period of years in a comprehensive political settlement” was what distinguished a policy from a “crusade.”\textsuperscript{807} Furthermore, Lippmann’s pointing out that the “fallacy” that the expansion of the Soviet Union and the spread of communism could be checked by “subsidizing all the governments […] which were most undeniably anti-Communist,” committed the US to a fruitless alliance with the “most reactionary forces in the world and alienated the moderate and democratic forces,” and instead suggested “direct diplomatic negotiation” with the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{808} The fact that the Congress voted for such a not at all “clear and considered policy,” was explained by Lippmann by the inability of Congress to reject it due to the potential Soviet interpretation of the rejection,


namely “as a green light [...] to become the heirs of the empire which the British were liquidating.”\footnote{Walter Lippmann, “Today and tomorrow: Resuming the discussion,” \textit{The Washington Post}, (1947, April 22), 7.}

Therefore, Lippmann welcomed Secretary Marshall’s help-them-help-themselves plan which would “mark the beginning of a more natural and normal relationship between the US and the European world” by keeping the door to Soviet cooperation open and would form a policy directed toward European unity.\footnote{Walter Lippmann, “Today and tomorrow: What Marshall is achieving,” \textit{The Washington Post}, (1947, April 17), 7. See also: Walter Lippmann, “What Marshall is achieving,” \textit{Los Angeles Times}, (1947, April 18), A4; Walter Lippmann, “On borrowed time,” \textit{Los Angeles Times}, (1947, May 13), A4; Walter Lippmann, “Revision of US policy,” \textit{Los Angeles Times}, (1947, June 25), A4.} The “compelling practical reasons” that was that the German settlement had to be agreed upon “within a framework of European unity.” However, the unification of Europe was not meant as a “coalition of democracies” against the Soviet Union, but as a confirmation that the contribution of US dollars would actually be an “investment in the reorganization of Europe.” Furthermore, Lippmann suggested the rectification of the German-Polish frontiers, since an “amputated” Germany could not be restored, let alone be “peaceable.”\footnote{Walter Lippmann, “American reasons for a European union,” \textit{Los Angeles Times}, (1947, May 23), A4. See also: Walter Lippmann, “Today and tomorrow: US reasons for European union,” \textit{The Washington Post}, (1947, May 17), 5.}


The famous “X-article” was regarded by Lippmann as the “work of a man who had observed the Soviet regime closely with a trained eye and an educated mind,” and merited one of the scarce positive comments Walter Lippmann included in a series of articles he published in the fall of the 1947.\footnote{Walter Lippmann, “Today and tomorrow: The Cold War: study of US policy,” \textit{The Washington Post}, (1947, September 2), 11. See also: Walter Lippmann, “The Cold War: A study in US foreign policy,” \textit{Los Angeles Times}, (1947, September 4), A4.} Nonetheless, after the revealing of the identity of the author the article was no longer for Lippmann a “report on the Soviet regime” but a disclosure to the American people, to
the world at large, and to the Kremlin of the “estimates, the calculations, and the conclusions” on which the State Department was basing its “plans.” With his critique Lippmann did not express his belief or hope that the US conflict with the Soviet government was “imaginary” or that it could be “avoided, or ignored, or easily disposed of,” but the opinion that Mr. X’s plan was unsound and based on the “wishful thinking” of a Soviet collapse, and that it would cause the US to “squander” its “substance” and “prestige.” The only way this plan could construct unassailed barriers was if the US relied upon the unification of “heterogeneous, unstable and admittedly weak” satellite states. Instead of trying to organize “disunited, feeble and disorderly nations” around the Soviet perimeter, Lippmann advised the US policy to focus on the vital interests of the US’s “natural allies in western Europe by reconstructing their economic life” and by “promising a German settlement on which they could agree.”

For their enlightenment Lippmann recommended to his readers an article by a “distinguished political geographer” Professor Robert Strausz-Hupe of the University of Pennsylvania who explained everything Mr. X’s analysis failed to explain; namely the “pattern and plan, not merely the generalized fact, of Soviet expansion, as well as the causes and issues of the diplomatic conflict in the postwar period.” The Truman Doctrine, Lippmann argued, was bound to fail for another reason as well: even if it succeeded in withdrawing the Red Army, it could not fight the “Soviet fifth column,” the Communist Party. Therefore, Lippmann suggested a plan to

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separate the four columns (of the Red Army) from the fifth column through the settlement of a German and Austrian treaty which would include the withdrawal of the Allied armies of occupation and result in the “evacuation of Europe by the Red Army” and the restoration of the “balance of power.” In case the Soviet Union refused to withdraw its army, this would prove that the American cause was just, and that the Americans were the “champions of freedom, and then the great masses of the people of Europe” would be on the American side because the US stood “for the very thing which only traitors could oppose.”

Consequently, Lippmann turned to how the problem of Germany was defined by the Truman Doctrine and analyzed his approach. On the one hand there was Kennan’s “suicidal” attempt to “incite the sentiments of unity” to the German people, since unity could not be promised without inciting the German desire of “recovering of the lost provinces of eastern Germany,” which could only be achieved by either going to war with the Soviet Union, or the Soviet Union actually offering them that. Lippmann’s suggestions pointed toward making the “real issues much more clear” by concentrating American energy on Germany, and “not dispersing it all over the globe.” For Lippmann Marshall's request that the countries participating in his plan draft their own rehabilitation plans, would eventually prove that the “division of Europe” could not be “perpetuated due to the economic interdependence of western and eastern Europe.” On the other hand, the containment policy of Mr. X “destroyed” the principles of the United Nations because its objective was not a “settlement of the conflict with Russia,” which would “cast aside the future” of the U.N. as a “universal society” like it had happened with the League of Nations. Lippmann concluded that for a “diplomat to think that rival and unfriendly powers could not be brought to a settlement was to forget what diplomacy was about.” Moreover, as the Soviet would continue to

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be Soviets and the Communists would continue to be Communists, it was of paramount importance
that a settlement between East and West would force the Soviet Army to retreat from Europe.823

According to Lippmann, if the Marshall plan intended to be a reconstruction program and
not a relief program it had to successfully establish “trade and mutual aid between east and west,”
which consequently required a “political settlement or at least a modus vivendi” between Western
Europe and the countries behind the “Iron Curtain.” In other words, according to Lippmann's
interpretation, the success of the Marshall plan committed the US to a “policy of ending the cold
war.”824 If the State Department did not come up with a “resolute, lucid, and coherent diplomatic
campaign to unify Europe, then its Marshall Plan policy would fail and become a series of annual
doles.”825 Since the Soviet Army did not intend to retreat from the center of Europe, Lippmann
drew up an “American agenda” according to the American understanding of the national and the
common interests of the Europeans. He suggested that the Soviet army be “contained” by an
operational striking force “capable [...] of delivering a sustained assault at long range,” along with
the approval of the necessary funds, the submission of the full Marshall plan and the confirmation
that the defense of Italy against external aggression would remain. Concerning Germany,
Lippmann proposed the dedication of coal and steel resources of the Ruhr “to the security of
Europe and not to the sovereignty of Germany,” and pointed out the importance of a German peace
treaty as a whole. Lastly, he urged for the declaration of all European nations, including the eastern
ones, “as members of one indivisible political and economic community.”826

The Washington Post

The two significant staff replacements impacting occupation policy, which marked the
beginning of the year 1947, were very well received by The Post. On the one hand, General Lucius

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17), 9. See also: Walter Lippmann, “Europe revisited,” Los Angeles Times, (1947, November 5), A4; Walter
Lippmann, “The limit of communist expansion,” Los Angeles Times, (1947, December 16), A4; Walter Lippmann,
D. Clay’s appointment as Commanding General of the United States forces in the European theater and his promotion from Deputy to Military Governor of the United States zone of Germany was “logical” as his “political and administrative performance” so far had proven him “one of the great American public servants.” For The Post Clay had “thus far bitterly, courageously and successfully resisted” corporations of “great power and influence which were seeking up productive German assets on the cheap” and was thinking of “fat profits while talking of “just punishments.”

On the other hand, even though the replacement of Byrnes was regarded as “a great national loss,” the appointment of General Marshall, a man of “sterling character, exceptional attainments and very high regard, was greeted with relief and rejoicing rather than with fear and alarm” due partly to the unprecedented choice of a military man as Secretary of State.

In contrast to Lippmann’s stance against US foreign policy in Europe, and Germany in particular, The Post supported the American foreign policy and openly refuted Lippmann’s approach to it. For instance, during the very first days of the year the newspaper expressed its “encouraging feeling” that there was a “slightly better chance” for an agreement with the Soviet Union after the realization that neither the US nor the Soviet Union alone could define the “political and economic status of postwar Europe and Germany’s place in it.” However, in view of the Moscow CFM Conference The Post drew attention to the kind of peace the Allies would make with Germany, and the kind of Germany the Allies would make peace with; namely the establishment of an “industrial, commercial and financial rehabilitation” which could be carried out so that Germany would not “make a new bid for world power.” The newspaper acknowledged the mutual distrust between the US and the Soviet Union and did not expect an easy compromise as the Soviets, for various reasons, did not intend to rush into the negotiations especially after “already extracting from their zone all that could be taken out of it,” while on the other hand it emphasized the US willingness to participate with “Russia to the fullest possible extent in the international control of a demilitarized Germany.”

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not optimistic toward the Moscow Conference and expected the “inevitable result” of an “unbroken deadlock,” its failure was reported neither with propagandistic implications nor with direct blaming of the Soviets, as the western allies were not united either. On the contrary, it admitted that “neither side was inclined to give way on any issue that was deemed fundamental,” which led to “a definite hardening of the respective attitude of Russia and the western powers.”

Therefore, the unsuccessful Moscow meeting did not provoke The Post, which did not overdramatized the Soviet attempt to influence the people of Germany, Italy and France, and supported Secretary Marshall’s attempt to maintain a middle-of-the-road policy and to do the best to “bring peace and stability back to this battered old world” if the Soviets declined to cooperate, while keeping the “door to Russian cooperation hopefully open.” Even though the Moscow failure was not exploited propagandistically by The Post, the conclusion was that “the beaten Reich could not indefinitely be left in chaos” and the Anglo-American merger of the occupation zones along with a coal agreement for the Ruhr were two satisfactory first steps.

Refuting Lippmann’s critique the newspaper also welcomed the President’s “momentous, novel and daring” policy dedicated to the “fulfillment of the traditional American role on the larger scale of operations that modern science had made imperative.” Truman’s resounding statement was, for the newspaper, not just an anti-communist statement, but a “moral” attempt for political encouragement and the only alternative to “chaos, a Russian-subjugated Europe, or a Europe [...]

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on America's back.” Therefore, the newspaper believed that the doctrine would attract attention “abroad” once the people realized that the new American policy meant the “strengthening and not the weakening of the international order,” the “expansion of the democratic ideas,” and not merely an “opposition to disruptive doctrines.” Even though the newspaper addressed the fact that the Truman Doctrine was approved by the Congress “without enthusiasm and with many qualms, hesitations and forebodings” because there was no “safe and reasonable alternative” to it, it expressed faith in Truman's ability to make his plan a “positive investment in democracy and peace” for the prevention of the expansion of totalitarian ideas. Consequently, the newspaper also endorsed the “essential corollary” to the Truman Doctrine, Marshall’s “eloquently simple” speech, another “extraordinary attempt at public enlightenment,” and urged for the approval of its funding by Congress, which would have to vote between “discomfort” and “disaster,” and the determination of the American people was determined to “see through to the end what they had started.”

As already mentioned, The Washington Post was supportive of a US foreign policy that did not shut the US door of cooperation in the face of the Soviet Union, but declared the American determination to move forward with the restoration of Europe, even if it meant the restoration of Western Europe only. Despite the position the newspaper adopted, it did not criticize harshly the Soviet stubborn and uncooperative attitude, but exposed the “maneuvers” of the Soviet Union to become “the master of Europe” by publishing the “Stalin Doctrine” which was “taking shape rapidly in five key countries” - Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, France and Italy- “in the tug of war for Europe” in many ways: by seizing government control either through legal elections or through anti-government “armed Communist guerilla bands,” by imprisoning their political opponents in order to “plunge” them into “economic chaos,” by wrecking the peace negotiations in an attempt

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843 Relman Morin, “’Doctrine’ of Stalin takes shape in 5 nations,” The Washington Post, (1947, June 8), M1, M10.
to “scare” the US away without “resourcing to brute force,” by resisting a German recovery and in turn “retarding” Europe’s recovery was well, by making the peoples of European countries more “susceptible” to Communism, and by setting up “‘stooge’ governments dominated by Russia.”

Continuing its support of the US foreign policy The Post not only endorsed the “X-article” but also identified as the most “powerful instrument” of Soviet foreign policy the “trade-union movement outside Russia which had come under Communist domination,” and regarded the Truman Doctrine as its expression -as the realization of the US policy of “containment”- and therefore disagreed with Lippmann's opposition to it. Additionally, as the newspaper had stated already at the beginning of the year the replacement of Byrnes by Marshall did not mean any change in the US foreign policy. Thus, the newspaper regarded the Marshall Plan as an application of Byrnes' policy announced in Stuttgart to “western Europe as a whole.” “Europe independent or Europe tied to the Soviet chariot? Europe on its feet or Europe in its knees?” To these questions The Post employed “audacity” and “clear thinking” and chose “Operation Survival” -or in the official words the European Recovery Program- to “build up” Europe and Germany before the Soviet Union “pulled it down.”

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By the end of the year the newspaper even changed its attitude against the Soviet responsibility for the dead end of the East-West “collaboration.” In contrast to the interpretation of the failed Moscow conference, The Post did not expect that the London conference would be a success but a “stalemate.” The newspaper also referred to Marshall’s “background of painful experience” in London and ascribed a potential failure of the London conference to the Russian attempts to make any agreement “impossible” but not to “risk a definite breaking off of diplomatic conversations between the Big Four.” Moreover, The Post expected the Soviets to attempt to “drive the representatives of the west out of Berlin employing all methods short of war,” while Germany and the world would be divided, thus the newspaper saw no alternative for the US but to struggle for Germany and win that struggle with “determination, full resources, sound social imagination [and] good hearts.”

Regarding the internal situation of Germany at the beginning of the year the newspaper warned of the formation of a new right-wing political party “that it termed even the “powerful church-backed parties of southern Germany ‘leftists’.” Germans, the newspaper claimed, did not think about their war guilt, on the contrary they appeared as nationalistic as they had during the Nazi regime and even dreamed of a “leader who would guide them to another national renaissance.” Nonetheless, the newspaper supported the transformation of the de-Nazification process in the American occupation zone, which would “let the great mass of passive Nazi followers escape with mere payment of a fine, as the emphasis of American rule in Germany was being placed upon democratic reconstruction rather than upon deindustrialization.” Otherwise

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the situation in US-occupied Germany was being reported as “normal” by The Post. For instance, reference was made to Americans in Germany having little contact with Germans and living “in a world within a world” -namely in Germany but “in almost every other respect it was as American as Oklahoma”- or that marriages between American G.I.s and German girls were finally allowed after social background checks.860 The newspaper also declared that there was no need for any “agitation against dismantlement,” which was producing a variety of “inimical” results to the US foreign policy, as Germany was left with plants which would enable her to be the economic “kingpin of Europe.”861

On another account, the new US Military Governor in Germany, General L. Clay, who sometimes took “vital decisions” when they were not “forthcoming from Washington,” was praised by The Post as he “was dealing not with words on paper but with human beings.”862 Clay's request to the State Department for the power to make more decisions was supported by The Post, along with Clay’s belief that even though Communism was “foreign” to Germans, to “hungry” and “hopeless” people in a “chaotic” economic situation Communism with its “false promises, lies and panaceas” could be “attractive.”863

The Post readership in its majority approved of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and Kennan’s containment theory, and found Lippmann's suggested policy “immoral, unrealistic” and “dangerous,”864 while only a few like the chairman of the Postwar World Council believed that Lippmann had made an “impressive” case, and that he underlined the “general fear” of the containment policy among America's “natural allies in Europe.”865 Post letters to the editor found

Clay’s appointment “logical as his political and administrative performance” so far had proven him “one of the great American public servants.”

Even though some readers argued that if Germany had been put to work in the employment of its people and resources for the benefit of all Europe, no Marshall plan would be necessary, most Post readers endorsed the political and economic reforms of American foreign policy in Western Europe. They also supported the termination of the Joint Chiefs of Staff order 1067 as the primary policy governing military government in the US zone, which they now considered to show apathy and insensitiveness toward a people very much like themselves. Moreover, some readers believed that the world had “overcome the German and Japanese hurdle and [was] now faced with a far greater one, Russia” and regarded the dismantling in Germany as inconsistent with the Marshall Plan. On the other hand, there were also readers, who wondered whether the attitude of the Soviet press was justified by the attitude of the American press against the Soviet Union, while some suggested that European countries do more work toward a “spiritual rehabilitation” of the adherents of Communism instead of giving out American dollars.

In summary, the Washington Post overtly endorsed Truman’s foreign policy. The newspaper insisted on reminding its readers that the US was still keeping the door of cooperation open for the Soviets and thus did not use the communist fear as its leading persuasive tool and instead focused on the promotion and support of the US foreign policy. One could say that Lippmann’s numerous articles offered the readership a different approach to the pursued foreign policy, but their actual impact on the readership is hard to be estimated since the newspaper kept stating its refutation toward Lippmann’s views. The Post readership was inclined to recognize the important role of Germany in the new balance of power and appeared sympathetic toward the US foreign policies developed that year.

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In anticipation of a German peace treaty and since the American people had little to no access to the roaring Moscow voices of the newspapers Pravda and Izvestia, the newspaper decided to selectively represent and criticize the “Red propaganda line” of the Soviet press. The newspaper referred to the continuous Soviet reports of how the Soviet Union had won the war and how all other Allies were “more or less benevolent observers,” and how it was obvious that the German peace treaty would take place in Moscow. The LA Times drew attention to the Soviet press omitting the fact that Britain “was fighting Hitler when Stalin was virtually his ally from September 1939 to July 1941.” Therefore, the newspaper urged, after Hungary's and Bulgaria's fall into the Soviet orbit, that it was time for the US to rebuild her “historical traditional alliances and friendships,” and to co-ordinate her efforts with those who shared the “same philosophy and way of life.” Despite these and other reports expressing the Los Angeles Times’ suspicions against the Soviet Union, the newspaper continued to express its belief in the success of the new US foreign policy, without shutting the door to the possibility of a Soviet collaboration and participation in any plans drawn up for the recovery of Europe.

The newspaper hoped for the political reorientation of Germany before its economic reconstruction, the deterring of the division of Germany, and the combining of Germany’s disarmament with a program of political education. It also supported the US government's policy to “do” its “share” and “meet” its international “colleagues half-way” but not disarm. Furthermore, Marshall was expected to introduce “a new element and a new vigor” in US foreign policy, as he was not “in the habit of mincing words” or yielding “where American interests were at stake,” and to use his “profound knowledge of the true military position” of the Soviet Union.

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and Britain in dealing with them.\textsuperscript{874} Attacking the Communist definition of “security,” according to which, the \textit{LA Times} claimed, there was “no room for accommodation with capitalist countries” and no security could exist “until all countries were communized” the newspaper challenged Marshall to make clear to the Soviet Union that the US was aware that the US’s great problem would be the “‘aggressive and expanding’ policy of the Soviet Union” as long as Stalin was alive or not overthrown.\textsuperscript{875}

In reference to the Moscow conference, the newspaper saw not unity, not even among the western allies. Yet it was slightly optimistic toward the conference, expecting that Marshall could “act as referee” with “clarity” and “simplicity,” and when needed play his “cards close to his vest with the calm attitude of a man holding a royal flush” to counterstrike. Of course, the newspaper did not refrain from condemning the Soviet seizure of every opportunity to “lower the US prestige in the eyes of Europe and in the eyes of the world.”\textsuperscript{876} Nevertheless, neither the Soviet attitude nor the Moscow failure reinforced the newspaper’s anti-communist attitude, which praised Marshall, “the chief architect of western unity,” and his clear message that the western powers would proceed with the German treaty without the Soviet Union and its satellites, with a “standing invitation,” nonetheless, to join.\textsuperscript{877}

Referring to the Congressional approval of the Truman Doctrine the newspaper called on the American people to make America’s greatest decision and choose between acting “to shape the


affairs of the whole world” or, “as they had done in the past, escaping history by ignoring it.”

Even though the Truman Doctrine enjoyed the support of the LA Times, it went out of its way to bring to its readers the views of the anti-New Deal conservative Raymond Moley, who claimed Truman Doctrine supporters rested their “hopes” and not their belief on its success, as they questioned whether the US administration was aware of its actual limits and suggested either to pursue “an agreement with Russia concerning the limitation of her influence first or at least to project some sort of inventory of American resources and obligations.”

US policy was determined to “follow in an atmosphere of liberty under the law as distinct from regimentation under a police state,” the LA Times maintained. Nonetheless, it warned that “American money would not continue to flow into Europe without stint or limit,” as the failures of U.N.R.R.A. (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration), which was founded by 44 nations in 1943 as a social welfare-type agency to help victims of war before it became a part of the UN in 1945 and then was shut down in late 1946, were a “lesson learned.”

Nevertheless, it was not only Lippmann who criticized the US foreign policy of Soviet containment through US dollars. The newspaper expressed its “hopes” rather than its confidence in its success and even though its criticism was definitely not as sharp as Lippmann’s, the LA Times columnist Polyzoides, generally a supporter of the US foreign policy, did acknowledge the fact that money alone was not the solution to the European problem. Polyzoides argued that since the US did not intend to “indefinitely” foot the food bills of her “two vanquished enemies,” the German factories had to be in a position to “manufacture goods, from sewing machines to tractors and locomotives, in order to help the European restoration.”

Furthermore, regarding the unstable internal political situation of Britain and France “a ‘grand alliance’ of the west against the Soviet[s]” was questioned and therefore the rebuilding and mobilization of the U.N. or the “reforming” of the US “wartime alliances” might need to be a solution for this East-West conflict.

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The Soviet withdrawal from the Paris conference and its refusal to participate in the Marshall plan, according to the newspaper, on the one hand "materialized" the sharp coming down of the Iron Curtain and the "dreaded eventuality of a divided Europe," and on the other hand it launched an "economic" and "social" struggle between the Soviet Union and the US. As such a new US policy plan would call for a deviation from the Potsdam agreement, which even though not being "sacrosanct," had, according to the LA Times, been violated by the Soviets first, and for the reconstruction of the European arsenal, namely the restoration of Germany's coal, steel, iron, chemicals and fertilizers as well as the reorganization of its currency. The Soviet Union had now caused the US to have "reached" the American "limit" and the newspaper suggested that the West go ahead on its own and even make a peace treaty with Germany, while keeping the door open to the Soviet Union.

Despite the Soviet refusal to participate in the Marshall plan, the newspaper still believed that there was a slight possibility that the Soviet Union would agree to a "loosely organized German government" at the London Conference. Nonetheless, in the view of the newspaper, the continuous savage Soviet attacks and false accusations regarding the western occupation policy as well as "Molotov's arrogant demands, reduced the Big Four relations to the lowest point [...] and threatened an almost immediate break-up of the London session." Despite the newspaper's harsh estimation of the Soviet delegates at the London conference, and the placing of the blame for the

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conference’s failure on the Soviets, the newspaper still wished that the success of the Marshall plan would convince the Soviet Union to join it. Lastly, the LA Times was against the accusation of Radio Moscow that the Marshall plan intended to rebuild Germany’s war arsenal by contradicting the “foolishness” of this argument with noting that America’s war potential was 10 times greater than anything the Germans could achieve, and the fact that Germany would be a “liability” for the US in a potential war with Russia. Besides, the newspaper had already declared its disapproval of the continuation of the dismantling process in Germany because this would further increase the US burdens and would not contribute to the European reconstruction.

From the side of the LA Times readership there was mostly suspicion against US foreign policy in Europe. Some people even accused the American press of “hot” propaganda in order to bring about “militarization” of the US in “peacetime,” which would “bring about a third world war.” Quite a few readers tended to equivocate over which was worse, Nazi Germany or Stalinist Soviet Union, wondering why the US worked its way “into the war against Fascist Germany,” when it was prepared to “‘get along’ with the unscrupulous totalitarian government of Russia.” They advised against the adoption of a “‘head in the sand’ attitude” toward the Soviet “industrial” and “physical power” or the Soviet spread of “suspicion” and “confusion,” disapproved of any American dollar spent on reparations to the Soviet Union, as this country, in their view, had never been an ally of the US and had “allied herself with no country in an effort to stop Germany until the Germans attacked Russia” and she was “forced to fight to survive.” Moreover, there were readers who stated that the “good” Germans had yet shown “no signs of expiating even a millionth part of their iniquities.” Some argued that an underground German resistance was never heard of, explained by “the simple reason that it did not exist.” Even though some readers acknowledged the emergency situation of the German people and the threat of starvation and even proposed some methods of saving wheat like the simple marketing method of slicing the bread, others who either

traveled in England, France and Germany or corresponded with someone stationed in Germany reported no ‘‘starving’’ Europe.”

*The Los Angeles Times* with its anti-communist fears, of course, published about the Soviet expansive maneuvers or the reports of Soviet press outlets regarding the US policy. Nevertheless, the newspaper did not close entirely the door to Soviet cooperation. The new Secretary of State George Marshall and the new appointment of General Clay as military governor in Germany were supported by the newspaper, sometimes as people even more than their pursued policies. The fact that the newspaper expected to “see” how Truman’s and Marshall’s policies would become action without trapping the US in a cycle of doling out aid, might indicate that its support would not be based on continued blind trust. On the other hand, the LA Times readers were much harsher in their criticism against Soviet communism. Even though California was a strong Republican hold at that time, this was probably not the reason behind this intense anti-communist expression by the readers. “Millions of Americans thronged into the state of California in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s and many of them “benefited from the industrial and military expenditures of World War and Cold War [...] and its citizens could be said to have a vested interest in the ideology of anti-communism.”

*The New York Times*

At the beginning of the year The NY Times appeared quite understanding of the Soviet “vehemence” against Germany and their reservation concerning the level of industry; the newspaper was optimistic that the Soviets were ready for a peace treaty. For the newspaper as well the “spiritually unbeaten Germans despite the destruction of their country” and their as-strong-as-ever “old instincts” could threaten a return of Nazis, unless these forces were

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“supplanted by trained, well-indoctrinated personnel.” Nonetheless, apart from the “unyielding” Germans, who had learned that “a lost war was a bad war,” there were also the “willing” ones, who wanted to learn, and seek the democratic way. Therefore, the newspaper expected that the issue of the “still smoldering volcano” of nationalistic feelings would be included in the Moscow conference as well.

The newspaper’s optimistic attitude toward the Eastern ally lasted until the Soviets “again grabbed the initiative in the struggle over Germany's economic future,” increased their zone’s industrial output, and came out “strongly for a centralized Reich,” an attitude, which meant for the newspaper that “in any event, the German treaty would not be written in Moscow.” Therefore, the US delegation and the US position at the Moscow Conference enjoyed the support of The New York Times. On the one hand, in view of the conference The NY Times dedicated an extended article to the skills and character of the new Secretary of State, who was a “forbidding, honorable, dispassionate, moral man who could speak for America.” The fact that Marshall had been previously at the State Department demonstrated that he had “the brains to see the pitfalls and the ability and character to avoid them.” On the other hand, the primary business of the Moscow conference might be the German problem, but this was “only one facet of the greater and growing issue of American-Russian relations,” as the Soviet policy toward Germany at the Moscow conference was the “ideological and political mastery of the country and its people.” Despite the newspaper’s harsh critique of the Soviets’ attitude at the Moscow conference, The NYT was

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Nonetheless, as the days went by without any positive sign toward achieving a German peace treaty, the Soviet proposals at the Moscow meeting were characterized by the newspaper as a “bid for the domination of Germany, which would mean the domination of Europe, and were thus another facet of the Russian drive for expansion.”\footnote{“Marshall at Moscow,” \textit{The New York Times}, (1947, March 31), 22. See also: Drew Middleton, “Soviet plan held peril to Germany,” \textit{The New York Times}, (1947, March 31), 1, 3; “A month at Moscow,” \textit{The New York Times}, (1947, April 6), E1.} It was not only the articles that demonstrated the dead end for the Moscow conference. An image of a dove carrying a suitcase with baggage tags from New York, Paris and London on it and an olive branch in its beak standing outside the closed door of the Moscow Conference, as well as an image of a man shoveling money from the US rehabilitation funds from the barrel of the German economy into the cart of the Soviet demands stated the newspaper’s opinion more vividly than any article.\footnote{C.L Sulzberger, “Big powers, all seeking peace, cannot find it,” \textit{The New York Times}, (1947, April 13), 105. See also: Dana Adams Schmidt, “Germans in West zones seeking closer unity,” \textit{The New York Times}, (1947, April 13), 107.} Nonetheless, according to the newspaper, Marshall’s “firm stand” and a western policy based on balancing out world power by filling the vacuums and preventing Soviet domination, on organizing the Western-oriented world and inviting the Soviet Union to join it could still give the Soviet-West deadlock hope for agreement and for preserving “the concept of the United Nations and One World.”\footnote{Drew Middleton, “Soviet confessions on Germany held possible,” \textit{The New York Times}, (1947, April 20), E3. See also: “Moscow and after,” \textit{The New York Times}, (1947, April 25), 20.}

Regarding the Truman Doctrine, the newspaper found it to be of “vital importance” as it stated to the world that the US “was ready to play a much bolder role of leadership,” but in case the Soviet Union was not interested in a collaboration for peace, then the US was prepared to contain it.\footnote{James Reston, “Truman plans dual policy to meet Russian expansion,” \textit{The New York Times}, (1947, March 11), 1, 3. See also: “’Truman Doctrine’, “ \textit{The New York Times}, (1947, March 16), E1.} The President’s doctrine was a “political offensive, the first open declaration” on the American side that a “contest of policies existed and that it was joined.” Therefore, it was no surprise to the newspaper how much attention the doctrine had drawn compared to the ongoing
Moscow conference, since “Germany and Greece were segments of the same picture.” Nonetheless, the newspaper did not overstate the Soviet threat and expressed its disbelief that a war was possible for two decades, because neither country wanted it, and further because neither was ready to start it, despite the tension between the superpowers. Therefore, if “suspicion” was removed the US and the Soviet Union could do a “lot for each other on a strictly business basis.”

The Marshall plan was also “deemed enlightened self-interest” by The NY Times. An image at the middle of an article depicting the economic chaos as a fat, big man whipping the European people and the caption stating “As dangerous as Hitler” made obvious that “only a bold, drastic statesmanship could free Europe of the shackles that Hjalmar Schacht and the Nazis devised and liberated Europe retained for the lack of any workable substitute.” The Marshall plan was “groping and tentative,” but was expected to function both as a barrier against communist as well as go further and “correct the mistakes” of the past. Additionally, the appointment of George Kennan as the new head of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department, his “roving, speculative, both philosophical and practical” mind and “considerable intellectual independence” was more than endorsed by The NY Times. The newspaper also urged for Congressional approval of the Marshall Plan as the US as that the containment of the Soviet communist expansion would be “thwarted.” Besides, the US had been pouring in billions to aid Europe “in place of the reparations which Germany did not pay,” thus it was “entitled to have Germany taken off its back” if it was to continue helping Europe.

911 Raymond Daniell, “Europe counts need in men, money materials,” The New York Times, (1947, June 22), 99. Schacht was a German economist who served in Adolf Hitler’s government as Economics Minister from 1934-37 and as President of the National Bank until 1939, but as Reich Minister without portfolio in Hitler’s cabinet until 1943.

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Regarding its anticipation of the meeting of the American, British, French and Soviet delegations in London, in case the Soviet Union showed “a much greater disposition,” the newspaper favored the “formidable” movement for separate arrangement with Germany.\(^917\) According to The NYT the failure of the London Conference due to the West-East “quarrels” would result in misery “on a progressive scale and in inability of Germany to supply essential raw material abroad.” It would also “confirm Germans in the belief” that they were right that their conquerors were “inefficient,” especially at a time when neo-Nazism was rising.\(^918\) Furthermore, it would indicate whether and to what extent “the great gulf that had opened up between Eastern and Western Europe could still be closed” and whether the Soviet Union would participate in the settlement of the German peace treaty, or it would “clamp down the Iron Curtain even harder and establish her own regime in Eastern Germany.”\(^919\)

The London conference opened in “a dense atmosphere of gloom and suspicion;” this was a conference which, like the previous ones, would not make history but would become another “minor battlefield of the world war between democracy and totalitarianism” and would broaden the rift between the US and the USSR.\(^920\) During the London conference the newspaper decided to publish a comment on Walter Lippmann's articles on the Cold War even though his actual articles were not published in The New York Times. Due to the focus of the articles on Kennan's article on “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” The NY Times believed that Lippmann's ideas were “in a sense an incomplete rebuttal,” because Kennan's magazine article was “merely a small fraction” of his “conception” of the Soviet-American problem. Therefore, Lippmann's ideas were of “great value as a stimulant to further thoughts on America's world war, but their positive contributions were limited.”\(^921\)

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Regarding Germany’s role in European recovery, the newspaper stated, from the beginning of the year, that if the world was to return to “peace and prosperity” it would have to turn from “destruction to construction,” namely to increase Germany’s industrial potential in an effort to help itself and repair the damage it had done to other countries.\textsuperscript{922} Even though the newspaper published a report by the International Committee for the Study of European Questions revealing that “a number of Nazis still held key posts in both the United States and British zones of Germany,” it believed that the danger of neo-Nazism could be avoided by restoring the economy and keeping its politics under strict control.\textsuperscript{923} Therefore, the “success or failure of any long-term effort to put Europe on her feet” depended to a large extent on the economy of the Ruhr valley as well as on the continuation of the deliveries of reparations in plants and machinery for the support of the recovery of Europe.\textsuperscript{924} Nonetheless, “no solution” of the German problem could be reached unless “politics and economics were recognized as first cousins” by the Soviet Union and the Western allies.\textsuperscript{925} Therefore, the newspaper believed that a new policy “toward and in Germany” was necessary, as Germany could not recover as long as it was “run like a penal colony under the rule of alien military governments,” and Germans would not be re-educated as long as the Western powers did not “preach their newly acquired wisdom about Russian Communism.”\textsuperscript{926}

The majority of The \textit{NYT} readers were influenced by the anti-Communist campaign of the time. This was especially true since most American people realized the inconsistent reports of the Soviet reparation claims “grossly overstat[ing]” their lowest estimate, or the Soviet techniques of denunciation of the demilitarization of Germany as carried out by the western powers, while the Soviets were “building up the nucleus of a new German army,” and they understood the “hypocrisy” of the Soviet “allegations.”\textsuperscript{927} Therefore, the potential cut of the US military budget by Congress alarmed the \textit{NYT} readers, because, mostly out of their own experience, they were of

the opinion that the occupation forces of the US zone were understaffed, reminding also that even though the Second World War was over, the “hostilities had merely ceased,” as Nazism was “not merely a political credo, it was a religion, a way of life.”

When the economic restoration of Europe and its protection from the Soviet influence came down to the issues of Germany’s industrial production as well as the postponement of the dismantling and the continuation of reparations, the reactions varied. As a former adviser to the German Ministry of Economics under the Weimar Republic and a former chief of the European Enemy Division of the Foreign Economic Administration stated, to change the foreign policy in “any serious way” was a complex procedure and one had to take both “clean administration and time” to do it, while other NYT readers favored the “elimination of Germany's capacity to rebuild for war.” Furthermore, the readers suggested taking a look at the fact that the failure of the Potsdam decisions was caused by the failure to implement its “principles in letter and spirit.” They argued that it would be “much more plausible to give constructive priority to heavy-industrial rehabilitation of Germany's neighbors than to an ever potentially dangerous Germany” itself, or even that the Germans were playing the Allies “slyly one against the other in the hope of coming out on top of both” once Germany's living standard was raised. Furthermore, the readers suggested that the short-term economic advantage of the US did not justify a treatment which could “fatally lead to a third war,” or that France would be allowed to govern the Ruhr until she felt “safe,” as she “knew the danger” and would “take the necessary care.”

On the other hand, there were some readers who mostly wrote in the second half of the year, welcoming every step in the direction of free trade for Germany and requesting the “realistic revision” of the level of industry agreed upon at Potsdam. This was especially true when combined


with the anti-Communist propaganda campaign of the US military government. Nevertheless, the attitude of the readership hardened in reference to a declaration of the former members of the German Reichstag for participation of the German people in the country’s future. Particularly, the readers recognized “unaltered passages direct from Mein Kampf” in the text, or felt “uncomfortable” as they recalled the “same sort of appeal” to have occurred in the US press after the First World War. Such readers were frustrated with the “typical ‘German mentality’” that after two world wars wanted to “speak as neutral mediator,” while others even though they did not disagree with the expression of such sentiments, they thought it would be more “decent” if the former members of the German Reichstag waited a bit longer before submitting their pledges.

The New York Times focused on the official meetings of the postwar allies, reported the developments of all Allies in their occupation zones, and provided full texts of the most important documents and speeches both of the Western powers and of the Soviet Union. It supported the US foreign policy, which was a result of the dead end the allied negotiations had reached mostly because of the Soviet insistence on complicating cooperation among the allies. The newspaper did not oppose the possibility of European division and recognized the important economic and political German role in European recovery and communist containment respectively. The NYT readership was much more critical in reference to Germany's financial contribution to Europe. The majority of the readers were not willing to put a US short-term economic advantage over their own safety with regard to renewed German aggression, if that meant that Germany would be industrially restored, since they knew very well where this restoration could lead them again.

The Wall Street Journal

Most of the main events of 1947 were of an economic nature and the voice of The Wall Street Journal is therefore very important in this chapter. During the first month of 1947 The Wall Street Journal focused on the German situation, describing the “grotesque” German economy that

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based its production on “hot water bottles, cement, razor blades, bicycles, potato mashers, milk cans, soap, electric stoves, cheese and shoe soles instead of wages,” and led the German workers of low income to work in the black market.\textsuperscript{933} American foreign policy had to resist its temptation toward isolationism and to aim, according to the \textit{WSJ}, at the promotion of a “free, stable and prosperous federated” Europe. Furthermore, Byrnes’ replacement by Marshall as Secretary of State was favored by the newspaper as the General had a background of “delicate negotiations” during the war with the leaders he would deal with to secure the peace.\textsuperscript{934}

Additionally, the newspaper endorsed Hoover’s report on Germany, a “document of genuine constructive significance combining humanitarianism with economic common sense.”\textsuperscript{935} The report ushered in an era of a revised foreign policy: a “basic change in US policy toward Germany, a break, once and for all, with the restrictive, punitive attitude” economic decisions of the Potsdam declaration.\textsuperscript{936} Regarding the de-Nazification process, Hoover’s report was expected to argue “against an administratively unmanageable program carried to lengths not only economically disastrous but morally unjustifiable.”\textsuperscript{937} Furthermore, the newspaper supported Hoover’s differentiation of the issue of disarmament from the issue of deindustrialization and claimed that in a politically controlled Germany the ban of army, navy and air force would serve its disarmament better than the ban of steel production.\textsuperscript{938}

In view of the upcoming Moscow meeting in a series of articles carrying the title “Chaos in Germany” the Berlin correspondent of \textit{The Wall Street Journal}, Joseph E. Evans, urged that there was a necessity for a “radically altered occupation policy discharged from vaguely general and practically meaningless” declarations, like the one agreed at Potsdam.\textsuperscript{939} Moreover, as the newspaper did not regard the settlement of a German peace treaty as a feasible outcome of the


meeting, it drew attention to the need for the Allies to at least act as allies.\textsuperscript{940} Depending on the outcome of the Moscow meeting and on the basis of the immoral situation the occupation created, Evans also suggested a reduction of both occupation troops and military government establishment and their reorganization into small control units.\textsuperscript{941} Evans also published an extensive report on the desperate condition of the “isolated” and “neglected” industrialists in Berlin, where a radio firm turned out 2,000 to 3,000 radios a month when it made 1,000 a day before the war, and where an American G.I. could buy a radio for 500 reichmarks ($50), the same amount of money a German would pay to buy “one-half carton of cigarettes.”\textsuperscript{942} As a sign of how much the WSJ wanted to get out this message, the three articles were also reprinted in pamphlet form and were available to the reader on request.\textsuperscript{943}

Even though the newspaper acknowledged the desperate situation of the German people and of the German economy, it did not give into the fear of Communist expansion—yet. Since many peripheral issues, in its view, had been settled the newspaper saw the Moscow meetings as a chance for the allies to finally deal with the settlement of the German peace treaty, and the development of peaceful industry and trade.\textsuperscript{944} At least that was the newspaper’s attitude until mid-March when the editor of the newspaper, in the same issue, openly wrote about a political war between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies.\textsuperscript{945} The Germans would still be the center of the war, but this time it would not be a struggle against them but for them. The Berlin correspondent Evans even identified communism with fascism, but concluded his article with the “hopeful” message that the Germans had failed to see the “profound similarity between what the Soviets were trying to give them and what they already had.” Thus, to win the German minds Evans urged for a change in the economic occupation policies “along democratic lines.”\textsuperscript{946}

As such the newspaper supported the Truman Doctrine as a “historic decision” and the frankness of the President, who recognized the Soviet attempt to “impose upon helpless people

totalitarian regimes” and without hiding or softening the “implications” of his policy had requested a million dollar grant that would have “strong impact on the country's domestic life.”

The newspaper also called the Congress to support his policy, “an apparently popular political trend,” and even confronted those who accused Truman of proposing to Congress nothing more or less than a venture in imperialism and challenged them to ask themselves whether the US could afford to wait. Even though the fear-of-the-communism atmosphere that characterized the editorial articles after Truman’s speech did not dominate Chamberlin’s articles, who found Truman’s doctrine politically and economically sound, the journalist warned against getting into “a state of mind where any foreign government could persuade [the US] to sign a blank check by crying that otherwise communism would be unavoidable.” Additionally, for Chamberlin and the newspaper Germany's threatened collapse was identified with the ultimate collapse of western civilization. In particular, as Ruhr coal output approached normal figures the fuel shortage in Europe would disappear, Greek and Turkish exports would not burden the US as they would be exchanged with German machinery and equipment, and the German increased exports would decrease the people's need to be fed by the US. Furthermore, the newspaper stated that the turning out of products would not only be a “solution of the inflationary threat,” but could also “do a great deal in Germany to assure that peace, when it finally was attained, would not be an empty name, but a reality, with a solid economic underpinning.”

The fruitless results of the meeting at Moscow provoked an WSJ attack against Moscow and support toward Washington. Therefore, the newspaper not only supported the Marshall
plan, or in other words “the last chance for Europe and conceivably the last chance for averting World War III,” but also challenged the American people to dispel the “extravagant pessimism” about America’s destiny and the “shrieking advertisements” about inflation and deflation, that have been “oversold” on. It called on them to trust America's ability to “retain the gifts of individual self-reliance” and to “see issues in fair perspective” and on those who misinterpreted Marshall's speech to realize that he “was telling Europe to find some ways which would diminish the need for American assistance and not increase it.” If the US were “to survive in a world arena, it simply could not afford, in the conduct of [its] foreign affairs, such luxuries as ignorance, amateurism and infiltration of foreign ideologies.”

Generally the newspaper backed any decision contradictory to “the memorable plan” of former Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau for making Germany “one vast potato patch” and regarded Europe’s political, economic and cultural division the clear “responsibility” of the Soviet Union. Therefore, Marshall’s “self-help” plan was a wise alternative to the morally indefensible, politically shortsighted and economically disastrous US experiment of the past two years in Germany, while the increase of production in Bizonia would be a “belated but welcome triumph of commonsense.” In addition, the newspaper called not just for a rise of German output but for the “total abandonment of the whole vicious conception of an arbitrarily fixed permitted level,” as it was the governments that made wars and not “private corporations or industrialists.” As proof, the Berlin correspondent of WSJ Evans published his report on his two-year experience in Europe.

in a quite dramatized way. Particularly, after a couple of weeks in the US he found it “hard to believe that such a place as Germany existed; so completely divorced from reality.” However, he did not wish to forget about Germany and the “monstrous, incomprehensible confusion of Europe,” because the Americans and the Europeans were “essentially the same people, essentially part of the same civilization” and Europe was “the source and fount of that civilization.” As such Germany’s inclusion in the Marshall Plan would result in Europe’s major recovery factor.

By the end of August, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the newspaper clearly propagandized against Communism not only to emphasize the importance of the approval of the US economic assistance to Europe, and even more to western Germany, but also to support the settlement of a separate peace treaty with Germany among the Western Allies. Nonetheless, the newspaper did not limit itself to pushing for a revision of the management of the German industrial level. Despite praising General Clay's strong stand in favoring a level of German industrial production to make Germany self-supporting, Chamberlin accused the military government of persisting in one major blunder, the de-Nazification process. In Chamberlin’s view, denazification “unless corrected could thwart all the rational objectives of the US policy in Germany,” since it did not concentrate its “attention on those responsible for the Third Reich and the crimes committed in its name [but] bothered with the vast mass of people forced or duped into membership in the party or related organizations.”

Generally, The Wall Street Journal reporters’ opinion regarding the handling of Germany were consistent with each other. However, the associate editor Vermont Royster, who provided a more conservative interpretation of the news regarding economic issues, warned against an economic dependence of the countries participating in the Marshall plan upon US dollars. The initial program of mutual cooperation and of the “fullest utilization” of the countries' “own agricultural, industrial and manpower resources” was transformed, for Royster, into a “little more than a supply voucher submitted to the US warehouse.” Even though Royster was mostly positive

toward the political viewpoint of the program, he questioned whether the US could afford it and wondered what were the “alternatives to such a program;” especially as the Republican Congress was inclined to vote for the plan. Even though many WSJ editorials doubted the existence of a “concrete” plan for European economic recovery, let alone the existence of a detailed plan figuring the US “labor, materials and factory capacities down to the last cotter pin -to make certain it would work-,” or employed “smear techniques” to downgrade the European starvation problem, the newspaper supported Truman, called for the “abandonment of the level of industry” if the US government was to “face up to Europe's cry of distress,” and believed that the Europeans impatiently looked at “the big picture.” In the meantime WSJ felt that the leftist inclination of the European governments made it more certain that the objective of the Marshall plan could no longer be the containment of Communism. Therefore, for The WSJ the report of the Harriman committee was regarded as perhaps “the best formulation” of the “fiscal and monetary reforms,” which could restore a “reasonable degree of stable purchasing power to the currencies of western Europe” and result in an “honest and effective” use of the US aid, and as the necessary condition for the success of the Marshall plan, as it restored the original idea of the Marshall plan of the dependence of the European recovery on what the countries would do for themselves rather than on the US aid.

Furthermore, the newspaper favored not only the decision of General Clay to “embark on a campaign to show the German people the superiority of democracy over communism,” using all information media at the disposal of the military government, as apparently the difference between life in the Soviet zone and the Western zones was not “palpable enough to constitute an argument in favor of democracy” but also the discontinuation of any reparations and of the

“idiotically wasteful” dismantling procedure. Additionally, a sweeping amnesty of former Nazis, which permitted “the reinstatement of all administrators, engineers and technical specialists,” along with the “recognition of a government in Western Germany and admission of its representatives on an equal basis to the committee that was working for European reconstruction would get Germany going for the benefit of Europe and the world.”

After the failure of the London Conference of Foreign Ministers at the end of the year for the drafting of a peace settlement for Germany the newspaper went back to its initial posture against the Soviet Union and the threat of expansive Communism, and toward a merger of the Western occupation zones, toward the economic recovery of western Germany and toward the support of a people who wished they had not had “last year's gruesome winter,” as they were not living, but “vegetating” in a place, where not only food and clothes but also water and light were rationed while the Soviets were allegedly vastly promoting the black market to “garner foreign currencies.”

Due to the financial nature of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan The Wall Street Journal received many contradictory letters by its readership. On the one hand, some readers believed that Americans were being given a second chance to quit being the “international ‘softie’” and correct the “weak, shabby and ineffective bureaucratic mismanagement” of an occupation policy that “by all accounts had been a disgrace to the nation (at least in Germany)” and “fundamentally” support “freedom” and “those who would reconstruct their systems of production and commerce as a basis for that freedom.” On the other hand, some readers found the doctrine

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vague and confusing as to how one should be liberal in the US but conservative in Europe, wondered why the US would spent money to prevent foreign people from converting to communism, and questioned Russia’s ability to threaten the US as well as the actual value of helping a “bunch of wrecked countries with starving populations unable to feed or house themselves.”

The Marshall plan also received contradictory letters by the readers who, on the one hand, wanted the world to benefit from “the healthy, shining example of what free, decent government could do for a people,” while, on the other hand, a reader did not agree with the reconsideration of what he called this manufactured crisis to ‘save’ Europe, which “foolishly” led the US to “deplete its raw material reserves,” another reader felt as if a “pistol was being pointed at the United States” and as if the people were being told “If you don’t support us in style we will espouse Communism,” while other readers believed that if Europe desired Communism then it should have Communism. While a few WSJ readers did give into the communist conspiracy theory, the majority of the WSJ readers mentioned that the short-term results of this “economic bribery”
would only hasten the spread of communism when withdrawn, while in the meantime the US would be caught in a vicious circle any time a country was presented with a “‘real’ crisis.”

While the treatment of the Germans as “pariahs” was not regarded as an “aid in keeping the peace” by one WSJ reader, in two separate letters another reader suggested that the US took a look at the German record and the participation of the industrialists in the rise of Nazism, as proven by the Nuremberg trials, and advised “extreme caution” and “watchful suspicion” on the US part toward “German business firms;” of course differentiating those from German owners who could prove that they had not been Nazis and should be compensated for their confiscated property.

The number of the Wall Street Journal’s articles referring to Europe increased significantly in the course of 1947, and particularly the articles regarding the important role of Germany’s industrial importance in the restoration of European economy and in the “fight” against the spread of Communism. The ideal solution for the European crisis, according to the newspaper, seemed to be the Marshall plan. The WSJ supported the financial aid to Europe and Germany from the beginning, but at the same time requested more information regarding its long-term goals, or what the US had to gain and what to sacrifice. Nonetheless, the failure of the London Conferences of Foreign Ministers at the end of the year drove the newspaper back to its initial attitudes against the


Soviet Union and toward the support of the economic reconstruction of western Germany. Based on the letters to the editor that were chosen to be published the WSJ readership remained mostly critical about the newly imposed financial obligations of their country and skeptical of spending American dollars on financial aid programs.

*LIFE*

The first *LIFE* editorial article about the US foreign policy in 1947 started with the declaration of America’s “paradoxical double foreign policy;” namely the pursuit of the prevention of the next war, while its international statesmen attempted to win the Cold War. Even though Byrnes' policy so far focused on the resistance against Soviet aggression, it was time, *LIFE* argued, that the Secretary of State pursued the building of “a true world community.” Furthermore, the editorial questioned the readiness of the American people and of the Congress “to accept the consequences” of American foreign policy and to commit to “active participation in world affairs with coolness and resolution.”

Nonetheless, the magazine was optimistic when it referred to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers at Moscow as it thought that the US had the chance to make Europe “both peaceful and burglar-proof” against the Soviet attempts to “steal” Europe. It also believed that the Soviet Union would agree to join the Anglo-American merger (partnership) and hopefully France would “justify the blood, treasure and sweat Americans” had spilled in Europe by coming along as well. Lastly, it stressed that “even small countries behind the Iron Curtain were excited about agencies like the Emergency Economic Committee for Europe,” or the “reparations deal with Russia and the money and materials the US” invested in Germany for the creation of “new trade patterns.”

Byrnes' replacement by General Marshall was, according to *LIFE*, “the most dramatic and important governmental shift since the presidency changed hands.” George Marshall, who made it hard to tell “where military strategy left off and diplomacy began, would have an even greater opportunity to win the peace.” According to a *LIFE* editorial, the task of the new Secretary of State would not be to share the US wealth with the “straitened economies” of Europe, but to share the US “talent for creating wealth.” The magazine analyzed the “wide revision” of the US policy

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from orders to General Eisenhower during the war to occupy Germany and occupy it as a “defeated enemy nation” up to Byrnes' Stuttgart speech, which in 1946 “promised ‘to help the German people to win their way back to an honorable place among the free and peace-loving nations of the world’” and Marshall's policy for making Germany “a self-respecting community and an integral part of a larger European society.”  

Nonetheless, *LIFE* realized that the road to the Marshall plan was not paved with roses. It chose a large photo of Secretary of State Marshall looking “somber” before leaving for the Moscow meeting as the “most accurate mirroring of the state of mind” of US diplomacy. According to the *LIFE* interpretation of Hoover's report, “Germany would sink into the morass and perhaps pull down all Western European civilization with it,” unless “a vast moral and financial help” was provided by the US. The strain the US foreign policy was under was acknowledged by *LIFE*, which therefore advised that the US policy helped the European nations to federate and called on the Congress to back Truman and Marshall extend the US “influence and commitments […] because political physics abhorred a vacuum.”

*LIFE* backed Marshall's insistence on the economic unity of Germany - as all boiled down to and depended in the short and long run on the price of steel - and his resilience not to compromise an “inch on the question of political democracy and freedom.” Since the US had already made the irreversible jump into world affairs and the conflict between the Soviet Union and the US was inevitable, the magazine believed that the “friends of truth” were obliged to speak up and not capitulate to Communism. Therefore, no money would be enough to support the truth against the untruth in the war of ideas in which the US was engaged with the Soviet Union - or at least a war between respect for truth and cynical manipulation of it - as the US could not compete in tyranny with the Communists and had to rely on its anti-totalitarian policy of freedom by making itself the instrument of the hope, not the fear, of mankind. Thus, *LIFE* did not only support that financial assistance be granted to the Mediterranean area but also to any country in need, because to rectify past mistakes, to give the people “a chance to earn a living,” to bring a “responsible democracy to

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birth” and to regain some of the old American “faith in having a progressive mission in the world,” it would have to cost the US money.995

The Soviet rejection of the Marshall plan at the Conference on European Economic Cooperation in Paris did not come as a surprise to LIFE. The magazine declared that a “break in the postwar roll of Russia across Europe” would come if there were “still truth and strength” in the US ideas of Western democracy.996 LIFE explained to its readership that the Soviet Union and its satellites behind the Iron Curtain did not participate in “the most important conference since the end of the war,” because “the Communists would not accept even the limited amount of unity that seemed required to respond to the Marshall plea.”997 Hence, the magazine called on the Americans to resolve their “remaining doubts and fears and go ahead and capitalize on the Marshall gamble […] of painful but peaceful reconstruction.” LIFE thought it was “high time” that the US took the next step and instead of pouring out as reparations the coal, steel, fertilizer and manufactures of Germany –“the nub of Western Europe's economic problems- to sit in with Europe on ways and means of restoring German production.” A united Europe would be the “best way to keep Germany or any other aggressor from dominating the continent” and to “equal the new superstates,” the US and the USS.R. Furthermore, only if the US helped Europe to help themselves without however dictating “the terms of Europe's future,” would the “burden upon US grow progressively less.”998

According to the magazine, the Marshall plan was “the second big move in the ‘cold war’” after the Truman Doctrine and the “most important decision of the 20th Century for the Congress, and was designed as an attack.” Additionally, the magazine once more credited to the issue of US financial expenditures a secondary role and therefore did not focus on the various committees assigned to study the fulfillment of the Marshall plan, as it was “obvious” that the plan would “hurt” the US “bad,” but it would not “kill” it and if it succeeded in saving Europe it would “be cheap at any price.”999 As the Marshall plan had not “yet produced real agreement in its final aims” an additional supportive article by the former American diplomat in Bolshevik Russia DeWitt C.

995 “Korea,” LIFE, (1947, May 19), 22(20), 32.
Poole declared that this “generous, creative and progressive” policy did not intend to dominate the world but to “balance the powers in the world.” The article was extensive and included recommendations for various countries all over the world, and particularly for the economic revitalization of Western Europe and in fact the magazine suggested that it should be “applied first in the Ruhr.”

On a political level, LIFE was very much concerned with the possibility of a “communist victory” in France and its contagion to other European countries, like Italy which was “squeezed between France and Tito's Yugoslavia,” the French occupation zone of Germany, and Greece with its guerillas who in their effort to rebel against a government they despised, might be turned into “strategic pawns” in a Soviet campaign. In support of LIFE's fears came Churchill’s rhetoric in his nine-page LIFE article. Churchill not only explicitly described the political situation in Greece but he also put himself in American shoes and declared that the approval of the Truman doctrine by the American Congress would create a new situation in the Mediterranean, “full of hope for the future of the Middle East and also to the future peace of the world.” Churchill concluded that after all the “toils, sacrifices, costs and burdens” cast upon the “freedoms” and “virtues” of the United States, the US had “no choice but to lead or fall” and assured that along with the US Britain and the British Commonwealth would go “forward together in all understanding and amity and perhaps even roll away the course of war forever from mankind.”

Further examples of how the “free peoples of Europe” would be “united under Soviet tyranny” were constantly being fed to the readership of the magazine. They took the form of photos of a left-wing union member masqueraded as Stalin to mock Communist-controlled leadership, LIFE’s claim that Communism was “the hottest problem in US labor,” the “tired and shabby” Soviet people in “visible” need of “more goods, more buildings, more of everything,” and Stalin mounting “Lenin's tomb to receive the salutes of Russia's proletariat.” Further examples included a nine-page article on how Bulgaria had become “a testing ground for Stalinist

1002 Winston Churchill, “If I were an American,” LIFE, (1947, April 14), 22(15), 107-123.
1004 “May day in Moscow,” LIFE, (1947, May 19), 22(20), 27-32.
Communism,”1005 the 150 Hungarian Communist workers, who intruded and broke up an opposition’s meeting until they finally established “a Russian-dominated government,”1006 the claims of the Greek government that “Reds tried to seize power” while “guerilla forces”1007 attacked its northwestern borders, an eight-page article on how the Communists rigged the Polish elections, the famous article by George Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” advocating a policy of containment of the Soviet Union,1008 the Communist mobilization against and “abuse” of the US by holding secret meetings to “unify strategy for the war against US ‘dollar imperialism’,” and the Statue of Liberty presented in the form of George Marshall holding a moneybag.1009 Lastly, the highlight of LIFE’s propaganda was France, that it claimed “took orders from Moscow, changed its policies to meet the requirements of Soviet foreign policy” and resorted to the “violent”1010 Communists attacks against political opponents, but at the end managed to resist the Red influence and to be one of the “startling results”1011 in Europe, where the Marshall Plan had “replaced the seeds of hope, putting Russia on the defensive for the first time since the diplomatic war began.”1012

On another level showing that the war against the Nazis had been justified, Nazi atrocities were exposed and published again in LIFE as the Nuremberg trials revealed the medical experiments the Nazi doctors conducted on concentration camp prisoners, like being frozen to investigate the results of long immersion in ice water, or being subjected to explosive decrease in air pressure and oxygen to determine the effects of parachuting from altitudes as high as 68,000 feet, what LIFE termed “the final horror in tales of organized Nazi inhumanity.”1013 Apart from that, referring to the German people and the American G.I.s in occupied Germany it was crystal-clear that Nazis were being differentiated from regular Germans and the notion of Germany being

1010 “May day in Moscow,” LIFE, (1947, May 19), 22(20), 27-32.
1013 “Human laboratory animals,” LIFE, (1947, February 24), 22(8), 81-84.
an enemy nation was permanently abandoned by the magazine. The life of the German people was undoubtedly harsh-so were the lives of millions of people around the globe-but the way the German life of 1947 was presented by the magazine was intended to provoke compassion and sympathy to the point of tears, perhaps raised ethical questions whether such compassion was being shown for the victims of wartime German atrocities. For instance, LIFE compared the life of an average Nazi family in 1939 and in 1947 through photographs. Surprisingly, the life of the family showed little change. They still had a house but due to “slimmer” meals and “scarcity of groceries” they had lost some weight. Apart from that the fact that the mother and daughter each owned a sewing machine and managed to “help out the family finances,” while the daughter served as nurse in a Berlin hospital during the war and was now married and the owner of a “four-room house,” it seemed as if the author tried to make the reader feel sorry for them. The magazine appeared to give the impression that the German people was also a victim not only of the war, but also of the US postwar occupation policies. For instance, the description of the “horribly complex” processes of “getting rid of Nazi influence and rebuilding the cities,” the depiction of “denazification trials being handled by all-German courts, free assembly” taking place “for the first time in 14 years,” while the 21,000 persons suffering from venereal disease would most likely always “be a black mark on the US occupation record.” Additionally, even though the German industry was “back to 30% of prewar production” in the US zone—“the most industrial progress”—the “unhappy and poverty-stricken” German people ironically attributed the 1,550 calories per day—“400 calories below that required for normal health”—to the American process of restoration of democracy.

Further examples of how the everyday life of the German people in 1947 was represented by LIFE in the most sympathetic way like: the life of a proud German coal miner with “steel-gray eyes, a lean and aristocratic face” who lost twice as many pounds as he had lost during the war but had “no regrets about his rough occupation,” his corn bread-or in other words “the postwar nightmare of the Germans”-that tasted bad and caused stomach cramps, and the fact that his family had no fresh vegetables for many months, the “pursuit of small boys and girls,” who attempted to “sneak cigarets [sic] and coffee across the Belgian border, by armed and uniformed frontier

guards,”\textsuperscript{1017} the crying children in frontier jail while awaiting juvenile hearings, and the stories of how little children, “cynical and wise beyond their years,” were “fast being engulfed by hunger, prostitution and violent crime in a prostrate and stagnant fatherland.”\textsuperscript{1018} Yet the magazine appeared confident that “by the year’s end about 30,000 US citizens” would have visited Europe and would [have been] given the opportunity to “get a firsthand impression of Europe’s food shortage, war damage and economic stagnation.”\textsuperscript{1019} \textit{LIFE} clearly hoped this would garner public support for increasing American aid to Germans.

On the other hand, \textit{LIFE} did present an article regarding the 75 different nationalities that lived in the city of New York in which the ethnic Germans were described during a club meeting in the city's Yorkville district, as people who were “fond of uniforms and costumes” and where a “pro-Nazi Bund flourished before the war- dressed in their regional costumes,” engaged “in violent Bavarian folk dances and drinking huge quantities of beer.”\textsuperscript{1020} In the meantime, the G.I.s were described -but not criticized- more as tourists rather than occupation forces. A G.I. -like many others- and his German bride had transformed the “famed German castle” Garmisch-Partenkirchen into a “resort hotel with [an annual] salary of $3,160 plus the right to buy American food, tax-free cigarettes, low-priced luxury goods from all over Europe,” and “even an occasional new American automobile” through the Army.\textsuperscript{1021} \textit{LIFE} also reported uncritically the ‘training’ of the young US soldiers who could listen to their own radio, read by their own bed lamp and even pet their dog before going to the ‘actual’ military training of dance, music and handicraft classes in their fitted uniforms.\textsuperscript{1022}

By the end of the year a \textit{LIFE} editorial, remaining faithful to the magazine’s initial attitude, stated that it was “exactly the moment” that the American people “face[d] up to” the fact that “Germany [was their] problem.” Furthermore, \textit{LIFE} insisted on leaving behind, “dead and discredited” policies like the Morgenthau Plan, the Joints Chiefs of Staff order 1067, the Yalta and Potsdam agreements and turn all American “efforts from punishment for the past to education for the future” in four steps; a new status for Western Germany in the struggle between democracy

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1017} “Child smugglers,” \textit{LIFE}, (1947, November 3), 23(18), 63-64.
\item \textsuperscript{1018} “Germany’s lost youth,” \textit{LIFE}, (1947, September 15), 23(11), 124-138.
\item \textsuperscript{1019} “US citizens look at Europe,” \textit{LIFE}, (1947, September 15), 23(11), 124-138.
\item \textsuperscript{1020} “People of New York,” \textit{LIFE}, (1947, February 17), 22(7), 89-97.
\item \textsuperscript{1021} “Occupied Germany,” \textit{LIFE}, (1947, February 10), 22(6), 85-95.
\item \textsuperscript{1022} “The army’s kid-glove rookies,” \textit{LIFE}, (1947, March 10), 22(10), 43-46.
\end{itemize}
and Communism, the broadening and maturation of the German political base, the allowance to German industry to operate again, and the placement of the Ruhr under permanent international control. According to the melodramatic conclusion of the editorial, only then would the Germans revive Europe “as a place where people eat with something more than caloric arithmetic in mind, sleep safely and dream dreams that sometimes c[a]me true.” The “futile” meeting of the Foreign Ministers in London and the false Soviet accusations about the Western administration of Germany were proof for the magazine that Germany would be decisively divided and that President Truman would be forced to “include western Germany as ‘an integral part’ of any Marshall Plan aid.” Additionally, a full-page image of the two Germanies depicted the enormous difference of the total population between the Western and Eastern zones of Germany as well as the $500 million in reparation taken out of Germany by the Soviet Union in contrast to the $700 million spent in one year to feed American and British zones.

The LIFE readership was also influenced by the on-going anti-Communist campaign, which the magazine run, while some readers even identified the “vicious and evil” Communist attack with Hitler's Mein Kampf. Regarding Germany, mixed feelings about LIFE trying to promote sympathy for postwar Germans were expressed by the readers. On the one hand, a reader who had made “sacrifices and contributions toward defeating the barbarian Huns,” was disgusted with the medical experiments on the concentration camp prisoners and with the fact that the plight of the German people was “played up” more than that of the ‘victimized nations of Europe,” while LIFE’s weepy article on the good German coal miner received mostly ironic comments. On the other hand, a few readers were more worried about the decentralization of political power, and wished the unification of Germany and its reconstruction into a “respectable” country in the world.

LIFE’s attitude toward the foreign policy the US pursued in 1947 was twofold, clear and unchanged throughout the entire year. On the one hand, the magazine supported every policy of

1023 “A new policy for Germany,” LIFE, (1947, December 1), 23(22), 44.
1024 “Russia and the West cut German national in half,” LIFE, (1947, December 29), 23(26), 16-17.
financial aid for the economic and political recovery of Europe (emphasizing Germany’s industrial contribution to the first and using the successful and unsuccessful Communist attempts to seize power to justify the latter) and on the other hand it exploited every opportunity to attack the grim Soviet flexibility and Soviet efforts for political influence in Europe. The majority of the magazine’s readers appeared to give into the fears of communism, but were much more reluctant toward accepting the need to sympathize with postwar German people and how the magazine presented them as victims, indirectly victims of hunger due to US occupation policy.

*TIME*

One could argue that *TIME’s* focus for the year 1947 had two axes: the persuasion of the American people of the Communist threat and the realization of the necessity of a program for economic relief for Western Europe. This necessitated popular approval of a program for economic relief for Western Europe to protect it from Communist expansion. The first axis -the persuasion of the people of the Communist threat- included reports about the internal political situation of every European country except for Germany and the Communist attempts to seize power “from Latin America to the Far East” and “from central Europe to the Aegean” and representations of the miserable everyday life of Germans, which would continue to increase their vulnerability to the appeal of Communism. Particularly, according to *TIME*, one major problem of US diplomacy was the Soviet “defensive silence, equivocation and niggling delay” in the settlement of present issues, while the magazine urged for the expansion of US influence against “Communist imperialism” and Soviet rule “through political terror to be contained.”

This would require fighting a “battle” not only in the Soviet satellite countries or at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Moscow, but on the entire European continent, where for instance the Soviets strived to “maintain at all costs Communist-sponsored political leadership of the trade-union movement against the will of the majority of the membership” in both Berlin and in Greece, “the key to the eastern Mediterranean and to the Dardanelles which Russia wanted.”

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As *TIME* also warned in Poland Communists conducted “terror-ridden election […] in plain view of the Government's poll watchers,”1031 in Italy Communists had built “a state within a state,”1032 while French Communists “played along with a democratic system they sought to destroy.”1033 Bulgarian Communists “suddenly discovered a ‘plot’” involving the opposition leader and the Yugoslav Tito who “jailed his only real opposition,” while “occupied by the Red Army [Hungary] laid beyond direct reach of US policy.”1034 Seeing or imagining Communist threats everywhere, *TIME* claimed that the Soviet Union would never sign the Austrian peace treaty, until the “Communist offensive broke out” in Western Europe (France and Italy) to “wreck the Marshall Plan” and to “threaten the London Conference of Foreign Ministers with chaos if they did not meet Russian demands on a German peace treaty.”1035

The promotion of this Communist fear progressively escalated in *TIME* with the publication of descriptions of the Soviet existing and potential military power, such as the depiction of comparative levels of American and Soviet military divisions all over the world (208 for the Soviet Union, 14 for the US) as a proof of the changing balance of military power. *TIME* published statements by strategists declaring that by 1948 the Soviet Union would “have the power to send one-way missions of 1,000 planes against the US” and by 1949 the Soviet Union “would probably have guided missiles, armed with a one-ton warhead, with a range of 3,000 miles.”1036 Reports from *TIME* correspondents in three “vital way stations” (Rome, Poland, Nanking) warned that one could “only imagine half the danger” as “Communists [might] be anybody”1037 and made

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reference to the instructions of a US Army booklet on how to identify a Communist, implying that they had infiltrated it as well.\textsuperscript{1038}

On the other hand, apart from a few reports about the increased crime rate in Berlin, where a physician handled about 120 frostbite patients a day and the “less forgiving” indictments of top Nazis by their “fellow Germans” at the trials -a misrepresentation of the trials that actually took place and were conducted by the United States Nuremberg Military Tribunals-\textsuperscript{1039}, the majority of the reports referred to the internal situation of Germany.\textsuperscript{1040} Some stories had also been published in \textit{LIFE}, but \textit{TIME} represented them in a somewhat less tear-jerking, but not necessarily hyperbolic manner. For instance the same Ruhr miner story described how he earned his “daily bread at the bottom of a black hole, deeper than twice the height of the Empire State Building,” but produced only half as much as before the war due to his failing energy. The correspondent also pointed out that the coal miners were more privileged than the average German as they received “top rations,” and they could buy “a lunch of vegetable soup with a little meat at the mine daily.”\textsuperscript{1041} Even though he wished to provoke a feeling of mercy, pity or sympathy with these Germans in his report the \textit{TIME} correspondent was more reserved than \textit{LIFE}.

In another story a law student in a neighborhood in Berlin was described by \textit{TIME} as balancing his life between studying law half the time and breaking it the other half, after he confessed to selling coal on the black market after it fell at his feet from a coal truck that swung sharply around a corner.\textsuperscript{1042} In another case \textit{TIME} reported that a German Pastor told his congregation that a farmer had taken a gold wedding ring from the mother of five hungry children in exchange for 60 lbs. of potatoes and after denouncing his action, the Pastor warned that he would announce the farmer’s name if he didn't return the ring. The pastor, \textit{TIME} reported, ended up with eight gold wedding rings.\textsuperscript{1043} In Hamburg people were reported to be soaking “cats in skimmed milk diluted with water for eight hours to make them tender enough to eat.”\textsuperscript{1044}

\textsuperscript{1038} “National affairs. Communists,” \textit{TIME}, (1947, June 30), 49(26), 17.
\textsuperscript{1042} “Foreign news. Germany,” \textit{TIME}, (1947, April 7), 49(14), 33.
love story of a girl who decided to “ship herself by air freight” to the US to finally be with her loved one was published in the magazine.1045

The anecdotes of German everyday life were embellished but probably true, nevertheless, neither LIFE nor TIME dedicated an article to the everyday life of person in a country destroyed by the Germans. On the contrary, it seemed as if these press outlets used the political and economic condition of these countries to justify, in a more or less passionate way, the pursued US policy against Communist expansion, as though Communism was what brought about the hardships as opposed to Nazi invasion and occupation. In the German case reports lacking commentary or analysis were made that the price of the now tabu Mein Kampf fetched “as much as 2,000 marks ($200) on the black market,”1046 and the British unsuccessful attempt to blow up a huge concrete flak tower in Berlin's Tiergarten was followed by a “spontaneous gust of cheers.”1047 It was not until the end of the year that a TIME correspondent who visited Germany reported clearly that very “few Germans” showed “any real remorse,” rather that the “stony face” of Germans was presented to foreigners who dared to step on the “sacred soil” of Berchtesgaden, Hitler's favorite mountain. He did note the apparent German preference to “lean neither East nor West,” even though the Germans “were cynically willing to use either to their own advantage,” and provided a breathtaking photo of three undernourished babies of a few months old.1048 TIME also reported the unremorseful and unapologetic attitude of highly ranked Nazi officials like the acceptance of the death sentence as an “honor” and not as a punishment and Mrs. Goering declaring that she was a “political idiot and that Hitler did not ask German women whether they wanted this war.”1049 In contrast to LIFE, TIME magazine did not fail to report the German sentiment, which appeared to be far from regretful, but the way it was represented by the magazine it might lead the reader to assume that the magazine did not differentiate between Nazi war criminals and average Germans.

1047 “Foreign news. Germany,” TIME, (1947, September 8), 50(10), 32.
The second axis of *TIME’s* approach to the US policy-the realization of the necessity of a program for economic relief for Western Europe- included supportive articles about the two US foreign policies of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. On the cover of the first *TIME* issue of 1947 was the Secretary of State J.F. Byrnes, *TIME’s* chosen man of the year.\(^{1050}\) *TIME* celebrated Byrnes as the man who recognized what the Potsdam Agreement failed to recognize: “that a healthy Germany was necessary for a reconstructed Europe.”\(^ {1051}\) Even though the magazine expressed the opinion that “all recipients of charity forever dislike their benefactors”\(^ {1052}\) and found so the instances of rape, widespread looting, disorderliness, and promotion of black marketing (for a “few cartons of American cigarettes” one could furnish their apartment) a “typical” behavior of occupation forces, *TIME* did hope that in 1947 the US leadership would extend “in full vigor from the field of diplomacy into economic organization, education, morals and wherever American ideals find expression” without, however, dictating or interfering with the policies of other countries.\(^ {1053}\)

*TIME* endorsed Marshall’s appointment as Secretary of State, a man whose “delicate tasks had won him respect and affection” in China, since the “immense confidence he inspired” was the “most important fact in US relations with the world.”\(^ {1054}\) The magazine not only recognized the need for a revised policy toward Germany so that Germany and subsequently Europe could “return to some kind of sovereignty,” but also the importance of the extension of US policy all over the world to fight the Soviet challenge.\(^ {1055}\) Therefore the Truman Doctrine was regarded by the magazine as a “logical development of US diplomacy” and in fact “one of the broadest projections of US foreign policy in history,” which also provided “a stronger US policy” for the Foreign Ministers Conference at Moscow and would “help to build and guarantee a stable Europe,” regardless of its ending.\(^ {1056}\) Even though the doctrine was not quite clear, its “effects” in other countries were “crystal clear,” for instance the “courage” (and funding) the US policy had given

\(^{1050}\) *TIME*, (1947, January 6), 49(1), cover.


to Italy’s Premier de Gasperi to resign and to form a cabinet and coalition without Communists, since a democrat had “no business collaborating with Communists.”

Nonetheless, according to *TIME*, the purpose of the Truman Doctrine, which was to “reconstruct” Europe and save it “from the Communist advance,” had been “overlooked” in Europe and the Marshall speech at Harvard served well in clarifying the “constructive side” of the doctrine. The magazine continued its praise of Marshall, from the belief that the Marshall plan was a “calculated policy […] to restore (under suitable supervision) the productive capacity of Germany, Europe's industrial powerhouse, which galvanized “the hopes of a continent that had almost forgotten how to hope,” to lengthy explanations of how the “Marshall approach’ was one obvious way of trying to stave off a situation in which war would be inevitable.” Additionally, Ruhr’s coal and steel was acknowledged by the magazine as the means “make the Marshall approach work.”

In affirmation of the magazine’s position both that few Germans were to blame for their political or economic circumstances and that the Marshall Plan should be applied to Germany, a *TIME* correspondent upon his return from Germany reported that the number of the G.I.s was declining drastically and that “very few” of them were “interested in Germany,” and that the fact that only “few” of them knew the language had enabled Germans to “run things themselves.” He reported that even though the US economic policy on Germany was more “specific” than its political policy, no steps were being taken toward the establishment of free enterprise, and that instead the “Nazi totalitarian” economic system was “retained.” Therefore, the correspondent believed that the Marshall Plan should include western Germany, first of all because in case Germany did not get some US aid, “chaos and then Communism were almost sure to follow,” and second because the recovery of Western Europe depended upon “the Ruhr and its related industries.” So, “the carpenters, the smiths and the State Department Noahs hacked and

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hammered away [...] building ERP, the ark, to float Europe out of the deluge of its economic misery;”\textsuperscript{1065} a “momentous document which most [Congressmen] favored.”\textsuperscript{1066}

In the meantime, the fruitless meetings of the Foreign Ministers and the Soviet refusal to be included in the ERP, did not seem to bother \textit{TIME}. The meaning of the failure of the Moscow conference was only indirectly commented upon by \textit{TIME} through quotations from various Europeans (in Austria, Hungary, west Germany, Italy, France), revealing their fear that the US would withdraw from Europe or that the world would be divided “into two blocs by iron curtains on both sides.”\textsuperscript{1067} The Soviet refusal to participate in the Marshall Plan was presented by \textit{TIME} as a “great moment” and a US “opportunity to set Western Europe back on its economic feet, unhampered by Russian participation, bickering, delay and vetoes.”\textsuperscript{1068} Furthermore, in view of the London conference at the end of the year the magazine pointed out the importance of Germany for the revival of Europe. Since the Soviets would most “probably” not accept the “year-old US offer of a control treaty over Germany,” after the conference there would “probably be two Germanys, one working for European stability, one working for Russia.”\textsuperscript{1069} Furthermore, \textit{TIME} explained the decisive role of Germany. The Western powers pinned their hopes on Ruhr coal – “precious as black gold for all of Europe”- to restore Europe’s “peace and economic equilibrium,” while the Soviets were not afraid of a German revival through a revival of Ruhr production but of a revival in Europe, which the Communists wanted to keep in want and disorder. The report was of course embellished with sensationalist stories of “Knochenrappler (“rattlers of bones”),” the German children who “rattled bones in garbage cans while reaching for food,” or the story of a “Berlin entrepreneur” who rented coffins for burials at 40 marks for five hours.\textsuperscript{1070}

Using \textit{TIME’s} identification of the struggle of US foreign policy as “between communism and Western Democracy” with a struggle “between the US and economic anarchy,” the common result of these two axes was depicted in two contradictory photos - two contradictory worlds- of “what kind of a Christmas it was in Europe” in 1947. The photos were published in the last issue

\textsuperscript{1066} “National affairs. The nation,” \textit{TIME}, (1947, December 29), 50(26), 9-11.
\textsuperscript{1070} “National affairs. The nation,” \textit{TIME}, (1947, December 1), 50(22), 21.
of the magazine for the year. In the one photo Frenchmen “greeted with almost childlike joy” the USS. “American Leader,” loaded with food collected by the US Friendship Train -a train which began its journey from Los Angeles, California and ended in New York collecting food from homes, kitchens, gardens, and fields of the American people- and in the other photo German men and women in Frankfurt “scrabbled like animals for scraps of rotting food, discarded by US Army personnel.”

Regarding TIME’s choice for man of the year, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, readers wrote in contradictory comments. There were a few readers who believed that he deserved this “honorable distinction,” while some regarded him as a “visionless” and “parochial politician belligerent in substituting shallow ineptitude for a plan to create markets of good will and mutual trade outlets between the nations of the world.” The TIME readership was also affected by TIME’s anti-Communist propaganda. The readers expressed the opinion that the US foreign policy makers could achieve world peace only if they “face[d] the unpleasant truth that the Soviet Union [did not] want a peaceful, prosperous world outside its own borders and those of its satellites,” and thus understood the need for Marshall’s most “lucid” explanation of US policy. The fear of Communism did not concern the readers only in regard to their foreign policy but also to their domestic situation. Therefore, they believed that Communism had to be outlawed and fought in the open as it was “essentially dishonest, a cult of hatred, and so being the doctrine of ‘anti-Christ’.” Nevertheless, there were readers who believed that the best way to defeat Communism was to ignore it and not bother to study the basis of its propaganda, let alone have their statesmen on the cover page of TIME.

A photo of a Viennese child holding a new pair of shoes filled with joy touched a *TIME* reader who wished to offer their “small contribution toward seeing another little face raised in the same radiant joy,” while the editor urged other readers to contribute directly to their local Red Cross to help such needy children.\(^{1077}\) However, when former non-Nazi members of the German Reichstag, who “found refuge” in the US, called for the abandonment of “vengeance” and requested participation in the settlement of the German peace treaty, the majority of the readers fully or partially rejected the request and were frustrated with the audacity of the former members of the German Reichstag, who demanded what they called justice for Germany so soon after war’s end when the Nazi leaders had been devastating the European continent for 5½ years.\(^{1078}\) Such readers did not want to listen to political suggestions from Germans, even if they were refugees from the Nazis. In fact, the *TIME* editor stated that of the first 253 letters in response to this German exiles’ plea, 60 were in “complete agreement,” 20 agreed in “principle” but took “exception to specific points,” 35 disagreed in “principle but conceded that some points had merit,” and 138 argued that “no changes whatsoever in occupation policy should be considered.”\(^{1079}\)

*TIME* shared many articles with *LIFE*. Even though, *TIME*’s approach did not spread the fear of Communism in the same dramatic and anguished way *LIFE* did, the end result was the same. It would be accurate enough to say that the magazine’s focus was also twofold in 1947: to convince the people of the Communist threat and to make them realize the necessity of a program for economic relief for Western Europe -if not to convince the people of the Communist threat in order for them to approve of a program for economic relief for Western Europe. *TIME* readers appeared lured into the theory of the threat of ‘Red’ expansion and its solution.

**Commentary**

As expected, most of *Commentary*’s articles regarding Germany advocated for the relocation of displaced persons and the planning to set up a Jewish homeland in Palestine.\(^{1080}\) Apart


from that the magazine focused on two other topics: the German people and the democratization process, and the idea of the Marshall Plan. The 1947 book *Final Judgment: The Story of Nuremberg* by Victor Bernstein, foreign correspondent for the New York City daily newspaper *PM*, intrigued the interest of the Columbia University German émigré sociologist, Paul W. Massing, who published an article in *Commentary* on German individual responsibility. Massing first presented Bernstein’s documented work on the “poisoned minds and dehumanized hearts” of Germans, which proved that it was not just a small number of Nazis who decided the mass murder of the Jews. Through business correspondence Bernstein proved “the eager cooperation of German industrialists in providing furnaces for the crematoria, and through the publication of ‘research’ records of German scientists [performing experiments] on the living, almost all ending in agonizing death, and on the dead, murdered and cut up according to scientific specifications.” Bernstein accused “the German people as a whole of having been accomplices in the Nazi crimes [...] by mere participation, or by condoning and knowing without doing.” As an answer to Bernstein's accusation of collective responsibility the author of the article, a former prisoner himself at a concentration camp, who had been arrested as a communist, described how fellow inmates obeyed the Nazi orders and “disciplined” a man, who tried to escape but was recaptured, by beating him “ferociously,” while “twelve hundred other men witnessed it.” Only one man who dared to scream “You cowards!” shortly after was also laying “unconscious on the floor.” In this way the author wanted to emphasize that the acts of these men could not characterize all the concentration camp inmates as a whole, just as the acts of some Germans could not justify discriminating against the entire people. Furthermore, the author did not argue that all Germans, more or less, knew about the concentration camps, but attributed the “numbness” of many Germans in Nazi Germany being a sign of people withdrawing into to “the desire for self-preservation.”

Regarding the Allied de-Nazification process, the German émigré political scientist Franz L. Neumann, an old friend and colleague of Massing, wrote that forcing people to admit collective guilt and to choose the winners “of public breast-beating contests,” would not result in a denazified people. Furthermore, Neumann declared that attempting to re-educate the Germans “by military government action” was attempting the “impossible.” According to the Potsdam Declaration, the

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de-Nazification process was intended to eliminate Nazi and military doctrines and develop democratic ideas, but according to Neumann in Commentary there was a problem inherent in this Allied policy because the interpretation of Nazism and democracy varied between the western Allies and the Soviet Union. For the West Nazism was a “political phenomenon” but for the Soviets it was “a socio-economic system,” while for the West democracy was “a method of ascertaining the popular will in a free manner” but for the East it was “a society without exploitation” and of economic equality of citizens. These perspectives were mirrored in the different occupation policies of the Allies and would eventually result in “a lack of understanding” and making “Germans pawns in a struggle for their affections.” Furthermore, even if unification was achieved, basic educational reforms, such as “the destruction of educational privileges, the elimination of the caste spirit in German universities, the secularization of education,” would be vital for achieving long-range aims.1082

Coming back from a half year of investigating Jewish life in Europe in the summer of 1947, David Bernstein reported that “underneath the conflict between Russia and the Western democracies, fascism” was festering and the Western Europeans were left with “little faith and less hope.” On the lookout for “vestiges of Nazism and anti-Semitism,” the correspondent attributed to Germans “a terrifying nostalgia for the good old days of Nazi splendor, a glib repudiation of all the evils of the recent past, and an impelling desire for another attempt to dominate the world.” Bernstein reported on the results of the third official survey of a cross-section of the eighteen million Germans in the American zone, which revealed that 61% of them were deeply imbued with anti-Semitism. Other surveys revealed, on the one hand, that the Germans thought that National Socialism “was a good idea badly carried out, felt sorry that they lost the war, or refused to accept any responsibility for the Nazi atrocities,” while the American democratization process had been an epic failure. However, Bernstein pointed out that the Americans were not basically in Germany for the Germans, but preventively because of the Soviets, something Bernstein believed the Germans were aware of and tried to take advantage of.1083

Regarding the response of the Soviets to US foreign policy, according to Commentary, the Soviet Union had to attack the Marshall plan as imperialist “not because it might become imperialist, but because it might not.”\textsuperscript{1084} Even though the magazine warned of the possibility of a new depression in case the American economy could not handle the funding of the plan, the Marshall Plan, it felt was indeed “an offer of tentative aid” and its motivation “evidently arose out of a profound awareness of European distress.” Its political interpretation was “a sign of the crystallization of anti-Soviet opinion, as for the next few years the only thing that could dispel the fear of [Europe] being ground between the Soviet power on the one hand and domestic social unrest on the other would be the lavish award of American credits.” Nonetheless, the “stupid repressive” policies of the occupying powers toward the industrial heart of Europe, “Germany and the Ruhr Valley,” had made the recovery from “a cumulative depression” impossible “without substantial external aid” and the establishment of a “free-trade system in the immediate future unconceivable without the American dollars.”\textsuperscript{1085}

Regarding a Left or Communist threat in the US the magazine asserted the idea that the industrial and political maturity of the US was achieved long after the European one, and that therefore, the American Left was not to be identified with the European Left, let alone with the Soviet totalitarianism; the majority of the people in the US was committed to “free enterprise” and only a few to “socialism.” The US program of the Left mostly concerned itself with “social-security proposals, anti-discrimination measures and defense of labor rights,” a program which would not be regarded as adequately Leftist in Europe.\textsuperscript{1086}

As seen in Letters to the Editor, the majority of the Commentary readers differentiated between individual guilt and collective guilt. In fact, one reader noted that fear was “a potent and demoralizing emotion” and one must have lived under the Nazi terror to assume that there was “some innate brutality, servility, or sadism in the ‘character’ of a people” and suggested not to adopt “the same heresy toward the Germans which Hitler and his gang adopted toward the Jews,” but help the Germans “regain their own self-respect.”\textsuperscript{1087}

\textsuperscript{1086} Sidney Hertzberg, “The month in history,” Commentary, (1947, February), 3(2), 159-166.
Commentary, including its German émigré writers, and its readership mostly focused in 1947 on the importance of the democratic treatment of Germans, the need and importance of their re-education but not through methods which employed vindictive and degrading elements. The magazine also recognized the necessity of the Marshall Plan for the correction of the failed occupation policies that had been pursued so far.

The Nation

Even though The Nation warned against the approach of international matters primarily as problems of “national security and military strategy” and disapproved of the breaking of the “tradition of civilian leadership” in the conduct of foreign affairs by appointing a general to the post of Secretary of State, it did not fail to see in him “a big man without arrogance, an efficient organizer with no inclination to run a one-man show, a soldier who appreciated the essentially civilian character of a democratic state.”1088 Regarding the US policy toward Germany’s economic role in Europe the magazine was once more quite objective. For The Nation, the cancer spot of Europe was Germany's economic situation, which had to serve as the starting point of any realistic program. The Soviet keen interest in production in eastern Germany on the one hand, and the non-existent American economic policy in western Germany on the other hand made the magazine wonder whether there was any “possibility of developing real democracy among a people living below-subsistence level, without houses, without jobs and without hope.”1089 The political suggestion of the magazine was the slow socialization of Germany, no matter how contradictory that would be to the capitalist tradition of the US, so that Germany could be politically independent. A socialization program could not be coordinated, however, with plans to stimulate free enterprise. The fact that German exports were already “offering some competition,” which could in time “backfire in South American and European markets” along with the fact that the former German coal and steel cartels “remained in full operation in the Ruhr” increased the risk of reviving the “backbone of German nationalism and of reinstating Nazi managers and industrialists in their former positions of power.”1090 The same concept applied to the entire continent, which was “caught between two backward giants.” If the Soviets could give a lesson in “energy and economics” and the West (the US Liberals and the British Socialists [Labour Party]) a lesson “in

civil rights, in freedom of thought and inquiry,” then a democratic and strong socialist Europe could emerge.\textsuperscript{1091} As such even though, according to \textit{The Nation’s} editorial articles, Hoover’s reports on the “starved and desperate” Germany did not provide any new information or any solution on “how to make German industry an asset to Europe instead of a liability,” the magazine believed that the government could go with his report to Congress.\textsuperscript{1092}

Not surprisingly given the more left-wing orientation of the magazine, Truman’s doctrine was regarded as a “plain declaration of political war against Russia” that was based on false assumptions about the Soviet influence in the Balkan area and instead it made the same suggestions as it did for Germany.\textsuperscript{1093} \textit{The Nation} did not approve of what it considered the American misinterpretations of the Soviet “obstruction,” “permeation,” and “strategic imperialism” and instead justified the Soviet need to have its international security as its first objective and to devote a disproportionate amount of its resources to defense. In addition, the magazine suggested that the Soviet Union plainly stated that the international situation was not yet “compatible with political democracy within Russia, instead of insisting that their political system was more genuinely democratic than that of any other country.” It was the magazine’s belief that no nation was in a position to make war and urged for “patience” and “good-will” in international relations for the next few years. The US, on the one hand, should realize that “safeguarding the forms of democracy” in Poland or Greece did not mean that they safeguarded what was actually taking place in the countries in terms of Soviet intervention, and the Soviet Union, on the other hand, should stop trying to merge the Socialist and Communist parties in Berlin or to block “the creation of a Germany that [...] was viable enough to give its people the right to hope.”\textsuperscript{1094} Of the same opinion was also the son of the late president Roosevelt, Elliott Roosevelt, who stated that Communism was not spreading through Soviet money, but because the European people had become discouraged by the continuous western attempts “to put relief on a political basis.”\textsuperscript{1095}

\textsuperscript{1092} “The shape of things,” \textit{The Nation}, (1947, March 8), 164(10), 261-163.
\textsuperscript{1095} Elliott Roosevelt, “A plea to America,” \textit{The Nation}, (1947, March 29), 164(13), 352.
In reference to the new Secretary of State and his own plan, *The Nation* had a totally different attitude. George Marshall received praise from the magazine for the balanced but strong way he handled the Soviet Union at the Moscow meeting by confronting the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov’s accusations that the British and Americans had “already helped themselves” to billions of reparation, while at the same time acknowledging the Soviet suffering in the war and her right to reparations.\(^{1096}\) The magazine believed that Marshall could play the “role of the mediator” in “reconciling differences” and proving that America was not “imperialist.” Nonetheless, the question remained whether he would do that, as the German problem was multidimensional. The issues of “political structure, demilitarization, economic unity, reparations and industry level were closely interrelated and interdependent,” and as the speed of a ship convoy was determined by the speed of its slowest ship so would the problems of the German peace treaty be determined by the interdependence of the reparations and industry level.\(^{1097}\)

Despite the failure of the Council of Foreign Ministers to agree on a peace treaty with Germany at the Moscow conference, the magazine believed that Marshall accomplished a few steps toward his true objective, such as with the Soviet reparations. *The Nation* believed that the “restoration of a unified economy under prosperous safeguards [could] prevent rearming of the revival of the great cartels so that Germany could withstand the pull of the socialist economies and the Russian political power to the East” and stated that if Marshall's recognition of the principle of reparations had been discussed more seriously it might have “detected the beginnings of agreement.”\(^{1098}\) The Marshall Plan was regarded by *The Nation* as a “substitute for the provocative, clumsy anti-Soviet crusade launched by Mr. Truman.”\(^{1099}\) It was a “wise move,” as it removed the anti-communist implications of the Truman Doctrine and focused on the drafting of “an economic program which provide practical justification for further American assistance” and invited the Soviet Union and the countries that it dominated to cooperate.\(^{1100}\) It also pushed for a fast Congressional approval, which was more likely if the ‘better informed about the international facts of life were fully aware that total collapse in Europe would have had shattering repercussions on

\(^{1099}\) Freda Kirchwey, “Marketing the plan,” *The Nation*, (1947, June 28), 164(26), 758-759.
the political and economic welfare” of the US. Furthermore, the implementation of the Marshall Plan would not tear Europe “between the polar attractions of two great world powers” but it would put the continent back on its feet economically and make it the “third bloc, providing a balance between the two giants.” Because most people could simply not “conceive of another war,” the two big powers would eventually negotiate. According to The Nation, that would be the ideal moment to “utilize the constructive aspects of the Marshall plan and to integrate them into a serious effort for the reconstruction of a united Europe.” So, the magazine called upon the American leaders to get “beyond their dollar complex” and start thinking about whether they “could afford to withhold from Europe the aid by means of which it could once more become a healthy part of the world,” instead of wondering whether they “could afford to pour into Europe billions of hard-earned American dollars.”

Nonetheless, Harold Laski, the British political economist and chair of the Labour Party as the war came to an end, wrote in The Nation that he was not totally in line with the Marshall plan the way it was presented to the Congress; namely as a spread of the American ideal of free-enterprise, which would “lay the foundation for capitalist revival, [and subsequently] capitalist revival would mean counter-revolution, counter-revolution would mean civil war over half of Europe or perhaps more, and civil war might very easily provoke a third world conflagration.”

As already mentioned, not communism but socialism along the lines of the German Social Democratic Party or the British Labour Party was what the magazine advocated for the economic restoration of Europe, and not out of “ideological caprice,” but because it was “the only possible way to rebuild Europe and at the same time give political democracy a chance.” Therefore, the political aspect of the Marshall plan was regarded with reservation by the magazine which believed that “certain American liberals had overlooked the danger that the Marshall plan might block European socialism more effectively than it would communism,” which would “wipe out the natural allies of the US in the inevitable clash between the extreme right and the Communists.”

Even though the magazine did not doubt the approval of the Marshall Plan by the Congress, since

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1102 “The shape of things. Realism for survival,” The Nation, (1947, September 13), 165(11), 244-245.
“Molotov’s retreat from Paris was a gift of God to Secretary Marshall,” after the Soviet rejection of the plan The Nation highly questioned its effectiveness, as it was based on an “anti-Communist basis which discouraged good trade or other relations with the Soviet bloc,” while “Western Europe, in order to pay for its pre-war volume of imports,” had to “export perhaps 30 per cent more than pre-war in physical terms.”

Regarding dismantling and the denazification process, the magazine published a report by the novelist Kay Boyle about her trip to Germany. She described not only the desperate situation of the Germans, but also about the “background” situation of the country. Her Polish D.P. (Displaced Person) driver was, she noted, well aware of the war atmosphere surrounding the country, as well as of the failed American attempts to uproot Nazism from the German hearts, only to make it stronger. He explained to her that Germany was a small, over-populated country and Hitler had managed to unite the people of Germany behind his ideas. No matter how many Germans the Allies had killed, no matter how many cities they had destroyed the situation in his view remained unchanged.

The magazine also published details of the indictment of I.G. Farben, which had reached an agreement of mutual support with Hitler before he came to power. The indictment declared that “no German government could have planned and waged war without the full, wholehearted, and unstinted cooperation of Farben.” Therefore, the magazine warned that if the American policy prevailed and German heavy industry were to be revived, the “actual German beneficiaries” would not be the “Ruhr miners” but the “industrial baron and the new-or old-Nazis” while the East would be building up based on “agrarian reform, nationalization, Socialist planning, and a broad program of trade and customs cooperation.” Thus, above all the Nation pointed out the importance of the role of the United Nations in reviewing Europe's economy since this was “the only place, outside the field of battle, where East and West” could meet and overcome their mutual distrust. The Nation concluded that “the possibility of a fascist revival in Europe, with Germany as its center, was far more real and menacing than it was two years ago,” and that if the US did not intend to

use “a fascist Germany” against the communist Soviet Union then “its policy of preventing a thorough purge of Nazi elements was one of the most tragic blunders of their time,” but that instead through “the active assistance to anti-fascist elements, destruction of fascism's capitalist underpinnings, nationalization of industry, strengthening of the worker’s political role; in a word, through a policy directly contrary to that being pursued by General Clay,” a democratic Germany could be rebuilt.\textsuperscript{109}

The Nation also saw issue of the (German) management of the Ruhr as a “decisive factor” in the “parallelogram of forces” that would decide whether there would be a “third world war” due to the Soviet refusal to participate in the deliberations on the Marshall plan. On the other hand, American influence from China to Germany was leading to the “destruction of independent left elements and helping to crystallize the division of the world, ideologically and geographically, into two opposed blocks,” which escalated the tension between East and West.\textsuperscript{110} Thus, the Nation also took a stand against the industrial dismantling of Germany, which it did not view as an act toward Germany's rearmament, since the countries entitled to reparations would gain more in the long run by “allowing Germany to become an efficient producer and then take as payment a share of its production.”\textsuperscript{111}

In terms of the views of Nation readers those that wrote in mostly opposed the Truman Doctrine. Specifically, one Nation reader found the Truman Doctrine to be a “misnomer,” as it was a “declaration of war” in an effort to maintain a “king on his shaky throne” and it should be called “the Mussolini-Hitler-Franco doctrine,” while another believed that if Roosevelt were alive, he would have suggested a more “simple” and “clear” program which “decent, peace-loving Americans” could accept as it would not attempt to establish democracy in a nation ruled by a king, it would not attempt to “arm the monarchists” contrary to the people's will, and it would not attempt to make a “lot of plutocrats into despotic millionaires,” but it provide electric power and transportation and it would establish a Greek national Bank and private productive enterprises.\textsuperscript{112} Another reader declared the Truman doctrine as Marxist, as it was based upon the Marxist theory

\textsuperscript{109} del Vayo. “Self-portrait of Germany,” The Nation, (1947, August 23), 164(8), 185.
\textsuperscript{111} Keith Hutchinson, “Everybody’s business. Does this make sense?” The Nation, (1947, November 29), 165(22), 586.
that the established “political system was merely the superstructure of economic conditions.” The reader argued that the alternative for communism was not democracy, as communism was an economic concept in contrast to democracy which was “a political or at most a social one.”\textsuperscript{1113}

On the other hand, the editorial article of \textit{The Nation} that pointed to the Marshall plan as a danger to socialism was attacked by the National Executive Secretary of the A.D.A. (Americans for Democratic Action) for ignoring “the inescapable fact that without the Marshall plan Europe would face another winter of hunger, want and chaos under which the remaining hope for democratic planning might collapse and all hope for social democracy” in Europe would be “truly lost.”\textsuperscript{1114} Another reader wrote that in Germany there had always “been a decent peace movement which tried very hard before World War II to convince and educate the German people that war was inconsistent with culture and civilization” and that was what a German “respectable minority” was trying to do “against, a future rearmament and war.”\textsuperscript{1115} Lastly, a member of the International Solidarity Committee wrote in to provide the address of the organization and the cost of a CARE package and encouraged the American people to support and “adopt” a “brave, anti-fascist” man or woman who had survived concentration camps.\textsuperscript{1116}

\textit{The Nation} generally supported the newly appointed Secretary of State George Marshall and the way he handled the issues of US foreign policy, as his policy provided the first constructive omens. Nevertheless, it believed more in the effectiveness of socialism than capitalism for the reconstruction of Europe and the cooperation between West and East rather than the isolation of the East and the reconstruction of a federated capitalist Western Europe. Not surprisingly, \textit{The Nation} readership was harsher in its tone and severely criticized the anti-communist campaign of the State Department, which it found baseless and not the necessary foundation for peace.

\textit{Human Events}

Prompted by the “Truman Doctrine” \textit{Human Events} stated in the April 16\textsuperscript{th} 1947 issue that “the truly decisive area” of the American-Soviet duel in Europe was Germany, where the political, economic and moral failure of the US occupation would not block the “realization of a totalitarian

\textsuperscript{1113} “Letters to the editor. Our Marxist president,” \textit{The Nation}, (1947, May 17), 164(20), 583.
\textsuperscript{1116} “Letters to the editor. Help for anti-fascists,” \textit{The Nation}, (1947, April 12), 164(15), 435.
The newspaper urged reform maneuvers aimed at the de-Nazification process, the failure of which had left the former inmates of concentration camps in “despair,” and the administration and the professional life of the American zone lost in “the sweeping, bureaucratic, indiscriminate proscription of enormous numbers of people.” It pushed for the economic recovery of the country, which would function as the foundation for the establishment of democracy. Lastly, it spoke of the German notion of “God give us a Fifth Reich, for the Fourth is all too like the Third,” which depicted the moral failure of the American policy. Furthermore, according to the editor, the “inexorable” consequences of the Potsdam Agreement forced the industrial and economic heart of Europe, Germany, to die while the US, which would have nothing to gain from the ruination of Europe, paid “lip service to the cause of international co-operation” and found “the phrase One World appealing,” was sponsoring a destructive policy. The editor criticized the US for so “blithely” assuming responsibility in Germany without fully taking responsibility and for allowing the spreading of Germany's decay all over Western Europe, as well as the enslavement of Germany by Soviets, who at least had a definite plan. Therefore, the Truman Doctrine, no matter how necessary, was regarded by the magazine as a mere massage of the extremities (Greece) of a patient (Europe), which was suffering from coronary thrombosis, instead of strengthening the heart (Germany).^1118

Secretary of State George Marshall’s speech at Harvard was, for the founder of the newspaper Felix Morley, the first official American policy-making address that handled the problem of European reconstruction “in the two wasted years since Germany's unconditional surrender, intelligently.” Morley felt it provided the basis for political and social conditions in which free institutions could exist by abandoning the State Department's misleading “advocacy of political democracy,” and substituting instead a “clear-cut, practical objective” that really would mean something.^1119 After summing up the destructive application of the Potsdam agreement resulting in the deindustrialization of Germany and the destroying of all hope of European recovery the newspaper questioned the ability of the US to save Europe. In the event the Marshall Plan would not work as a “stopgap” in the long run, it would “weaken the US, fail to strengthen Western Europe and would bring the whole European continent under the control of Moscow.” Therefore,

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the newspaper endorsed the raising of the permitted level of industrial output in the American and British zones, suggested that this be followed by “giving full political and economic independence and responsibility to Western Germany” and concluded that a “thoroughly vicious and stupid policy” should be replaced with “a creative and intelligent policy, designed to attach the Germans firmly, and on a basis of equality, to the Western bloc which […] might be the nucleus of a future union of all European states.”

At the end of the year the magazine differentiated between the people and their political leaders, while identifying Hitler's Nazism with Stalin's Communism, summing up both formulas of governing in the phrase “unlimited propaganda plus unlimited terrorism.” In both political structures there was the “supposedly infallible leader and complete absence of any check on the executive power, of any safeguard for the individual against the arbitrary tyranny of the State.” As a way to escape Communism and the Soviet definition of democracy and resulting inflation the magazine suggested “a return to monetary stability, to the respect of property and to the enforcement of the law in Germany.”

*Human Events* mainly reported on what it considered the failure of all attempted American policies on Germany prior to the Marshall Plan and awaited the approval and application of the Marshall Plan, as this was regarded by the magazine the only actual program that could restore the German economy. In its view, this was Europe’s only hope.

**Conclusion**

The way the news regarding US foreign policies on Germany in 1947 was represented by the majority of press outlets under examination here appeared to be in line with the way Truman would have liked to see the press outlets handle his pursued US foreign policy; making the American people aware of the expanding threat from the Soviet Union and the measures of the US

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1121 William Henry Chamberlin, “We will accept only a consecrated world,” *Human Events*, (1947, December 17), 4(51).
Administration “to meet the situation straight on—head on,” but also at the same time promoting the idea that the US was striving to accomplish cooperation for the sake of the world’s welfare.\textsuperscript{1123}

One could argue that Lippmann partially backed Truman’s request by endorsing the continuation of quadripartite cooperation for the settlement of German peace. However, behind his suggestion was neither Truman’s fear of the political instability in the Mediterranean area nor his belief in Kennan’s containment theory, since he thought that neither communism nor American imperialism should be expanded. As such Lippmann emphatically objected the Truman Doctrine, in contrast to the Marshall Plan, which did not close the door of cooperation to the Soviets and could include Germany, probably implying that Germany’s industrial potential would benefit the ERP.

On the exact same page with Lippmann was again \textit{The Nation}, while I can conclude that all press outlets under examination, apart from \textit{Commentary} which in its limited essays for Germany in 1947 mostly criticized the failing de-Nazification policy, were totally in line with the Truman Administration. Expecting the dead end the negotiations with the Soviet Union would reach, but, at least up until the time of the Soviet rejection of the Marshall Plan for some press outlets and the Council of Foreign Ministers in London for others, awaiting the possibility of cooperation between East and West, the majority of the press outlets managed to totally derail their focus on preventing a new German aggression and re-orient it toward the fear of communist expansion. Even the failing US occupation policy of de-Nazification or the consequences of the non-fraternization ban, which had been harshly criticized in the previous years, were mildly commented on, while Germany’s industrial value in the evolving Cold War and in the success of the Marshall Plan was rising and raising. Even though all press outlets urged Congress to approve of the Marshall Plan, they also understood that the US could not sustain Europe financially alone. As such Germany’s inclusion in the Marshall Plan was unanimously suggested not only for humanitarian reasons at that time, but also (if not primarily) for the support of the Marshall Plan, the first US foreign policy which could fix all US foreign policy blunders pursued so far.

\textsuperscript{1123} The American Presidency Project, Harry S. Truman, \textit{Remarks at a Meeting With the American Society of Newspaper Editors}, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, Retrieved on 8/22/2020 from https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/232909
Additionally, as mentioned in the previous years, all press outlets rejected the idea of collective guilt of the German people. In 1947 the majority of the press outlets took this belief a step further and totally differentiated the Nazi war criminals from the German people. In view of a beneficial utilization of Germany by the US in the developing Cold War the majority of the press reported on but disregarded the still existing German nationalism except for *Commentary*, as already mentioned, and *The Nation*, which disapproved of the dismantling process but did not fail to report the return of industries to former Nazi partners and the danger of using a revived German nationalism against Soviet communism. The political implications of the Marshall Plan were also not overlooked by the magazine after the Soviet rejection of the plan, while along with *The Nation* in 1947 also *Commentary* believed that Socialism fitted Germany more than free enterprise.

Regarding the possible impact of the attitude of the press outlets on the formation of public opinion, the year 1947 was a turning point for the awareness of the American people in reference to their international relations. Even though strikes and labor problems were still the main concern of the majority of the American people, in 1947 two and a half times more Americans were concerned about foreign policy issues compared to the ratio of one in ten of last year while after the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and the publication of Kennan's containment theory, regardless of whether the American people were aware of their entire context or not, their country's foreign affairs ranked first. Additionally, the Americans were not willing anymore to cut down on their food to feed the Europeans anymore even though they knew how bad the famine situation was in Germany. This might indicate their belief in the effectiveness of the Marshall Plan, which was made public by the time this question was asked.

This shift of opinion was mostly based on the acknowledgement of the Soviet threat, which was not only emphasized by the US Administration but also by the press outlets since the previous year. Nevertheless, this shift of opinion also affected the attitude of the American people toward the former enemy, Germany. Even though the few questions which were asked about Germany revealed that the American people still did not trust the Germans and their becoming into a democratic nation, this belief was not followed up and one can assume that it was either not that important or that it did not matter that much since the fear of the Soviet Union wanting to dominate the world was considered even bigger.
Returning to the triangular relationship between US policy that targeted the Soviet Union and would acquire the support of Germany for its success, the US press outlets and the US public opinion, I can say that intentionally or not the press outlets aligned with the US foreign policy; meaning whether the press outlets truly identified with the objectives of US policy or whether they were seen as the most ideal alternative at that time, is hard to say. However, what can most likely be extracted as a result of this alignment and the bombardment of the public with the expansive attempts of the Soviet Union in Europe is the redirection of public interest toward international problems and the acceptance of the communist threat as its scapegoat. As such, one could assume that the press outlets might have contributed to the public’s awareness and opinion-shaping in regard to the country’s foreign affairs and ‘obligations’ toward western Europe and particularly in laying the foundations for the justification of the drastic change of the American policy toward Germany, which had just started. In 1947 the fear of German aggression had been replaced with the fear of the Soviets to a certain degree.
Chapter 4

“The economic reform of western Germany”

1948

As observed in the previous chapter communist fear was being spread successfully by the Truman Administration and the press outlets in American society, since, as British historian David Reynolds noted, “an economic recovery program of the magnitude of the Marshall Plan require[d] a sense of overwhelming threat. The Marshall Plan was more discreet than the Truman Doctrine [...] but the basic anxiety remained the same, namely a Europe pushed by poverty into the hands of Moscow.”1124 Therefore, it was important that the American public was adequately prepared to accept the sponsorship of the financial aid to the European people out of its own pocket in order to fight the communist expansion.

Besides, Communism was also considered a threat domestically. The Taft–Hartley Act of the previous year, which restricted the activities and power of labor unions and required union leaders to declare that they were not supporters of the Communist Party,1125 as well as the Mundt–Nixon bill of this year, which required all members of the Communist Party of the United States to register with the United States Department of Justice,1126 were clear signs of the US efforts to shield US society against Communists and to marginalize any potential appeal of Communism. Moreover, the hearings of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), which “investigate[d] alleged disloyalty and rebel activities on the part of private citizens, public employees and organizations suspected of having Communist ties,” also elevated fears of Communism to a witch hunt-like fervor, as seen for instance in the investigations involving US government official Alger Hiss, who was accused by TIME magazine senior editor Whittaker

Chambers of being a member of the Communist Party while himself had also been a communist spy, or in that of the senior US Treasury department official Harry Dexter White.\textsuperscript{1127}

In the field of foreign policy, apart from the anti-communist campaign of the Department of State Secretary of State’s Economic Recovery Program (ERP), which was introduced the previous year, offered “unprecedented” American assistance to the participating European countries and allowed the United States gradually “to engage itself in the bipolar confrontation by first committing money, not blood.”\textsuperscript{1128} The Marshall Plan was part of an effort to build a strong postwar global economy that would avoid the problems that plagued the West after WWI: 1) the production of postwar global economy, 2) the shaping of the military and political events of the late 1940s and 1950s, and 3) and the prompting of a move toward European unity.\textsuperscript{1129} However, the Marshall Plan had to be available to all of Europe, not just to noncommunist countries, or else the division of Europe would be unavoidable; and that was something that better came from Moscow and not Washington.\textsuperscript{1130}

It should also be noted that the ERP did not only target the communist threat but also benefited the American economy as well. The money of the program would increase the production of goods to be shipped abroad, keep up prices, maintain employment, increase exports, and raise buying power in the US. Additionally, the increase in the US military expenditures due to the military aid for Europe would also benefit the American economy. Truman “leveraged foreign threats to initiate economic projects at home” to create a strong US economy with a twofold outcome; a domestic “vibrant democracy” and international US “military might.”\textsuperscript{1131} Take initiatives that would not only benefit the recipient, but also the donor would result in peace and prosperity for both of them, or as the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs William L. Clayton

bluntly said: “Let us admit right off that our objective has as its background the needs and interests of the people of the United States. We need markets -big markets- in which to buy and sell.”  

The US military governor in Germany Lucius D. Clay also supported the ERP, which he found “so sound and wise” that he could not refrain from expressing his “very real admiration for the contribution” which the State Department made “in times of national crisis.” According to Clay, the ERP was “essential” if the US were to “obtain a stable western Europe” and have “any chance for eventual peace;” it was the “real hope for a free Europe,” and the only way to face the “Russian danger” even if this was not immediate. Clay also did not object to the rearming of Western Europe, since he did not think that it would “alarm Russia to such an extent that they might precipitate a war.”

At the same time, a series of events in 1948 provided evidence of an ever-growing Cold War between East and West. On the one hand, there was the Soviet objection to the London Six-Power Conference, which took place from April 20 to June 1 between the three Western occupation powers in Germany and the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) and prepared the creation of a democratic and federal government in the western occupation zones of Germany and Germany’s participation in the international community. The Soviet Union was not invited to the London Conference, which led to an escalation of what was seen as Communist pressure through fomented strikes, interference in elections, and pressure on governments to add communist members to cabinets in European countries.

Bizonia and the French occupation zone Germany were original members of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), the organization created to allocate and distribute Marshall Plan aid on 16 April 1948, most likely because it was quite fast recognized that Europe needed Germany as much as Germany needed Europe especially in the light of various

1134 ibid. p. 564.
1135 ibid. p. 650.
developments affecting Germany. Such thoughts were, however, not new to the Department of State. In May 1947 the Director of the Policy Planning Staff George Kennan had already discussed with Under Secretary of State Acheson about the shaping of the occupation policies in Germany “toward enabling the western zones [...] to make the maximum contribution to economic restoration in western Europe in general” and in July 1947 the Assistant Secretary of State Hilldring after discussing with Secretary of Army Royall submitted to the Secretary of State his position about the relationship of German level of industry with the Marshall Plan and concluded that “the recovery of Europe and the recovery of Germany [were] two aspects of one problem and that a sound German economy [could not] survive in a prostate Europe any more than that European reconstruction [could] be achieved without a stable, democratic Germany.” The American government was therefore in no doubt that West Germany had to be included in the ERP, but as President Truman had stated in his address to Congress on the issues involved in the economic reconstruction of Europe on December 19, 1947: The inclusion of western Germany in the European recovery program would not weaken the “determination that Germany shall never again threaten to dominate Europe or endanger the peace of the world.”

On the other hand, to implement the Marshall Plan, to bolster the economies of West Germany and West Berlin and “to bind the two more tightly to the West” the western powers introduced the new Deutsche Mark in their zones only, despite the fact that this went against the quadripartite agreement not to implement any policies that would affect more than one zone

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1137 The failure of the CFM conferences on Germany, the inauguration of the European Recovery Program, the virtual suspension of quadripartite machinery for the control of Germany, the initiation of measures for implementing the London agreements of the western powers relative to the three western zones, and the Berlin crisis. As cited by Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Germany and Austria, Volume II, Part 6, Basic statements of policy regarding Germany, eds. William Slany, Charles S. Sampson (Washington: Government Printing Office 1973), Documents 720.


without unanimous agreement. This 3-power action had a detrimental impact on the economy of east Berlin and the Soviet zone, to the dismay of the Soviets. On June 20, 1948 the American, British, and French occupation authorities replaced “the hopelessly inflated” Reichsmark with a new currency, the Deutsche Mark. The new currency formed the basis for western Germany’s impressive postwar recovery, helped control the black market and reinstate “the conditions for regular price formation and economic calculation absent in Germany since the mid-1930s.”

However, as former Social Democratic West German chancellor Helmut Schmidt wrote in 1997, “this monetary and economic revolution would never have transpired had it not been for the Marshall Plan,” which became operational in Germany in the summer of 1948. The West also blocked the Soviets from continuing to extract reparations the Soviets had been promised from the Western zones, despite the vulnerability of the western sectors of Berlin located around 100 miles inside the Soviet zone and mostly staffed by US troops with no to little combat experience.

When the Soviets started to pressure the western occupation sectors of Berlin with strict controls of western rail and road communications between Berlin and the West, even though Clay did not believe that they wanted war, he urged in a teleconference with Secretary of the Army K. Royall, Chief of Staff of the US Army General O. Bradley, Deputy Chief of Staff of the US Army General J.L. Collins, and Army Chief of Plans and Operations Lt. General A. Wedemeyer that “any failure” to meet the situation “squarely” would “cause great trouble.” However, as the Soviets intensified their investigations of US trains at the Soviet check points, Clay thought it was advisable for the US government to “give some consideration to possible retaliatory measures such as the enactment of stringent regulations which would make Soviet use of ocean canals, bunkering facilities, and other facilities under our and British control, difficult if not impossible.” Nevertheless, Clay stated in his telecommunication with Deputy Chief of Staff General J.L. Collins


1146 ibid. p. 607.
and Chief of Intelligence Division Lt. Gen. S. J. Chamberlin that he would rather “evacuate Berlin” and “go to Siberia,” than fulfill a proposal of the Army Department, which instructed the evacuation of American dependents in Germany, Austria and Trieste due to the increasingly tense international situation.\textsuperscript{1147} Instead, he advised Chief of Staff of the US Army O. Bradley to take “retaliatory measures” again, and particularly in shipping. Clay was of the opinion that the withdrawal of dependents from Berlin would create “hysteria accompanied by rush of Germans to communism for safety,” and “panic to the dependents” would be translated by the Soviets as a “success,” and would “frighten the rest of Europe.”\textsuperscript{1148} The only thing that would force Clay out of Berlin was the “Soviet stoppage of all food supplies to German population in Western sectors,” but he doubted that the Soviets would make such a move, as this would “alienate the Germans almost completely,” unless the Soviets were prepared to supply food for them.\textsuperscript{1149}

Berlin was not just a city; it was a symbol. It was where “Hitler's Reich ended in ruins” and “a warning to future generations”\textsuperscript{1150} and that was why the western allies had tried so hard at the Yalta Conference to persuade the Soviet Union to allow them to also have occupation sectors in the city after the war’s end, so that “all the victorious nations could thus presume to be present in the enemy capital when terms for the future of Germany were laid down.”\textsuperscript{1151} That was what drove Clay after the Soviet blockade of the city began in retaliation for the introduction of the western–backed DM into Berlin and the western zones to order the Berlin airlift, or officially known as Operation VITTLES, on his own authority, while continuing to pressure Washington to get more aircraft.\textsuperscript{1152} But he was not the only one refusing to abandon the city to the Soviets. Despite the Soviet rewards of full rations to those who would refuse the new currency and the Soviet retaliation of blocking Berlin and cutting off its electricity, the Berlin City Assembly along

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\textsuperscript{1147} ibid. pp. 579-583. \\
\textsuperscript{1148} ibid. pp. 604, 611, 613-614. \\
\textsuperscript{1149} ibid. p. 622. \\
\textsuperscript{1150} Christoph Bertram, “Germany moves on: Laying angst to rest,” \textit{Foreign Affairs}, (1998, July/August), 77(4), 186-194. \\
\textsuperscript{1151} May (1998, July/August). \\
\end{flushleft}
with 80,000 Berliners resisted the Soviet appeals as well.\textsuperscript{1153} The Berlin Blockade was the “worst mistake” of the Soviet Union risking war and gambling desperately.\textsuperscript{1154}

Lastly, with the uncertainty the Berlin crisis of 1948-49 caused, Germany’s value and importance to the American public and foreign policy raised significantly. Therefore, Clay strongly advised against the internationalization of the Ruhr, and, in support of the London agreement, he suggested the reorganization of the Ruhr “under a pattern which would permit responsible enterprises to be formed under at least a substitute for responsible ownership.” A reorganization which would allow the regrouping of Ruhr companies, which were split into smaller as a result of the deindustrialization process, and their placement under German trustees responsible for their economic operation under allied supervision.\textsuperscript{1155}

President’s Address at a Meeting with the American Society of Newspaper Editors

In contrast to the President's addresses to the American Society of Newspaper Editors of the previous years, which took place in the White House, in 1948 Truman met with the Society at the Statler Hotel in Washington and his address was carried as a nationwide radio broadcast. In his message the President mostly focused on the domestic situation of the country and the danger of high prices and inflation, which would be further burdened by the US “undertaking [of] a program of assistance to foreign countries [and] […] certain necessary additions to [the US] national defense program.” Thus, Truman reminded the newspaper editors and the American public of the importance of the problems at home, since “the success of [the American] foreign policy depend[ed] to a very large extent upon the strength and stability of [the US] domestic economy.” Truman went on further to say:

These requirements [had to] be met in large part from the production of American mines and factories and farms. Thus, a strong American economy [was] the bedrock upon which rest the hopes

\textsuperscript{1153} May (1998, July/August).
for establishing a peace of free men in the world. Without it [the US could] provide neither aid, nor leadership, nor example.\textsuperscript{1156}

On the other hand, the President’s special conference with editors of business and trade papers took place a week later in his office at the White House and the President’s message was completely different. Truman started with reminding the editors how the post-World War II East-West conflict began; how Truman went to Potsdam “with a program, with that idea in view, of helping the Russians recuperate and recover” showing his “appreciation” for the tremendous human loses the Soviets had suffered and how “the Russians began to fail to keep their agreements.” Truman went on describing the “peculiar psychological approach” of the Soviets and that they had no “respect for the life of an individual if it [stood] in the way of some state project which they [thought] should be for the good of the country,” giving examples of Soviet governmental seizures of power in Bulgaria, Rumania and the eastern end of Poland.

Therefore, in his speech to editors of business and trade papers Truman stressed the significance of world peace and its enforcement and guarantee by the US and the role of the ERP as the “peaceable means […] in the interests of peace,” and expressed his hope that they would “take this thing into consideration and study it from the standpoint of the world setup.” In his “statement of the facts,” as Truman himself characterized his message to the editors, the President also expressed the obligation of the US “to do everything [it] possibly [could] in order to help this country do what [was] necessary for peace, and [stated that in order] to get peace [the US had to] have the wherewith to back it up-back up what [the US thought was] right.” And what the US did not think was right was to annex any country, and what it thought it was right was to make America prosperous and keep peace in the world.\textsuperscript{1157} Even though the content of the two messages may appear different the bottom line is that the Marshall Plan would benefit not only the recipient countries but also the United States. Covering this endeavor with the cloak of peace, Truman basically promoted the boosting of the US economy though raised US production, exports and trade while the Marshall Plan would be in effect.


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American Public Opinion as Evaluated by Polling

The concern that Truman focused on in his nationwide radio-broadcasted message to the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 17, 1948, was the danger of inflation, which was also a concern for the American public as expressed through their answers in the Gallup polls. In a poll in February 1948 American people were asked what would they ask the president if they were to attend a press conference at the White House and 25% of them would ask the President about the inflation and the danger of depression, and 19% of them about the Marshall Plan and the relations with western European countries. \(^{1158}\)

Nevertheless, US foreign affairs remained of high public interest in 1948, especially with regard to fears of Soviet aggression and communist expansion. In March on average 80% of the Americans polled had heard of the Marshall Plan, and in April, shortly before the Congressional approval of the ERP, the majority of the people surveyed approved of the Marshall Plan, whether they were Truman, Dewey or Wallace supporters. \(^{1159}\) After the Berlin blockade, in July, the Americans polled revealed that the most important problem facing their nation was foreign policy (44%). A slight majority expressed the belief that the Democratic party could do a better job of handling foreign affairs than the Republican party (52% vs. 48%), and encouraged that the US and its Western European allies stay in Berlin (80%). \(^{1160}\) In November on average 60% of the Americans polled favored the ERP funding and were fairly to very satisfied with it, while they also believed that the State Department should have full control and supervision of it. \(^{1161}\)

The majority of the American people polled were willing to contribute to European recovery in various ways beyond providing the aid of the Marshall Plan. Specifically, in January 51% of the Americans polled believed that the US government should put rationing and price controls on some products, with meat and butter being the two top products the Americans were willing to ration. In June 42% of them favored the adoption of towns and cities of a similar size in friendly Western European nations by towns and cities in the US, and in June 63% of the people

\(^{1158}\) Gallup (1972), Vol. I, pp. 709-710.
\(^{1160}\) ibid. pp. 744, 748.
\(^{1161}\) ibid. pp. 770-771.
were willing to write letters and send food and clothing to a family in Europe from time to time. In August again 56% of the people surveyed thought that the US government should put back rationing and price controls on some products. Finally in December 58% of the Americans polled would agree to spending money in order to tell the American side of the story to Europe and the world, in order to counter what the Soviet Union spent in telling her side, and, in particular, the majority favored the spending of at least one billion dollars to do the job right; yet at the same time the people polled were split between making the personal sacrifice of putting back rationing and price controls on some products (45%) and not (42%), while in 31% of the Americans believed that the first problem the President and the new Congress should take up was again the high cost of living like it did for the first one-and-a-half postwar year.\footnote{ibid. pp. 705-706, 737, 752, 772, 774.}

In 1948 the focus of the public was kept on the foreign affairs by utilizing fears of Soviet expansion. 83% of the Americans polled in February believed that the US government should stop sending oil, machinery, and industrial products to the Soviet Union, and 72% of them believed that even the American business firms should stop selling these products to the Soviet Union.\footnote{ibid. p. 707.} Additionally, the vast majority of the Americans surveyed (77% in March and 69% in July) believed that the Soviet Union was trying to build itself up to be the ruling power of the world, and that the US was being too soft in its policy against the Soviet Union.\footnote{ibid. pp. 721, 742-743.} Even though in May 63% of the Americans asked supported the idea of calling an international meeting with Stalin and heads of other nations to work out more effective plans for peace, they were split regarding the effective solution of this issue (39% though that the US would be successful in coming to an agreement with Stalin and 35% thought not).\footnote{ibid. p. 730.} The fear of Communists had naturally affected the American people domestically, as seen in the fact that the vast majority of those polled (77% in May and 63% in August) would have favored a law requiring all members of the Communist party in the US to register with the Justice Department in Washington, because they still thought (56% in August) that the American citizens who belonged to the American Communist party were
loyal to the Soviet Union and in case of a war with the Soviet Union the Communists in the US would work against the US.\textsuperscript{1166}

These suspicions that dominated American public opinion cultivated the fear of war as well. As such, in February, 54\% of the Americans polled believed that the US would find itself in another war within the next ten years, and of those who answered in the affirmative 70\% believed it would be with the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{1167} Surprisingly, after the Berlin crisis even though 57\% of the Americans asked believed that there would be another big war within the next ten years, only 32\% of the people believed that the US would be in this war, and of those 24\% believed it would be a war that the Soviet Union would be responsible for.\textsuperscript{1168} This indication that so many Americans thought they could stay out of a war with the Soviets and remain in isolation from another big war may display the limits of engagement with or sympathy for Germans and Europeans. Nevertheless, the threat of a war made the vast majority of the Americans defend throughout the year the conscription: 65\% in January supported the passing of a law to require every able-bodied young American man to take military or naval training for a year, 55\% in May chose to build up the US military strength by requiring every able-bodied 18-year-old young man to take military or naval training instead of drafting only men between 19 and 25, 60\% in August believed that a law should be passed that would give the government the right to require all citizens under 65 to draft and 70\% believed that the US government should require young men of draft age to take military training, and lastly 73\% in September approved the draft.\textsuperscript{1169}

In January the most popular reason for this support for the conscription was “preparedness and protection,” while the majority of those who replied negatively had “no good arguments against” it.\textsuperscript{1170} Additionally, in March 61\% of the Americans polled believed that the US should increase the size of its army and 63\% the size of the navy, and 51\% were willing to pay more money in taxes to support a larger army.\textsuperscript{1171} According to the polls, a growing majority of Americans also favored, throughout the entire year (51\% in February, 65\% in May, 73\% in August, and 68\% in December), a permanent military alliance between the US and all Western European

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1166} ibid. pp. 736, 751-752.
\item \textsuperscript{1167} ibid. pp. 714-715.
\item \textsuperscript{1168} ibid. p. 759.
\item \textsuperscript{1169} ibid. pp. 700-702, 737, 751, 758.
\item \textsuperscript{1170} ibid. pp. 700-702.
\item \textsuperscript{1171} ibid. p. 719.
\end{itemize}
countries participating in the Marshall Plan. Nevertheless, at the end of the year the majority of the Americans surveyed would oppose the spending of about $2 billion in the next year to help Western European countries re-arm. On the other hand, despite all willingness of the American people participating in the polls to be prepared for a Soviet attack and to protect western Germany (but apparently not to go to war), many Americans were lacking in awareness and any sophisticated understanding of the development and seriousness of East-West tensions. The result of a December survey revealed that only 47% of them knew generally correctly what the term ‘cold war’ meant, 46% did not know at all what the term meant, and of those who knew the term, regardless of whether they knew their meaning or not, only 17% believed that the US could win the cold war, 15% believed the Soviet Union could, and 16% believed that neither could win.

Yet from the survey results one could conclude that the American public not only backed the US foreign policy, whether they understood its context or not, but also the Truman administration. In January and February the majority of the people would vote for Truman, if a presidential election were being held (55% at the beginning of January and 46% at the month, and 45% in February). The early 1948 survey results also showed that Truman had the lead not only against all Republican candidates, except in the hypothetical scenario that he was running against the Republican Eisenhower, but also against any Democrat. Nevertheless, from April until the day before the November elections the Gallup poll results delivered a clear win for the Republicans. Even the final presidential election survey, a day before the elections, showed Truman 5% behind the Republican candidate. The actual election result did not conform with the survey results and predictions. Therefore, the Gallup organization conducted research on the causes of this and concluded that the early termination of interviewing, 10-12 days before the election, was believed to have contributed substantially to the error of the Gallup forecast. Prompted by this miscalculation the institute began studying more closely undecided voters and the number of potential voters who might not vote at all. Nevertheless, the Truman’s electoral

1172 ibid. pp. 707, 735, 750, 771.
1173 ibid. p. 771.
1174 ibid. p. 771.
1175 ibid. pp. 697, 702-703, 710.
1176 ibid. p. 703.
1178 ibid. p. 766.
1179 ibid. pp. 768-770.
victory coincided with the poll result at the end of the year that the majority of the American people named Harry Truman the most admired man living at that time in any part of the world.\footnote{ibid. p. 774.}

Press outlets

\textbf{Walter Lippmann as Political Commentator}

Before studying the way the press outlets under examination handled the US foreign policy in Germany and to what extent Truman’s press conference to the newspaper editors influenced the press outlets, the viewpoint of the political analyst Walter Lippmann will be presented. Lippmann, who served both as a lightning rod and a baseline from which to react for several newspapers, including the \textit{Washington Post} and the \textit{LA Times}, continued to criticize the Truman Doctrine. Lippmann located the failure of this containment method in the US declaration of using countries “as a bulwark against Communism,” a declaration which could not be withdrawn without “suffering humiliation and a spectacular loss of prestige,” and thus depriving the US side of “diplomatic bargaining power.”\footnote{Walter Lippmann, “The costs of containment,” \textit{Los Angeles Times}, (1948, February 11), A4.} Nonetheless, he believed that the Marshall Plan was “evidence of an increasing strength, efficiency, and lucidity” of American foreign policy.\footnote{Walter Lippmann, “Today and tomorrow: After the Truman Doctrine,” \textit{The Washington Post}, (1948, January 6), 9.} According to this influential political analyst, the plan was “a result of responsible re-examination of the problem of European reconstruction,” and he approved of the fact that the program did not desire to rebuild western Germany “as a military arsenal” but to restore the trade between East and West.\footnote{Walter Lippmann, “US foreign policy becomes clear,” \textit{Los Angeles Times}, (1948, January 7), A4. See also: Walter Lippmann, “Today and tomorrow: After the Truman Doctrine,” \textit{The Washington Post}, (1948, January 6), 9.} The results of this reciprocal trade would restore “the indivisible unity of the European community as a whole” and could successfully persuade “the American people [...] to do great things” without being “frightened and angry.”\footnote{Walter Lippmann, “Trade must dissolve the Iron Curtain,” \textit{Los Angeles Times}, (1948, January 22), A4.} Believing in the actual value of the Marshall Plan, Lippmann was against any “campaign of fear” for the approval of the Marshall Plan. In his view, fear was “a bad motive in diplomacy” and fright “a poor substitute for argument in dealing with a democratic people” like the American people, especially since “hysteria and fear” could not be sustained over
a long period of time. Lippmann believed that the Marshall Plan was an “investment in peace.” He thus insisted on the priority of European unity, and on the abandonment of the idea “that Germany should be revived as a great power in order to be a bulwark against Russia,” so that matters could “be brought to a head with the Soviet Union.”

As the Soviets gradually increased their pressure on Berlin, Lippmann remained true to his beliefs. He declared that the US could not “any longer carry out the unlimited responsibilities of universal leadership on every issue, in every conflict, everywhere in the world” and urged the establishment of a “balance of power” between East and West. Since the US alone could not provide the German people with unity, and the German people might turn to the Soviets for unity, Lippmann urged the West to understand that the unifying sentiment of the Europeans was “to be independent [and united] again, and not to be the stakes of Soviet-American diplomacy.” In other words he insisted, without denying the US a role, on returning Europe to the Europeans.

Even after the launching of the Berlin blockade Lippmann was anything but provocative against the Soviets. On the contrary, he suggested that the Soviets had to be fully consulted and considered along with the western powers, so that the conflict, which was “already so grave and so dangerous,” did not become “altogether unmanageable and irreparable.” Marshall had to “resume four-power negotiations” and abandon the idea that an all-German government had to be established before a peace settlement was made, an opinion he had held even before the blockade of the city. Additionally, Lippmann asked to allow “great freedom and flexibility of maneuver


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in the confidential discussions which would have to take place” and suggested the offering of a “modus vivendi” in Berlin to the Soviets, “under which the blockade would be lifted and the project of the western German state postponed and reconsidered.” In this way neither power “would have suffered a diplomatic defeat, or surrendered to the other its rights, commitments, or power.”\footnote{1191}

Despite the rising feeling of fear and insecurity in Europe, Lippmann did not fear the launching of an attack from either of the two great powers, because the Soviets were not strong enough to march to the west, and the US was not strong enough to defend Western Europe. On the contrary, Lippmann again encouraged a mutual policy of “evacuation and [military] withdrawal” from Berlin, since this would not only fortify European unity and western Germany’s integration into Western Europe, but would also allow the occupation powers to negotiate “an armistice agreement.” This, in turn, would leave “the vanquished to face the responsibility of their own reconstruction […] [and of adjusting] themselves to the international system which the new balance of power […] brought into being.”\footnote{1192}

Lippmann clearly had two main points in his arguments: that Germany should not be used as a bulwark against the Soviet Union and that US foreign policy did not escalate the already existing tension with the Soviet Union. His syndicated articles, which were carried by the \textit{Los Angeles Times} and \textit{The Washington Post} will be examined to analyze whether his beliefs aligned with the positions of these two press outlets.


Surprisingly, despite the numerous events reported either as responses to Western initiatives or as outright Soviet provocations in Central Europe The Washington Post did not adopt a posture of fear mongering. The newspaper of course reported the Communist advances, their presumed role in the fomentation of strikes, and the pressure on European governments to add communist members to cabinets, and a few times it did use harsh language, but generally it did not leverage these events to boost the anti-communist campaign of the State Department. On the contrary, The Post expected that the Congress would “act promptly and deliberately in the face of a critical situation” like the implementation of the ERP, “remembering that mere talk does not rebuild roads and factories or save hungry and frustrated peoples from despair.” In regard to Germany, the newspaper was of the opinion that as long as the US. continued to let the German people “go undernourished,” there would be “nobody with whom to work for the revival of western Europe.” The newspaper had no doubt that the Communists were “making capital out of” the Ruhr strikes and thus advised that the currency reform and industrial expansion “had to go hand in hand” in western Germany, which should also be brought “within the scope of the ERP.” As much as the newspaper supported the foreign policy makers, it supported also the military government in Germany, viewing General Clay as “one of the ablest administrators and one of the most supple negotiators at America’s disposition,” while doing the hardest job of any American representative. Even though the newspaper did not criticize the foreign policy it promoted the more realistic objective and benefit of the ERP and not the prevention of Communist expansion version of the State Department; namely promoting the revival of trade between eastern and western Europe, and not merely converting the program “into an agency for boycotting totalitarian

regimes.” Furthermore, *The Post* supported the immediate increase of German production, as the success of the Marshall Plan realistically depended “in large measure on the extent and speed of German recovery.”

Nevertheless, the Berlin crisis affected the stance of the newspaper, which advocated not a radical but a firmer attitude against the Soviet Union. This crisis had to be seen “in conjunction with the rape of Czechoslovakia, the drive for Finland, the pressure on Scandinavia and the struggle for Italy,” since the “danger of political chain reaction” was “inherent” in the Berlin situation. Having said that, the newspaper suggested not an aggressive but a firm stand at Berlin, “without appeasement or surrender or a serious break in the front of freedom.” As long as the US remained in Germany, its policy had to be to prevent aggression in Europe, and therefore the newspaper believed that the rearmament of the other western powers and the Benelux countries was a “reasonable supplement” to the ERP. *The Post* also warned that the US should not be “seduced” by any accommodation with the Soviet Union, since accommodation did not mean “peace.” On the contrary, “watchfulness and preparedness” should “go hand in hand in any nation that assumed the burden of world responsibility.”

Even though the newspaper supported the foundation of the ERP, it had several objections regarding its application, especially after the Soviet pressure on Berlin became clear. The newspaper “stigmatized” a federalized Germany “as a mistake,” and believed that “nothing tighter than a commonwealth system for Germany should be envisaged,” or Berlin was bound to be turned into a mousetrap. Even though the inclusion of western Germany in the ERP was regarded by the newspaper as the “first big step in welding all western Europe into an economic bloc,” the London agreement on the formation of a western Germany was not received with the same enthusiasm. According to *The Post*, it was a “bold decision” but also a “risky business” and a

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“fateful step” which raised “a host of new hopes, new problems and new dangers,” and was regarded with skepticism and concern; skepticism regarding the consequences which would “not be pretty or pleasant,” and concern regarding the “revival of German nationalism.”

Even after the Berlin Blockade the newspaper maintained its attitude and handled the situation from a diplomatic viewpoint. Therefore, *The Post* believed that the Cold War strategy that caused the “Western beleaguerment in Berlin” had to stop. It felt the US had to face the “fact” and not the “theory” that the Soviets, “in the watching presence of all Europe,” were calling “for either surrender or resistance.”* The Post* insisted on a firm policy that would “persuade the Russians” that the US did not want war, and would “give the Russians some means of relatively graceful retreat.” Even though the newspaper attacked the “fecundity” of the Soviet “imagination in devising new blasts against the Western air support of Berlin,” the newspaper was anything but belligerent toward the solution of the Berlin crisis and believed that “some sacrifice of face was required on both sides as the price for the exploration of a peaceful solution.”

In his trip to Western Europe the first full-time diplomatic correspondent of *The Washington Post* Ferdinand Kuhn, who during the war had been surrounded by many political figures very wary of German aggression, first as an assistant to Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau from 1940 to 1943 and then as deputy director of the Office of War Information, observed in September 1948 that western Germany was “still a moral as well as a physical ruin;” his report supported the newspaper’s hesitation about Germany’s self-governing. Despite the material improvement there had been “no emergence -except in Berlin- of a sense of purpose and direction among the German people.” No “awakening public interest in democratic self-government,” and no “new spirit of [German] partnership with the rest of Europe” was to be found. Furthermore, the reporter found it “deceiving” that the Americans could believe that western Germany could be used as “a buffer against Soviet encroachment” or as a “dependable source of support for future American diplomatic or military policy;” he was of the opinion that the west

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German state would not “hesitate to make any deal with Russia that would seem to serve its immediate German interests.”

Nevertheless, *The Post* declared that the western German currency reform was an “economic miracle” that had “brought about a change of morale.” Furthermore, the newspaper while supporting the primary ERP aim of uniting and strengthening all of Europe, suggested again to take the “initiative to breach the curtain between eastern and western Europe at a point known as Yugoslavia, since trade was a two way street and the benefits would be reciprocal.” Besides, according to the newspaper, foreign policy was “always a question of choices,” and the choice of this occasion showed “possible profits greater than the risks.”

Moreover, the newspaper favored the internationalization of the distribution of the Ruhr industries, but believed that the idea of the reversion of Ruhr's coal, iron and steel industry to German ownership and control was “unwise both in policy and timing.”

Despite the results of an American military government survey that revealed that while the Soviets were pushing for a forced merger of the social democratic SPD and the communist KPD 88% of the Berliners would prefer “continuing the present situation in Berlin rather than bringing it to an end by uniting Berlin under the Social[ist] Unity Party,” along with direct quotations of Berliners’ favorable opinion toward the west in the midst of the blockade, the newspaper did not believe that the western Europeans would fight just because they would be rearmed by the US. They surely wanted to be “friendly” with the US and reasonably grateful for the Marshall Plan, but their “friendship,” according to the newspaper, would not “go to the extent of fighting.” Therefore, the newspaper suggested inspiring the will in the western Europeans to “defend themselves.” Furthermore, acknowledging the importance of the Ruhr for Western Europe and Germany, the newspaper suggested the creation of a commission of small nations to control the Ruhr and to protect the consumers' interest. At the end of the year, and after the re-election of Truman as President of the United States, *The Post* declared that “whatever his other defects,” the

“all-out effort” of the President to “stabilize the desperately dangerous world situation” through the adoption of the ERP, the passage of the conscription, and the launching of rearmament showed his “disinterested courage and simple patriotism.”

*The Post* readership was however split in regard to the ERP. For instance, one *Post* reader drew attention to the reeducation of the German people and the disposal of at least a small part of the ERP for that purpose, as they were of the opinion that “many persons in Germany had become stronger Nazis than they were two or three years ago,” while another wondered how rewarding the “enemies in Germany” was going to “stop communism.” Other readers stated that the restoration of Europe with American funds to “even a modicum of her former virility was an undertaking as dubious in its issue as it was dismaying in magnitude,” or that “the proposal to make a major slash in the appropriation for European recovery was as stupid as for a community to appropriate millions for a new hospital, with the promise that the hospital would have no roof.” On the other hand, there were readers who approved of the way Truman “kept the international questions above the cheap level of mere partisanship, and wisely and with statesmanlike qualities controlled his decisions and policies” in order to support Clay’s plans for a “working economy of Europe,” which was the “object of the Marshall Plan.” Taking into account the failures of foreign policy between 1940 and 1945 another reader suggested a “general policy toward each general area or individual country abroad” instead of “detailed economic policies and operations.” Another reader urged that “every kind of media should be marshaled, every means of intelligence should be used to acquaint the peoples of the world with the [...] true workings of democracy” in the US in order to support the ERP operations. Another believed that the US had an opportunity to “establish a permanent peace policy, not military,” in the

“backbone of German aggression,” the Ruhr, and gain “the trust and goodwill of all Europeans.”

The Washington Post did not give into the Communist-fear-mongering campaign. It focused on the realistic benefits of the ERP for the accomplishment of the realistic objective of the program: a peaceful and self-sustaining Europe. It did not favor the utilization of Germany as a bulwark against the Soviet expansion, and emphasized the importance of an intelligent diplomatic solution of the Berlin Blockade. Walter Lippmann’s analysis of the US foreign policy was not that contradictory to Post’s, but his language was definitely stronger against the US intention to make some European countries, including Germany, a bulwark against Soviet expansion. The Post readership appeared also concerned about and skeptical toward the US foreign policy and was not convinced of the basis for the anti-Soviet /anti-communist campaign of the year.

Los Angeles Times

Los Angeles Times’ attitude toward the US foreign policy of 1948 was supportive. The newspaper endorsed the Marshall Plan and pointed out that the plan was not only based on the amount of money the US could spend on European recovery, but also on Marshall’s initial objective as expressed in his Harvard speech, namely that the European countries would help themselves recover properly first, and that the plan did not depend on permanent US support or explain “phony money.”

Even though the newspaper understood the urgency of the creation of a US military force in Germany “on the basis of unsettled world conditions,” it warned against the “sacrifice of a balanced national defense.” Regarding the role of Germany in the European recovery and French fears of a German revival, the newspaper made the peculiar suggestion that if population statisticians could convince the French that the Germans would never again outnumber them then “the hard core of their fear” might soften and France might stop “seeking military allies” and start seeking “economic partners in complete good faith.” Furthermore, the newspaper refuted the “dogma of irrepressible German nationalism.” Invoking the testimony of history it argued that nationalism was a “new and relatively untried element” in the only relatively

1225 “It’s not only how much,” Los Angeles Times, (1948, February 11), A4.
1226 “All our eggs in one plane?” Los Angeles Times, (1948, March 7), A4.
1227 “The forecast is fewer Germans,” Los Angeles Times, (1948, April 8), A4.
recently unified German state; a state whose “impulse toward unity […] was typified by the Zollverein -the tariff union- not by the military alliance.”*1228

The voice of *LA Times* correspondent’s Polyzoides dominated in the newspaper much louder than that of other correspondents, but this time he objected to the limitless give away of American dollars. He did not approve of a yielding US “approach to the Soviet-American friendship”*1229 and supported the continuous increase of ERP’s military and defense outlays.*1230 Although he recognized that European recovery was based on the recovery of western Germany and that the largest part of Germany's industrial production was located in the western zones, he found it “annoying” that the US kept “pouring billions into Europe.”*1231 He was frustrated that the value of Germany was still only “potential,” since the biggest part of the cities, plants, mines and industrial areas had been destroyed or partly rebuilt, and the German people were crippled by defeat, idleness, and malnutrition, while the Soviet expansion experiments were “in the offing.” Additionally, he was concerned about the urgent needs of the European markets, which preferred to have the US “supply them with everything at the cost and expense of the American taxpayer,” or with the uncertainty of how far the formula of economic aid could potentially stretch.*1232 Therefore, on the one hand, the London agreement indicated “a return to sanity after the erratic and hasty handling of the German problem”*1233 and yet on the other hand, he disapproved of the precipitous criticism against the cutting of the ERP funds and the argument that the US was retreating from its commitments toward European recovery. He did agree with the program’s “conclusive proof” that Western Europe was “so advanced on the way to recovery that certain retrenchments” of the ERP expenditures were “eminently in order.”*1234

Shortly before the Berlin blockade Polyzoides made it clear he did not object to a US withdrawal from Berlin. On the contrary, he believed that the US had “a trump card,” which was “the speedy establishment of a western federal republic, with the historic city of Frankfurt as its capital.”*1235 American democracy and Soviet Communism were “coming to grips as never before,”

*1232 Polyzoides, ”'Some ERP nations lag in effort to help selves,” *Los Angeles Times*, (1948, June 9), 11.
*1233 Polyzoides, “Plans for German state seen as return to sanity,” *Los Angeles Times*, (1948, June 8), 10.
*1235 Polyzoides, “Plans for German state seen as return to sanity,” *Los Angeles Times*, (1948, June 8), 10.
and war was in the offing. Nevertheless, the newspaper also carried a column by the Associated Press correspondent, Dewitt MacKenzie, who argued a divided Germany was a “heavy blow to general European economic rehabilitation,” since Germany was a “keystone of Continental economy.” The LA TIMES seemed to share MacKenzie’s view that the western Allies had been “striving for unity in order to speed the general program of recovery,” a situation which also hindered the possibility for the people of Eastern Germany “to reassert themselves and throw off the Muscovite yoke.”

After the Berlin blockade, even though it was “too late to wail about” the “great mistake” of setting up “a small western island 125 miles inside the Russian zone of occupation without a corridor of approach,” the newspaper pointed out that the Soviets could at any time shut off commerce between East and West. This would leave the West with “no means of applying pressure to force the Russians to recede,” and therefore the Soviets could at any time “resume with the squeeze” while the West could only resume “the flow of notes and official statements.” Despite the Soviet setbacks or temporary defeats the newspaper believed that “so long as the westerners did not control a corridor all the way to the Spree,” the Soviet Union retained “the whiphand” and “the next move.” Since the American and British governments had made it “abundantly clear” that they intended to stay in Berlin, the newspaper, believing that actions like reducing trade with the Soviet Union, closing the world's canals and water passages to Soviet ships would “hardly nick the Iron Curtain,” suggested that a convoy of tanks, armored cars, trucks, engineers and bulldozers should force a passage to Berlin under a covering air umbrella.” The newspaper did nevertheless acknowledge that such a tactic would run the risk of resuming World War II, “right where it left off three years ago.” Despite this radical approach and its criticism of the Democrats’ foreign policy that went back to the Roosevelt administration, the newspaper appeared sure that “responsible Republicans” would not attempt to “upset Secretary Marshall's applecart,” despite the intensification of bipartisanship in view of the upcoming elections.

1239 “The next move is the Kremlin’s,” Los Angeles Times, (1948, July 13), A4.
1241 “Bipartisanship seems to be here to stay,” Los Angeles Times, (1948, August 3), A4.
After the Soviets’ blockade of Berlin the Marshall Plan acquired a different meaning for the newspaper. According to Polyzoides, who had until that point questioned the large amounts of grants of the Marshall Plan, the plan was “apt to play a far larger role in European and world affairs than all the other forces competing for supremacy in the world scene.” He now felt the Marshall Plan proved that the US would not “stand for appeasement of anybody” and that it would “arm for peace.”1242 As long as the Soviets continued the Berlin blockade as “a means to coerce the western Allies,” the western Allies should work to make the Marshall Plan a complete success while maintaining the strength of their Berlin sectors in order to make the Soviets realize that they were “merely a part of the show and not the whole show.”1243 Putting Germany back on its feet was now also supported by this journalist, since the western powers had already invested a lot of money in it, “not only for her own sake, but also for the sake of Europe,” and because the success of the ERP depended on the success of the currency reform of western Germany.1244 Therefore, the operational cost of the Marshall Plan was not to “be considered too high,” and even though the prospects of a co-operation “in harmony” of the participating countries was “not very bright,” Polyzoides based his hopes on the assumption “that the thing would somehow work itself out.”1245 At the end of the year, and probably realizing that the Berlin blockade was no temporary situation, Polyzoides suggested that the western powers pull out of Berlin “proudly and with evidence of dignity.” However, his proposal of withdrawal completely differed from that of Lippmann’s, since his proposal of withdrawal was not intended to appease the East-West tensions. On the contrary, he stated that since basically there never existed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, he proposed the withdrawal of the western Ambassadors from Moscow, “leaving their Embassies in charge of minor officials for the transaction of routine business alone,” and declaring that the presence of the Soviet Ambassadors in Washington, London and Paris was “no longer desired.”1246

Like Polyzoides, Joseph and Stewart Alsop, were also in favor of a firmer US policy, mostly against the Soviet Union. They believed that the “fear of war, that was once widespread,” had “diminished almost to the vanishing point,” and so had the “equally widespread fear of another

appeasement.”  With regard to the question of whether the US should develop further its foreign and defense policy, the Alsops declared that, if the US was not going “forward on the foreign and defense fronts,” it went “automatically [...] backwards, losing ground disastrously.” Therefore, they called for the employment of “disinterested courage and simple patriotism” from Truman, qualities he possessed, “whatever his other defects.”  Realizing that the airlift could keep the population alive, but could not keep the city running, the *NY Times* nationally syndicated columnist James Reston pointed out the distinction between using “the air lift temporarily in order to achieve an east-west agreement” and using it “permanently in lieu of such an agreement.”  However the political economist and Republican-leaning Raymond Moley stated that the Berlin crisis was not solely a question of losing or saving face for the western powers, but a question of recognizing “the full potency” of their “bargaining power,” since the greatest part of the industrial power of the city was located in the western zones and their utilization could “play a major part in the final solution of the Berlin crisis.”  Nevertheless, not all journalists whose work was carried by the *LA Times* with this position, like Pulitzer Prize-winning, Edgar Ansel Mowrer, who had been the first American correspondent to have been kicked out of Nazi Germany, regarded the revival of Germany with great hesitation. Mowrer believed the Germans were “undependable allies of the west” and could easily partner up with the Soviets, in which case the political revival of Germany could cost the US its European allies who were still afraid of Germany. He also warned that the rebuilding of the Ruhr “as the powerhouse of Europe” could be used once more from the Germans to wage war and would “facilitate Soviet aggression.”

In terms of the *LA Times* readership, the letters to the editors published in *LA Times*, by and large considered the Marshall Plan “as a triumph of world responsibility.” The readers were split regarding the US participation in universal military training during peacetime.  While one

reader attacked the French attitude toward Germany and accused France of being “as much interested in a just peace as in obtaining as large a share as possible of the spoils of war,”\textsuperscript{1254} another reader was of the opinion that the German people were “subservient” and not interested in the American “ideas of personal liberty” and suggested one should “let Russia have Germany.”\textsuperscript{1255}

\textit{Los Angeles Times’} attitude toward the US foreign policy in 1948 needs to be contrasted between that before and that after the Berlin blockade. Both the syndicated political columnist Walter Lippmann and the other journalists writing for or carried by the newspaper before the Berlin crisis were more judgmental of the US foreign policy, the amount of money the ERP would require and the US notion of regarding Germany as a Western bulwark against communism. Nonetheless, after the Berlin crisis while Lippmann suggested US withdrawal from Europe and the return of the control of the continent to its people, the newspaper and the writers it hired were split. The newspaper elaborated much more on the menacing aspect of the Soviet decision, supported the US involvement and acknowledged the US benefit from Germany’s industrial power, while a few hired journalists regarded the revival of Germany with great hesitation.

\textit{The New York Times}

One could dare to say that \textit{The New York Times} of 1948 conducted both an anti-Communist and a pro-ERP campaign. The anti-Communist campaign fanatically and thoroughly detailed the methods the Soviets employed to manipulate the European people, to distort eastern European electoral results, and to sabotage their economic recovery with strikes. When the newspaper reported a development of either Communist propaganda or expansion attempts, it typically went out of its way also briefly to remind readers of all previous communist offensives in Europe and worldwide until that time, or emphasized that “not an hour passed without a hostile Soviet speech. Where violence was not used, “propaganda, incitement and infiltration” took its place. For the newspaper, “every economic discontent and injustice was exploited, every racial cleavage widened, every flame of social unrest fanned” by the Soviets. Furthermore, for \textit{The NYT} Communism had been quite successful so far, because it was like an infection which sought out

the “infected patches - destitution, bad race relations, injustice, hopelessness-” or which was able to “settle and ferment” where the Western policies had failed.\textsuperscript{1256}

Among the numerous examples of such criticism and outrage the newspaper expressed, several pertained to Germany. The newspaper reported the “long-forecast direct Communist attack on Germany's role” in the ERP through the incitement of strikes. It described the “most determined Communist onslaught against the Marshall plan” as intended to undercut the whole Military Government and to cripple German production, which was the “key to European recovery.”\textsuperscript{1257} The \textit{NY Times} wondered how the Americans could “look forward to the day” when Germany could have a central government, with which a peace treaty might be signed, as long as the Soviets hindered “political freedom by putting the Communists in their zone on top politically.”\textsuperscript{1258} Nonetheless, they did not try to make the Germans “forget their history, [or] neutralize [their] nationalism,” or divide, weaken and despoil their country, but they did try to exploit all of these against the West. Outside of Germany, Germany was used as a source of fear for Eastern Europeans in the Soviet game of “conveniently” installing Soviet troops “as liberators” in Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania and Hungary, and taking control of those countries without invading them. The Soviets were blamed for hindering the success of the ERP in France and Italy, and of expanding its European sphere of influence by expanding into Czechoslovakia.\textsuperscript{1259}

\textit{The NYT} was equally enthusiastic about its pro-ERP campaign. To prove the importance of the ERP for the security of the US and the wallet of the American taxpayers \textit{The NY Times} stated that the money invested in the 270,000,000 Europeans would “buy more protection” against “unpeaceful and undemocratic nations” than the “same amount invested in weapons of war,” and that Germany’s “steel, chemicals, railroads, highways, ships, transport airplanes, even fertilizer and agricultural machinery” would be needed to build the war potential of Western Europe.\textsuperscript{1260} \textit{The NY Times} waxed poetic about the worthwhile cost of the ERP, declaring that the ERP dollars would be “symbols” of the restoration of the “democratic faith” in Europe, but the newspaper

warned that the “acceptance of an ERP in principle and a subsequent refusal to back it up with sufficient money” would be more damaging than open opposition.\textsuperscript{1261}

The newspaper compared its vision of the ERP with that of “making war,” and stated that the US “fundamental moral attitude” was to “see the struggle through to a victorious conclusion, sparing nothing.”\textsuperscript{1262} It was a “promising effort to help Western Europe get on its feet,” instead of abandoning Europe to “revolution and to [the Soviet] ruthless subjection, which would demand even greater expenditures to arm the United States for self-defense in a hostile world.”\textsuperscript{1263} It was “an investment,” a “historic suggestion” made by Secretary Marshall, and “not a peacetime project, for the world was not at peace, but neither a war measure in the usual sense;”\textsuperscript{1264} rather it would allow the “flowering of freedom” in this century. The newspaper even claimed that the program was the “bulwark of Western power in Europe” and the proof that the US was “prepared to make sacrifices, endure shortages and take incalculable risks to meet political aggression not yet aimed directly” at it. It advised that only if the ERP was seen through Soviet eyes, could one understand what “a tremendous weapon”\textsuperscript{1265} it could be and warned that any “uncertainty” about the US continued support of the program “immediately increased the strains within the countries” the US was trying to “strengthen,”\textsuperscript{1266} since the task of resolving the Soviet-American relations was not a simple one, as Communism was “no cold economic doctrine; it was a kind of inverted religion, inflexibly and ruthlessly orthodox with clever and dangerously fanatic” leaders.\textsuperscript{1267}

Regarding Germany, \textit{The NY Times} warned that like Czechoslovakia, Germany was “astride the Iron Curtain,” and by “one quarter already on the far side.”\textsuperscript{1268} Therefore, the newspaper stressed the importance of getting France to work “happily and effectively in the Western European set-up,” where the Ruhr valley would be the “industrial heart of Europe.”

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1261} "ERP in the budget,” \textit{The New York Times}, (1948, January 30), 22.
  \item \textsuperscript{1262} Barbara Ward, “The idea that may mean a new freedom,” \textit{The New York Times}, (1948, February 15), SM7, 47, 48, 50.
  \item \textsuperscript{1263} “ERP or armament,” \textit{The New York Times}, (1948, January 16), 20.
  \item \textsuperscript{1264} Anne O’Hare McCormick, “Abroad. ERP is the greatest weapon in the political war,” \textit{The New York Times}, (1948, March 31), 24.
  \item \textsuperscript{1265} Barbara Ward, “The idea that may mean a new freedom,” \textit{The New York Times}, (1948, February 15), SM7, 47, 48, 50.
  \item \textsuperscript{1267} Lester Markel, “Europe --’Tomb or Treasure House’?” \textit{The New York Times}, (1948, September 19), SM7, 8, 67-71, 73.
\end{itemize}
NY Times supported the inclusion of western Germany in the ERP, stating that it had to be “one of the first concerns” of the Western powers, “for on the success of such an effort might depended their own survival.”

Including Germany into the ERP was considered both the “complex” and “crucial” part of the US job. This inclusion could be achieved while Germany was still being “impotent and under control of the occupying powers,” because it would be the “easiest way of striking a new balance and relieving the fears that haunted” its neighbors. Therefore, the report of the six-power conference on the organization of western Germany was “probably the most important document issued since the surrender” for the newspaper.

Even though the newspaper was initially reluctant toward a currency reform limited to the three western zones, which could have “grave political, economic and social consequences” leading to “a further intensification of the split” between the Western and Soviet zones, it supported the currency reform because the people were being paid in money that was “worth something,” and so the farmers were willing to sell their products for it, the manufacturers were willing to produce for it, the storekeepers were eager to sell for it and the “commercial and industrial life” of the country was “slowly beginning to revive.” The newspaper also understood the decision of returning the Ruhr industries to German ownership, and to appoint German trustees to administer these properties under continued Allied supervision. Even though it sympathized with French fears, it strongly believed that the “crippling of Germany” would mean the “crippling of all Europe.”

Despite the initial attitude of the newspaper toward the existing possibility of war with the Soviet Union, namely before the approval of the ERP, after the approval of the ERP the newspaper did not promote the idea of a war for either of the two sides, and so its articles always ended with the encouraging message that the ERP was not a war program, but “a means of avoiding a war,” and also that the West was not “lulled” by the Soviet tactics; on the contrary the US position was
that it had been on alert since it was much more “clever” than the East.\textsuperscript{1274} Despite the idea of an inevitable war with the Soviets the newspaper disapproved of the “far-fetched” idea of replacing Berlin as “the capital of a reunited Reich” with Frankfurt, since Berlin was a “testing ground” and its “fate” might well decide “the fate of Europe.”\textsuperscript{1275} The US had to lead her “crusade” with the “same kind of vigor and the same kind of conviction the Communists gave to theirs,” and “not let democracy go by default,” since Europe could be “a tomb or treasure-house.”\textsuperscript{1276} The ERP seemed to be the sound policy \textit{The NY Times} was calling for. It was still “young,” but “full of vigor” and “remarkably well staffed,” especially “considering the uncertainties of an election year;” it a “sound doctrine and spiritual strength, a sense of reality and a sense of perspective,” with modesty and tolerance.\textsuperscript{1277}

Even though the newspaper realized the risk that any accident involving the American planes participating in the air supply of Berlin during its blockade could turn into war, it did not believe in this possibility, since the Soviets had never “really shown any interest” in “interfering” with the American air lift. This was confirmed by the American pilots themselves, who declared that they had “never seen a Russian fighter or any other Soviet military activity.”\textsuperscript{1278} Nonetheless, by the end of the year, despite the success of the ERP in France and Italy, the newspaper suggested the creation of Western “interlocking defense pacts” conforming with the U.N.’s provisions, and a “permanent economic collaboration” either through the World Bank or the International Trade Organization to “underpin the new unity of the free world.”\textsuperscript{1279} At the end of the year \textit{The NY Times} reviewed the “outstanding trends and events” of 1948. It concluded that the events of 1948


\textsuperscript{1276} Lester Markel, “Europe --‘Tomb or Treasure House?’” \textit{The New York Times}, (1948, September 19), SM7, 8, 67-71, 73.


marked a “historic milestone,” which completely transitioned the US “from a nation steeped in isolation to a nation fully committed to a world role.”

*The NYT* hosted articles by experts who commented on the news beyond those articles by their own journalists. The articles, published in the summer of 1948, were extensive and did not follow the newspaper’s positive opinion toward the creation of a western German state. A Yale Professor, who had also served as wartime assistant to an Assistant Secretary of State, pointed out some pitfalls of US foreign policy, like for instance that the “first premise” of the US policy for Germany should be that Germany would be “strengthened economically,” but “weakened politically,” and instead of thinking of a unified Germany, to start thinking about a unified Europe which would “allow the historically separate German states to participate individually in the common affairs of the European Commonwealth.” Additionally, offering the German people hope for an “equal” and “prosperous participation in the affairs of Europe and the world,” the Soviet Union could not accuse the US of “seeking to use Germany as a buffer or a fighting cock against her.”

A member of the Office of Strategic Services, the predecessor to the CIA and by 1948 a member of the Office of Policy Coordination, a covert part of the new CIA Allen Welsh Dulles, stated that the hope of Europe and the success of the ERP laid in “creating a greater degree of economic, military and political unity among the states of Western Europe,” while at the same time following a “middle course,” since the US should “neither encourage great centralization not enforce artificial division in Germany.” In his opinion Western Europe could be secured against German military revival through the maintenance of international control of the Ruhr, and the assurance that Germany would “neither manufacture nor import any aircraft or aircraft engines of any nature whatsoever.”

Lastly, a historian and professor specializing in Soviet Studies and until 1947 US Embassy official in Moscow, Frederic C. Barghoorn, attempted to explain in *The NYT* what made the Soviets think the way they did. He described the Soviets as a people who lived “in spiritual schism with an all-powerful authority which governed them without consent or consultation.” Unlike the

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Americans, Barghoorn claimed the Soviets were a people with a “single-minded tendency to extremism in thought and feeling,” who responded “readily to severity and to patriotic appeals.” Individualism was “frowned upon” and the “subordination of the individual to the group” along with the reporting on the activities of their fellows were basic features of the Communist party. Furthermore, the Kremlin sought to “gain affection of its people by making them hate the West.” This was deemed necessary because the Western standard of living was the Soviet Union’s “Achilles’ heel;” was what the economic objectives of US foreign policy had been striving for since Byrnes’ speech in September 1946.1283

Almost all letters to The NYT editor published in the newspaper not only supported the US foreign policy, but stated their pleasure that the European people were “encouraged” by the Marshall Plan, which “defeated the Communist effort to paralyze” their economies and their governments.1284 For the readers the success of the ERP depended on its ability to “turn western Germany into a going concern in which forty million inhabitants [...] could live, prosper and exercise the rights and privileged of a sovereign nation.”1285 The success of the ERP would “demonstrate” that the Soviet Union “misread” the American “law of historical determinism,” and that the Soviet policy had “lamentably failed” in Europe.1286 Additionally, another reader referred to the necessity for monetary stability in Europe so that the ERP could succeed.1287 The editor and publisher of The Arizona Daily Star also declared that the US had to “exercise not merely its economic power,” but its “political power to restore western civilization in all of Western Europe, including Germany,” which had to be brought home as “part of the defense” of the US as well.1288

The newspaper also published multiple letters by The Society for the Prevention of World War III, which was founded toward the end of WWII in an attempt to prevent future German military aggression and to support denazification and the de-industrialization of Germany.1289

Society “endorsed the basic principles” of the ERP as they were “wholly admirable and corresponded to the real interests of the American people and their correct implementation” was of “fundamental importance,” but insisted that the Ruhr should be placed under international ownership and control, if a “stable and prosperous economy” was to be maintained in Europe.1290 The Secretary of the Society disapproved of the postponement of the dismantling program, as this would cause the recipient countries “serious concern” and would “give propaganda material to the critics” of the US1291 Lastly, the Society, not surprisingly given the basis of its mission, also stated that the “so-called reorganization of the Ruhr under German trusteeship, undermined the necessary safeguards against the revival of Germany's war-making power.”1292

The 1948 articles of The New York Times were a surprise. After following a middle-of-the-road policy and measuring the benefits and the disadvantage of the US policy toward Germany, the newspaper not only expressed its endorsement of the 1948 US foreign policy, but it was also very descriptive and emphatic about the ‘why’s’ to support the US foreign policy and ‘why not’s’ to trust anything regarding the Soviet Union. The foreign news correspondents’ articles, like those of Anne O'Hare McCormick, were quite combative and definitely revealed her feeling of bias against the Soviet Union. Furthermore, a considerable number of the articles were extensive and passionate. They often began by reviewing the Soviet instances of aggression thus far, went on applauding the US foreign policy attributing to it a sense of liberation, and ended with a new approach to the way it presented the news. The articles had intriguing titles and eye-catching, huge photos underneath them, while accompanied, most of the time, by a simple report. Through its articles in 1948 The NY Times, probably more successfully than any other press outlet under examination, made the American reader feel like a Western European. They invested in and built upon the Communist fear, while calling upon Americans’ patriotic duty toward democracy. “We are the focus of hope as Russia is the focus of fear.”1293

Throughout the year *The Wall Street Journal* was clearly on the attack when it came to the Soviet Union and the so-called Sovietization of Eastern Europe\(^{1294}\): first, by condemning the successful Soviet attempts to facilitate Communists gaining power in Central and Eastern European governments or blaming the Soviet Union for any social unrest in European countries, second, by interpreting the Soviet dismantling process in Eastern Germany as a way to force the Eastern zone into the Soviet orbit, and third, by comparing Stalin’s character and his behavior to that of Hitler.\(^{1295}\) It described the “visible evidence [of] violence [and] terror,”\(^{1296}\) claiming in Bulgaria that “terror, prison camps, slave labor, and torture were used to permanently establish a unanimity of opinion without which no dictatorship could hope to last.”\(^{1297}\) It described the “strangulation of free government in Czechoslovakia,”\(^{1298}\) alongside the nationalization of the Hungarian banks and industries.\(^{1299}\) The sudden dismantling of “the giant prewar chemical trust” and all former subsidiaries of IG Farben in the Soviet occupation zone was also interpreted by the newspaper as an attempt to “leave eastern Germany no alternative to Soviet absorption” or as a way to protect the Soviet Union in case Germany became a “theater of war.”\(^{1300}\)

In reminding readers that “socialism and communism looked to the same founders,”\(^{1301}\) it also endeavored a sociological comparison between Communism, Socialism and Americanism, according to which living in Communism meant living with low standard of living, isolated and away from the “free, honest, comparisons with conditions in other countries.”\(^{1302}\) Having a socialist future meant having a “drab and uninspiring” future for “tired and unambitious people who were willing to settle for an assured minimum of permanent poverty,”\(^{1303}\) while the capitalist

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Americans advocated the ideal of freedom in economics and politics, and enjoyed “the widest range of opportunity, the largest scope of educational facilities and the highest standard of living in the world.”

*The WSJ* saw evidence of Stalin’s relentless character in the way he “strangled his opposition,” or how he was nothing “if not thorough in getting rid of political rivals and individuals whom he suspected, rightly or wrongly, of disloyalty.” The newspaper even compared Stalin to Hitler, and found Stalin more dangerous since communism could win the support of the people more easily than Nazism, because in “theory it was opposed to race discrimination.” Lastly, the anti-Communist campaign of the newspaper went full force when it warned the American people to “take to heart for their own country the political lesson” that communism should be stopped “before, not after, it had entrenched itself in trade unions and government agencies,” and would need to proactive fight against the communist “network of open and semi-comparative agencies [which was the] continuous, unrelenting pressure of an aroused, informed, intelligent public opinion.” The newspaper made it seem like it was the patriotic duty of every American to back up the fight against Communism.

Regarding US foreign policy, *The WSJ* drew attention to Marshall’s own admission and “uncompromising honesty” that his plan had a clear political objective but “uncertain results,” the newspaper also commented that “interim aid without long-term commitment” would “best serve” his political objective. The newspaper feared that the “sure alternative” to the Marshall plan would be the “engulfment of western Europe in Russian communism,” warning that the “informal demarcation line” between the Soviet and non-Soviet parts of Europe was drawn after the Soviet refusal of the Marshall Plan. Yet, true to its commitment to free trade, it did not want the US to be dragged into a “foolish and shortsighted” attempt to “block any fair trade that might develop through cracks in the iron curtain,” which could be an “opening wedge for the ultimate economic reunion of Europe” once communism was contained.

Key to the success of the ERP was Germany, according to *The WSJ*. For the newspaper Germany had suffered from the agreements and disagreements between the US, Britain, France and the Soviet Union, yet had managed to “surmount the frustrations of a planned economy under the most discouraging” circumstances.\textsuperscript{1310} Therefore, if, on the one hand, the American purpose was “not to run or starve Germany, but […] to encourage the revival of its non-military industries there should be the freest possible hand for private enterprise,” and if Germany was to play a “significant role” in the European recovery the newspaper urged the Congress to give an “imperative mandate” to end not only the plant dismantling, but also “all restrictions on non-military German industry immediately.”\textsuperscript{1311} *The Wall Street Journal* emphasized this latter point throughout the year. If the interests of western Europe were not put above those of the individual nations neither Germany’s industrial potential nor the American resources would be effective.\textsuperscript{1312} The newspaper urged not only the permission for but also the encouragement of more “authority” and “responsibility” to the Germans, like the “vesting of full governmental authority, the complete unshackling of German industry and foreign trade, the end of do-gooder interference with internal phases of German life like education, and the stoppage of denazification.”\textsuperscript{1313} It called for the abandonment of the “unsound political decision, [the] autocratic controls [and] economic totalitarianism,” so that the control was “naturally exerted by a free market,” or else most of the money western Germany was scheduled to receive would be “wasted.”\textsuperscript{1314}

*The Wall Street Journal* begged for an end to the “schism between statesmanlike words and negative deeds” because now that the “myth of four-power government” was terminated, the western powers had to decide whether they would treat Germany as a “partner” or a “colony.”\textsuperscript{1315} The newspaper pushed to accompany economic aid with a strong “diplomatic pressure for closer union of the European countries outside the Soviet” orbit, and with a “constructive, intelligent policy of economic rehabilitation in the parts of Germany which were under western influence,”

as well as with an armaments program.\textsuperscript{1316} The newspaper drew the attention to the agreement among the great majority of Republicans and Democrats as to the objective of the US foreign policy, noting that non-partisanship would be an “immense asset in the American struggle to preserve peace, freedom and order in a troubled world.”\textsuperscript{1317}

Even though the newspaper had no “patience” with the “idea of a long-term commitment” regarding European aid, it urged Americans to support stopping the “march of communism to the Atlantic Ocean.”\textsuperscript{1318} The newspaper explained that there was no point in making a single week in US foreign policy a “be nice to Stalin week,” since the Soviet Union was not afraid of the “unreal specter of foreign legions marching against her in a Third World War,” but feared instead the infectious example of freedom and prosperity” for the Soviet people as “long as one free government” existed “anywhere in the world.”\textsuperscript{1319} The WSJ did not know whether the Cold War would turn into an “all-out shooting war,” but it did point out that no ostrich ever saved itself from danger by sticking its head in the sand. Indicative of its focus on the threat of Soviet communism the newspaper warned against every “shrill voice of pro-Soviet propaganda,” or of “irresponsible criticism” of the US policy as these voices would be regarded as an “invitation” by Stalin to “commit new acts of aggression in the confidence that America was so weakened by internal division that it would not act.”\textsuperscript{1320}

When the Soviet dragnet started to tighten around Berlin following the western currency reform, the newspaper warned its readers not to fall into the “illusion of believing that peace could be assured by […] the waving of the magic wand of some patented formula.”\textsuperscript{1321} Prompted by the Berlin Blockade the newspaper clearly advised the people against “slamming the door on all trading with Russia and her so-called satellite countries,” because to “embargo trade between eastern and western world would be to accomplish completely what currency and other controls


do partially.”1322 Even though the newspaper initially had doubts about the effectiveness of the airlift with regard to its ability to keep factories and power station running, the newspaper emphasized the important role and significance of the city, as a “big industrial city” and the “political center of modern Germany” and America’s “moral obligation to stand by the liberal and democratic Germans in Berlin.” It now even suggested the establishment of a German regime with full control over its foreign relations, trade and currency.1323

For The WSJ the Soviets were actually pushing for a war they did not want, so the newspaper favored the “breaking of the blockade” and the calling of the “Russian bluff,” since in case the blockade was no bluff then it was a matter that “had got to be faced sooner or later anyway.”1324 Furthermore, being of the opinion that the Berlin crisis was the result of the failed American policy, the newspaper urged the abandonment of “naivete” that characterized the old policies and instead the support of Germany’s free economy, and the “quickest possible scrapping of the whole apparatus of unwieldy, strangulating controls over German trade and non-military production.”1325 In particular, Stalin’s opposition to the unification of Germany's western zones proved to the newspaper that doing business with Soviet Russia was impossible unless the western powers were “prepared to make all the concessions.” Moreover, the newspaper favored the continuation of the economic and political “counterpressure,” which was reinforced by the US military might and by the lessons learned these three years of occupation and initially supported the idea of the “neutralization” of Germany after its unity.1326 In view of the possibility of the division of Germany the newspaper started to change its attitude and used hard language to

describe the future situation of two Germanies and to explain the role of western Germany as a “useful asset” in the “European equilibrium.” The newspaper directly asked whether the US desired a “lifeless puppet regime” in western Germany “of little use or value, existing only to carry out the orders of the military governments,” or a “genuinely self-governing” one, with its people “convinced that a western orientation” would offer them the “best chance of a brighter future.” If the US were to choose the latter, it had to “abandon policies in Germany” which were “economically self-defeating” and which reaped a “harvest of hatred that could give satisfaction only to the Kremlin.” Lastly, in view of the November presidential elections the newspaper did not support a change in the foreign policy as long as the policy could be “applied both consistently and wisely;” a statement that might also be interpreted as a preference toward Truman’s re-election.

Interestingly, The WSJ readers who appeared to criticize the ERP, were not genuinely against its philosophy as much as against the very poor information provided to them by the US administration or the use of the Communist fear and of the “usual clichés” about the preservation of freedom to justify it. They pleaded for the application of “common sense,” like the establishment of normal trade-and-pay operations, or a more controlled spending of the foreign aid program. On the other hand, a Wall Street Journal reader wondered why the administration did not turn over money to the Society of Friends to spend it “as they [saw] fit” to those in need in Europe, and why the dollars for the European rehabilitation were not in the form of loans, to which the governments would “contribute capital as stockholders” and which would raise “additional capital by the sale of bonds to the public,” while another reader called the attention positively to the CARE packages

for Germany. Even the most “anti-Truman and anti-Administration” WSJ readers approved of the idea of universal military training in the US, while other readers believed that that the punishment of the Germans had gone “far enough,” and that it was time to “leave the Germans [to] reform themselves,” and agreed with the defense of Berlin as it was of strategic importance.

The Wall Street Journal remained true to its beliefs. It treated the Soviet Union as a political threat, but not an economic enemy and continued to acknowledge the importance of trade between east and west. It did not approve of a long-term commitment regarding the European aid program and it endorsed and promoted the revision of the occupation policy, the abandonment of the dismantling process and the treatment of western Germany as an ally; the latter especially after the Berlin Blockade started to make the Soviet intention to expand into western Germany less and less seem like a bluff.

LIFE

LIFE magazine’s reports on Germany were scarce in 1948. LIFE’s communist-fear-mongering, however, continued with its effects apparent on a domestic level as well. According to the magazine “by and large” the anti-Communist laws, which either required union leaders to declare that they were not supporters of the Communist Party or required all members of the Communist Party of the United States to register with the United States Department of Justice, and the FBI’s hearings were “not (as the Communists called it) a ‘witch hunt’ but a partly bungled hunt for real enemies.”

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Furthermore, especially after the Berlin Blockade, *LIFE* reported on the escalating Communist attempts to take control of governments in Europe claiming that: in Greece the Left was backed by Soviet Communists, and that the Communists engaged in “an all-out effort to smash the Marshall aid program in France” through coal mine strikes. On the other hand, *LIFE* was truly impressed by the Soviet Union’s “truly amazing” industrial recovery from the “ravages of World War II,” its military power and build-up, and yet was anxiously expecting the Soviets to gain total control of all of Berlin by staging kidnappings and aiming “simultaneous blows at the police, the economy and the political administration.” *LIFE* explained why the Soviet Union made “every effort of propaganda and sabotage” to defeat the Marshall Plan, and “prolong Europe's chaos and misery,” with an attack on the Marxist ideology, on which *LIFE* felt the Soviet Union had built “her monstrous party dictatorship” and its “highly privileged class of party member.” *LIFE* contrasted the lives of powerful Soviet leaders with the “miserable conditions” of the Soviet people, including women working at jobs that most countries reserved for men, and camps that held prisoners and “slave workers” who were mistreated and deprived of “all sense of shame and dignity,” merely for their criticism of the Soviet government.

*LIFE* endorsed the Marshall Plan and celebrated the passage of the ERP bill as a “major victory scored by parliamentary democracy,” as there had “never [been] a piece of legislation so carefully prepared” and so “thoroughly sifted by so many brainy and conscientious men.” The magazine claimed the ERP gave hope to “the democratic world,” because all “over Western Europe there were stirrings and expressions by word and deed that the people were ready to oppose Communism.”

1337 Hubert Kay, “Karl Marx,” *LIFE*, (1948, October 18), 25(16), 63-75.
dominated countries painted black and the Marshall Plan countries painted white. The magazine noted that the “door to membership” was left open “possibly even to western Germany.” \textit{LIFE} emphasized that if the US wished to “secure” the economic objectives of the Marshall Plan, a “military Marshall Plan” was needed because “if Stalin found all doors locked he might kick one in.”\footnote{1341} \textit{LIFE} reiterated that “every great nation had to have a double foreign policy,” and the US double policy had to “be both to win the next war and to prevent it” with economic aid, otherwise the chances were that “some day” the US would have to “fight not to defend Western Europe but to liberate it.” In a lengthy article in late June \textit{LIFE} also provided proof that Marshall Plan money was not being poured “into a hole totally surrounded by somnolent mice.” Despite the fact that conditions in Europe had visibly improved: the European harvest in 1948 had reached a general average of 85\% compared to the 63\% it had reached the first postwar year, the recovery of the French railroad transport was “well ahead of its 1938 pace,” in many small Italian villages of the North “buildings were going up, [the] railroad were running, there was more food, and the trade was brisk,” the general standard of living was “well below” prewar levels. Nonetheless, the magazine pointed out that the Americans needed “not despair,” as the people who had “done so much amid so much ruin and so many difficulties,” might with US aid be able to do far more.\footnote{1342} \textit{LIFE} celebrated Italian elections rejecting “an all-out Communist bid for power,”\footnote{1343} including the Italian Socialist party rejecting an alliance with the Communists, Tito’s denunciation as a “revisionist, nationalist, [and] megalomaniac,”\footnote{1344} Finland’s resistance against Communism,\footnote{1345} along with the firm US standing in Berlin as “great news, of overwhelming import to the free world.” \textit{LIFE}, warned, however, that such news should not “lull [the US] into a false sense of victory” and to be on the safe side US “statecraft should assume that the battle for the soul of Europe would continue for a generation.”\footnote{1346} The Berlin siege led a \textit{LIFE} correspondent

\footnote{1341} “The foreign policy crisis,” \textit{LIFE}, (1948, March 22), 24(12), 38. See also: “Will there be war?” \textit{LIFE}, (1948, March 29), 24(13), 36-39.\
\footnote{1342} “Western Europe wears a new look,” \textit{LIFE}, (1948, June 28), 24(26), 25-33.\
\footnote{1343} “An aroused Italy chooses freedom,” \textit{LIFE}, (1948, May 3), 24(18), 36-38. The Italian elections were influenced by US aid secretly being given to the Italian parties that cut their ties with Communist coalition partners and by paying for massive propaganda. Marshall Plan money and a successful US cooperation with the government of Alcide De Gasperi and the Vatican made the Italian people face the dilemma of “democracy or totalitarianism, [...] abundance or starvation.” As cited by James E. Miller, “Taking Off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948,” \textit{Diplomatic History}, (1983, Winter), 7(1), 35–55.\
\footnote{1344} “Three weeks in Tito’s Yugoslavia,” \textit{LIFE}, (1948, July 12), 25(2), 24-31.\
\footnote{1345} “The Finns resist,” \textit{LIFE}, (1948, June 7), 24(23), 33-37.\
\footnote{1346} “Good news from Europe,” \textit{LIFE}, (1948, July 12), 25(2), 32.
to remind the magazine’s readership of the binding moral commitment of the West, which started its “bloody road from the Normandy beaches, over the Rhine and the Elbe,” and ended in Berlin. Despite the fact that the “stamina of free men” was tested in Europe, Berlin was unique, because there the “moral claim of the West in World War II was passing its ordeal by fire.” Therefore, the surrender of Berlin would be much more than the “humiliation of retreat;” it would be a “confession” that in July 1945 the West had not really had the “dignity and moral” purpose it boasted of but simply just the military power.\footnote{Emmet Hughes, “Berlin under siege,” \textit{LIFE}, (1948, July 19), 25(3), 26-27, 72-80.}

\textit{LIFE} believed ardently in the direction taken by US foreign policy in 1948 and told its readership that Europe and the American statesmen had to “fully appreciate,” that “the US course was set, beyond the power of any party or president or Congress to alter it gravely or for long.”\footnote{“Western union,” \textit{LIFE}, (1948, August 2), 25(5), 18.} The magazine believed that no election year should soften the American position against Communism and demonstrated this by playing up the initiative of a Berliner from the British sector clambering up Berlin’s Brandenburg Gate and taking down the Soviet flag as a sign of the importance of the continuation of US foreign policy. For \textit{LIFE} that was an action in response to “Soviet provocation,” which not only “represented all the forces of freedom, of fear, of guilt which troubled mankind in 1948,” but also the expectation of Berliners that the “Western powers would protect them.”\footnote{“The “little man” turns on the Reds,” \textit{LIFE}, (1948, September 20), 25(12), 35-38.} Furthermore the magazine warned of the “danger of being too afraid of possible war” and that any further retreat would “deliver the fainthearted in Europe into the hands of the enemies of mankind.”\footnote{Reinhold Niebuhr, “For peace, we must risk war,” \textit{LIFE}, (1948, September 20), 25(12), 38-39.} Therefore, the “national morality and strategic shrewdness” of the US should be harnessed to “save mankind from another holocaust.”\footnote{“A moral case for the West,” \textit{LIFE}, (1948, September 27), 25(13), 36.} The magazine’s promotion of fears of Communist expansion had evolved to evoking the need to be prepared for war. Despite, \textit{LIFE}’s declarations in the midst of the airlift that the US had not sent the 75 swift jet fighters to the Rhine to make war, its publication of photographs of the “mass formation” of the airplanes, as well as of the interviews of the “excited” and “eager” US ex-combat pilots who were more than qualified to respond to an “enemy” attack “bound to outnumber them” created a contradictory feeling to the reader.\footnote{“Jets over Germany,” \textit{LIFE}, (1948, October 11), 25(15), 101-105.}
LIFE’s reports on the German situation and German life were limited and mostly referred to the political state of mind of the German people. Nonetheless, not through words, but as LIFE knew best, through photographs. In particular, the German standard of living could be understood from a photo depicting an “irate German housewife” in Berlin heaving eggs “one by one at dismayed” peddler’s “head in protest against high cost of food.”\textsuperscript{1353} Regarding the German state of mind, according to LIFE’s reports, one could say that the situation was not that encouraging. The weekly magazine Weekend run by the US army’s The Stars and Stripes in the US occupation zone of Germany published an issue with Hitler’s face on its cover aiming at showing that Hitler’s impact on Germany was “still so powerful that even his ghost could be expected to evoke interest among Germans for some time to come” -at a time when the American Military Government had forbidden the hanging of Hitler’s pictures in German homes- and wondered whether Hitler was still alive. The responses of the German people were published by LIFE. Some were thrilled to see again such a “familiar sight” and declared to the editor that he made a “grave mistake” by making them think that Hitler was still alive, others who did read the English text found it a “rehash of previous versions of the last days of Hitler,” and those who could not read the article at all only checked the photos and especially those of the undressed Eva Braun, while German Communists regarded it as a “campaign to revive the Nazi spirit.” LIFE also reported that a newsstand on one of Frankfurt’s main roads sold 50 copies in less than 20 minutes, and 100 copies were sold within half an hour from a second distributor. In tiny Berchtesgarden, the site of Hitler’s second seat of government and his planned refuge of last resort, 200 copies were sold, and in Munich, the so-called capital of the Nazi movement, 3,000 copies went like hot cakes.\textsuperscript{1354}

Furthermore, the story of a “hard, cold, arrogant [and] cocky” young German man, who was “brought up under the rule of Hitler” and was at the moment hosted by an American family, was published in LIFE next to the photo of an American boy receiving his father's medals and casket wrapped in an American flag.\textsuperscript{1355} The magazine did not comment in words on these two provocatively contrasting images, letting them speak for themselves. LIFE reminded readers of the continued arrogance and lack of reeducation of young Germans tainted by being raised under

\textsuperscript{1353} LIFE, (1948, September 27), 25(13), 37.
\textsuperscript{1354} David Richardson, “LIFE’s reports. The Führer's face,” LIFE, (1948, October 18), 24(16), 7-10.
\textsuperscript{1355} “People. Attempt at Americanization of a Nazi ends in failure,” LIFE, (1948, October 25), 25(17), 53-54.
Hitler and the Nazis while recalling the losses American youth of the same age had suffered at the hands of Nazi Germans, inviting its readership to draw its own conclusions.

A majority of the readers’ responses to LIFE’s article about this young German man who grew up under the Nazi regime and his peculiar aloofness and arrogant attitude displayed while with his American foster family, supported the boy, assuming he needed some time to adjust, even though there were a few letter writers who believed that “once a Nazi always a Nazi.”

Regarding the Berlin air lift the majority of the LIFE readers whose letters were published supported it, seeing it as their moral obligation to preserve democracy and freedom, while another reader characterized it as the “greatest demonstration of Christian democracy the people of the world had ever seen.”

LIFE magazine continued the fear spreading posture of the previous year. In fact, this year the magazine dedicated the biggest part of its issues to its anti-communist campaign and called for Americans not only not to back down but to be prepared to go to war, and not let the Soviets take over Berlin, and then Germany. The articles on Germany were very limited. Nonetheless, they did not paint an optimistic picture for the country as they expressed the German aggression or the revival of Nazism. In view of the upcoming elections the magazine made clear its support of the US foreign policy of the Truman administration, emphasizing the importance of maintaining this foreign policy, regardless of the electoral result.

TIME

The year 1948 started for TIME with its selection of George Marshall, as TIME’s ‘Man of the Year,’ the man who “offered hope to those who desperately needed it,” and a flattering article on his career until he reached the State Department. TIME chose Marshall as its 1948 ‘Man of the Year’ because of his “integrity” and “dignity” as a “big soldier-diplomat” and his “firm, courteous, patient, persuasive” and determined presentation of his plan to the Congress – “by far

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the most important single measure before the Congress”-, which the magazine also believed to be “the ark, built to rescue Europe from catastrophe.”

Germany was acknowledged by the magazine in 1948 as the “most important area in the conflict between the West and Russia.” According to TIME in Germany the need for “the new economic plan was underlined” by the hungry Ruhr workers who began a series of food strikes. Yet TIME claimed the strikes were neither anti-American, nor did they mean that the Americans were losing the Cold War, but through them the demonstrators requested unity and food, as “nobody was that cracked” to want the Americans to leave. Furthermore, in March TIME attributed the recent fall of Czechoslovakia to the Soviets to the failure of the “performance” of the “unimaginative” and “uncertain” US “leadership in world affairs,” and to Washington’s “little sense of urgency.” The magazine also laid out three future options for the US in ten years accompanied by a half-page photo of a crowding of pro-Communists in Rome. Option number one was a “divided, stunned and defeated” US trying to “adjust itself to a Communist-rulled world,” option number two was a “weary, mangled and victorious” US trying to “salvage what it could from the radioactive wreckage of the world,” and option number three was a “busy, peaceful US helping to push forward the frontiers of freedom everywhere in the world.” In order to make the second option more likely than the first, and the third more likely than the second, the magazine drew the attention to the stamping out of the faith of millions in Europe and Asia who were waiting for the Americans to save them from Communism. The magazine quite openly implied that the US could either save the world through money or through the launching of a nuclear war against communism, which was in a position to win. TIME concluded that if Hitler was stopped “in 1933, in 1936, perhaps even in 1938” there would have been no World War II. Therefore, if the US and its friends wanted, they had the power to stop World War III.

In the magazine’s description of Soviet tactics in Europe one could recognize even more easily TIME’s anti-Communist inclination. TIME commented on the latest French initiative of the

Communist Party to “entice not only the proletariat, but white-collar workers, small businessmen and anyone else gullible enough to fall for Communism’s pseudo-democratic propaganda.”

In February TIME even put Karl Marx on its cover looking like the devil with red eyes and a cauldron in front of him steaming up the hammer and sickle. Even though the majority of Communist actions in countries, which were under Soviet pressure, were reported by the magazine in a more simple way than they were by LIFE one could not help but be overwhelmed by the specter of the communist threat. TIME also published a photo of the huge sign in eastern Berlin reading “Attention! You are now entering the American sector. American democracy rules there. But no power in the world can forbid you to sign. Don't be robbed of your fundamental democratic rights. Sign up here.” under which the Soviets run their “full-blast propaganda campaign” for collecting signatures on a petition against a western Germany and for “an ‘all-German unity’ government.” Without using a harsh tone, the magazine did cultivate an environment of fear. The magazine also listed the “battlefields of peace” which the Soviet Union had gained or was about to gain control of, while “anti-Communist powers sat back waiting for the next Communist move.”

Despite the fact that the administration had not defined -or reached- the point at which the US would have to use force against the Soviet Union, it seemed as if the magazine wanted to imply that an economic aid program alone would not be enough, and it stated in March, following the Communist takeover of key cabinet posts in Czechoslovakia, that spelled the demise of democracy there, that the Soviet Union had not only proclaimed its “intention to rule the world” but also since the end of World War II its Communist power had “grown faster than any rise in Hitler's power between 1933 and 1939.”

As the Soviets started to increase transportation controls around the western sectors of Berlin, the magazine’s tone vacillated a few times. On the one hand, TIME characterized the battle for Berlin as the “most extreme case to date of face-making and nose-thumbing among the nations,” and named a military corollary to the Marshall Plan the “next great pillar in the slowly

1365 TIME, (1948, February 23), 51(8), cover.
building structure of US postwar foreign policy."1370 In contrast to LIFE, TIME did not believe that the “chance of war had increased” or that the Kremlin could “get what it wanted by war,” and expressed its faith toward the military governor of the US Zone, General Clay. Clay was also hosted on its cover standing determined in front of the shadow of a bear on a red background.1371 TIME was convinced that Clay was able to lead the “crucial battle” for Berlin, which was being fought in the “hearts and minds” of 2.5 million Berliners, whom the Soviets were attempting to “starve into submission.”1372 Furthermore, the anti-Communist rally in Berlin and the “snatching” of the Soviet flag from on top of the Brandenburg Gate could not be simply reported by TIME, as in the past 100 years there was “no such show of popular force.” The Berliners’ “unifying purpose” was “freedom” from the “Red tyranny,” and according to the magazine, the “weight and voice of the German masses” proved that there was “enough mass power in Berlin throng to change the fate of Europe.”1373 Despite the Berlin crisis and the question of whether this crisis would be expanded, for the magazine it was “certain” that the US did not want war and “probable” that the Soviet Union did not want war, but also “highly probable” that the US would fight “against a Russian military advance almost anywhere, including Berlin,” beyond the agreed-upon “Soviet-controlled area.”1374

TIME, like LIFE, also employed the power of images and photos. One of the most striking images was a map depicting the crystallization of the Cold War, the former Soviet borders and its expansion into the Soviet satellites, the “Western Union” (Britain and France), and the “no man's land”1375 (Greece, Turkey, Italy, Germany, Portugal, the Scandinavian countries). There was also an image of Stalin sitting at his desk, asking Molotov, who was next to him pointing at a spinning globe, “who's next to be liberated from freedom?”.1376 Then there was an image of Stalin holding his script of Soviet policy of deliberate provocation, and Hitler bending over his shoulder and telling him ‘I, too, believed democracy was decadent.’1377 Finally there was a photograph of a

1371 TIME, (1948, July 12), 51(2), cover.
1374 “How close is war?” TIME, (1948, October 4), 52(14), 28-29.
German lighting his pipe with a 50-mark note, before the currency reform in western Germany made a more intense impression.1378

On another account, throughout the year *TIME* continued to publish on the war crime trials and to report the behavior of the Nazi defendants. Regarding the punishment of the German industrialist Friedrich Flick, the magazine simply stated that his sentence might have been “stiffer if Flick and associates had not risked trouble with the Nazis by feeding, housing and clothing their slave laborers better than the law decreed.”1379

No reader’s letter about Germany was published by *TIME*. The letters published mostly referred to the Marshall Plan. A reader agreed that the US confirmed the faith of the peoples of Europe and Asia who counted on its protection from Communism. Another warned of the possibility of a war by comparing the “easiness” with which Hitler had marched into Czechoslovakia to that of Stalin’s march into the country. While a *TIME* Western European reader stated that if Western Europe was “lucky enough to remain free and keep her rights to think and speak,” it would be in “great part owing to George Marshall.”1380 The *TIME* readers were split regarding mandatory universal male military training.1381 Some regarded it as necessary for their safety and would not “begrudge” a year of their life to their country, others believed that money should be spent for education and not military training. Furthermore, a reader suggested the formation of an American Foreign Legion consisting of European mercenaries, mostly D.P.s, an idea which most readers endorsed, while a few others found it insulting to peoples who had already fought for their freedom without any materialistic reward.1382

Neither the US foreign policy nor the developments in Germany, and specifically in Berlin, were addressed as thoroughly as one would have expected by the magazine. However, Germany was not simply dismissed by the magazine. On the contrary, Germany was a means to an end and

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not the end in itself anymore. It was the geo-political bulwark against communist expansion and this was slowly but surely making the country a western extension. On the other hand whether the magazine was trying to prove also something else with its intense anti-communist posture due to the involvement of its senior editor, Whittaker Chambers, a former Communist and spy for the Soviet Union, in providing testimony to the House Un-American Activities Committee hearings against the former State Department official Alger Hiss, whom he accused of being a Communist and spy, cannot be speculated. In any event, Chambers resigned from TIME by the end of the year, and dedicated himself even more ardently to anti-communist conservatism in his writings after leaving TIME.

Commentary

The breakdown of the London conference in November/December 1947, when the Foreign Ministers of the US, Britain, France and the Soviet Union did not manage to reach a settlement for a peace treaty with Germany, was the first reference to the German question for Commentary in 1948. The failure of the conference did not surprise the magazine since struggles between the Soviet Union and the Western powers had existed in the meetings of Joseph Stalin, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill at Teheran in 1943 and Yalta in 1945 as well but it had been “officially ignored or obscured by an agreement to postpone the consideration of all questions on which an immediate decision was not essential.” In the meantime, their differences persisted and became sharper instead of disappearing until they built up to their climax: the Soviet refusal to attend the conference on the Marshall Plan. Commentary felt this proved that the Soviets “were neither in search of mediators nor in a mood for compromise,” but that they had come to “present ultimatums, not to negotiate claims,” and to insist on the acceptance of their “own interpretation of the ambiguities of Yalta and Potsdam,” without defining their demands. Furthermore, the magazine claimed that Moscow was trying to pull the US out of the European continent, since it was clear that Europe's economy could be restored in time and that the Marshall Plan could, in the long run, save Europe for democracy. The Soviet attempt to sabotage this was meticulously carried out by the “Communist press and blossomed organizationally” through the “riots” and “political strikes.”

Commentary also recognized that the “rehabilitation of Western Germany [was] vital” to the success of the European economic recovery plan, especially after the failure of the London conference to facilitate the unification of Germany and “in the face of Russia's political and economic offensive.” Additionally, Commentary did not seem to oppose the American policy itself of transforming Germany from a “defeated enemy into the guardian of America's European front line” whether in a cold war or in an actual war that had not yet begun. The magazine’s concerns about the Communist threat led it to accept the “paradoxes” inherent official policy of entrusting the former enemy with protecting US and western Europe’s interests. On the one hand, “the creation of a Western European bloc, and of [a] West German state to be included in the ERP,” and on the other hand, the multiple examples of “Jew-baiting,” which extended from the anti-semitic behavior of the German people to “high state and bi-zonal officials,” raised the issue of the US “humanitarian duty” to protect the so-called “remnant’ of survivors of the Jewish population from Germany's “bestial hatred of Jews” and relocate them either in the newly-created state of Israel or in the US.\(^\text{1384}\)

With regard to the Berlin Blockade the magazine did not see it being the role of the US to prevent Soviet expansion into all of Berlin at the risk of war. According to Commentary, “if the Soviet Union was determined to dominate Europe at the cost of war,” the US could not “preserve the peace except at a price which its people clearly would not accept.” On the other hand, if the Soviet Union “was intent on peace, no American government would seek war,” and therefore the magazine was of the opinion that a “minor ‘incident’” would be regarded as a “casus belli,” only in the event that “the Russian leaders had made up their minds to fight.”\(^\text{1385}\) Further articles on the Berlin Blockade reported its progress and the damage it had inflicted on the “even convinced Communists,” as well as the extensive, negative impact to the Communist-oriented “ideological war” in Europe.\(^\text{1386}\)

The Commentary predominantly Jewish readership referred only to the magazine's article by Samuel Gringauz, who emigrated to the USA in 1948 and worked for the Jewish Restitution

\(^\text{1384}\) Samuel Gringauz, “Our new German policy and the DP's,” *Commentary*, (1948, June), 5(6), 508-514.


Successor Organization, an organization founded to restitute the heirless property that were racially expropriated as “Jewish,” on the German “bestial hatred” for the Jews. A reader believed that “breathed a hatred and bitterness” were “easily understandable,” but played “havoc with the writer's attempt to give an objective picture of the German situation.” Other readers described very different positive experiences of a “number of Jewish service men” in Germany. Gringauz replied explaining that his opinion was not about all the Germans, but provided further examples of “endemic, predominant anti-Semitic tendencies in the great majority of the German population.”

*Commentary* supported the rehabilitation of western Germany, especially after Moscow had made perfectly clear that she did not wish to cooperate with the western powers. Nonetheless, the magazine was not worried about the possibility of a war, as it was in no one’s interest. The readers of the magazine, on the other hand, focused more on condemning the magazine’s article focused on German hate against Jews, again refuting the presumption of German collective guilt.

*The Nation*

Despite the “grimly and gravely wrong things” that *The Nation* felt the Soviet Union had done, *The Nation* found “no evidence to suggest that Russia wanted war.” On the contrary, the magazine believed that Soviet “leaders were afraid of war,” and therefore, “given patience and understanding,” the newspaper saw “no reason why accommodation with Russia was not feasible.” Furthermore, the newspaper accused the critics of this approach of being “enemies of the human race” and of setting the “stage for a third world war” and believed that “within the framework of the dictatorship lied the purpose of building in Russia a democratic way of life.” Therefore, the US could “dissipate [the] dark clouds” of the Soviet sense of “insecurity on the international plane [with] common understanding.” *The Nation* promoted the idea of understanding the Soviet side and using this as the basis of cooperating with it, but it was obvious that this approach was influenced more by the newspaper’s social democratic orientation than by a purely humanitarian way of thinking. The newspaper believed in the creation of a “Socialist Third Force,” which would, it thought, be supported by Britain and France, both of which had social democratic Labour or

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Left-centrist-coalition governments at the time, in order to “save Europe from the deadly interaction of the Truman and the Molotov doctrines, [and in the] internationalization of Western German industry and its integration into a planned Western European economy.” Additionally, the newspaper emphasized, to those who opposed the program and condemned Western Europe to “economic and political disaster,” the importance of the Marshall Plan for the American economy. The “spurt in business investment” and the “mounting export balance” which would accompany the ERP, should keep business “active and prosperous” for a considerable period of time. The newspaper revealed that the ERP could “prevent still larger military appropriations,” would “encourage American trade,” would make “no additional demands on the domestic food supply,” and would “increase national prosperity.”

Even though the magazine applauded “the historic bill approving the ERP,” as the urgency of ERP was “apparent,” it personally attacked Truman and the way he addressed the ERP to the Congress. The magazine found his attitude “inept and needlessly provocative,” and the US foreign policy “corrupted from the start by its dependence on force and its alliance with reaction.” The magazine believed in a “democratic Europe united in social and economic planning, backed by American dollars and good-will, [but also in] an honest attempt to use the US to break down hostility and reach agreement with Russia.” The magazine attempted to prove that the US administration had the opposite intention by mentioning the publication of the ‘Nazi-Soviet Relation’ by the State Department, whose purpose was, according to the newspaper, to “build up fear and hatred of the USS.R.” Therefore, the newspaper advised “circumspection” towards

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1394 In 1945 the archives of the German Foreign Office were captured by the American and British armies and “it became evident that the documents concerning the aims and methods of German foreign policy should be published for the enlightenment of world opinion.” As such, in June 1946 the US and Britain sponsored the publication of documents of German foreign policy between 1918 and 1945. The Department of State decided to publish separately the most significant documents bearing on German-Soviet relations during 1939-1941 revealing the political relations between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union from their efforts to reach an agreement in the spring of 1939 to the failure of these efforts and the outbreak of war in June 1941; As cited by Raymond James Sontag, James Stuart Beddie (eds.) Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941, Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office, Department of State, 1948, (Publication 3023).
such documents in order to be on guard against a “propaganda campaign designed to drag” the American people “closer to a third world war.” Besides, as the newspaper reported, the “German desire for national unity had never been stronger;” the Germans of the eastern zone were more afraid of a “divided Germany” than anything else as well.\footnote{331} Even the “politically mature” were convinced that “without economic unity, backed by political unity, there was no hope of German revival,” but they still preferred to leave the problem of Germany “in suspense” until the Soviets and the Americans could agree. It was up to Western Europe to decide whether the ERP would become “a new pre-war lend-lease,” and Western Europe an “air base for America or an industrial colony of the Soviet Union.”\footnote{1396} Since the ERP would not solely be an aid program for Western Europe, but a boost for the American economy as well, the newspaper stated its certainty that a bill would be passed which would provide military aid to Western Europe, setting “in motion an armament economy” not on the ground of “waging or supporting a war already in progress -as was the case in both the first and second world wars- but as a means of preventing a war that was at that moment only threatened or feared.”\footnote{1397}

Prompted by the Berlin Blockade, the newspaper expressed the foreseeability of such an action by recalling the city's importance for the Soviets even before the war ended and the agony they went through to invade Berlin before the other Allies. Berlin was the symbol of the Soviet propaganda for a “rapid progress of communism.”\footnote{1398} Furthermore, in 1948, after the two failed conferences of the previous year, the Soviets “made no secret of their view that the presence of the Western Allies in Berlin was ‘no longer justified by anything’.” Therefore, the Berlin Blockade was a retaliation to a western decision; namely the “devaluation of the Western German currency” and its substitution with new currency, a new currency which aggravated the economic problems of the Soviet zone and sector of Berlin. Nonetheless, the newspaper did not believe that this situation could be grievous enough to lead to war, as “blockades and embargoes” deprive the “states behind the iron curtain of needed machinery and markets for their output,” and in turn “economic revival.” At the same time, the “German coal and other production was reviving under the stimulus of the new currency and marking an improvement in the states of Western Europe.”\footnote{1399}

\footnote{331}{del Vayo, “Report on Germany,” \textit{The Nation}, (1948, January 31), 166(5), 129.}
\footnote{1396}{Freda Kirchwey, “E.R.P. and war?” \textit{The Nation}, (1948, April 10), 166(15), 385-386.}
\footnote{1397}{Fritz Sternberg, “Our new armament economy,” \textit{The Nation}, (1948, May 1), 166(18), 467-468.}
\footnote{1398}{Alexander Werth, “The Russians and Berlin,” \textit{The Nation}, (1948, July 10), 167(2), 37.}
\footnote{1400}{“The stakes at Moscow,” \textit{The Nation}, (1948, August 28), 167(9), 221.}
Therefore, the newspaper suggested that the western powers demonstrated their “determination to hold their ground without asking steps that would make conflict inevitable,” until the Soviet government would become convinced that it was either compromise or war.1401

The Marshall Plan for Western Europe and the Marshall Plan for western Germany constituted an indivisible unit, because the “catastrophic state” of German economy would be a “retarding factor in Western Europe's struggle for economic independence.”1402 If Europe was to overcome its stalemate, it needed Germany, and if western Germany was to exist, it needed Europe. Nonetheless, the magazine believed that if Western Europe and Germany were to survive as an “independent third force in a time of sharpening conflict” between the US and the Soviet Union, the US had to realize that their rebuilding “on a basis of private capitalism” was impossible as the foundation of a type capitalism in the country and the continent that were “demolished” many years ago. At the moment the only viable “socio-economic system,” according to the newspaper, was the “socialist reorganization of Germany's economy in the framework of an integrated Europe.” Furthermore, the Berlin crisis had brought also a crisis to the Marshall Plan as well, since it “rested heavily on the assumption that something like the pre-war trade between Eastern and Western Europe could be renewed.” Nonetheless, a western war economy would “weld Europe and the US together with scarcely a seam,” as an inflation in the US could be avoided only if military expenditures were “sharply increased.”1403 Lastly, the “Berlin deadlock with all its hazards” had been “useful” because it had “shown the limits beyond which aggressive threats and political stubbornness dared not go.”1404

Last but not least was the issue of the elimination of Nazism, to which the press outlets in the passage of time paid even less attention. The Nation's European editor, had the chance to acquire “a first-hand picture” of the German feelings about the Western Union, and realized that despite the different opinions, one German feeling was “unanimous:” that “western Germany” was “coming back fast.” To this observation the editor attributed a nightmare, since “the notion of guilt was as alien to the average German as the idea that the US might one day go fascist was to most

1401 “The chips are down,” The Nation, (1948, September 25), 167(13), 332-333.
1404 “Prerequisites for peace,” The Nation, (1948, October 30), 167(18), 480.
Americans.” Furthermore, The Nation was the only press outlet intensively objecting to the way the trials of the industrialists were handled. The newspaper reported that the judges sitting in the case of the German industrialists who collaborated with the Nazis were appointed by “executive order of the President,” that the name of the person who recommended them was classified information, and that the industrial giant, IG Farben continued to exist, “in shadow form,” while “being managed by a former subordinate” of the 23 men on trial. Even if the magazine could “dismiss all these suspicious circumstances as accident or coincidence,” it was no accident that the industrialists on trial “were on intimate terms in pre-war years with some of America’s foremost industrialists and also with various public officials, Senators, and Representatives.” The “appalling ruling” of absolving the IG Farben officials of the “charge of plotting war,” let alone of war crimes, was regarded by the newspaper as a failure of the court’s “duty to render justice, strengthen the international law, and destroy the seeds of future wars.”

The majority of the few letters to the editor published by the newspaper focused on the war trials. Specifically, a Nation reader was furious with the seven-year-retroactive-to-his-date-of-imprisonment sentence of the industrialist Friedrich Flick, urged that the American people did not “remain silent,” and requested that the “same standards used in judging the leading Nazi politicians who were hanged at Nurnberg be applied in the same manner in the trials of their collaborators.” To the request for harsher punishment of the industrialists and for the changing of a sentence that was already passed down, a Jewish refugee in the US replied that such an action would be “in harmony with the custom of some Soviet-dominated courts -where the penalty had been affixed before the sham trial”- and not with the American law, let alone with the US efforts to “educate the German people in the ways of democracy.” Lastly, a Nation reader requested a declaration of US policy that would clear the air by affirming certain basic motivations in the light of which particular acts could be tested and interpreted, instead of the usual clichés and useless and ambiguous phrases such as “the preservation of freedom.”

1407 Howard Watson Ambruster, “They cheated the gallows,” The Nation, (1948, August 14), 167(7), 176-178.
1409 “Letters to the editors. Law is law,” The Nation, (1948, March 13), 166(11), 315-316.
The Nation did not support the anti-Communist campaign of the administration. On the contrary, the newspaper promoted an attempt from the American side to cooperate with the Soviet Union, and endorsed the ERP objective that included the East-West trade. In reference to the German people, the magazine welcomed the German preference to be under Western occupation rather than Communist, but criticized the relaxation of the de-Nazification process and the narrowing of who was held accountable in war crime trials. The Nation readers were also concerned with the industrialists’ war crime trials, which they regarded as serious as the Nuremberg trials, and urged the democratic re-education of the German people.

Human Events

It was “obvious” to Human Events that the failure of the London conference of the previous year on the settlement of a German peace treaty “intensified the miseries, the psychological suffering and the growing hopelessness of the German people.” In the view of this, Secretary of State George Marshall “gave no encouragement to the suffering and half-fed Germans [...] to hold out, or to believe that the state of war in which they were still kept would be terminated.” The newspaper expressed its strong sympathy for the Germans in how it reported that the Germans could not receive airmails or money from abroad and as a result they could not purchase foreign books, magazines or newspapers. This lack of materials had held back the efforts of de-Nazification and democratization, and “anti-Hitler refugees were frequently refused permission to return to Germany and help to rebuild their country along democratic lines.” The more these “sadistic” policies and their results remained unchanged the more the German public would regard the American assertions for German economic recovery and rehabilitation as “pure hypocrisy,” as the “frantic effort to purchase safety for democratic institutions with dollars” was not the “surer road to the restoration of goodwill.”1411

While the ERP was “still pending before the representatives of the people,” it appeared to be a coincidence for the newspaper that secret documents on the “Nazi-Soviet Relations” were published. Despite the staunchly conservative republican party-leanin nature of the newspaper, Human Events did not over emphasize the Soviet threat and called the American people to understand that the success of the Marshall Plan required Soviet participation as well, or else it would hold “little promise of being more than stop-gap aid” and more promise of being “a political

move” which could provoke Soviet reaction.1412 In particular, as the ERP was about to get its Congressional approval the magazine underlined its three basic assumptions: that “European unity was necessary” if the plan was to succeed, that trade between the “agricultural Eastern and industrial Western Europe” had to be re-established, and that “German industry was an indispensable factor in European recovery.”1413 Hence, if the Soviet Union was “determined to wreck” the ERP, she could simply tell her satellites to stop food exports to the West, while the Marshall Plan would be “revamping” the European “economy on narrowly nationalistic lines” rather than using Europe's skills and material resources “quickly, co-operatively and rationally.” The newspaper concluded that there was “nothing to be feared from a Germany occupied by foreign troops, but everything to be feared from an ERP doomed to failure because it [was] not truly European in conception” thus the US should strive to get along with the Soviet Union in order to dispel the Soviet “dogmatic faith, that permanent peaceful co-existence with the non-Communist world was impossible.”1414 Therefore, the newspaper personally accused Truman of forgetting the “principles” which really made the American “Republic great,” and of misusing the issue of “national ‘security’.”1415 The same characterization was also attributed to Secretary Marshall, who grossly exceeded his “constitutional prerogative” in “accepting the London agreement on western Germany in the name of the [US] government” of the US”.1416

Despite the harsh criticism of the Truman Administration’s foreign policy, the newspaper admitted that the plans of the Communist government of the Soviet Union for “domination were based on a cynical philosophy and a ruthless application of brutal force.”1417 Nonetheless, a sound American policy, which “alone” could be “constructive and successful,” had to first “recognize the great and friendly Russian” people and had to “assume towards them a sympathetic and understanding attitude.” According to the newspaper, the Soviet people were not in “sympathy with the ambitious plans of their rulers,” and they did not hate the Western “free institutions.” Therefore, the US should not treat the Soviets as Hitler had; as a “lower race.” On the contrary, the free peoples should “proclaim that they had nothing but friendship towards all oppressed

nations behind the Iron Curtain,” that they had “no intention of humiliating these people or injuring their national patrimonies,” and that they would invite them to “surrender in mass” in case of an armed conflict, “promising them good and honorable treatment.” The newspaper recognized the need for “adequate military preparedness,” but believed that it was the “vital interest” of the US and of other free nations to “uphold liberal humanitarian principles so that the individual could once again be free.”

The Berlin blockade seemed to have slightly affected the attitude of the newspaper. It supported the new phase of the occupation policy, which signallized the setting up of a new administration for western Germany, the establishment of a currency reform, the ending of earlier policies, which had led to “political, economic and moral bankruptcy, [and] frankly, honestly and speedily” accepted Germany into the “fellowship of Western nations on equal terms.” Furthermore, the newspaper suggested a total abandonment of the “last traces of Morgenthauism,” in particular the termination of plant dismantling, the assignment of full administrative rights and complete control in the fields of domestic finance and foreign trade to the prospective German government, and the immediate removal of the “cultural iron curtain.”

Nevertheless, “capitalizing on ‘American Imperialism’” was not the solution for the newspaper. Instead it supported the creation of the United States of Europe, which would allow for “the immediate lifting of the marginal income of the Continent,” and the shifting of the “world balance of power,” as the Soviet Union would have on “her western borders a real ‘Third Force’” with the “economic and military resources of fifteen nations.” Recognizing, though, that the “fate of the world” depended upon the “fate of Germany,” the newspaper drew the attention to the German youth and their “ideas and attitudes [as a] decisive factor in all calculations.” According to Human Events, Germany’s youth was “probably the least class conscious generation” in Europe and had “little appreciation of representative government, having never experienced it in action.” Even though the newspaper believed that the German youth was “better inoculated against Communism than in any other country of Western Europe” and at the same time of “little

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use for the Nazis who led them to disaster,” *Human Events* saw “danger as well as promise” in this generation who sought a way to “be good Europeans” and wondered who would open for them the door to “decency and honor.” Additionally, the newspaper highlighted the importance of the “independent and democratic” German newspaper, which carried the “chief responsibility for remolding the German mind.” According to the newspaper, the American occupation zone had failed the “undernourished physically and frustrated spiritually” German newspaper editors; the “most responsible and potentially competent collaborator in the effort to lead Germany back into the paths of representative government.” Therefore, the magazine promoted the application of the already existing idea of American cities ‘adopting’ German cities also for the encouragement of the press and the bringing over to the US German editors to study the “American press and other means of influencing public opinion.”

*Human Events* criticized extremely harshly the Truman Administration’s foreign policy, which it accused of provoking a war with the Soviet Union instead of attempting to avert one. Strongly differentiating between the people and the government of a country, the newspaper focused on the treatment of the people as the real source of democracy, regardless of whether they were Germans or Soviets, and promoted a collaboration with the countries behind the Iron Curtain. Without disregarding the fundamentally tenacious Soviet mentality of regarding every non-Communist country as a threat, the newspaper also suggested ways to approach the Soviet people in a friendly manner, and utilize Germany’s democratic potential for the benefit of the continent, while interestingly the newspaper did not publish any letter from its readers about Germany.

Conclusion

Truman’s messages to the newspapers’ editors, which was also nationwide broadcast, had only one focus in 1948: the identification of the fulfillment of the Marshall Plan with a problem of domestic economy, the decrease of US inflation. Increasing exports would appreciate the exchange rate and decrease prices. Obviously Truman had learnt and adapted to handling his relationship with the press and in 1948 successfully managed to identify US prosperity, or in other words domestic policy, with US foreign policy. None can be quite sure whether Truman would have

actually done that in case the US economy was not threatened by inflation or whether he would have just stuck to the anti-communist rhetoric and the urgency of the maintenance of world peace. But what can quite definitely be said is that in 1948 Truman hit two birds with one stone. So in others words Truman did not try to camouflage the reality neither from the press nor from the US people or utilize the Soviet fear to make his foreign policy more appealing and urgent; the pursued US foreign policy would benefit the everyday life of the American citizens as well and that message was openly delivered. Of course, the intense anti-communist campaign of the previous year still had an effect on public opinion, thus this in combination with Truman’s 1948 message could become the perfect combination. So, one can argue that Truman was quite honest when he requested the support of US foreign policy from the press outlets. Were the press outlets as honest as Truman toward the US people?

As this is a yes or no question, I believe that the answer would most likely be yes since all press outlets acknowledged and made very clear that the success of the Marshall Plan was based on two factors: development of trade between East and West and Germany’s industrial revival. In particular, the political analyst Walter Lippmann continued to attack the containment theory of the US Administration and its campaign of fear of the Soviet Union and supported the Marshall Plan which was based on the development of trade between East and West and not on the making of western Germany a bulwark against the East. The Berlin Blockade did not have a negative impact on him, but a realistic one. He insisted on the maintenance of a modus vivendi between East and West and the mutual military withdrawal from Berlin or else the Germans would turn to the Soviets as they were the only ones who could provide them with unity.

On the same page were also The Washington Post, The Los Angeles Times, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, TIME and LIFE. Even though these press outlets, except for The Post that was not overly aggressive against the Soviet Union, did not sugarcoat the Soviet expansive attempts in Europe and run their anti-communist campaign quite passionately, they did recognize the vital importance of the development of East-West trade for the success of the Marshall Plan as well as western Germany’s inclusion in the ERP along with the abandonment of old destructive policies like the dismantling of German plants. That the introduction of the new Deutsche Mark was the actual event that led to the Soviet blockade was overshadowed by the Berlin crisis, which affected the stance of the newspapers and made Germany’s economic revival
even more urgent and a firmer attitude against the Soviet Union more imperative. Even though the 1948 foreign policy was not an either-butter-or-guns policy, *The Washington Post* and *LIFE* magazine advocated a military corollary to the Marshall Plan for the participating countries, while for instance *The New York Times* and *The Wall Street Journal*, which both used very hard language to attack the Soviet Union, believed that the Marshall Plan was a program for avoiding a war and not provoking one and advocated that it was the patriotic duty of every American to back up it.

The press outlets of smaller circulation also agreed with the two aforementioned preconditions for the success of the Marshall Plan and were reluctant toward the Soviet Union, but all three, from the Jewish *Commentary* to the leftist *Nation* and the over-the-top conservative *Human Events* mostly referred to the urgent need of re-education of the German people, who had not yet cast away nationalistic remnants, neither form their society nor from their mind. The still existing nationalistic German mind and the failure of (if not inability of some) Germans to be re-educated was more or less addressed by all other press outlets, but clearly not in the sense it was addressed by the three press outlets of smaller circulation; as a problem which had to be solved and not bypassed or replaced by the evolving and escalating East-West tensions.

Another thing that occurred in 1948, was that compared to the previous postwar years in 1948 the correspondents as well as the editors not only commented on or criticized the foreign policy, but actually made suggestions about the handling of the US foreign policy and alternative strategies, especially after the Berlin blockade. This could have been a result of the apparent stalemate of US foreign policy or the distractions of those to whom one looked for foreign policy cues with regard to Germany; Secretary of State Marshall was waiting for the final approval of the funding of his plan, while President Truman was campaigning for the upcoming elections, and Military Governor Clay was contending with the crisis surrounding Berlin.

Regarding US public opinion, there is nothing to be said in reference to Germany as there were no questions asked about it, but a lot to be said about the Soviet Union, which dominated the pollsters’ questionnaires. In particular, the Soviet Union was again the number one enemy of the US and in fact in 1948 the American people believed in the possibility of a war with it, regardless of whether the US would be involved or not or whether the American people even actually knew what the ‘cold war’ was. Therefore, US foreign affairs managed to remain the main concern of the American people in 1948 without, however, ignoring the threat of domestic inflation. Generally,
what one can understand from the poll results in 1948 is that the American public opinion tended to support US foreign policy almost unconditionally; a foreign policy which clearly at this point attacked the Soviet Union and could even benefit Germany if needed.

Returning to the triangular relationship between US policy, US press outlets and US public opinion, the lurking threat of communism, which had been relentlessly propagated by all major US press outlets since the previous year, had been promoted by the US Administration, supported by the US press outlets and had clearly influenced the American public opinion in 1948 as well. The collateral result of this anti-communist campaign was the public support of US foreign policy in Western Europe, and consequently in western Germany. Germany was no longer an enemy, an aggressive threat or an evil empire. In the mind of the American people the country had not only been incorporated into the western world, but its maintenance there was imperative for the revival and safeguarding of the entire concept of “the West.” Its former place as enemy was successfully occupied by the Soviet Union and any decision about German economic recovery and some level of centralized political autonomy, which would have caused the public’s furious reaction around the time of the end of the war was in 1948 overtly encouraged.
Chapter 5

“The Political Creation/Transformation (or Re-creation) of W. Germany”

January 1949-October 1945

[Human dignity – Human rights – Legally binding force of basic rights]

(1) Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.

(2) The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world.

(3) The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive and the judiciary as directly applicable law.\textsuperscript{1423}

Article 1, Basic Law (Grundgesetz) for the Federal Republic of Germany

The newly elected Truman administration set its anti-communist tone from the beginning of the year 1949. Harry Truman’s message to the Congress on January 5 was broadcast nationally, introducing not only his “Fair Deal” to promote more social equity with national health insurance, raising the minimum wage, strengthening the position of organized labor, and guaranteeing the civil rights of all Americans, but also expressing his concern over the potential spread of communism, the growing influence of the Soviet Union and the moral obligation of the US to establish peace and prevent mankind's catastrophe “from selfish interests.” Truman stated:

In this society, we are conservative about the values and principles which we cherish; but we are forward-looking in protecting those values and principles and in extending their benefits. ... The driving force behind our progress is our faith ... [which is] embodied in the promise of equal rights and equal opportunities which the founders of our Republic proclaimed to their countrymen and to the whole world. ... Our domestic programs are the foundation of our foreign policy. The world today looks to us for leadership because we have so largely realized, within our borders, those benefits of democratic government for which most of the peoples of the world are yearning. ... The heart of our foreign policy is peace. ... We stand at the opening of an era which can mean either great achievement or terrible catastrophe for ourselves and for all mankind. ... This is the task before

us. It is not an easy one. It has many complications, and there will be strong opposition from selfish interests.1424

The second expression of the anti-communist objective of the Administration’s foreign policy was delivered in Truman’s inaugural address on January 20, 1949, which was televised as well as broadcast on the radio. The speech was also known as the *Four Point Speech*, stating that the US: 1-would continue to “give unfaltering support to the United Nations and related agencies,” 2-would “continue its programs for world economic recovery,” 3-would “strengthen freedom-loving nations against the dangers of aggression,” and 4-would “embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of [American] scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.” Apart from that the press regarded the speech as a straightforward declaration of war, albeit a cold war on behalf of democracy, against the Soviet Union and Communism:

Communism is based on the belief that man is so weak and inadequate that he is unable to govern himself, and therefore requires the rule of strong masters. Democracy is based on the conviction that man has the moral and intellectual capacity, as well as the inalienable right, to govern himself with reason and justice. Communism subjects the individual to arrest without lawful cause, punishment without trial, and forced labor as the chattel of the state. It decrees what information he shall receive, what art he shall produce, what leaders he shall follow, and what thoughts he shall think. Democracy maintains that government is established for the benefit of the individual, and is charged with the responsibility of protecting the rights of the individual and his freedom in the exercise of his abilities. Communism maintains that social wrongs can be corrected only by violence. Democracy has proved that social justice can be achieved through peaceful change. Communism holds that the world is so deeply divided into opposing classes that war is inevitable. Democracy holds that free nations can settle differences justly and maintain lasting peace. [...] We are now working out with a number of countries a joint agreement designed to strengthen the security of the North Atlantic area. [...] Our allies are the millions who hunger and thirst after righteousness.1425

Before moving on to the most important events of this year regarding Germany, it should be first briefly mentioned that the US Secretary of State Dean Acheson and the foreign ministers of Canada, Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the

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Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal gathered in Washington, DC on April 4 to sign the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO);\textsuperscript{1426} “a military and political complement to the Marshall Plan for European economic recovery by establishing a mutual defense pact against possible aggression from the Soviet Union,” as it is described by the independent agency of the United States government NARA (the National Archives and Records Administration) responsible for the preservation and documentation of government and historical records.\textsuperscript{1427} According to the Treaty:

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They [sought] to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.\textsuperscript{1428}

However, NATO was not the first defense alliance of the West. On March 1947 the ‘Treaty of Dunkirk’ was signed between France and Britain, and was in fact an alliance of mutual assistance against a possible German attack, while on March 1948, as its expansion, the ‘Treaty of Brussels’ was signed between the Benelux countries, France and Britain. Consequently, the rising sense of insecurity in Europe and the 1948 Soviet pressure in Europe (particularly in Czechoslovakia and Norway) led to top secret talks between the US, Britain and Canada in Washington, DC between March 22 and April 1, excluding France at that time with American initiative; today also known as the ‘Pentagon Talks’ which built the foundation of NATO, an alliance of mutual assistance presuming at that time as an external threat mainly the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{1429} In contrast to the ‘Treaty of Dunkirk’ the ‘Pentagon Talks’ would allow Germany's (or


the three Western Zones) adherence to the North Atlantic Area “when circumstances permit” it; an objective which, however, “should not be publicly disclosed.” Besides as the US Department of State stated on the Pact on March 20, 1949 “western Germany also participate[d] fully in the OEEC” and the “North Atlantic Pact [was] made possible by the strides the Western nations of Europe ha[d] taken toward economic recovery and toward economic, political, and military cooperation, [and t]he core of the economic recovery effort [was] the European Recovery Program and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).”

Apart from the Administration’s anti-communist declarations and the formation of a defensive alliance of the “western” world, the sixth Council of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union, was held from May 23 to June 20, 1949 in Paris. The agenda included discussions regarding the restoration of the economic and political unity of Germany, the revision of the reparations-dismantling list, and the lifting of the Berlin blockade, but the four Allied Foreign Ministers did not reach an agreement on the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany. Nevertheless, they did agree to “recommend to the leading German economic bodies of the Eastern and Western Zones” the “expansion of trade and development of the financial and economic relations,” the “facilitation of the movement of persons and goods and the exchange of information” between the “Western Zones and the Eastern Zone and between Berlin and the Zones.”

The economic development and stability of a western Germany, however, could not be based only on German industrial production and US dollars. Political stability was an important precondition for Germany’s economic recovery and integration into western trade networks and


the West had to take into serious account the lessons learned from the past. “A repetition of the traumatic experiences leading to the gradual destruction of the Weimar Constitution,” the “normative content” of which had been transformed “into a mere political manifesto contested by radical political forces, both on the Left and on the Right,” had to be avoided.\footnote{Jens Woelk, Germany, In: Dawn Oliver, Carlo Fusaro (ed.) (2011), How Constitutions Change: A Comparative Study, New York: Hart Publishing, p. 144.} The result was called the Basic Law, which in contrast to the Weimar Republic protected basic rights and strengthened the government responsible to parliament counteracting “opportunistic tendencies of the parties and ‘Bonapartist’ tendencies of the head of state.” The Basic Law was approved in Bonn on 8 May 1949 by the Parliamentary Council of the three western zones and was “ceremoniously proclaimed” on 23 May, precisely on the date the sixth session of the Council of Foreign Ministers started, after having been approved by the occupying western Allies.\footnote{Heinrich August Winkler (2000), Germany: The Long Road West, 1933–1990, Vol. II, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 248-260.} It defined the rights in the new western state (Federal Republic of Germany – FRG) held by each citizen in dealings with the state and stipulated how the German people in the FRG should behave within the German society. As the preamble of the Basic Law stated the German people in the Laender Baden, Bavaria, Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Schleswig-Holstein, Wuerttemberg-Baden and Wuerttemberg-Hohenzollern

conscious of its responsibility before God and mankind, filled with the resolve to preserve its national and political unity and to serve world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe […] ha[d], by virtue of its constituent power, enacted this Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany to give a new order to political life for a transitional period. It acted also on behalf of those Germans to whom participation was denies. The entire German people [was] called upon to accomplish, by free self-determination, the unity and freedom of Germany.\footnote{Cassidy V. Hastings (1950), Germany, 1947-1949 : The Story In Documents, Washington: US Govt. Print. Off. p. 283; for the entire document see pp. 283-305.}

To a letter the three western military governors sent to the President of the Bonn Parliamentary Council, Konrad Adenauer, they stated that the Basic Law had received their “careful and interested attention” and expressed their opinion that it “happily combine[d] Herman democratic tradition with the concepts of representative government and a rule of law which the
world [had] come to recognize as requisite to the life of free people.” Yet only the minister presidents of the states in the western zones had actually participated in the Parliamentary Council and written and then passed the Basic Law, so that despite the attempt to speak for all Germans, the Basic Law could only speak on behalf of West Germans. East Germans would get their own state and government and constitution in October 1949. Both states’ constitutions laid claim to Berlin, although the city itself remained under Four-Power Allied occupation, with the three western sectors functioning in many ways as a whole, connected yet separate from the FRG (Federal Republic of Germany), while East Berlin mirrored most developments in the GDR (German Democratic Republic).

Consequently, the first free national elections in West Germany since 1933 took place on August 14, 1949. The American Jewish Committee declared that these elections were a “test for democracy,” which the (west) German electorate passed. “The two parties competing (the Christian Democratic Union and the Social Democratic party) jointly polled more than 14.5 million voters, or over 60 per cent of the total cast. Adding almost three quarters of a million votes gained by the small Zentrum party, and those polled by the liberal wing of the Free Democratic party [...] the German electorate voted for democratic candidates.” The first parliamentary government of West Germany (the lower house or Bundestag) was elected and could “justifiably be called a truly representative body,” since the invalid ballots reached 3.1% but were “not high enough to attest to any appreciable opposition to the convocation of the parliament,” and those who were excluded from the total electorate after the modifications and amnesties of the denazification process were not more than 0.2% to 0.4%. But who did the new Bundestag consist of? Of its 402 members, 15.6% “omitted data on their background during [the Nazi] period, except to designate military service in World War,” 45.7% were clerks, insurance agents, salesmen, farmers, etc. throughout the pre-World War II period, 12.2% held leading positions in business, agricultural organizations, or the academic world, 8.7% were in concentration camps or prisons for an extended period before and during the war, 7.7% suffered minor persecutions accompanied by loss of rights during the

1439 American Jewish Committee (ed.) (1953), Neo-Nazi strength and strategy in West Germany: Forces attacking democracy in West Germany, an up-to-date account. The coming national elections in West Germany and their significance for the democratic future of the country. The democratic elements and their fight against Nazi attempts at a comeback, New York: American Jewish Committee, p. 5.
Nazi period, 6.8% were refugees who returned to Germany after 1945, 2.3% were government officials, exclusive of teachers and minor officials, and 1% were in the armed forces.1440

The former mayor of Cologne Konrad Hermann Joseph Adenauer of the center right Christian Democratic Union of Germany (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, CDU) would serve as the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany. During the Nazi regime Adenauer was arrested several times by the Gestapo suspected of anti-Nazi activities and was imprisoned near Cologne for two and a half months. After the end of the war, he reemerged with his past convictions reinforced and his Catholic faith deepened. At the time of his election as Chancellor he was an old and quite conservative leading political figure, who however “implemented a decisive break in German political culture,” by westernizing German conservatism and displacing the anti-Western bitterness that dominated before 1945.1441 In September 1948 Adenauer had been elected chairman of the Parliamentary Council (Parlamentarischer Rat); a constitutional convention, which met in Bonn and was made up of representatives of the western occupied zones and charged with the drafting of the constitution of West Germany (the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany). This position made Adenauer “a national spokesman.”1442 On March 23, 1949 Konrad Adenauer delivered a speech in the Swiss city of Berne at an international meeting of the Interparliamentary Union, an organization of representatives of national parliaments founded in 1889 and with its headquarters in Switzerland, and declared that “it was the German Army and not the German people who capitulated and this the world had better remember.”1443 Adenauer did later deny this statement by stating that the meaning of his words was misinterpreted, but not without considerable consternation and a sense of foreboding that where there’s smoke there’s fire.

Last but not least as a factor affecting foreign policy and international relations in 1949 was the successful ending of the Berlin blockade on May 12, which not only “prevented the disappearance of West Berlin into the Soviet sphere” but also “catalyzed an American-European

military alliance” which had united Western Europe against the Soviet Union from the time it started during the previous year.\textsuperscript{1444} In December 1948 the airlift averaged over 4,500 tons of cargo daily brought to the citizens of the western sectors of Berlin, by the end of February 1949 it rose to an average of 5,500 tons, and by the spring of 1949 the daily average reached 8,000 tons. On Easter Sunday, April 17 alone, the British and American airplanes carried 12,941 tons in 1,398 flights, almost one a minute. On May 12, the 276,926\textsuperscript{th} flight ended the airlift in which the 689 participating airplanes (441 American and 248 British) had totally flown more than 124 million miles and had carried more than 2.3 million tons cargo.\textsuperscript{1445} Regardless of whether Stalin aimed at forcing the Americans, British, and French out of their sectors in Berlin or delaying the consolidation of their zones, the only think he achieved was the creation of the FRG and the NATO, so by the ending of the blockade, “the map of Cold War Europe had been drawn.”\textsuperscript{1446}

The military governor in the US zone of Germany Lucius D Clay, however, remained suspicious toward the Soviet Union and did not dismantle the operation until September 30, 1949, when the final airlift flight took place.\textsuperscript{1447} One could argue that Clay was stubborn, but no one could argue that he was not loyal to his duties. Even before the Berlin blockade Clay refrained from social life in Berlin, spent long hours every day in his office, “chain-smoked cigarettes and consumed quarts of black coffee” which made him lose 30 pounds during the airlift period. Therefore, it is not surprising that when during the night of May 12, 1949 he was informed that trucks and trains from the western zones were again crossing the Soviet zone into Berlin, he requested for the last time to be relieved from his duties as US military governor in Germany.\textsuperscript{1448} Clay’s replacement, John J. McCloy, was no longer designated Military Governor but rather High Commissioner for Occupied Germany and consequently the military OMGUS (Office of Military Government, United States) was formally eliminated and replaced on December 5, 1949 by the civilian HICOG (High Commission for Occupied Germany).\textsuperscript{1449} HICOG, especially as the Cold

\textsuperscript{1444} May (1998, July/August).
\textsuperscript{1445} Smyser (1999), p. 84-86.
\textsuperscript{1448} Grose (1998, July/August).
War intensified, coordinated cultural and educational programs for FRG’s democratic reorientation and familiarization with American values by reshaping the attitude of German sources of information (books, newspapers, films), and by promoting “awareness among German professionals of successful American and European school reform” through new teaching material and the *Amerikahäuser*.1450

The Cold War did not intensify only internationally but also domestically. In the US anti-communist feelings not only escalated, but dangerously transformed into racism. In Peekskill, New York, on September 4, 1949 25,000 people -“about 40 percent of the crowd was women, and one local resident estimate[d] that about 80 percent were Jews”- attended an open-air concert of the African-American singer and actor Paul Robeson, who was alleged to owe allegiance to the Soviet Union, and prominent civil rights folksingers like Woody Guthrie, Lee Hays and Pete Seeger, only to be trapped on their way back from the concert by local veterans and Ku Klux Klan members.1451 The demography of Peekskill and its neighboring northern Westchester communities was mixed; “summer people and weekenders [mostly] middle-class Jews with left-of-center leanings [and] year-round residents, mainly working class and conservative, whose resentment, and even open hostility to the ‘summer people’ had been steadily growing.” The mob initially numbered a couple of hundred people, but it quickly reached 1,000. The burning of books and sheet music along with slogans echoing “Communism Is Treason. Behind Communism Stands — the Jew! Therefore, for my country — against the Jews!” were reminiscent of recent and certainly very dark and dangerous times.1452 The Peekskill veterans “felt that their protest march was part of the ongoing international struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union;” a position especially supported by the *Peekskill Evening Star*, which posted headlines, editorials and front-page articles containing statements like “Robeson Says US Negroes Won’t Fight Russia,” “Robeson Concert Here Aids 'Subversive' Unit,” “The Discordant Note” attempting to clearly mark the differences between “minority versus majority rights, outsiders versus locals, and ‘Communists’ versus “Americans’.”

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Nationwide most press outlets embraced or justified the Peekskill veterans' cause but denounced the violence, even though 150 people at least were injured badly enough to warrant medical attention, not because they sympathized with the victims, but mostly because they feared that Communism thrived in chaos.\textsuperscript{1453}

Yet another factor must be taken into consideration when painting a picture of the atmosphere of 1949. After the Japanese surrender in 1945 there was a resurgence of a Chinese civil war. Even though the Nationalist Chiang Kai-shek was receiving US support against the Communists, in 1949 a Communist victory seemed more and more likely. After the capture of several cities of significant importance on October 1 the Chinese Communist leader Mao Tse-Tung “solemnly proclaimed the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC).”\textsuperscript{1454} The fall of China into communist hands was naturally addressed by all press outlets under examination in this thesis and \textit{TIME} magazine even had “the Communist Boss [who] learned tyranny as a boy”\textsuperscript{1455} on its cover of the first February issue. Nevertheless, although these references are not central to this thesis these global events affected the Cold War atmosphere. The fear of Communist expansion is a phenomenon that has appeared in the midst of the Russian Civil War in 1918-21, but it reappeared shortly after the end of WWII and officially shaped and re-shaped the US foreign policy from September 1946 onward. However, the way the Communist initiatives and advances affected the formation of US foreign policy did have an impact on US attitudes toward postwar Germany, which became regarded as the natural frontier between the Western world and the Soviet Union, but my focus will remain on Germany and Europe. Therefore, no matter how much the developments in China reinforced the anti-communist campaign of the administration, the capture of China by the “Reds” will remain outside the focus of this study.

As noted earlier, in May 1949 the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was formed with the conservative leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Konrad Adenauer as its first chancellor and its capital in Bonn. The CDU represented a merger of the old Catholic Center Party and various smaller Christian parties. Germany's reunification was less likely which “frustrated

\textsuperscript{1455} \textit{TIME}, (1949, February 7), 53(6), cover.
whatever hopes Stalin [might] have had that communism would spread there on its own.\[^{1456}\]

As such the FRG’s creation from the three western zones of occupation resulted in a respective action in the eastern Soviet occupation zone of Germany. On October 7, 1949 the eastern German state of the German Democratic Republic (GDR - German: Deutsche Demokratische Republik, DDR) was formed with East Berlin as its capital. In the Soviet zone the two parties of the Left, the SPD (Social Democratic Party) and the KPD (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands-Communist Party of Germany), had been forcefully merged into the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (German: Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED) under Wilhelm Pieck, who both chaired the SED and served as the GDR’s President. Pieck had sought exile from the Nazis in the USSR already in 1933 and served there until 1943 as the head of the Communist International (Comintern) and then became one of the founders of the National Committee for a Free Germany. Germany was then officially divided and under the political and social influence of the respective powers. The study of the year 1949 will stop in October, after the official division of Germany, as this will give me the opportunity to study US foreign policy on the western state of Germany alone in the next and final next chapter (Oct. 1949-Dec.1950). The chapter could also end at the date of the elections in the FRG, but the frequency of publication of the press outlets of smaller circulation would not have allowed the study of their comment on this event until the end of August.

President’s Address at a Meeting with the American Society of Newspaper Editors

In 1949 President Truman’s meeting with the American Society of Newspaper Editors, which was held in the Congressional Room at the Statler Hotel in Washington on April 22, focused on US foreign policy. Truman began with the fundamental developments of the US foreign policy since he had become President of the United States in 1945. Truman noted that it took the US a year and a half to find out that not “every nation in the world was as interested in obtaining a peace” as was the US and “that agreements were made by one power for the express purpose of breaking them.” Truman felt it was the American duty to see that the countries participating in the North Atlantic Pact were “amply armed to meet a situation which might arise” and explicitly

\[^{1456}\] Gaddis (2005), Chapter Three: Command Versus Spontaneity.
explained the expenditures that had to be made and that these expenditures were being made for peace “in the hope that [the US] won’t have to make a war expenditure.”

Pulling together the connection between the need to fund rearmament at home and abroad, Truman shared with the newspaper editors that the dollars that would be spent for the ERP and European rearmament were basically money saved from the war appropriations cutback that amounted to $60 billion in late 1945. As such the President concluded with his wish that the newspaper editors would inform themselves completely on the matters of foreign policy, before they came “to any conclusion as to what policy should be with regard to the policy of the United States.” Truman’s main aim was to make clear that it was an American duty to police world peace and that was why he did not hide the fact that the Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson was “a part of the foreign policy of the United States” and the newspaper editors should be informed by him as well as by Secretary of State Acheson. The Soviet threat for the US and world security was taken for granted by the President and the newspaper editors, who needed little convincing by this time.

American Public Opinion as Evaluated by Polling

In terms of the polls used to evaluate American public opinion in 1949 Germany was hardly a topic in the surveys’ questionnaires. Apart from a question in March that revealed that 44% of the Americans polled disapproved and 38% approved of a marriage between G.I.s and German women (the percentage of disapproval was highest among widows, women and married people who were asked as opposed to among single men), only in August, when elections for the first West German Bundestag were held, were the American people asked about their views regarding their former enemy. The survey results revealed that 50% of the Americans asked believed that the German people could not actually govern themselves in a democratic way, while 33% believed that they could. When the same group of people was asked if, four years after the end of the war,

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1457 The press conference took place on April 22, 1949. Louis A. Johnson served as United States Secretary of Defense as of March 28, 1949 succeeding James Forrestal.
1458 The American Presidency Project, Harry S. Truman, Remarks at a Meeting with the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 22, 1949, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, Retrieved on 9/23/2020 from https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/230209
Germany had been punished enough for its part in World War II, 53% of the people surveyed believed that it had, while 29% believed that it had not, perhaps based on the assumption that those Americans asked whether Germany’s punishment was enough correlated with whether they considered democratization successful.\textsuperscript{1460} Nevertheless, an alarming survey result revealed significant concerns on the part of western German students about the holdovers of Nazism: 42% of German university students throughout the American, British, and French zone of Germany thought that National Socialism would return, 33% of them believed that racial feelings in Germany were being actively stirred up or were a holdover from earlier prejudices, and 32% of them thought that racial discrimination was only partially rooted out of Germans’ hearts. Moreover, 43% of them found the Nuremberg penalties unjust, because 84% of them believed that Germany was not the only one responsible for starting the war. Lastly, 49% of the German students surveyed condemned the Nazi doctrine only in part and 53% of them thought that there was some ongoing connection between Nazism and the spirit of the German people.\textsuperscript{1461} No comment or note was published by the organization about these results, but the students’ opinion coincided with the resurging nationalistic feelings of west Germans. Additionally, the west Germans openly declared their dissatisfaction about US occupation policies, so this might have triggered a provocative response.

The remaining topics that dominated the Gallup surveys’ questionnaires were of course about the Soviet Union, communism and how to drastically contain both not only in Europe but also in the United States. Regarding the relationship with Europe, the Americans surveyed encouraged a military defense alliance against the eastern enemy and consequently supported the continuation of the draft. Between 72\%-75\% of the Americans surveyed, regardless of their occupation and education status, believed that the Soviet government did not sincerely desire peace, and thus not surprisingly during the airlift they also favored an increase of the size of the US army, the navy and particularly the air force and were even willing to pay more money in taxes to support this increase.\textsuperscript{1462} Additionally, 67\% of the Americans asked in February believed that the US and the Western European nations that participated in the Marshall Plan should join together in a mutual defense pact. Specifically, 59\% of the Americans believed that the US should

\textsuperscript{1460} ibid. pp. 841-842.
\textsuperscript{1461} ibid. pp. 842-843.
\textsuperscript{1462} ibid. pp. 788, 791-792.
supply arms and war materials to the Western European nations if they agreed to provide the US with air bases and any other help which they might be able to give. While in March 73% of the Americans polled believed that every able-bodied young American man who had not already been in the armed forces should be required to take military or naval training for one year.\footnote{ibid. pp. 792-794.}

After the signing of the North Atlantic Pact the number of questions about the Soviet Union increased and revealed the still existing if not intensifying American distrust against the Soviets despite the fact that the poll results revealed in May that 74% of the Americans believed that the US would not find itself in another war within the next year or within the next six months (81%). Regarding the arming of the NATO countries, of which west Germany was not yet one, in May 43% of the Americans polled believed that the shipment of arms and war material to the North Atlantic countries would decrease the chances of a war with the Soviet Union, which was also revealed in the August polls where 50% of the Americans asked expressed the belief that there would be another world war within the next 25 or 30 years, while 41% believed that it could be avoided.\footnote{ibid. pp. 817-818, 838.}

Further signs of distrust and suspicion toward the Soviets were revealed by the poll results all the way through to the end of the year. In particular, in June 62% of the people surveyed believed that the Soviet Union would not cooperate with the US in world affairs, 60% of them that the Soviet Union did not sincerely want peace, and 66% that the Soviet Union was trying to build itself up to be the ruling power of the world. Additionally, the majority of the Americans asked believed that the Soviet Union lifted the Berlin blockade because it realized that the blockade was a losing proposition in contrast to the success of the air lift.\footnote{ibid. pp. 814, 826-827.} In June 65% of the Americans asked had heard of the North Atlantic Security Pact (the military alliance agreement between the US and the Western European countries, except W. Germany, participating in the Marshall Plan), which at least proved that the majority of American people surveyed were in fact informed about the pact and they were probably not accepting any decision of the administration merely influenced by the anti-communist campaign that had been running since the previous year.\footnote{ibid. p. 820.} Lastly, in September the majority of the American people approved of the President's plan to send war
material and money to countries that wanted to build up their military defenses as a protection against the Soviet Union, and the principal arguments of the voters in favor were: 1- “it's the best way to stop Russia,” 2- North Atlantic nations should be strong to resist the Soviet Union, and 3- the more Allies the US had to fight the Soviet Union, the less she would have to fight.1467

Regarding the issue of how to contain communism drastically inside and outside the US, which occupied the polls this year as much as 1948, if not more, the polls revealed that the communist fear had penetrated the US society definitively. Particularly, in January 64% of the Americans polled (most of them high school or college graduates) had heard of the House Un-American Activities Committee and the majority of those aware of the committee approved of its continuation.1468 Moreover, in February 82% and in May 80% of the Americans surveyed approved of the labor law which required officials of labor unions to swear that they were not communists before they could take a case before the National Labor Relations Board.1469 Again after the signing of the North Atlantic Pact on April 4 the questions regarding the domestic communist threat became more frequent. Specifically, in April 83% of the Americans surveyed were aware of the June 1947 Taft-Harley Act restricting the power of trade unions in the US The majority of them disagreed with President Truman and the labor leaders who considered the law unfair to labor and felt it should be changed to give labor unions more strength, and agreed with many businessmen and Republican leaders who thought that the law had worked well and that it should be kept pretty much as it was, while in May 53% and July 50% of mostly union members polled were aware of the discussions regarding the Taft-Harley law and the majority of them favored a change or amendment.1470 Furthermore, 83% of the Americans polled favored a law requiring all members of the US Communist party to register with the Justice Department in Washington, and 87% of the Americans thought that all Communists should be removed from jobs in US industries that could be important in wartime.1471

In August, the month of the West German parliamentary elections, a peculiar question appeared in the questionnaire of the Gallup organization. It was the first time the American people

1467 ibid. p. 848.
1468 ibid. p. 787.
1469 ibid. pp. 791, 809.
1470 ibid. p. 808.
were asked to correlate their religious beliefs with their political ones. The Americans chosen to participate in the survey were asked whether a good Christian could at the same time be a member of the Communist party and 77% of them replied that this was not a possibility. Whether the survey intended to examine the connection of Christianity and communism in the American mind cannot be answered definitely, but it is worth remembering that the new West German Chancellor was the co-founder and leader of the explicitly Christian party. The Gallup pollsters continued to pose anti-communist questions until the end of the year. For example, in September 73% of the Americans surveyed disagreed with allowing college and university teachers to belong to the Communist party and to continue teaching. Additionally, 72% of them agreed with the oath the University of California requiring its faculty to swear to declare that they were not Communists.

The American people, who expressed their support of the Truman administration not only with their vote in the presidential elections of November 1948 but also with their faith in their President and preference for the Democratic party throughout the year, presumably also supported Truman’s view that the US was the only country that could support European recovery and defend the western part of the European continent. In particular, in 1949 the majority of the Americans polled approved of the way Truman was handling his job as President (69% in January, 57% in March, 59% in June, 57% in July, 51% in October).

Press outlets

**Walter Lippmann as Political Commentator**

Before moving to the study of the press outlets, it is important to discuss the opinions of the political analyst Walter Lippmann, expressed across an array of newspapers. Walter Lippmann insisted throughout the first nine months of the year 1949 that the US could not create Western Europe and Western Germany in the way it had imagined with dollars, propaganda and the threat of the atomic bomb. For Lippmann, the US had to discover how to use its influence in Europe to make the best future there based on what was possible. Lippmann continued to promote the
idea of a balance of power on the European continent for the containment of the expansion of the Soviet empire. Therefore, he advocated that a “real defense” was not to be found in a militarist alliance of “weak and dubious allies,” which had to be organized, armed, equipped and financed by the US. In this alliance Lippmann favored a policy of neutrality, disarmament and demilitarization for Western Germany, suggesting that the US offer the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia to sign along with the US a pact of disarmament, demilitarization and neutralization of Germany. Additionally, he argued that East-West tensions would probably not evolve into war as it was in no one's best interest, and that the Soviets would restrict themselves only to propaganda and to “at worst their fifth column,” their communist supporters outside the Soviet orbit.

Comparing on February 22, 1949 the US Secretary of State Dean Acheson to the US military governor in Germany General Lucius D. Clay, Lippmann urged Washington to determine its German policy and like Clay had, to take responsibility for any power it exercised in Germany. He claimed that Clay was a “man of the very greatest ability—one of the strongest American figures of [his] time; [...] deeply imbued with the American tradition, and quite without vulgar ambition or delusions of grandeur.” Therefore, he warned the State Department to invest effort and time in finding his civilian replacement, or otherwise to leave Clay's duties unchanged.

For Lippmann the Atlantic Pact was decisive, an American guarantee that the Soviets would not attack a country of the pact, as this would mean a war with the United States, especially if all occupation forces were to be reduced and then withdrawn from Germany. Therefore, Lippmann drew attention to the countries that were not yet in the pact, and particularly Germany, whose control could be seized by the Soviets. Furthermore, Lippmann firmly told those who

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wondered whether the US should bet on France or Germany to “shut up and sit down,” as a “collective policy of defense [could not] be created unless there [was] a collective policy.”\footnote{1481} The pact also allowed the West to “face up to the [problems] of the European recovery program without the fear that it might be a temptation to military aggression.”\footnote{1482} Additionally, the pact was a chance for the US to use the security guarantee provided by it for the diplomatic resolution of the crucial problem of German partition.\footnote{1483}

Prior to the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris Lippmann made quite a few suggestions about the position the US should take. For him a German government could not be achieved by the occupying powers or as long as Germany was occupied. Therefore, for Lippmann the purpose of the next Council of Foreign Ministers meeting should be the German peace treaty, so that the Germans could take responsibility for governing themselves and creating a German government.\footnote{1484} Lippmann also alerted the American public to the potential development of the Soviet-German relationship, and warned that no matter how much the Soviets and Germans might “hate and despise and fear one another,” they could come together if it was “expedient and profitable.” Besides, the Soviets could offer Germany unity and access to eastern markets, while the Germans could offer the Soviets security against the Atlantic Pact and industrial and technological resources.\footnote{1485}

In May Lippmann promoted the idea that the West German Basic Law advocated for German unity, because it was an “ambiguous document, designed for negotiations with the Russians.”\footnote{1486} He advised the US not to interfere with the eastern borders of Germany, if not asked, and to free itself of the old fallacies that wanted Germany divided and dependent on the West, in case a German peace treaty was negotiated at the Council of Foreign Ministers’ meeting in
Moreover, Lippmann openly challenged having US foreign policy support “an atmosphere of crisis and of fear,” since in case the Soviets suddenly decided to withdraw their military forces from Germany, Europe would be secure without an American guarantee and “solvent without some special financial arrangements.”

During as well as after the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting Lippmann acknowledged the benefits of the Marshall Plan, but warned of the possibility of a world-wide deflation if the standard of living in the Western world, including Western Germany, did not rise “amidst conditions of increasing confidence and stability,” as opposed to simply focusing on the plan to “expel the Russians and to suppress the Communists,” as he also said at the beginning of the year. Being sure that American subsidies could not sustain Germany’s standard of living indefinitely, Lippmann urged for a plan to “cushion the shock and the strain of [its] unavoidable reduction.” The result of the meeting proved to Lippmann that no western power had a definitive proposal for Germany, which would inevitably force them “to accept the fact that the outcome [of the German problem would] be shaped by events within Germany and elsewhere.” Therefore, he suggested that the US be ready in the meeting to ensure the security of western Europe against the revival of German militarism and against a Soviet-German partnership, because the end of the German partition and occupation was inevitable.

The Washington Post

A study of the press outlets in 1949 shows that The Washington Post’s attitude toward the US policy in Germany was quite clear, straightforward, and quite contradictory to Lippmann’s which instructed neutrality and disarmament of west Germany. The newspaper generally

supported the US administration’s foreign policy objectives, but believed that the government lacked a structured plan toward making west Germany self-sustaining, favoring the industrialists, and integrating west Germany into western Europe.\textsuperscript{1494} Additionally, the Chinese loss to the Soviets should alert the American policymakers even more, as Germany was “no morass,” but a “springboard,” which should be integrated into and controlled by a Western democracy or else, along with Germany, all of Western Europe would be lost to the Soviets.\textsuperscript{1495} Therefore, the success of the Berlin airlift in regard to the support of West Berlin as well as to the reinforcement of the US presence and determination in Germany, made the newspaper favor the division of the city.\textsuperscript{1496} The airlift, which was initially intended to meet an emergency situation and had a defensive nature for the newspaper, developed in The Post’s interpretation into “a real instrument of foreign policy,”\textsuperscript{1497} which safeguarded not only a city, but also western security. Berlin was “the strategic island behind the Iron Curtain [that had] not only become Europe’s most sensitive weather vane of East-West relations but probably the western world’s most fruitful listening post on Soviet foreign policy.”\textsuperscript{1498} The Alsop brothers, Stewart and Joseph, pointed out how important it was for US German policy to take a final form. Steward Alsop warned against keeping Germany “in a permanent colonial status” and “in constant danger of being drawn into the Kremlin's orbit.”\textsuperscript{1499} Even though he felt the Marshall Plan had definitely saved western Europe from falling into Soviet hands, Joseph Alsop made clear that the American “responsibility” in Europe was not yet over. For Joseph Alsop America had to be strong to “build the arch for the [European] future” and provide the “keystone at whatever cost.”\textsuperscript{1500} He advocated that the western powers a “bold, imaginative measure” to maintain the western advantage in the Berlin crisis at whatever cost, like that of the socialization of the Ruhr, since its industrial production was closely linked to Germany’s economic and political structure.\textsuperscript{1501} Despite Joseph Alsop’s support of Germany’s economic and political

\textsuperscript{1497} "Stuck With The Air Lift," The Washington Post, (1949, January 12), 12.
\textsuperscript{1499} Stewart Alsop, "US German Policy Taking Form," The Washington Post, (1949, February 27), B5.
development, he did not turn a blind eye to the resurgent nationalistic feelings in the country. He declared that the West had to “cut the ground out from under Dr. Adenauer,” who would take advantage of the French refusal for the socialization of the Ruhr and bring back the ‘Krupps’ as “the hope of the future;” the “very worst in the old Germany.”

Furthermore, even though for Joseph Alsop the Berlin situation was becoming more and more an “uneventful stalemate” as the months went by, it was still “a chink in the Iron Curtain.” Furthermore, for him it was not only the American military government with the continuously reinforced airlift, but also the Western Berliners themselves who continued to defy the Soviets. The “symbol” of their “will to resist” was Ernst Reuter, the German “anti-Communist Socialist” mayor of West Berlin. Toward handling the communist influence Alsop found the Atlantic Pact to be “absolutely essential,” but still only “a small program of peacetime lend-lease” compared to what was needed - a rearmament program; an opinion that was also supported by the newspaper as it expressed the US irrevocable commitment to the support of the European democracies would put the West in a “much better position to talk with the Russians.”

Nevertheless, no matter how “fabulous” the victory of the western airlift against the eastern blockade was, and despite the role of the Berlin airlift as the US “enforcer of foreign policy” in Europe and the “turning point” of the European attitude toward the West, The Post felt that the new American civilian administration in Germany, namely High Commissioner John McCloy, along with the creators of the ERP, Paul Hoffman and Averell Harriman, still had an “unparalleled opportunity to contribute to [an economically] stable -and democratic- Europe” so that Germany would not be dominated by communism. Additionally, The Post declared that the winning of the Berlin battle did not mean the winning of the Cold War and believed that during the months of the blockade the West could have instead made Western Germany “a full-fledged partner in

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1503 Joseph Alsop, “Matter Of Fact. The Chink In The Curtain,” The Washington Post, (1949, February 21), 11. Ernst Reuter was a Social Democrat, which clearly indicates Alsop’s ability to differentiate between Socialism and Communism, an opinion expressed so far only by press outlets of smaller circulation like The Nation.
western European recovery and unification.” Therefore, it was now high time that both sides (the East and the West) applied “the lessons of [this] weird and essentially tragic episode in international relations” and practiced diplomacy, and that the West concentrate on bringing Germany into the western democracy, where “its only true salvation” could be found.1506

Similar attitudes were found in both the newspaper’s editorials and the Alsops’ column with regard to the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris. Before the meeting Joseph Alsop was of the opinion that the US should reply affirmatively to a Soviet proposal to evacuate Germany with the condition of the maintenance of “a garrison” at one of the German ports” as well as to their suggestion to unite Germany with the condition that the Soviets would allow east Germans to “obey the [western] rules.”1507 The Post reporter Ferdinand Kuhn, Jr. pointed out the importance of “a prospect of security and peace” to the “war-weary” European through the easing of the tension between East and West.1509 During the meeting The Post warned that the West could not afford to continue the Cold War indefinitely and advised that it was time that “prudent diplomacy” was employed. This would need to be a diplomacy directed toward what the Soviets really wanted; it would “welcome the opportunity to reach any genuine agreement,” which would allow the integration of Western Germany to Western Europe and relax the political and economic tension.1510 For The Post the root of the German problem in 1949 was located in the “disruption of the Allied coalition and the schism between East and West.”1511

The newspaper continued to insist that the “true solvent of Europe's ills” was “continentalization,” namely an internationalization of Europe that would include Germany. Federalism was the only vital foundation for European unity for The Post and that was why the newspaper appeared enthusiastic about the result of the first (west) German elections after the Second World War, which in contrast to that of the First World War was not dominated by

nationalists or centralists, and demonstrated a “European feeling.” Nevertheless, not all writers carried by The Post acknowledged the West German elections as a turn toward democracy. The German-Jewish refugee turned wartime US intelligence officer in London and then after the war foreign correspondent and education reporter Fred M. Hechinger, was alarmed by the “total omission of re-education and democratization” references in the American occupation statutes, which could endanger the progress of political, mental and moral reconstruction of Germany; especially when the future of Germany, namely its own students, were struggling to find the way toward democracy “fighting simultaneously against the Nazi reaction and Nazi-type Communist bid for domination.” Therefore, on the day of the first federal (west) German election Hechinger condemned the “apathetic [German] mass” as well as the “homelessness of the truly democratic elements.” The slogans and ideals employed by all left and right German parties during their pre-election campaign pointed to one direction, to nationalism, and Hechinger declared that this “truth of German nationalism and irredentist aggressiveness, long rejected as the hallucination of an alarmist minority,” had been “reluctantly” accepted by the foreign correspondents.

Finally, in view of General Clay’s replacement with High Commissioner John McCloy, The Washington Post pointed out the importance of maintaining qualified American personnel in Germany. For the newspaper Clay's “nerves [were] made of iron” and he himself was “the very model of a soldier-administrator.” The Post stated that the US had to be “proud that it could produce […] soldiers of the stamp of General Clay;” who labored with “might and main” and “downright toughness” with the West German government. Additionally, The Post considered the US fortunate to have the “able and courageous” McCloy assigned the task of German integration into western Europe. Therefore, The Post welcomed High Commissioner McCloy as “a man of independent and salient character,” who “deserve[d] a lot of credit at the outset

1512 "German Results," The Washington Post, (1949, August 16), 8.
1515 Fred M. Hechinger, "Reds Split Student Unit In Germany," The Washington Post, (1949, July 31), L5.
for being willing to shoulder a heavy and probably a thankless responsibility,” especially since he was succeeding the “skillful and adroit” military governor Clay.1521

In terms of the letters from the readers that The Post chose for publication in 1949 most either supported the US policies on Germany or expressed the need to look at the German problem from a different viewpoint due to the evolving East-West tension. Some readers agreed with The Post’s “serious” and “frank”1522 interpretation of the US policies, supported the Atlantic Pact, and showed faith in the President's ability to commit wisely to the use of military force. One reader shared a letter of a young man from Germany praising the benefits of the ERP toward the establishment of democracy and hope in the country, and pointed out the consistency of the Soviet aims, namely the establishment of world communism.1523

Other readers appeared more skeptical. A Professor of the Yale University Law School warned about the dangers which the US faced “as public opinion [began] to accept certain realities about Germany,” like the industrial re-building of the FRG by the former industrialist collaborators of the Nazi regime, and urged that the US should recast its German policy, if it wished to avoid “the tragic errors of 1919.”1524 The Republican Senator from Nevada Malone who had also traveled in Germany last summer and fall after providing an extended analysis of the recovery program for France, Britain and Germany concluded that the Soviets could “ask for no better assistance from this side of the Atlantic.”1525 Yet another Post reader warned that the Soviets would leverage the nationalist sentiment in Germany to urge for a unified German government and that the US should not allow that except in case the Social Democrats, led by Adenauer’s political opponent Kurt Schumacher, were allowed to organize their political campaign in the GDR.1526 Additionally, a Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame emphasized the need of proportional representation after the FRG election.1527 For the Secretary

of the Society for the Prevention of World War III it was a matter of “justice” and “fairness” that Germany continued to deliver its “tremendous” industry surplus to contribute to European recovery, while the Associate Secretary of the National Council for Prevention of War stated that such “hostile attitudes” were useful for “conquering” Germany and not for the “conciliation of Germany, the restoration of Europe, or the creation of peace.” For the Associate Secretary Germany was no longer an enemy and suggested that the best way to deal with it was to “deal frankly and generously.”

Up until Germany’s division, the establishment of the western German state of the FRG and of the eastern German state of the GDR in May and October 1949 respectively, The Washington Post favored the incorporation of the FRG into the Western European community and had not closed the door to Soviet negotiations; a position which agreed with that of Walter Lippmann, even though the newspaper’s readers mostly focused on the financial benefit of such integration.

Los Angeles Times

At the beginning of the year the Los Angeles Times mainly referred to the achievement of maintaining peace in the previous year and preserving it in 1949, reinforced by the Marshall Plan and West Germany's economic and political success. It included the North Atlantic Pact as a necessary move in this direction, but advised that it should not be merely “an old-fashioned military alliance” but also an agreement that would include all nations not under the Soviet umbrella. The North Atlantic Pact, along with the rearmament of Western Europe, would “bring the world closer to real peace.” It rejected the idea of a “buffer” zone of disarmed countries between the two rivals, the US and the Soviet Union, since the latter was a “predatory state” and “any cushion would be] a soft spot inviting occupancy, [and] not an agreeable protection against outside attack.”

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Toward Germany’s political success, the *LA Times* international affairs daily columnist Polyzoides was more than confident. The Bonn constitution was for Polyzoides “one of the most decisive and historic moves” of the western allies. He expressed his certainty that the new West German state would be incorporated into the Western European bloc and implied that the new state would also be included in the new western defense alliance, as the FRG would become a “most valuable addition and helper to the western world” due to its economic, geographic and national importance.\(^{1533}\)

On the eve of the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting at Paris Polyzoides praised not only the ongoing airlift, but also the US ability to rebuild West Germany’s industrial capacity and to facilitate the recovery of the European economy and political unity. He also applauded America’s determination to “help create a provisional national German government” despite the “Russian opposition and sabotage.”\(^{1534}\) Nevertheless, he did not fail to recognize and report a potential trap for the West, namely the Soviet promises of unity for the German people or withdrawal from East Germany, which of course also fed German nationalism.\(^{1535}\) Such a case would be a lose-lose situation for the US as the rejection of unification would cost the US millions indefinitely, while the acceptance of unification would make the Soviets the winners not only of Germany but also of World War II. Before but also long after the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting at Paris the newspaper acknowledged the spiritual presence of Germany, “this uninvited German ghost,” the fifth member at this meeting\(^{1536}\) Against the Soviets Polyzoides as well as the newspaper were not as aggressive as they were in previous years. On the contrary, the Soviet negative position was not only to be expected, but Polyzoides even described the situation of the


Soviets as pathetic, because their behaviors since the end of the war had “alienated most of the friendship, affection, good will and respect of even [their] closest friends.”

After the Paris Council of Foreign Ministers meeting, Polyzoïdes described the Atlantic Pact as the duty of the United States and the only way to prevent a third world war. Nevertheless, he also warned that at a time when the Soviets were accusing the US of planning a war, the West should exercise “skillful diplomacy,” “due consideration” and “political wisdom” and not be hasty with “ticklish situations” such as the rearmament of Europe. Additionally, the columnist stated that if the US economic burden needed to be lighter, the priority of US policy should be “Germany's speedy reincorporation into the body politic, economic [and military] of Western Europe.”

Regarding Germany’s return to political life with the first West German elections, the newspaper seemed to support both of the main candidates, Konrad Adenauer from the CDU and Kurt Schumacher from the SPD, even though their rhetoric was provocatively against the western occupation forces and their pursued policies such as dismantling, the internationalization of Ruhr, etc. The lack of criticism of such rhetoric may have been a way of setting of the stage for a potential switch of US policy toward these issues. The western German appeal to nationalism during the electoral campaigns also did not alarm Polyzoïdes, who believed that it was a tactical move and “evident effort to gain more concessions” from the western Allies such as their participation in the Atlantic Pact, the stopping of dismantling etc. Accordingly, a post-election survey in October conducted in the western zones of Germany among German university students by a former student at the Institute of Political Studies in Paris with the help of the French Institute of Public Opinion, revealed that “the growing signs that Nazism [was] far from dead” was “no surprise to anyone familiar with the opinions and attitudes of German youth” these days.

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For Polyzoides the German election result was a clear indication that the FRG had “scored so heavily against Soviet Communism” and chosen a free over a state-controlled economy and the journalist urged that other western European nations, like France and Italy, show the same determination against their “noisy Communists” and the “type of socialized experiments that [had] retarded their recovery.” His comment was slanted more toward the CDU’s position rather than with the SPD’s, which had supported a certain level of nationalization of coal and other industries. Even though Polyzoides must have recognized the difference between “communism and social democracy,” he still showed his bias against the SPD when he expressed the hope that Adenauer would “unite in an economic program of national reconstruction based on free economy and private initiative” with the Rightists and independents. Accordingly, the newspaper saw the Center-Right electoral victory as “encouraging signs” and pointed out the western German win over socialization and of course communism as an indication of the western German preference for “free enterprise over the planned economy of a centralized socialist state.”

Even though most of the newspaper’s articles on the evolving situation and role of West Germany were intended to be informative rather than filled with commentary, the alarming issue of resurging German nationalism caused its daily international affairs columnist Polyzoides to express that he was not surprised by the surge of nationalism in Germany. He also declared that if anyone was “naive enough to expect that the new Germany would inaugurate her existence in sackcloth and ashes” they should better wake up and realize the reality that Germany was “a vigorous national entity not only determined to regain its place in the sun but equally ready to play a major role in the forthcoming drama of Europe,” namely to “fight Bolshevism in the name of western civilization.”

The LA Times readers who wrote Letters to the Editor did not refer often to Germany, or at least such letters were not often published in the newspaper. Nonetheless, the opinions of those that did mostly focused on the German political way of thinking, but varied considerably. One

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1544 Polyzoides, "Aid to Europe Held Up by Senate Stand," Los Angeles Times, (1949, August 18), 11.
reader charged Germans who had recently immigrated to the US with ignorance as they never got acquainted politically, historically and economically with the US and blamed the country for their own shortcomings, while another reader separated the true followers of the Nazi regime from those who went along just to survive.\(^{1549}\) Another LA Times reader was outraged by the fact that former Nazi scientists, who helped in the “killing and mutilation of defenseless children,” were now assisting America's defense system.\(^{1550}\)

The Los Angeles Times and its main journalistic voice, its daily international affairs columnist Polyzoides, were supportive toward the Truman administration and its decisions favoring West Germany and fighting communism. This was the attitude of the newspaper in January to October 1949, with only one surprising exception: Polyzoides’ comment on the western German resurgent nationalism. Polyzoides did not attempt to justify this German inclination, but rather expressed the opinion that one would better accept German nationalism and more or less move on.

The New York Times

At the beginning of the year 1949 The New York Times made it clear that it approved of the fact that any change in the administration did not bring with it any change in the US foreign policy. The NYT reported on the beneficial contribution of the Marshall Plan and monetary reform already observed in Western Europe as well as on the contribution of the Ruhr output to European recovery, and encouraged the US Government and the Congress to “keep up [their] end of [the] business.”\(^{1551}\) The issue of Germany and the problems deriving from the fact that the western powers and the Soviet Union were “miles apart on the basic issues in the German problem” as well as the possibility of a Soviet withdrawal from Germany, which was more of an alarm rather than


a hope for the West, were the matters that The NYT predicted would dominate US diplomacy this year.\footnote{Edwin L. James, "The Issue Of Germany Dominates Diplomacy," The New York Times, (1949, February 13), E3. See also: C. L. Sulzberger, "Europe Is Again Nervous Over US, Soviet Policies," The New York Times, (1949, January 10), 8.}

Generally, the newspaper supported the Truman Administration’s policy in West Germany and Western Europe throughout the year. For The NYT the North Atlantic Pact was an “open recognition of the great step that the United States was taking in assuming the role as leader in a Western defense system” and a new approach to the struggle for Germany.\footnote{Jack Raymond, "Accord Spurs Hope In West Germany," The New York Times, (1949, March 19), 3. See also: "Western Unity," The New York Times, (1949, April 10), E1; W. H. Lawrence, "West’s Hopes Run High On German Agreement," The New York Times, (1949, April 10), E4; "Western Policy In Germany," The New York Times, (1949, April 14), 24; "The Struggle For Germany," The New York Times, (1949, April 18), 24.} Additionally, the newspaper supported the lifting of the restrictions on German production, which had transferred the burden of the German and European recovery to the American taxpayer. It advocated for the integration of Western Germany into the economics of Western Europe.\footnote{"Western Policy In Germany," The New York Times, (1949, April 14), 24.} The newspaper also acknowledged the possibility of a Soviet exploitation of German nationalism after the lifting of the Berlin blockade, urging the western powers to shape their policy accordingly, so that the battle of Berlin would not be followed by a “defeat in the struggle for Germany, and that the path remain open for the return of a democratic Germany to the comity of the Western World.”\footnote{"The Struggle For Germany," The New York Times, (1949, April 18), 24. See also: C. L. Sulzberger, "'National Front' in Germany Now Pushed by Cominform," The New York Times, (1949, June 5), 1, 7.}

For The NYT in mid-May 1949 the upcoming Council of Foreign Ministers Paris meeting would be the most fateful gathering of the Foreign Ministers since the end of the war as the “fate of Germany [was] the fate of Europe,” and this “in a world split between an expanding Communist totalitarianism and a still shrinking realm of freedom.”\footnote{"A Fateful Meeting," The New York Times, (1949, May 17), 24.} The attitude of the newspaper before the meeting was skeptical toward but not hostile against the Soviet Union and supported the idea of a unified Germany, even though it was probably more than obvious that this could not be achieved.\footnote{C. L. Sulzberger, "Variety of Surprise Steps By Russia Is Held Possible," The New York Times, (1949, May 11), 19. See also: Anne O’Hare McCormick, "Abroad: When Will Western Powers Agree on Germany," The New York Times, (1949, March 28), 20; James Reston, "U. S. Stays Skeptical In Negotiating With Russia," The New York Times, (1949, May 1), E3; "For A Positive Program," The New York Times, (1949, May 6), 24; Edwin L. James, "Unification Of
favorable switch of western policy toward Germany regarding the reparations and the industrial restrictions and her political and administrative future so that the country would not become a political vacuum “open to Communist penetration.”1558 But at the same time The NYT in May encouraged a western invitation to the Soviet Union to join forces in the making of Germany into a “peaceful, united and democratic” nation on the basis of the Bonn Constitution.1559 Nevertheless, the newspaper declared that this move of creating a separate western German state was not directed against any nation and was not intended as an offensive act against the Soviet Union directly, but represented a move “against human misery, against despair, against chaos.”1560 German cries for unification and withdrawal of the occupation troops could not be achieved unless the foreign ministers worked successfully in Paris “toward the political and economic unification of Germany.” Since this objective failed the newspaper advised pursuing a united Western policy that could “win the confidence and support of the West Germans” and allow the continuation of “the dual policy of economic recovery and security in a divided Germany.”1561

As The NYT saw it, with the West German elections the status of the western Allied powers changed from that of “supreme boss to that of supervisor; a much more subtle and difficult relationship.”1562 Although the newspaper reminded its readers that West Germany was still potentially dangerous -especially now that it was “a moving force in world politics”1563- and reported on the pre-election appeals to nationalism, such as demands for occupation withdrawal or the abolition of the plan to internationalize the Ruhr, the report did not reflect any serious sense of anxiety, as it felt “the nationalism of Bonn [was] [N]azism only on the fringes.”1564 Yet the

newspaper indicated it was, along with the entire western community, “awaiting to see how far Herr Adenauer and his Government [would] press the nationalistic objectives offered in his campaign.”

Because “democracy [could] not be dictated by military government,” the reporter Anne O’Hare McCormick acknowledged the imperative need for the transition to a civilian government and praised Military Governor Clay's service and character and his ability to “[wear] out the Russians by sheer patience.” With the switch from the military to the US State Department civilian occupation forces in Germany, the newspaper seemed to feel the need to rush again to state that the US policy had not changed. Rather it made clear that for the western policies to be achieved the “unnecessary and mutually damaging pinpricks” should be ended and “common [western] goals” had to be set. This would be the challenging task facing the new High Commissioner John J. McCloy, a man of “top-notch ability and excellent judgement.”

Even though the newspaper did take note of the issue of the resurrecting or at least intentional instrumentalization of western German nationalistic sentiment, it did not comment further on this subject. The NYT foreign military correspondent, Drew Middleton, on the other hand, acknowledged the political warfare in Europe between the Soviet Union and the democratic West. Middleton, who reported to The NYT from Germany from 1947 to 1953, intensively warned, prior to the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris, about the Soviet appeal to German nationalism. He held the Soviets responsible for encouraging the idea of German unity and warned of the threat this Soviet maneuver could impose on western policy, since the Soviets were “adept at fishing in troubled waters” that western disunity had created. Surprisingly, despite the

constant reports of Middleton about the potential threat posed by the Soviet manipulation of German nationalism, the journalist encouraged the Germans who were moving falteringly toward a new political life and supported the argument that any nationalistic references of the western German candidates during the pre-election period was “forced upon them […] by the large number of Germans who [were] apathetic to parties and whose only political concept [was] the restoration of Germany's position in Europe.”1570 The journalist came back to the topic of western German political apathy, when this was reflected in the findings of a survey conducted by the Information Service Division of the United States High Commissioner's Office at the end of the year; it revealed that 60% of the Germans polled across West Germany did not even know who their Chancellor was.1571 Drew Middleton kept reporting on the potential consequences of the division of Germany and the related smoldering desire for unification and on how this desire could recruit nationalists both in West and East Germany.1572

The majority of the Letters to the Editor published in The NYT in 1949 about US policy in Germany were authored by experts, such as politicians, economists or academics or by organizations advocating for the prevention of another world war like the Society for the Prevention of World War III or the National Council for Prevention of War. The letters took a more reluctant view of US policy, expressing a skepticism toward the ability of the Germans to govern themselves, to the discontinuation of the reparations and about the actual impact of the East-West tension.1573 On the other hand, the non-elite people who wrote in appeared split on this matter. The German nationalistic sentiment that came out during the pre-election period was no surprise, in fact more of a foregone conclusion to a NYT reader due to what the reader considered the indecisive and disastrous policies the West had applied to Germany. Another reader believed that German nationalism would strive for its place in the sun as long as the East-West tensions

existed, while yet another reader located the resurgent German nationalism in the inherent German tendency to absolve itself from every blame. Additionally, some readers supported halting the dismantling of German plants, while others totally opposed Germany's industrialization since her plants had produced mostly war material and endorsed “a perpetual dole financed by the taxpayers of the United States.”

The New York Times in 1949 generally supported US policy in Germany; it recognized the alarming reappearance of German nationalism but believed that the resolution of this problem lay in the integration of the FRG in the western democratic community, a matter the newspaper advocated. Acknowledging the geopolitical situation of the FRG, the newspaper urged in 1949 for western unity when dealing with it. Additionally, the newspaper hosted in its pages extended articles authored by experts who analyzed the situation in Germany as well as the US policies applied in the country, but did not object to any of them. On the other hand, experts not hired to write for the paper, who vented in their Letters to the Editor appeared more skeptical toward US policy.

The Wall Street Journal

The main voices of The Wall Street Journal in the year 1949 were that of the editor and of the former Bolshevik sympathizer turned conservative foreign correspondent, William Henry Chamberlin. At the beginning of the year a WSJ editorial rejected the “tutelage” role played by the US toward Germany and did not hesitate to express its serious concern about the disastrous consequences of an imprudent continuation of US funding. To these economic fears Chamberlin added the “price of destructionism” he felt American taxpayers were paying for

1576 Social Networks and Archival Context, Chamberlin, William Henry, 1897-1969, Retrieved on 12/30/2020 from https://snaccooperative.org/ark:/99166/w6sx8ffr
1577 The editorial article quoted the definition of the term tutelage according to the Webster dictionary, which defined it as the “state of being under a guardian or tutor; also, the right or power over his pupil,” and the lexicographer which gave “it a slightly different sense: Act of guarding or protecting; guardianship; protection.”
Germany due to the continuation of dismantling, “the restriction of non-military industry and the setting up of one-sided non-reciprocal controls over German industry and foreign trade.”

However, in 1949 the newspaper’s interpretation of the US policy in Germany was not just based on financial concerns; the newspaper did not hesitate to interpret the political developments in Germany as well. “Control of The Ruhr. Policing Reich Arsenal Is Necessary to Secure Europe From Possible German, Plus Soviet, Aggression” was the full title of the January 13th article by The WSJ Berlin correspondent Joseph E. Evans, who questioned the likelihood of success of international control of the Ruhr area for the prevention of future German aggression, especially following the foreseeable formation of a West German state and its participation in the control authority. Evans did not downplay German potential aggression by stressing the new Soviet one, but instead argued that the Soviet threat added to the already existing German threat, warning that “combined Russo-German aggression would [...] be distinct and dreadful.” Nevertheless, he concluded that if the Ruhr industries were ever to be used for war purposes, it would be better for them to be used by the West, indicating he saw the larger threat in communism. The following week WSJ and Evans separated the two threats. Regarding Germany, the newspaper rested its hopes on the International Ruhr Authority and the Military Security Board in order to safeguard the western world from a new German aggression and to address the “tensions and frictions between the occupation authorities and the Germans” without forgetting who were the conquered and who were the conquerors. Regarding the Soviet Union, the newspaper highly doubted whether the western allies stationed in Germany were or ever would be “a serious deterrent to Soviet war aims,” especially at a time when the “famous door” was “pretty tightly shut, if not locked and bolted” to the Soviets and only “theoretically” open to them. Additionally, Evans suggested that the US increase its pressure “in the form of economic sanctions” around the Soviet orbit and not succumb to any “Soviet peace overtures.”

1581 “The board [established on January 17, 1949] was to be responsible for the whole field of disarmament and demilitarization, taking into consideration the laws and directives which had already been agreed upon on a quadripartite basis.” As cited by “Allied Control Council for Germany,” International Organization, (1949, May), 3(2), 372-377.
Regarding the newly elected Truman administration’s US foreign policy objectives toward Germany, Chamberlin focused on two parameters. On the one hand, there were the US troops in Germany, which functioned as “a shield for western Europe,” and, on the other hand, the replacement of Marshall by Dean Acheson, which signaled “the modification, if not the end of the ‘bi-partisan’ foreign policy,” which would allow a much freer and constructive Republican critique and a “more consistent and realistic policy toward Germany.” The newspaper also endorsed an active Republican political opposition and the ending of bi-partisanship. The WSJ reminded its readership in an overt way that the newspaper had always believed that the Soviet Union was “a militant dictatorship with the announced intention of ruling the world,” and would always believe in that until “indications of a change of policy [were] vastly more clear.” Consequently, the newspaper doubted “the long range wisdom” of Truman’s ideas, but confessed that it would be “foolish not to attempt to read the underlying significance of what [was] taking place,” like the dead-end the so-called “bipartisanship foreign policy” had reached.

Politically The WSJ regarded the creation of a western German state as “the greatest single threat to Soviet plans for control of all of Germany.” Thus the newspaper believed that the lifting of the Berlin blockade would be a “cheap price” for the Soviets in order to prove their clamor for a unified Germany and lure Truman into new negotiations, thus Chamberlin suggested that West Germany becomes “an equal partner in the European community.” Regarding the Soviet Union, Chamberlin suggested “force, not pacts,” as, in his view, no agreement had any value or significance for the Soviet rulers, even though he did believed neither in the possibility of war nor in the prompt termination of the Cold War.

Chamberlin believed the only key to European settlement would be an agreement of mutual withdrawal from Germany, provided that the two German zones (western and eastern) had not grown so far apart politically, economically and socially. Since that was not and could not be the case in Germany, in March 1949 Chamberlin supported the creation of a western German state

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that could be recognized as an equal partner in the (western) European order as well as the ending of destructive occupation policies like the dismantling of plants, even suggesting Germany’s association with the North Atlantic Pact. Therefore, for Chamberlin the creation of the western Trizonia showed that the western European governments had acknowledged that there was no “safety in isolation” and that the German problem could be solved within the framework of a politically, militarily and economically united (western) Europe, where Germany would play “a loyal role.” With the blockade lifted Chamberlin warned that this did not signal “the end or even a relaxation” of the struggle for Germany, but “a shift from the field of threats and intimidation to the area of diplomatic bidding and maneuvering.” Additionally, the approval of the West German Basic Law was considered by The WSJ as a “triumph of western, especially American, policy.” The newspaper expressed the critique, however, that if the West had not “lost sight of the inevitability of German unity” and had proclaimed the Bonn constitution for all Germany, even though it would be applied first in Western Germany, it “could have won support of Germans in both West and East.”

Even though the newspaper was quite anti-communist and anti-Soviet, it remained concerned that the US was over-committing itself financially in Europe. The proposal of the Atlantic Pact provoked both a critical evaluation of its consequences and a WSJ counterproposal to let the Marshall Plan countries recover economically and be able to contribute once again to their own rearming and not burden the US with Europe's rearming, which could bankrupt the country. The newspaper was clearly not supportive of or satisfied with the Truman administration and initially it wondered whether Truman truly meant that the pact was “an advance declaration of war.” Over time the WSJ came to understand the initiative of the North Atlantic pact as one of the many reactions US foreign policy had taken as a result of Soviet actions or

1592 In January 1947 the American and the British occupation zones in Germany joined forces and created Bizonia. In April 1949 France was persuaded to participate in a joint administration of the Western sectors of Germany creating Trizonia, which existed only a month prior to the founding of the FRG.
“refusals to act cooperatively;” a position which was not shared by Chamberlin, who saw it as a US attempt to restore the balance of power.1598

Nonetheless, *The WSJ* as well as Chamberlin, surprisingly, did not utilize the fear of communism as a persuasive or propaganda tool. In fact, it was not concerned with a Soviet-German alliance despite the worries and difficulties the western powers were facing in Germany.1599 On the contrary, the newspaper advised its readership “commonsense” and “not hysteria”1600 toward Communists, and therefore opposed “the government's outlawing of the Communist party as a political entity”1601 and trusted in the strength and sanity of the American people. Additionally, the Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers resulted in the “triumph of negativism”1602 and was regarded by *The WSJ* as a long-term failure for the East as well as for the West. On the one hand the Soviets utilized once more their propaganda and expressed no desire for a settlement of the German problem, while the West “provided them with [no] particularly fresh thoughts on the subject.”1603

The newspaper openly placed the blame for the failed cooperation between East and West also at the feet of the Truman administration, which led it to encourage an end to the bi-partisan foreign policy.1604 It called on the Republican opposition “to call attention to the majority’s blunders” and “facilitate getting the truth to the country.”1605 Regarding the four-power occupation of Berlin, the newspaper harshly condemned the American statesmen for not recognizing what kind of fruits they would harvest from this decision. *The WSJ* felt the US was left with the choice of either sacrificing the West Berliners “who courageously stood up to the Russians during the

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blockade,” or remain in Berlin and “invite provocations potentially more dangerous” than a blockade.1606

In the summer of 1949 Chamberlin returned to Germany after three years and reported “his breathtaking experience.” The dead country had come alive and he credited the change to the end of “the frenzy denazification which in 1946 was creating chaos and insecurity,” the currency reform and the occasional interference of the Military Government in German affairs, as well as to the German willingness to “earn their livelihood in a competitive world.”1607 He remained concerned about the prospective West German Government, but he believed that the (west) German people not only did not wish another war, but also that they stood together against one, with hopes of becoming a member of the European community.1608 Therefore, with the transition from military to civilian occupation Chamberlin hoped that the new High Commissioner would be able to maintain an “attitude of friendly co-operation” among the western allies and toward the new West German Government “on a basis of equality.”1609 The successful management of the unresolved issues of dismantling, German industrial production and export, and foreign controls over German economy were also associated with the likelihood of success of the new German state against the Soviets.1610

The WSJ did acknowledge the signs of German nationalism, but the reason for it was located in the failed American occupation policies coming from Washington. It did not criticize General Clay, however, who was credited with reviving the country.1611 The newspaper continued until the end of September to accuse the US Department of State of not acting but merely reacting to Soviet policies and urged for a reaction from the Republicans.1612

The Wall Street Journal provided its readership with a different take on US policy in Germany and the developing political situation in the country compared to the other press outlets. The WSJ did not use the Soviet Union and its communism as a scapegoat and acknowledged that the East-West tensions and the German problem were the results of failed western and eastern policies. US occupation policies were held accountable for the re-emergent nationalistic sentiment in Germany, which was neither expected nor justified by the German election. The newspaper still considered US policy-making as a reaction to the Soviet policies, and at least in 1949 it did not regard the loss of eastern Germany to the Soviets as a disaster. Chamberlin’s and the newspaper’s attitude toward the German problem split over the creation of NATO and on. Even though at first both agreed that Germany's rearming was anything but a wise choice, by autumn Chamberlin had endorsed the idea.

LIFE

Along with news of reports about Soviet advances on the development of the atomic bomb, LIFE wondered how long it would take for the European and American people to understand that the main premise of Communism was “to obliterate capitalist democracy and even Western democratic socialism from the face of the earth.” LIFE kept publishing reports throughout the year about devious methods of converting people as part of the Communist domestic danger. It gave examples like the framing and life imprisonment of Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty, the personification of Catholic opposition to Communist methods in Hungary, or about how the Communists occupied Peiping and spread the “Marxist dogma,” or the mocking report of a coal miner in the Soviet zone of Germany, who managed to increase his daily quota by 380%. It also showed examples of how Communists in the US suffered defeats, like how the non-communist members of United Electrical Workers in Pittsburgh won the union election and marked a “triumph for the democratic majority of US labor,” or how the steelworkers in

Bethlehem, PA cracked the strikes and led the “whole of US industry a long way toward the welfare capitalism.”

Additionally, *LIFE* published photos of 50 famous people it labeled and condemned as “fellow travelers”, like the physicist Albert Einstein, the playwright Arthur Miller, the movie actor and producer Charlie Chaplin, whom it described as “prominent liberals [who] were lured into […] the Moscow-directed line.” It condemned the propagandistic version of the first encounter of Soviet and American troops at the Elbe river in 1945 portrayed in the Soviet movie released in 1949, “Meeting on the Elbe.” It celebrated the breaking of a general strike and the defeat of the “Red bid for power” in Finland, and the stories of nine former Soviet citizens about their “old life and why they [would not] return,” depicting the situation in the countries under Soviet control (Hungary, Romania, Poland) as “a struggle with the primitive problems of hunger, poverty and backwardness.” Nevertheless, the tone of *LIFE*’s descriptions of the Soviet Union and the threat of Communism noticeably became less aggressive in 1949 as compared to the previous years. *LIFE* remained deeply anti-Communist, but it advocated for separating the Soviet state from the people, whom US foreign policy should target, as the Soviet people could be the US “secret weapon against Stalin’s plans for violent aggrandizement.”

In the year 1949 the magazine also maintained its supportive, if not over-the-top flattery, attitude toward Truman, who on his inauguration day delivered “one of the frankest statements of US foreign policy ever made in peacetime,” which would sorely disappoint Moscow if it were “looking for soft words.” *LIFE*’s national affairs editor Roger Butterfield found the “honest Missouri extrovert” Truman to be of “a very human character” as “one of the easiest Presidents”

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1616 “Labor and Society,” *LIFE*, (1949, November 14), 27(20), 42.
1617 A person who sympathizes with and often furthers the ideals and program of an organized group (such as the Communist party) without membership in the group or regular participation in its activities. Retrieved on 7/8/202 from [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fellow%20traveler](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fellow%20traveler)
1619 “Red Virtue Routs Western Villainy,” *LIFE*, (1949, June 6), 26(23), 63-64.
1621 “Russia Through Russian Eyes,” *LIFE*, (1949, September 26), 114-130.
the country had ever had. After praising the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the patrol of American military planes and ships in the skies and seas of Europe, a *LIFE* editorial stated, in an frustrated tone, that thanks to “the large executive powers of the US President,” it was time that the US “cashed out” everything it had done in the post-war years for Europe and be awarded with the “confidence of Europe,” which the US was “entitled to.” As such, the magazine called on the European and American people to strengthen the anti-Soviet’s world’s belief in America’s ability to protect them against the Soviet Union.

The North Atlantic Pact embodied that defense and was regarded by *LIFE* as the “greatest formal shift in US policy-and American thinking-since the promulgation in 1823 of the Monroe Doctrine.” At the same time *LIFE* took into account that after two World Wars and after being “twice burned, the US [was] deploying and committing its firemen in advance,” while it warned the western powers to declare that their alliance aimed at peace and not war so that it could not be interpreted by the Soviets as a Western commitment to war. In contrast to previous years the magazine refrained from provocative aggressive characterizations when referring to the Soviet Union. It seemed to try to deliver a more balanced interpretation of foreign affairs, by suggesting, on the one hand, that the West would do well to find diplomatic ways of addressing the peoples of the Soviet Union, while, on the other hand, calling upon Western European governments to treat the Communist leaders in their own countries “as national traitors;” a political action which was first adopted against anti-Communist leaders by the Soviets and could not be mistaken for a “measure of war.” The magazine's opinion of the pact was visually represented: one photo depicted the “sponsors of the treaty” smiling about the “new evidence of Western determination,” and the other photo depicted Communists (“Reds”) provoking riots in Italy to prevent the country from joining the treaty.

Interestingly, the possibility of the lifting of the Berlin blockade and ending the airlift was not welcomed by *LIFE*. On the contrary, it was observed with reservation and doubt, and the

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1629 “The Atlantic Alliance,” *LIFE*, (1949, April 11), 26(15), 44.
magazine questioned whether this was an opportunity that the West should take, or leave and maximize the pressure while the Soviets were in a weaker position. Additionally, the magazine expressed its belief that the lifting of the blockade was part of a larger Soviet plan, that of acknowledging defeat in Berlin in order to “regain their access to all Germany through a re-established four-power system.” The editorial article concluded by speaking on behalf of the entire American people and declaring that they did not want a “surrender of all that the West [had] lately gained in Europe.” When the Berlin blockade was finally lifted and the airlift ended, it was briefly reported on by LIFE, accompanied by a photo of “fast-flying, precision-drilled pilots of the US Air Force” spelling out Clay with their aircrafts. In the following issue, LIFE expressed its “enormous debt of gratitude” to General Clay, “the hero of the great airlift,” and stated that his replacement by John McCloy signaled “a shift from military rule of a dependent Germany to civilian supervision of a progressively independent Germany.” For McCloy, the first US High Commissioner in Germany, the magazine had only good words to publish; he was “straight,” “firm,” “knowledgeable,” the “best possible choice.”

Regarding western Germany's recovery, LIFE reported the two different sides of the same coin: the economic flourishing of the country in contrast to the economic situation of its people. Apart from western Germany’s reconstruction depicted in photos of 18 different western German cities, in which factories were running, construction work was taking place, buildings were being rebuilt, “the incentive [of German workers] for hard work,” and a full page photo of the massive production outcome of the Volkswagen factory, two LIFE correspondents also reported on the almost valueless Reichsmark, the black market and the “widening gap between rich and poor, which could be exploited by the Communists. Additionally, the magazine criticized “the West's failure to sell democracy to the broad mass of the German people,” and hoped that the Bonn Government would be “composed in the national interest” and would have a “democratic appeal” to the German people. LIFE believed in West Germany's “strong turn against Communism,”

1636 “To Democracy the German Says: "Show Me”,” LIFE, (1949, May 16), 26(20), 42.
but declared that it still had to demonstrate “either the will or the capacity for democratic practice.”

After the West German elections LIFE hosted an article by the newly elected West German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, who stated that the results of these elections proved the “growing power of Christian Democratic thought” of the German people and their preference for “parliamentary democracy and European cooperation” instead of “socialism and its doctrines of planned economy,” let alone Communism. Adenauer continued his statement in a very American way, saying what most American people would like to hear about West Germany's new role as bulwark in a world threatened by the East. After paying his tribute to the American dollars that had saved Germany from famine and guided it to the path of democracy, he pointed out the need for increased production and exports so that the country would no longer depend upon relief money. Consequently, his tone altered and hanging over the American head the threat of a Communist noose, he urged the US to maintain its “strong interest in giving Germany the protection” it needed and to plan measures which would be applied after the ending of the Marshall aid, like a halt to the dismantling process, so that increasing internal difficulties would be prevented. After expressing his demands, or more nicely put, his prerequisites, Adenauer concluded: We are of the West. Adenauer stated further that in the years to come West Germany, as part of the West, would contribute “her share to the benefit of the Atlantic world to which [it] belong[ed].”

The magazine was on the same page with Adenauer. For LIFE the new middle way, far from Socialism, Fascism and Communism, and as close to Liberalism as possible, was Christianity. LIFE supported the fact that European Christian democratic leaders, Adenauer of course included, did not turn their back on the use of the “tools of capitalism,” a cause the US should continue to strive for.

In terms of reader response “the Mindszenty Case” led LIFE readers state that it was time that Communism was not only regarded as “bad,” but that something be done about it, while LIFE’s article with the mug-shot-like publication of 50 photos of famous fellow travelers roused stormy reactions by the readers as well as by some persons whose photo was included in the article.

1637 “Europe in June,” LIFE, (1949, June 20), 26(25), 36.
1638 Konrad Adenauer, “We Are of The West,” LIFE, (1949, August 29), 27(9), 24.
The editor himself replied that “of the 300 people who wrote LIFE concerning this story, the majority were critical.” In a quite provocative way the editor added that LIFE “did not put these individuals in the class of dupes and fellow travelers. They put themselves there by joining or sponsoring Communist-front organizations.”

Up until Germany's division into two states LIFE magazine continued its pro-Truman and anti-communist attitude. Even though the magazine's language was not that strong when addressing the Soviet Union, as it had been the previous years, its anti-communist stance was still profound. Lastly, after Adenauer's election the magazine without hesitation made the overt connection of Christianity with democracy and anti-communism.

TIME

From the beginning of the year TIME included in its “Foreign News” section reports about communist political advances in many European countries, as well as in its “National Affairs” section analysis of domestic developments it considered communist-related. Apart from a few exceptions scattered throughout the year, the language was intended to come across as informative rather than provocative or notably biased. Nevertheless, three times in 1949 its cover, each time along with an extended article, clearly hinted at its desire to promote an anti-communist ideology: in February hosting Hungary's Cardinal Mindszenty, in April the American Communist politician Francis Xavier Waldron aka Eugene Dennis, “the boss of one of the noisiest and most pertinacious minority parties of the US history,” under whom there was a caption reading “To rule is to take orders” and behind whom there was a depiction of the caption showing the Kremlin pulling the puppet strings of people who were holding a red flag, and in August the Director of the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) J. Edgar Hoover “-a born organizer and a

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1643 TIME, (1949, February 14). 53(7). cover. József Mindszenty was the leader of the Catholic Church in Hungary, who opposed communism and the communist persecution in his country after the war and was tortured and imprisoned in 1949.
1645 TIME, (1949, April 25), 53(17), cover.
bear for accuracy-,”1646 in front of a gigantic fingerprint pointing at a man looking as if he was trying to sneak out of something.1647

As always, TIME’S “Man of the Year” from the previous year was on the first cover of the year and not surprisingly Harry Truman was chosen.1648 The first article featured the “symbol of the year,” the Berlin airlift, and consequently the magazine praised all the US historic moments of the previous year refusing to abandon “Europe’s helpless peoples […] until the voice of a free people [was] heard clearly.” According to TIME, Truman proved that he “had run on a program, not a record. […] In his inherited term, Harry Truman, by painful experience, groping and pluck, had developed a policy of containment and counterattack. In his new term, the man of 1948 would carry the full weight of driving that policy to a decision.”1649

In mid-March TIME magazine cited the disturbing results of a German survey from the German weekly magazine, Der Spiegel, which had asked who the greatest statesman in all history was. The results proved to TIME that “the collective German mind” still admired strong men, who mostly used force to achieve their goals. In the first place was Germany’s first Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, “who once bragged that the great problems of history are solved by blood & iron,” and second was Churchill, “who had helped to break up Bismarck’s Reich with blood & sweat.” In the third place was the German Chancellor during the Weimar Republic, Gustav Stresemann, credited with reaching a rapprochement with France, and coming in with only a few votes less in fourth place was Adolf Hitler. Next came Stalin, and then trailing even further behind Truman with only 7 out of the 8,500 votes and Jesus Christ coming in second to last with 4 votes. A second report in the same article included a description of the Bavarian Fasching (carnival or Mardi Gras) with the “2,500 public and 25,000 private parties,” where in order to attend costume balls “families pawned beds, shoes and watches to buy costumes.” TIME justified this “lunatic luxury,” because Bavaria was “Western Germany’s fat breadbasket, and its agrarian economy [had] always been nicely sprinkled with small industry.” Regarding the progress of South Germany down “democracy lane” the US Military Governor for Bavaria Murray D. van Wagoner stated that it was hard to “teach an old dog new tricks,” but no matter how long it would take, Germany would get there. In contrast

1646 “National Affairs. Boards & Bureaus,” TIME, (1949, August 8), 54(6), 12-16.
1647 TIME, (1949, August 8), 54(6), cover.
1648 TIME, (1949, January 3), 53(1), cover.
to *LIFE, TIME* acknowledged the existence and growth of German nationalism, but blamed the Soviets for it, whose concentration camps, it claimed, were “no more decent than those of the Nazis.” Furthermore, it attributed the rise of German nationalism to the Soviet blockade of Berlin, the division of Germany, and the East-West tensions.\(^{1650}\) *TIME* obviously did not paint a nice picture of Germany, but the magazine did not express any concern about it. On the contrary, it attempted, to a certain extent, to justify the situation in the country.

Even though *TIME* did not directly cite communist expansive attempts in Europe as a justification to support its anti-communist position, the magazine promoted the need for defensive preparedness.\(^{1651}\) As such, for the magazine the North Atlantic Pact was “perhaps the most fateful peacetime step in US diplomatic history since the Monroe Doctrine.” The fact that the State Department usually received bushels of letters about Palestine, China or Spain, while for the Pact it “had gotten only a trickle in the 14 weeks the North Atlantic pact was being negotiated,” made the magazine wonder whether this indicated “apathy or agreement” on the part of the US people, a question which it answered itself stating that “the US public had accepted, long since, the important principles involved.”\(^{1652}\) After the signing of the North Atlantic Pact *TIME* did not comment much on this matter but chose to depict its position with an image of a wounded globe wearing glasses like those Truman wore, but showing off its biceps muscle, on which was written the phrase *Atlantic Pact*, while the members of the defense alliance were depicted as surrounded by a wired fence which spelled the phrase *Atlantic Pact*, and looking at Stalin either scared or ironically, while he was calling them warmongers, against the backdrop of a map depicting the current US “design for defense,” which showed in white the small Western Union of France, Benelux and Britain, in light grey the bigger-than-the-Western-Union “area of containment” of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Western Germany, Switzerland, Austria and Italy and in red the much larger Soviet territory.\(^{1653}\)

The transition of western Germany from occupied zones to a civilian self-governed state was regarded with caution by the magazine. Clay, who had “dominated the German scene by his


firmness and boldness,” would be replaced by the High Commissioner John McCloy, who would “bear a heavy share of the responsibility for suppressing the worst in the Germans, drawing out the best. For this people [had] the greatest capacity for good & evil in Europe, and the future of the world [might] turn upon whether they [could] be made democratic, peace-loving people.” McCloy's appointment gave TIME one more opportunity to write about the complex German situation, since at the same time “Europe [needed] Germany and [was] afraid of Germany. Russia [feared] a Germany allied with the West; the West [feared] a German alliance with Russia. Neither side consistently and wholeheartedly [would commit] itself to either a strong or a weak Germany.” Therefore, TIME did not express its wishes or assert that McCloy could guide West Germany through this, but made clear that he was called upon to “find a way out of the German box,” while simultaneously he should manage the German “poverty, fears of another war, and national ambitions.” Corroborating this, after the end of OMGUS the TIME Berlin Bureau Chief Enno Hobbing reported the disheartening Berlin situation. Hobbing accused the US of winning Berlin for nothing, as the Westberliners were left jobless and an easy prey to the markets of the Soviet sector as they could not afford the Western ones.

The magazine might not have attacked only the Soviets for the situation in Germany, but also the US, however, its anti-communist inclination kept reappearing. The magazine applauded Paul McGuire’s book There’s Freedom for the Brave, especially how he analyzed Communism as a product of “Western civilization,” and that the Communists “w[o]n their victories” by filling the “vacuum created by the failure of Western power, Western nerve or Western ideals.” Specifically, McGuire located the failure of the Western world in the “disintegration” of its “moral community,” and pointed out that Communism could not be “stopped in the long run either by diplomacy, wealth or war,” but with “Christian morality.” As in LIFE, in TIME Christianity was also represented as the good democratic and anti-communist signpost. As such, even though before the August 1949 elections in the FRG TIME delivered a quite unbiased description of the two main candidates, Konrad Adenauer and Kurt Schumacher, locating their main difference in the role of religion and the Church and their mutual focus on the sharp criticism of the Western occupation powers and

1656 ibid.
1658 “International. What’s up & What’s to Do,” TIME, (1949, March 14), 53(11), 32.
mainly the dismantling process, after the elections TIME welcomed the German vote for “the Christian Democrat's, free-enterprising ideas, [and] a sharp swing to the right.” For the magazine Adenauer, “whose emergence to leadership in the West [was] one of the Continent's striking postwar phenomena,” had in the center of his mission “Christian democracy, not for Germany alone but for all Europe;” mostly likely the vital element which could guide West Germans through the “tortuous road to democracy.”

In contrast to LIFE, TIME magazine delivered its readership more reports from Germany. The billboard romance story, which was also hosted in LIFE, was presented by TIME in a much more discreet way. The magazine mentioned that not all romances were “ephemeral.” TIME's Berlin Bureau Chief and devout Catholic Emmet Hughes, after a month touring western Germany, described in a three-page article Germany's “faceless crisis.” In some places German faces were “hideously scarred,” while in other places they were “sleek and smooth,” the German production had surpassed the ERP target, but its imports were still twice as more than its exports, while politically “apathy, skepticism and confusion” dominated western Germany. Hughes provided a very clear example: three years ago if a German criticized the Soviets he was classified as Nazis, three years later if the same German did not “repeat loudly enough” the same criticism he was suspected of being a “Communist follower;” and that was on the US occupation policies according to Hughes. As such he concluded that if the West wished to build a free and stable Germany, and not a colony, it should make sure that the Bonn Government “establish a West Germany state integrated with Western Europe and looking toward reunion with Eastern Germany.” Another story from Germany, which TIME shared with its readership, was that of the 34-year-old Rainer Hildebrandt who tried to instill hope in Eastern Germans. Randomly mailing the letter F and writing it with chalk on walls in Leipzig, Weimar, Potsdam and throughout the Soviet sector of Berlin Hildebrandt wanted to declare that the people were not afraid to talk and also deliver his

fellow citizens the message that they were not alone. The F stood for Freiheit (freedom), namely from “the new way of totalitarian terror.”

In contrast to LIFE, TIME did report on the political state of mind of the West German people and the opinion it expressed was not optimistic. The West Germans still had a long way toward democracy, but the magazine had strong faith in their new Chancellor and the US administration. The lack of letter from the readers about Germany until early October is profound and striking.

**Commentary**

The first issue of *Commentary* for the year 1949 included a review by the film theorist Siegfried Kracauer of the 1947 German film *Marriage in the Shadows*, a film shown in 1948 in all four zones of occupation, which in the German-Jewish émigré Kracauer’s view indicated “the present state of the German mentality.” Even though the film was produced “under Russian auspices,” in the Soviet sector in Berlin, there was “no significant evidence of Russian influence.” Representing love and friendship between Germans and Jews during the time period 1933 and 1943, and the Nazi regime as “conquerors,” the film “very optimistically [spoke] of a turn to the better, with democratic thought gaining strength,” and yet recording “facts which [gave] about the reverse impression;-all too often, apparently, objective estimates [were] watered down by wishful thinking and moral preachment.” To Kracauer, who had worked from 1922-1933 as a literature and film editor for the renown *Frankfurter Zeitung* and was associated with the Frankfurft School of Weimar intellectuals, the film proved that the postwar German middle-class mentality had not really changed and that the problematic effects of German re-education was no result of “individual ethics,” but of the way the majority of Germans “conceived of authority.” Kracauer concluded by sharing his fear that “the decent Germans of today [might] again let the evil grow without penetrating and resisting it.”

Without turning a blind eye to the mistakes of the Allied occupation and the existence of Nazi elements in Germany, but acknowledging the German will for a return to democracy, the Rumanian-born French journalist Nicolas Clarion attempted to answer the question whether

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“democracy [needed] Nazi partners.” He analyzed the major trends in German politics and German society, and attempted to define the “German problem” in reference to the geopolitical background to the division of Germany and to the American goal of the democratic reconstruction of Germany. Clarion focused on the role of the Ruhr valley and on the American “blunder” to entrust, albeit under Allied supervision, to German trustees the regrouped gigantic German “‘decartelized’ enterprises,” as well as on the ineffective investigation of the “spinal column of Nazi imperialism's banking system.” Additionally, Adenauer's declaration over Radio Berlin that Germany's doors were wide open to Jewish fellow-citizens had “a melancholy, even mocking, ring” to Clarion's ears due to the return of Nazis to leading positions, and “the slowness with which the displaced-persons camps had been emptied.” Nevertheless, Clarion believed in Germany’s “embryonic democratic impulse,” like the Social Democratic party and the university students and young intellectuals, “if only the Allied occupation authorities [could] be persuaded to act more as midwives and less as abortionists.”

After Adenauer’s election as the first West German Chancellor the Russian-born political scientist A.R.L. Gurland, a Jewish émigré from Germany himself who had briefly worked for the OSS alongside other social scientists from the Frankfurt School, explained how democracy was losing in Germany by delivering its administration “more firmly than ever in the hands of a conservative and unimaginative bureaucracy,” the “denazifiables” and the Catholic industrialists and bankers, and its economy in the hands of former Hitler collaborators. Gurland criticized that the American and British military administrators had failed to re-introduce any kind of social insurance and that their “decartelization” of enterprises was only a substitution of control “under the trusteeship of appointed officials not subject to democratic controls.” Additionally, the absence of central executive and legislative powers in the country’s economy resulted in the development of “anti-Allied, nationalistic, and simple Hitlerite sentiment.” Gurland concluded that the Western occupation had “appallingly discredited democracy in Germany” and the “ill-constructed, complicated, unclear, and verbose” Bonn Basic Law was “hardly likely to win new adherents for democracy.”

As seen in all three essays by Kracauer, Clarion and Gurland, the main focus of Commentary until October 1949 was on western Germany’s return to democracy and how the US

policies that had been applied so far not only did not contribute toward this direction, but reestablished everything the Potsdam Agreement had attempted to root out.

*The Nation*

The German return to nationalism was also pointed out by *The Nation*. The magazine called on Truman to define the second phase of his foreign policy by relying upon “other natural allies in Europe than decadent monarchies, erstwhile Nazi industrialists, and the world hierarchy of the Roman Catholic church,” and instead to prove that his administration was liberal enough to be able to export some of its liberal ideas to Europe and Asia, which were “poised in doubt and growing cynicism between the systems of the East and West.”

Despite the leftist character of the magazine, which differentiated between socialism and communism and distanced itself from communism, *The Nation* defined the real danger of communism to be the promise of “hope of escape from intolerable [living] conditions” and counter-proposed the western “decent standards of living and real political and civil liberty” as the only weapon against communism. This was in contrast to what Truman spoke of in his inaugural speech, which sounded more like a declaration of Cold War. Additionally, the magazine pointed out the Soviet advantage in this Cold War as the terrain -“the terrain of propaganda”- was more familiar to them, but believed that the newly appointed Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, might be able to turn the cold war into “warm peace.”

Neither the Basic Law nor the victorious leader of the Christian Democratic Union Adenauer as Chancellor caused *The Nation* to feel more confident about the development of a democratic Germany. The magazine advocated for a four-power cooperation toward facilitating Germany’s development on a more socialist or social democratic basis, which would give the country a working class strong enough to fight any “attempted Nazi insurrection” through its participation in the economic and political institutions. Corroborating this, CAROLUS, a member of the German trade-union movement and the pseudonym of the new anonymous Nation’s correspondent in the western zone, described how the Western Allies were digging their own

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graves by allowing Nazi “henchmen” to dominate the economic scene of Germany in 1949. Democratization was “still far away,” according to CAROLUS, who quoted a German, who had never been a Nazi, who stated after he was told about American contributions to the German people, such as that every schoolchild in the US zone had been having “for more than a year received a good daily lunch, at the cost of three cents.”: “These Americans, if they give us as much as all that, they must have a very bad conscience.”

CAROLUS’s story was reinforced by The Nation's European editor Julio Alvarez del Vayo after a conversation he had with a German professional visiting New York City for three weeks. As the German kept talking del Vayo detected no concrete German political inclination in the views of this professional: the Western airlift contribution to the Berlin blockade had neither proven any Western commitment to the city nor impressed the Germans who were offered only two hours of electricity daily and had to get up at 3 a.m. to do their ironing and cooking. Additionally, this German appeared quite sure that the Soviets would convert the Cold War into hot by offering the Germans to join the Soviet sphere and helping them to achieve unity under the regime they chose. The hatred towards all occupation forces as the single unifying element among the Germans was also reported by CAROLUS, who even started to write about Germany’s “renazification” instead of the success of democratization.

However, when the question of Germany’s potential participation in the North Atlantic Treaty surfaced, it provoked mixed feelings for The Nation. The ex-banker and international affairs author James P. Warburg, who was a member of the Society for the Prevention of WWII, which was formed in 1945 to prevent a resurgence of German aggression, published in The Nation his alternative proposal for Germany with regard to the prospective signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, which he had already presented to the Secretary of State on February 26. Warburg suggested three steps toward resuming talks on the unification of Germany: 1- the suspension of the drafting of a constitution for a western German state, 2- the lifting of the Berlin blockade, and 3- the setting up of a date for a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Berlin, where Germany’s function as an economic whole and the establishment of a federal government would be discussed. Of course, Warburg did not neglect the hot issue of the control of the Ruhr, and of

the reparations; for the first he suggested four-power supervision as well, and for the latter payment out of current production after Germany was self-supporting.1676

The head of the Washington bureau of the Foreign Policy Association, Blair Bolles, questioned the Administration's confidence in the eventual success of the theory of containment, and blamed George Kennan for neglecting communism's appeal and overestimating the US resources in his analysis. The “fallacy” of the containment theory had left the US “helpless to stop the spread of Soviet influence” and restricted the US influence to one part of Europe. Additionally, Bolles declared that the Atlantic Pact would force Europe to rearm, while its population had hopes “of making a decent living in a world of civilians” and not army men.1677 Bolles’ latter argument was supported by the editorial writer for the New York Herald Tribune, Walter Millis, who believed that the Atlantic Pact would be “another example of the inveterate American fallacy of imaging that this country [was] a completely free agent in a world which [contained] no other wills than its own.”1678

Even though the Foreign Editor and the publisher of the Nation did not believe the US intended to lead a conflict, but in the “definitely defensive character” of the Atlantic Treaty, the magazine continued to publish essays by distinguished professionals who disapproved of the Atlantic Treaty.1679 The chief editor of Combat, the Paris underground paper during the German occupation, Claude Bourdet, found no purpose in such a defense organization, which was more likely to be ill-conceived by the Soviets. He suggested an “armed neutrality of Europe” since the US would go to war in case Western Europe was invaded, would supply Western Europe with arms, and Germany's war industry would be mobilized in the service of American strategy even without the Pact.1680 Additionally, the leader of the new, rapidly growing, anti-Communist but left-wing movement in France, the Rassemblement Démocratique Révolutionnaire, David Rousset, felt the Atlantic Treaty was meaningless as the world was “not on the eve of war,” and suggested making “use of [the] respite for radically transforming social conditions in Western Europe” against the Soviet Union. According to Rousset, the Marshall Plan could contribute to the essential

social changes in Western Europe by being available to produce more consumer goods, while war production would be decreased.\footnote{David Rousset, “The Pact Is Obsolete,” \textit{The Nation}, (1949, April 9), 168(15), 408-409.}

Lastly, the Russian-born former war correspondent Alexander Werth, supported West Germany’s neutralization over her “Atlantization.” Werth began by reminding readers of the existence of the Third Force governments and coalitions in Europe and mostly in France, unwilling to completely join in either of the sides of the Cold War, but to find a Third Way, which pursued “progressive, middle-course policies, neither too conservative nor too socialistic” aiming to “act as a buffer between America and Russia;” a role now West Germany could play. Werth even claimed that the idea of a neutralized Germany would be welcomed by the Soviet Union.\footnote{Alexander Werth, “Will Europe Go Right?” \textit{The Nation}, (1949, September 17), 169(12), 269-271.}

In reference to Germany’s industrial revival in the hands of former Nazi collaborators the magazine published several articles by distinguished experts who supported the magazine’s position. The German-Jewish refugee Marxist economist, Fritz Sternberg pointed out the US fatal error in the Ruhr was favoring the same “owning classes” that willingly collaborated with Nazis and excluding the only active supporters of democracy, the working class, and the option of socializing the Ruhr industry, employing the slogan of free enterprise.\footnote{Fritz Sternberg, “What To Do With The Ruhr? I. Socialize All Heavy Industry,” \textit{The Nation}, (1949, April 9), 168(15), 410-412.} Additionally, the leader of the French Socialist Party Leon Blum doubted France’s reconciliation with a Germany that had “not purged itself of the imperialist and Hitlerian venom.”\footnote{Leon Blum, “What To Do With The Ruhr? II. An Appeal to My German Comrades,” \textit{The Nation}, (1949, April 9), 168(15), 412-413.} Corroborating that viewpoint, Robert Bradford of the Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League, published in the magazine an exhibition of 530 German industrial firms -among them 40-50 bore “the swastika trademark”- sponsored by the American Military Government in Germany, which would be shown in various American cities.\footnote{Robert Bradford, “Hitler would have been proud of them,” \textit{The Nation}, (1949, April 16), 168(16), 446.} Lastly, CAROLUS revealed a technique Nazi members used to clear their name, proving that the denazification process was “the greatest farce of all time.” It was the whitewashing Persil (popular German laundry detergent) coupon (\textit{Persilschein}),\footnote{A soap powder popular in Europe for laundering and bleaching, which advertised that washed the clothes ‘whiter than white’.

\footnote{A soap powder popular in Europe for laundering and bleaching, which advertised that washed the clothes ‘whiter than white’.} a denazification certificate usually
obtained by bribing “complaisant clergymen, [...] Jewish D.P.s and the survivors of concentration camps.”

Yet despite these concerns about lingering Nazi influence, especially in the economy of western Germany, the lifting of the Berlin Blockade was understood in the context of Soviet-US relations and the Cold War. For The Nation’s publisher, this was “proof that toughness, embodied in the air lift, the erection of a West German state, and the Atlantic alliance [was] beginning to pay off.” Yet for The Nation’s Foreign Editor the lifting of the Berlin blockade did not settle everything since, as he warned, the issue of Germany might “prove to be long and stony.”

According to The Nation, the proclamation of the Federal Republic of Germany brought Germany back to the events of the proclamation of the Republic on November 9, 1918. Adenauer had previously been criticized by the magazine; now it was time for the magazine to reveal the support the C.D.U. had received from the US military government and the German industrialists and bankers. Germany’s renazification was mentioned once more by CAROLUS in June and in fact this time he implied that the Germans managed to manipulate the occupation forces and used their conflicts to their advantage by “selling” the same “formula” toward East and West and asking for “liberty and an end to occupation.” According to CAROLUS, if Hitler and Goebbels were aware of the “psychological and political effects of the cold war on the Germans [...] they would stir happily in their graves.” The newspaper’s harsh criticism against the US policy of denazification was also supported by the report of the former editor of Science Illustrated and veteran, Morton M. Hunt, who described how the Americans in 1945 were snatching out of Germany Nazi war scientists, even from the other occupation zones as long as they were not communists. Additionally, The Nation’s correspondent for the Nuremberg trials in 1945, Peter de Mendelssohn, reported that the Americans placed on the desk of every managerial office throughout the Ruhr a “Burnham Bible,” referring to Burnham’s 1941 bestseller The Managerial

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**Revolution: What Is Happening in the World,** an “exploration of an alternative to Marxist historical theory” by “a technocratic elite of credentialed managers” termed managerialism, who strove “for social dominance, for power and privilege, for the position of ruling class.”

Regarding US foreign policy toward the Soviet Union, from the beginning of the year the magazine expressed its critique of it. In February *The Nation* editor Freda Kirchwey criticized harshly the fruitless American attitude toward the Soviet Union the tendency of the US press to “waste columns of space” diminishing the value of whether Stalin’s purpose was propaganda and not peace, instead of focusing on finding a way to prove to the world that the US wanted good relations but it did not intend to “be hoodwinked on terms.” In June *The Nation’s* Foreign editor del Vayo emphasized Europe's unwillingness to fight especially in an area when battles would be fought with “weapons a hundred times more destructive” than in the past. Lastly, regarding the issue of whether members of the Communist Party should be allowed into America’s educational system, *The Nation*, despite its Leftist orientation, declared that the educational profession should maintain its ancient standard, its intellectual integrity, and pointed out that the teachers should have regard for their students and refuse “the deliberate practice of the lie.”

Surprisingly, despite *The Nation’s* repeated reports and essays not only about the failure of the democratization process in Germany but actually about its reverse outcomes, only one reader endorsed the magazine’s faith in the truly anti-Nazi Germans. The majority of the letters chosen for publication referred mostly to US-USSR relations. A *Nation* reader and teacher expressed the opinion that if teachers kept “silent about Soviet twists and distortions in matters scientific [they forfeited] the right to be critical of similar acts” in the US. While more than three hundred *Nation* readers collectively declared that the people of the US and the USSR wanted peace and
suggested that the two powers resolve their mutual fears, before war was inevitable. Regarding the management of the German problem, a Nation reader expressed the opinion that Europe's political union could only be based upon an economic federation. Another reader regarded Western Europe's rearming as “a dangerous prank,” since they believed that the Soviet armies would not “march across the borders of independent nations, unless attacked first or 'invited'”.

The Nation mostly had one main focus prior to the creation of the FRG. That concern was West Germany’s renazification under the eyes of the US for the sake of its industrial recovery and at the risk of West Germany’s return to potentially dangerous nationalistic feelings. The position of the magazine toward the Soviet Union did not take on polemical overtones; it did warn against communism, but promoted a diplomatic resolution of the conflict between East and West.

**Human Events**

Human Events openly attacked the newly elected US President Harry Truman. In the first issue of the year 1949 the newspaper called for an opposition party against the “consistently socialistic […] political philosophy” of the Democratic Party, while in the last issue of the month it made fun of what it called Truman's “contradictory and confusing” inaugural speech. Moreover, William Henry Chamberlin compared Truman to Roosevelt, aiming at showing how the attitude of the US administration had not changed over the years. By stating that “a person who had gone into a Rip Van Winkle sleep on January 19, 1939, waking up today [January 19, 1949], would have a curious feeling of: ‘This is where I came in’,” Chamberlin equated the Soviets with the Nazis. Also referring to the annual presidential message given by Franklin D. Roosevelt to Congress on January 4, 1939, and similar to the situation now with Truman,
Chamberlin mentioned the “six fatal blunders” that brought the US to the same position it was in before its involvement in the Second World War: 1-the British support to Poland, which dragged the Western powers into the war, 2-Roosevelt's “slogan” of “unconditional surrender [...], a tremendous damper on the German underground groups [...] working against Hitler,” 3-the US “getting along with Stalin” policy, 4-the adoption of the “incredible Morgenthau Plan,” 5-the “curious miscalculation of the situation in the Far East,” and lastly 6- the ineffective power of the United Nations “to mediate and adjudicate in disputes between the major Powers.”

The newly appointed Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, was also attacked by the newspaper. Its critique was acerbic and charged Acheson and not the Kremlin for turning over to Communism “helpless millions of people.”

Gradually the newspaper’s criticism became more extreme. Human Events, in an essay titled “In Stalin's Footsteps,” stated that it was difficult not to believe that the proposed “Economic Stability Act of 1949,” which vested in the US President “dictatorial power over the national economy,” was not some “Russian Law.” Additionally, a member of the Old Right and a non-interventionist Frank Chodorov charged Truman with potentially misleading the American people, who did not vote “for out-and-out Socialism.”

Despite the strong anti-communist attitude of the newspaper, Human Events did not welcome the North Atlantic Pact, as one might have expected. This was probably due to the position of the newspaper’s inclination to isolationism in 1949. As such, the Pact was regarded by Chamberlin as “the most spectacular move” of a policy, because it represented the abandonment of what he considered the Administration’s excessive spending on armaments. Apart from that he stated that the US should sign the pact but first set at least some minimum conditions, such as the lifting of the Berlin blockade, the signing of the Austrian treaty ending the Allied military occupation, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and Romania, the evacuation from Germany of all occupation forces and an end to the “milking of German industry.”
strongly believed that the Pact was another proof of the failure of reaching an agreement between East and West and a move that would intensify the “war of nerves” between them. On the same page the editor of the newspaper, Felix Morley, warned that the pact would deprive the US of its independence, and that the “lack of proportion between the units of the projected alliance” would make the European members dependent on American aid in return for a “common physical power.” Instead Morley suggested carrying on only the Marshall Plan policy, as in its one year of ERP operation there was no new Soviet aggression. The pact would only benefit the US in the event the Administration decided “to wage aggressive war on the Soviet Union at the first plausible opportunity.” Referring to the completion of the US-led successor war crimes trials in Nuremberg, Chamberlin in his essay “Vengeance, Not Justice” appeared outraged by the result of trials that cost American taxpayers from nine to twelve million dollars, and immeasurably sacrificed “basic ideals of equity, legality and sound international relations.” Downplaying Nazi atrocities against humanity or at a minimum separating the role and goals of Nazi ideology from the Second World War, Chamberlin pointed out the dangerous message the trial results promoted: that “every military or naval officer who [took] part in framing war plans [might] be indicted as a promoter of aggressive war -- if his country [was] on the losing side.” On the other hand, if the purpose of the trials were the “punishment of aggressive war,” then Chamberlin argued that “the place of the Soviet representatives was in the dock with the accused, not on the bench with the judges.” Provocatively, Chamberlin suggested the revision of sentences handed down by the Americans by the new West German State.

Indicative of the problematic stances of the newspaper and of its tendency to downplay Nazism and its legacy was a June 8th essay by James D. Mooney in Human Events about the US domestic political situation. Mooney stated that the people of a nation should “identify themselves actively with one party or the other, as indicated by their own interests and convictions.” Mooney was an American engineer and corporate executive at General Motors (GM), whose career had been stigmatized by his connection to the Nazi regime, when the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) “in response to postwar concern that GM colluded with the Nazis and used

1713 Felix Morley, “Alliance or Union?” Human Events, (1949, April 23), 6(16), 1-4.
involuntary labor, [...] scrutinized Mooney's actions.” Mooney may have been naive and easily manipulated, but he let himself in fact be “taken in” by the Nazis and even awarded “the Order of Merit of the German Eagle, with a certificate signed by Adolf Hitler.”\footnote{Daniel A. Wren, “James D. Mooney and General Motors’ Multinational Operations, 1922-1940,” \textit{The Business History Review}, (Autumn 2003), 87(3), 515-43.} 

Following \textit{The Nation's} and \textit{Commentary's} 1949 reports and essays about Germany's de/renazification, one might wonder how \textit{Human Events} would comment on Germany’s political state of mind in 1949. In the editor's essay titled “The Dead End of National Socialism.” Morley used a reference to the Nazi regime in order to condemn the practices of the British Labor Government and compare them with “the economic road constructed by the Nazis during the years immediately preceding the war.”\footnote{Scott Newton, “The 1949 Sterling Crisis and British Policy Towards European Integration,” \textit{Review of International Studies}, (1985, July), 11(3), 169-82.} He charged the British with domestic internationalization of industry while dismantling German industry in the name of providing reparations and preventing a resurgence of German military power, which had left the American taxpayers to “feed the unemployed [German] workmen to keep them from going Communist.”\footnote{Felix Morley, “The Dead End of National Socialism,” \textit{Human Events}, (1949, July 6), 6(27), 1-4.} Lastly, he used the opportunity to condemn American “internationalism,” which in his view would always lose “against the Russian or British isolationism.”\footnote{Felix Morley, “Compulsory Isolationism,” \textit{Human Events}, (1949, July 13), 6(28), 1-4.} 

Combining the European people’s “frantic desire to hold the Rhine, possibly the Elbe,” with military force and the natural elements in favor of the Soviet Union, like winter, manpower and the Soviet territorial size and terrain, the former military attaché and Republican Party supporter Brigadier General Bonner Fellers argued in \textit{Human Events} that it would be “disastrous” to rearm peoples whose governments were likely to change so radically that the US weapons might be used against the US. Instead as a military man Fellers suggested the use of the possession of the atomic bomb as a tool to “achieve national security.” Fellers concluded that “the attempt to hold the Rhine would be futile,” and that it might be better for the Red Army to occupy Europe, instead of the US having “the role of determining military strategy.” Fellers’ analysis combined both an isolationist tone, which would leave Germany and western Europe to Soviet domination, while noting that the atomic bomb guaranteed America’s own national security.\footnote{Bonner Fellers, “The Military Assistance Program,” \textit{Human Events}, (1949, July 27), 6(30), 1-4.}
For Chamberlin, the West German election provided the US with a “golden” but last diplomatic opportunity to bring the FRG definitely into the Western camp in the Cold War. Chamberlin praised the members of the new West German government and their tight bonds to Christianity, Liberalism, and economic progressivism, as well as the new West German Constitution, and applauded the decision of the German people to repudiate Communism. Finally, Chamberlin stated that the dismantling process should cease, to avoid “a relapse into industrial depression and mass unemployment,” and the rebuilding of machinery plants “with American money.”

In 1949 Human Events also carried a series “European Supplement” by the liberal French philosopher and political economist Bertrand de Jouvenel. The series made the point that Germany's integration in the Western sphere could possibly “alter the balance of power to Russia's disadvantage.” De Jouvenel argued that the Soviet Union would play on France’s fear of Germany, on Nazi domination and on the West’s inability to provide protection “to weld together the ‘satellites’.” Regarding Germany, de Jouvenel strongly stressed that the line of the Elbe River had to be “powerfully garrisoned,” if the Western Powers wished to gain time and be able to mobilize successfully Western Europe and “to administer swift retaliatory blows.” As such, de Jouvenel stated that the Atlantic Pact would serve as an important warning for the Soviet Union and would prove to the Western Europeans that American intervention in Europe was a “historical necessity stemming from the disastrous political strategy of the two World Wars.” De Jouvenel’s reports reflected the situation of how the entire western part of the continent, including Western Germany, was threatened by its eastern part, and supported the objectives of the US foreign policy.

Leading up to the establishment of the FRG in May 1949, Human Events’ anti-communist and conservative attitude evolved into an isolationist one and the newspaper was the second press outlet under examination, alongside The WSJ, in this study to have strongly criticized the Truman Administration. Even though it did not openly urge a break of bi-partisanship, it did charge Truman

1722 Bertrand de Jouvenel, “European Supplement to Human Events,” Human Events, (1949, January 19), 6(3).
1724 Bertrand de Jouvenel, “European Supplement to Human Events,” Human Events, (1949, April 23), 6(16).
with a socialist mentality. The newspaper continued to publish essays by experts in 1949, however it only published those whose opinions clearly aligned with the newspaper’s own position without providing the readership with an alternative point of view. The slight exception was de Jouvenel, who as a Frenchman in France analyzed the developments in Germany from a European point of view.

Conclusion

The annual presidential message to the newspaper editors in 1949 conveyed what Truman considered the responsibility of the United States, namely to police world security. The president believed that the press outlets would deliver their readership the right message to get the public firmly on board with this responsibility. The political analyst who definitely conveyed the message he himself regarded as right was Walter Lippmann. Lippmann continued to express the opinion that the US should use its influence to achieve a balance of power over the European continent and create the best possible future for its people. Instead of arms, Lippmann suggested the neutrality and disarmament of western Germany, mutually agreed upon by the West and the East. If this did not happen, Lippmann warned that the Soviet Union was the only power that could offer Germans unity; and such and offer, according to Lippmann, Germans would obviously take or they would be turning their backs on reunification.

Surprisingly, some of his views were shared by the majority of press outlets of wide circulation. The Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, The New York Times, TIME and LIFE magazines advised that the US follow the path of diplomacy toward the Soviet Union, not due to any change of heart toward it, but due to fear that the Soviets would withdraw from eastern Germany leaving the West high and dry as the only occupiers in Germany hindering the reunification of the country and the freedom of its people. Apart from that, however, these press outlets did not favor the neutrality of western Germany/West Germany. Acknowledging the important role of West Germany in the Cold War they urged an end to dismantling and West Germany’s incorporation into the West, even if it meant turning a blind eye to resurgent nationalistic feelings, which they themselves even reported on, up to the point of conveying the message that as long as the West Germans did not lean toward communism such nationalistic feelings were manageable, if not acceptable. The only exception among these press outlets was
The NYT foreign military correspondent Drew Middleton, who warned about the exploitation of western German political apathy by nationalists.

In contrast to the previous years, the topic of the Soviet Union did not monopolize these press outlets’ articles, and definitely not in the aggressive and judgmental way it had in the previous years. Besides, most of them had advocated cooperation with the Soviet Union before the establishment of the FRG. The position of the Soviet Union was more or less expected; the Soviets would either continue to delay and complicate the negotiations for the resolution of the German problem and the conclusion of the German peace treaty or would nominally retreat from its position only to strike back harder later. Additionally, the establishment of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in eastern Germany also came as no surprise to the press outlets and was regarded practically as a ‘puppet’ satellite state of the Soviet Union and a reaction to the establishment of the FRG.

On the other hand, The Wall Street Journal had a completely different perspective in 1949. It accused the Truman administration of merely reacting to Soviet actions, charged it with over-committing itself financially in Europe, and called on the Republican opposition to act accordingly, namely as a political opposition. This was also true, perhaps even more so, for the conservative newspaper of smaller circulation, Human Events, which in 1949 turned emphatically to a return to the old US mentality of isolationism and even charged Truman with having socialist leanings.

The two remaining press outlets of smaller circulation had markedly different interpretations of US policy on Germany as well as of the actual situation in Germany. The Jewish affairs-oriented Commentary and the leftist Nation were generally committed to alerting their readership to the danger of reconstructing Germany along the same lines and with the old industrial elite at the helm, and allowing it to govern itself on the basis of claiming to have new western democratic values, but without first providing a solid proof of its ideological transformation. This did not mean that both press outlets indiscriminately criticized or objected to the US policies on Germany, but that both focused critically on the most essential element for the long-term success of every policy, Germany’s political and social democratization.

Judging by the favorable way the majority of press outlets of wide circulation commented on US policy on Germany as well as observing the smaller number of polling surveys on this matter one might conclude that the American people either did not seem to need to worry about
Germany anymore or that they actually did not worry about it more than they worried about communism and their everyday problems. Perhaps all the money that the United States had spent thus far on Germany had paid off in one way or another. As I already mentioned in the previous chapter, the US dollars that were spent for Europe were not considered wasted but invested in strengthening the democratic spirit and winning the fight against communism and Soviet totalitarianism in the countries of Western Europe. Additionally, the US dollars would boost the US economy, just as this investment would decrease the inflation rate and increase US exports. Specifically, US purchasing power decreased by 8.07% in 1948 compared to 1947, while the US dollar experienced an average deflation rate of -1.24% in 1949, causing the real value of the dollar to increase.\textsuperscript{1726} As such, as long as the American people’s distrust of the Soviet Union and fear of communist expansion were confirmed through the polls, and some appeared worried about the possibility of an immediate war between the US and the USSR, their concerns about the ability of western Germany to govern itself democratically did not seem to matter that much. Besides West Germany was led by a devout Christian and for the majority of the American people polled, Christianity equaled democracy and anti-communist views. Lastly, despite the existence of surveys conducted on German soil revealing a resurgent nationalistic feeling and the report of this phenomenon by the press outlets under examination, the American people were not asked about their views on that at all. The poll questionnaires were oriented toward what Gallup considered the main concerns of the American people. That questions regarding Germans’ political orientation were not asked in 1949 might indicate that the Americans did not worry that much about Germans showing signs of German nationalism as long as they were not influenced by Soviet communism. This opinion was also promoted by the majority of the press outlets under examination, and as has been shown, American public opinion pretty much aligned with the views of the American press outlets, of course having been influenced by them along the way.

Returning to the main question of this study and the triangular relationship between US official foreign policy on Germany between January and early October 1949, the attitude of the press outlets under examination and the opinion of the American people participating in the polls toward it, I can quite definitely conclude that the anti-communist campaign of the Truman Administration of the previous years and its support by the majority of the press outlets under

examination in this study bore fruit; Americans’ fear of communist expansion had effectively replaced their fear of German aggression and any US policy pursued toward West Germany with this end in mind would most likely be approved by the American people, no matter what. Surprisingly, despite the constant reports of resurgent nationalistic feelings in Germany, reports coming not only from expected sources like the leftist Nation or the Jewish Commentary, but from all press outlets under examination except for LIFE in 1949 -reports which in the previous years would have been criticized and received skeptically even by the press outlets of wide circulation-this replacement of fears enabled the Truman Administration not only to gain the approval of the American people for its pursued policies in the name of national security, but also required less convincing from the press outlets as the US public opinion was also on the same page.
Chapter 6

“Acceptance back into the Fold?: The Rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)”

October 1949-December 1950

This chapter begins in October 7, 1949 with the creation of the Eastern German state, the German Democratic Republic (GDR). As of October there were two German states, the FRG and the GDR, both under the tutelage of the respective superpowers, the US and USSR. The transition of the three western occupation zones of Germany (Trizonia) into a quasi-independent and strong Western German state integrated into the West was the objective of the US foreign policy in 1950 and the focus of this chapter. Nonetheless, before moving on to the final chapter of this study a brief flashback is necessary. Back in 1945 and 1946, while the official US occupation policy regarded denazification primarily as punishment, the counterpart of reeducation promoted democratic values with books, education, culture and media to replace any holdovers of Nazism. After an American reading room was initially opened to the German public in Frankfurt in November 1945, the first American-style open shelf library for Germans with sponsored cultural events was founded on May 22, 1945 as the first of such establishments in major Western German and Austrian cities.1727 America Houses were created as places where Western German and Austrian citizens could learn more about American culture and politics, and engage in discussions and debates on transatlantic relationships.1728

In his address at the opening of the Amerika Haus in Stuttgart on February 1, 1950 the US High Commissioner for Germany John McCloy summed up the impressions from his stay there, as well as re-stated certain fundamentals of American policy in Germany. McCloy refrained from making provocative accusations against the Soviet Union and its communist influence and focused on West Germany’s world role. Particularly, he expressed his concern “over the reemergence of nationalist groups, [...] that many undesirable former Nazis and nationalists were finding their way

back into important places, [...] [and] that too many German people were apathetic or negative in their approach to their political responsibilities.” But he also acknowledged that the “picture was [more] positive rather than negative” due to the “freely elected Government and Parliament,” the “excellent men to be found in public life, sincere in their devotion to freedom” Additionally, McCloy made clear that “no one, last of all the people of the United States, [was] charging all Germans with the responsibility for Hitler's crimes” and characterized the “ability to admit mistakes and to make amends for them” as the “highest form of self-respect.”

McCloy reaffirmed US policy towards Germany, referring to the 1946 speech in Stuttgart by Secretary of State J. F. Byrnes, and adding to Byrnes’ “note of encouragement” to the German people a note of even more hope. According to McCloy’s declaration, the German people “should be enabled to develop their political independence along democratic lines in close association with the free people of Western Europe, [...] should be integrated into a free Europe, [...] should share fully in Free Europe's economic benefits and correspondingly assume its obligations, [...] should have the widest freedom to shape their future,” while American policy should “foster fair trade practices through a program of decartelization and deconcentration of industry.” McCloy concluded that “the future of Germany [was] not a local national question, [...] [but] an integral part of a great world problem.” Furthermore McCloy assured the German people that if they exposed and counteracted any subversive Nazi influences, the democratic peoples of the West would provide their full support so that Germany could “acquire a world position.”

Another sign of FRG’s reintegration into the West came on May 9, 1950 with the proposal from French foreign minister Robert Schuman, the Schuman Declaration, to place the French and West German coal and steel production under a joint High Authority (the European Community of Steel and Coal, ECSC), in which other Western European countries could also participate. The ECSC was to be charged with the task of quickly securing improved and modernized production, supplying on identical terms coal and steel to all member states’ markets, developing exports in common with other countries, and providing for equal and improved living conditions for workers

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1730 ibid.
in these industries.\textsuperscript{1731} The French steel industry had been purchasing from Germany between fifteen and sixteen million tons a year and worried about this reliance; thus an economic community helped provide a sense of security to France concerning the German coal surplus.\textsuperscript{1732} However, when on June 25, 1950 the Korean War began with Soviet-backed North Korea invading the pro-Western South Korea, the security of Western Europe became an imminent concern on both sides of the Atlantic, prompting a reevaluation of the management of the German coal surplus.\textsuperscript{1733} Adding to that the American pressure the French Premier and former Defense Minister René Pleven proposed the constitution of a European army including battalions from various European countries including Germany, the so-called “Pleven Plan.”\textsuperscript{1734} In turn, from September 16-18, 1950 the 12 members of the newly formed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) came together in the fifth Session of the North Atlantic Council in New York City to discuss a strategy against the Communist threat, and determine Western Germany’s role and participation in the new world balance of power and defense of Western Europe. As the U. S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated: “you can defend an adequate area of Europe either by bringing in troops from outside of Europe or by using, by arming, by having Germany participate.”\textsuperscript{1735}

Acheson worked to sell France and the rest of the NATO allies on his “one package” proposal on German rearmament—namely exchanging the stationing of additional American forces in Europe and the appointment of a Supreme Commander with the commitment that Germany would be allowed to contribute military to the defense of Europe, not as a full member of NATO at that time, since Western Germany joined to NATO officially in 1955.\textsuperscript{1736} The Secretary of State argued that the problem would not be solved by “the mere presence of a body of American troops

\textsuperscript{1733} James Dobbins (2003), America’s Role In Nation-building: From Germany to Iraq, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, p. 11. Korea, which had been occupied by Japan in the Second World War, was divided into north and south along the 38th Parallel in 1945.
\textsuperscript{1735} North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Verbatim Record of the First Meeting held in New York on 15.09.1950 - 20.30am, Retrieved on 6/10/2020 from https://www.nato.int/ebookshop/video/declassified/doc_files/C_5-VR_11.PDF
\textsuperscript{1736} James McAllister (2002), No Exit : America and the German Problem, 1943-1954, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p. 188.
in Europe.” He announced Adenauer’s intention “to participate in this effort, both in the field of production and in the field of manpower,” and straightforwardly asked the other members of the Council: “Do we repulse this offer? Do we encourage it? What is our basic decision? [...] We are at the threshold in this decision. We must go through or we must turn aside. We cannot stand shivering on the doorstep, unable to make up our minds [about] what we are going to do.”

According to the former Political-Military Attaché at the US Embassy in Bonn, Adenauer always “looked Westward for Germany’s salvation.” He saw in Germany’s “European integration a possible way to dilute the nationalistic fervor, […] worked indefatigably to restore German respectability and sense of national worth […] [and] viewed German rehabilitation as an engine for achieving a democratic, integrated Europe that eventually could take its rightful place in the world order.”

The September 1950 meeting did not resolve the matter of Western Germany’s rearmament and West German participation in the defense of Western Europe. However, in November at the 28th meeting of the NATO Council of Deputies the French Deputy insisted on signing off on the Schuman Plan, while he noted that the French Parliament would approve of “a German military contribution towards the common defense [...] without the revival of a German army or a German general staff [...] to safeguard the world and Germany herself against any revival of German militarism and to ensure peace, which [was] the supreme aim of the free nations.”

The US Deputy Charles Spofford did not object to the French proposals but was totally against depriving West Germany of its own military organization. For him, “the greatest military threat that could confront the North Atlantic Treaty powers in Europe would be for Western Germany to be aligned with the Soviets.” His argument must have been ultimately convincing as the West German contribution to the defense of Western Europe within the NATO structure, as proposed by the American Deputy, was accepted at the 6th Session of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels in


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December, when its members agreed that “an acceptable and realistic defense of Western Europe and the adoption of a forward defense strategy [could] not be contemplated without active and willing German participation.”\textsuperscript{1741}

The invasion of South Korea by the communist-backed North Korea caused once more the strategy of the US policies to change and made West Germany’s rearmament significant in the fight against Soviet expansion.\textsuperscript{1742} However, West Germany's rearmament was not well received by all Germans, as some feared that West Germany’s partnership with the Western defense alliance would deepen the division between East and West Germany, making the nation's reunification even more difficult. In fact of those West Germans polled in January 1950 74.6% were against German rearmament, with a majority of young men in particular rejecting the idea of conscription or military service as these were seen as making German aggression and war far too likely. The German resistance to rearmament created the public pacifist protest “Ohne-Mich Bewegung” (“Without Me” movement) with mottos like “Nie wieder Krieg” (“Never again war”) and “Lieber tot als Soldat” (“Better dead than a soldier”), which protested from 1949 until 1955 against Adenauer's security policy and spread through all social classes and political camps.\textsuperscript{1743} The Social Democratic Party (SPD) and its leader Kurt Schumacher were in the forefront of the German campaign against rearmament. Additionally, questions and doubts were raised about the form of a West German army as well as the moral and political acceptability of the German contribution to the defense alliance.\textsuperscript{1744}

Even though the anti-communist campaign of the press outlets will not be examined in this chapter except as they pertain to the West Germany, the anti-communist campaign of the US


government continued and it will be briefly mentioned, partly because of anti-communist fears that after purging OMGUS of left-leaning military and civilians that there might be some US officials with communist leanings left in HICOG.\textsuperscript{1745} In the fight against communist infiltration and expansion into the US the year started with a strong declaration against Communism, which not only characterized the year 1950 but also the new decade. This declaration did not come from the Administration, but from the Republican opposition and particularly from the speech of United States Senator from Wisconsin Joseph McCarthy. At a speech in Wheeling, West Virginia on February 9, 1950 McCarthy declared that he possessed a list of “cases of individuals who would appear to be either card-carrying members or certainly loyal to the Communist Party, but who nevertheless [were] still helping to shape our foreign policy,” as they were employed at the US State Department.\textsuperscript{1746} His movement, popularly known as “McCarthyism,” launched the second Red Scare wave in the US.\textsuperscript{1747} Even though McCarthy accused the Democratic Party from Roosevelt up through to Truman and his current Secretary of State of not reacting sufficiently against the phenomena of domestic and international communism, accusing past Democratic administrations of appeasing the Soviet Union, McCarthy’s anti-communist rhetoric buttressed Truman’s commitment to fight communism as a way to safeguard world security, and naturally to counter McCarthy’s accusation of being too soft on communism.\textsuperscript{1748}

Truman’s administration increasingly pushed an anti-communist stance and policies to go with it. On March 16, 1950 Secretary of State Acheson delivered a speech at UC-Berkeley carrying the title \textit{Tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union}, in which he called on the Soviets to lessen the tension between East and West in numerous ways, including asking if the Soviet leaders could “accept treaties of peace” for Germany, Japan and Austria which would give these countries the opportunity to enter into the international community as autonomous, self-governing units. Acheson warned his fellow listeners neither to raise their hopes nor to “allow [themselves]


\textsuperscript{1747} The First Red Scare began following the Bolshevik Russian Revolution of 1917.

to be betrayed by vague generalities or beguiling proffers of peace,” on the part of the Soviets, speaking instead of a US-led total diplomacy equal to the task of defense against Soviet expansion and to the task of building the kind of world in which our way of life can flourish. We must continue to press ahead with the building of a free world which is strong in its faith and in its material progress. The alternative is to allow the free nations to succumb one by one to the erosive and encroaching processes of Soviet expansion.1749

A month after Acheson’s “total diplomacy,” the US State Department’s Policy Planning Office presented to President Harry Truman a National Security Council Paper known as NSC-68, what the State Department’s Office of the Historian has described as one of “the most influential documents composed by the US Government during the Cold War.”1750 The process of the finalization of the NSC-68 paper started on January 31, 1950, when Truman requested the reexamination of the nation's strategy in response to the Soviet Union’s development of atomic power, the communist victory of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 and the Korean War in 1950, which “helped force the pace at which the new strategic concept was put into place.” On December 14, 1950 the final version of the paper was signed by Truman and two day later the Presidential Proclamation 2914 called for by NSC-68 announced “a state of national emergency requiring the defense buildup.”1751 In his speech delivered at the National War College, Washington, DC, on September 20, 1993 Nitze explained that the purpose behind the drafting of NSC-68 had been to deliver to the US President a thorough and detailed assessment of the Soviet threat and the US response options and not to convince the US public of the significance of this threat and the need for an increase in defense funding.1752 Neither returning to isolation nor purposely launching a war against the Soviet Union, the NSC-68 paper “made a case for an

alternative” to Truman, who in a world under the danger of Soviet “enslavement” could not afford to do nothing.

The NSC-68 paper warned that “the gravest threat to the security of the United States within the foreseeable future stems from the hostile designs and formidable power of the USSR, and from the nature of the Soviet system” and declared that “Soviet domination of the potential power of Eurasia, whether achieved by armed aggression or by political and subversive means, would be strategically and politically unacceptable to the United States.” Therefore the US “as the center of power in the free world places” had to “by means of a rapid and sustained build-up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world, and by means of an affirmative program intended to wrest the initiative from the Soviet Union, confront it with convincing evidence of the determination and ability of the free world to frustrate the Kremlin design of a world dominated by its will.”

This of course included the push for West Germany’s rearment.

Within two months of the formulation of NSC-68, on June 25, 1950, communist-led North Korea invaded South Korea with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) responding to this attack by demanding North Korea withdraw. The rejection of this measure led the UNSC to adopt Resolution 83 and constitute the attack on South Korea by North Korea a breach of the peace. The Korean war, the first hot war in the Cold War era, ended any disagreement in the United States about the continuation of the establishment of a large military force and militarized America’s containment strategy. The Korean war definitely reinforced fears of communist expansion on the European continent, in particular in and beyond divided Germany. US officials thus re-examined and hoped to strengthen the role of Western Germany in their military defense alliance, even though such a decision would likely solidify the division of Germany and reinforce the tension between the US and the Soviet Union.

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The final point I want to make before moving on to examine the press outlets is that in this chapter the fight against communism inside and outside the US is taken for granted; the American public was already by 1950 not only aware of but also, for the most part, afraid of communism. The threat of communist expansion in Europe had already resulted in various US doctrines and policies in the previous years, thus I will not dwell on its role in the formation of the US foreign policy on West Germany in this chapter, unless it is associated with the fear of a Soviet maneuver Westwards, which in turn would provoke an American response. The speeches and policies related to the US fighting communism mentioned in the introduction of this chapter reiterate that the Truman administration and consequently the US press outlets as a whole continued unabated with their anti-communist rhetoric. The role of the atomic and hydrogen bombs in the formation of US diplomacy when dealing with communism added to fears of communism and of war in the US and in Germany, but it was not central to discussions of West German (non-nuclear) rearmament and German re-entry into the community of Western nations.

President's Address at a Meeting with the American Society of Newspaper Editors

On April 20, 1950 President Truman addressed the American Society of Newspaper Editors on foreign policy at the Hotel Statler in Washington. Like the previous year Truman emphasized the importance of the press outlets in explaining US foreign policy, since “one vital function of a free press [was] to present the facts on which the citizens of a democracy [could] base their decisions.” At the beginning of his address Truman stated that the press served as a link between the American people and world affairs, so “if [the press] inform[ed] the people well and completely, their decisions [would] be good, [while] if [the press] misinform[ed] them, their decisions [would] be bad; [the US would] suffer and the world [would] suffer.”

Nonetheless, Truman went on to express his dissatisfaction with some of the press outlets, charging them with partisanship in the way they handled foreign affairs. Truman went on preaching about the values of democracy that should also be respected by the press, especially at “a time in history when there was so great a need for citizens to be informed and to understand

what [was] happening in the world.” Truman warned that the only way to overcome the “so false, so crude, so blatant” Communist propaganda of “deceit, distortion, and lies” was by presenting the “plain, simple, unvarnished truth” and having “confidence in the accuracy and fairness of the press.” The President concluded that the task of accurately presenting “the truth to millions of people who are uninformed or misinformed or unconvincing” and the task of showing “them that freedom is the way to economic and social advancement, the way to political independence, the way to strength, happiness, and peace” were not “separate and distinct from other elements of [the US] foreign policy” in building a peaceful world. He closed with a reminder that in this struggle the US had “truth and freedom on [its] side.”\footnote{ibid.}

As can be observed in such presidential messages since 1947 US foreign policy was inextricably connected to and committed to combatting Communism. As such in 1950 it appeared as if the President did not have to advocate for German recovery anymore, even if it was a military recovery, as the communist fear had effectively overshadowed the fear of Nazism.

\textbf{American Public Opinion as Evaluated by Polling}

Moving on to the American people, in October 1949 48\% of the Americans polled considered themselves Democrats and 45\% of the Americans said they would vote for a Democratic Congressman.\footnote{Gallup (1972), Vol. I, pp. 859-861.} In November 1949 65\% of the Americans surveyed believed that Truman would be a candidate for reelection in 1952 and 45\% of the Americans would vote for a Democratic Congressman.\footnote{ibid. pp. 864-865.} In fact, the majority of the Americans surveyed stated that the Republican party had not won the presidential elections since 1928, first because the people believed that the Republicans represented the big business party and the rich people, and second because the party lacked new blood and strong leadership.\footnote{ibid. p. 865.} To top it all, in December 1949 Harry Truman was voted the most admired man the American people polled had heard or read about.\footnote{ibid. p. 875.}
The messages deriving from the results of the Gallup surveys in 1950 were very encouraging for the US administration in reference to the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) as well. In particular, in November 1949 43% of the Americans believed that West Germany would choose to fight on the side of the United States in case of another world war.\textsuperscript{1762} In May 1950 the (Korean) war and the threat of war ranked as the most important problem facing the entire country among the people surveyed.\textsuperscript{1763} Thus it is not surprising that in the midst of the Cold War the American people were questioned about Western security in connection with the defense of the West Germany. In particular, in May 1950 the American people were asked whether they thought that the US should let West Germany: 1) build up her business and industries as they used to be, 2) build up her armed forces as a protection against the Soviet Union, 3) join the US and the nations of Western Europe in the North Atlantic Pact. Of the people surveyed 50% replied that the West Germany should be allowed to rebuild her industries, while 34% of them rejected the rebuilding of her army but 44% wished to allow her to join the NATO.\textsuperscript{1764} On this issue and judging by the survey results the founder of the survey organization George Gallup stated in his May 28, 1950 article in the \textit{Los Angeles Times} that “Western Germany [was] looked upon almost as an ally by the general public.” Gallup pointed out the change of views by the American people since the end of the Second World War and reminded that after the war the majority of the American people had declared that Germany could never be a peace-loving nation and that the US policies applied on the country were not tough enough.\textsuperscript{1765}

Furthermore, in August and in December 57% and 55%, respectively, of the people who participated in the Gallup surveys thought that the US, which as of June 1950 was caught up in the midst of the Korean War, was actually involved in World War III.\textsuperscript{1766} At this point it is important to mention that the American people who were surveyed were asked in the same months, August and December, about Germany’s rearmament, while no question of any kind had appeared up until then concerning the new Federal Republic of Germany. As such, in August 71% of the Americans polled believed that the Eastern zone of Germany, which the Soviet Union controlled and which since October 1949 had become the state of German Democratic Republic, was building up an

\begin{footnotes}
1762 ibid. p. 867.
1763 ibid. p. 907.
1764 ibid. p. 914.
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army and that the US should help the West Germany to build up an army of equal size. In December 1950 55% of the American people asked thought that the West Germany should be allowed to build up an army to help defend Western Europe in case of a Soviet attack. Because this poll result by the American people constituted a quite strong and clear statement in 1950 this chapter will focus on the role of the press outlets in the formation of this opinion.

Press outlets

Walter Lippmann as Political Commentator

Starting with an examination of the role of Walter Lippmann in the formation of a favorable position of the American people toward West Germany’s rearmament, I can quite definitely say that his contribution to this discussion was not determinant. In particular, after the division of Germany Lippmann focused on the new West German state and even though he believed that the new German Chancellor Adenauer was “a man of consequence, [...] not a political hack nor a relic of the past age,” and that the Adenauer administration was “committed to a good European policy,” he stated that the Bonn government, despite its non-militarism, could only succeed if it could resolve the partition of Germany. Therefore, he suggested that the West should strengthen Adenauer with the “strength and attractiveness” of the participation of his government in the Western European community and thus prove to the German people that they had been brought back into the world community. At the end of 1949 Lippmann was of the opinion that Europe needed intellectual and spiritual support from the US, like its everlasting righteousness, rather than material, like dollars and bombs.

In 1950, according to Lippmann, as the objective of the containment policy kept deteriorating and the role of West Germany in the balance of power in the world increased

1767 ibid. pp. 932, 951.
decisively, US diplomacy had to be re-oriented “to the realities of the German position.” Moreover, he warned of the “paramount danger” of an alliance between Germany and the Soviet Union, as the latter could offer the Germans unity and provide joint administration of formerly German, now Polish, territories and could end the military occupation. Especially with the Soviet Union possessing atomic weapons Lippmann stated that it was “almost academic to debate” Germany’s rearming. As such Lippmann advocated a US policy of neutrality that would provide Germany more security, unity and access to eastern markets, would allow the country’s political and military neutralization and would make it a “buffer state” between the great powers and not a bastion or satellite. For Lippmann such a policy was a “common sense” policy; a policy, which someone who knew German history and German “pride, patriotism, tradition and immediate interest” would follow. Therefore Lippmann advised that the US reshape its foreign policy and diplomacy on the grounds that Washington and Moscow were not the masters of the world. On the contrary, the US policymakers should keep in mind that the Germans were “principals, not pawns, satellites, clients, dependents in the shaping of events.” Germany’s “middle position” would not be “ineffectual and unimportant” and the US should make sure to make the German revival “compatible with the peace of the world.” Furthermore, Lippmann pointed out that the German unification would bring the end of the German problem. Probably Washington could exist without relations and deals with the East, but the West Germany could not. If the US wished for the West Germany not to turn eastwards to achieve its unity, both parts of the country and the

two great powers would have to sit at the same table and make unification happen by utilizing diplomacy.\textsuperscript{1777}

When the time would come for the controls over Germany and its unconditional surrender to be liquidated, then, for Lippmann, it would be up to the Germans to determine what kind of relations the two Germanys and the two great powers would have.\textsuperscript{1778} Therefore, the US had to make sure that the Germans were able to “suppress insurrection and to police themselves against sabotage and subversion,”\textsuperscript{1779} so when Germany was rearmed, according to Lippmann, it would have to fulfill some conditions, for instance Germany's rearmament would have to be for the country's “own internal security” and not a “reserve of military manpower upon which [the US could] draw,” it would not be included in the North Atlantic alliance and that they would be in the form of police and “militia of a size and with arms”\textsuperscript{1780} designed to neutralize the GDR forces and not to make war with them.\textsuperscript{1781} Lippmann also favored the establishment of American military divisions in Germany on the grounds that there was not enough power in the country to “maintain law and order [not only] against insurrection and subversion, [but also] against intervention by satellites,” so that the country could grow into an independent nation which would not have to choose between being dominated by the Soviet Union or dependent on the US.\textsuperscript{1782}

Regarding the German perception of the rearmament idea, after a two-month long trip to Europe, Lippmann reported the unwillingness of the German people to make the West Germany “the main battlefield” for the Western defense and to “fight the kind of sacrificial war […] the Allied strategists [were] proposing to them.” At the end of the year, when West Germany’s rearmament was approved in the December NATO meeting, Lippmann emphasized once more the


importance of making peace with Germany and restore its territory first by employing diplomacy or else he feared that the German rearmament might be the wrong approach with irrevocable consequences that would provoke the Soviet Union and prevent Germany’s reunification.1783

Lippmann’s calling for diplomacy and Germany’s neutrality at that time found little resonance when the idea of the Administration and most of the press outlets as we will see in this chapter was that Germany was the Western European barrier and that this view was reinforced by the Korean War. We see how marginalized his views had become after having witnessed so far the anti-communist attitude and distrust toward the Soviet Union of the majority of the press outlets under examination. Therefore, it will be interesting to see whether Lippmann played again the role of the straw man or whether the opinions of the newspapers which carried his syndicated columns, The Washington Post and the LA Times, were in direct conflict with their columnist.

The Washington Post

Even though Lippmann’s syndicated articles were published in The Washington Post his opinions were not shared with the newspaper, as already observed in previous years as well. The newspaper favored the incorporation of the West Germany into the Western European community throughout the year, so that it could be economically and politically stable and militarily strong to “live in the uncomfortable shadow of a threatening Russia.”1784 Since the GDR and the West Germany had become oil and water and the hope for the reunification of Germany had ended for The Post the West had to choose between destroying the West Germany or incorporating it into Western Europe.1785

The Post believed until the end of 1949 that the West Germany had to fit into Western Europe so that its new Chancellor “could look West” and not east. In fact, the newspaper believed


that “the German problem [could] be solved only on European lines” and urged McCloy to take the initiative and lead this integration no matter how much the State Department was on board.\textsuperscript{1786} The newspaper applauded the “great strength of character as well as great resourcefulness” of the new Chancellor and supported Adenauer’s vision for the West Germany, which it felt should also be the American vision for the West Germany. This meant the end of dismantling, the withdrawal of occupation forces, and the unification of Germany within a federation of Western Europe.\textsuperscript{1787}

Even though the newspaper supported the economic and industrial recovery of the West Germany, it did not share the same feelings for its potential rearmament at the end of 1949. For The Post the intermingling of different nationalities would guarantee for the newspaper the secure integration of the country into the European community.\textsuperscript{1788} Therefore, The Post found that it would be “wise” to have Germany rearm after its European integration,\textsuperscript{1789} because “only a policy of war could envisage […] the rearmament of Germany” before West Germany’s incorporation into Europe.\textsuperscript{1790} In December 1949 the newspaper carried a syndicated column that severely criticized the business visit to New York City of Hermann Josef Abs, the most powerful commercial banker of the Nazi regime. The purpose of Abs’ visit was to work on rebuilding the German steel industry, which was a clear indication for syndicated columnist Drew Pearson not only of “how drastically American policy toward German [had] changed,” but also of “how history appear[ed] to be repeating all over again.”\textsuperscript{1791} However, in 1950 such contents were not carried, by either Post journalists or syndicated columnists like Pearson.

In 1950 The Post generally endorsed and encouraged the decisions proposed or taken for the future and military safety of the West Germany, like the establishment of additional US military divisions in West Germany and of a West German domestic police force, as well as the West

\textsuperscript{1788} "Germans In Uniform," \textit{The Washington Post}, (1949, December 15), 12.
German participation in the Western community and defense alliance. However, this participation was under the condition that American control would not be lifted over the country and its army and that Germany would not be allowed to form a national army or war ministry, but only civilian recruitments and divisional-size units. Additionally, in reference to the two NATO meetings of the Foreign Ministers in September and December to discuss the issue of Germany’s rearming *The Post* appeared supportive in contrast to the previous year. In fact, it regarded this US decision as “momentous” and welcomed the West Germany’s integration into a Western European defense system with a single army under the command of an American. *The Post* also continued to oppose the dismantling and decartelization processes in Germany on the ground that the US at the same time was calling upon Germany to participate in the defense of Europe.

Despite the supportive attitude of the newspaper toward US policy in Germany, the newspaper’s outspoken journalist and civil rights activist and Republican Agnes E. Meyer, published a few times about the ‘darker’ side of the German situation. As the wife of the owner of *The Washington Post*, Meyer had perhaps more leeway than most *Post* journalists. She condemned the arrogance of the political and industrial leaders who had forgotten that Germany revived thanks to US dollars, or the German unwillingness to rearm and their fear that mostly young “bewildered” people and unemployed or “rejected” people would join a German army - a scarcely “trustworthy” combination. Nonetheless, the journalist did not aim to alarm the readers or make them question Germany’s inclusion into the defense of Western Europe, but to reassure

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the readers that the German middle working class had significantly contributed to the reconstruction of Germany and that any rumor of nationalistic revival in Germany was “sheer fabrication.”  

In contrast to Lippmann’s views, the newspaper’s own journalists did not write about making peace with the West Germany first and then rearming her, even though The Post did realize that the occupation statute had to be altered to give West Germany more autonomy and end the state of war with Germany. Generally, the newspaper rejected the idea of Germany’s reunification and neutralization and did not hesitate to openly state that “Europe and Germany [were] one and indivisible” with the unwritten reference being to Western Europe and Western Germany.

In the reader’s letters to the editor of 1950 one can observe a more palpable split of opinion. On the one hand, members of the Society For the Prevention of World War III as well as ordinary people who referred back to the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939 and the fact that former Nazis had held onto positions in the US occupation zone, opposed the rearming of Germany and urgently asked for the maintenance of US and Western troops in West Germany. On the other hand, a Post reader challenged Lippmann’s suggestion about the neutralization of Germany simply because he believed that Germany could not be trusted and would stay neutral only while waiting for the higher bidder, the US or the USSR, while others, including a former member of the US military government in Germany, supported West Germany’s participation in the Western European defense.

Even though the newspaper promoted in 1949 the cooperation between East and West, this attitude changed after the official division of Germany with the establishment of the GDR. From

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that point on the newspaper advocated a politically and economically strong West Germany to stand up against the Soviet menace. Even though the newspaper did not widely comment on West German progress toward democracy, it did express in 1949 its reluctance to support the creation of a German army. The newspaper’s attitude changed drastically the following year (1950). The Post openly endorsed rearming West Germany and totally rejected Lippmann’s idea of a reunited and neutral Germany.

Los Angeles Times

For the Los Angeles Times the answer to most of Europe's difficulties once the division of Germany was formally realized in October with the establishment of the GDR, was West Germans’ hard work, integration into Western Europe and cooperation among the countries of Western Europe. Nevertheless, the LA Times journalist Polyzoides did not fail to recognize the alternative Soviet scenario of either a Soviet withdrawal from the GDR, which would definitely put the Western powers in a difficult and “embarrassing” position or of a Soviet exploitation of German nationalism. Therefore, Polyzoides acknowledged the economic and geographic role of FRG for US policies like the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Pact. He supported the “validity” of West German leaders, but not of the West German people; claims to be included in the Western military set up, claims which the US had to fulfill “without at the same time alienating the sympathies and friendships of [the American] wartime allies.”

Throughout the year 1950 the Los Angeles Times continued to support US policies regarding FRG. In fact in 1950 FRG had become one of the Big Four allies rejecting the Soviet Union. Even though the newspaper did not neglect to report German hesitation or even disagreement against US policies, it always tried to contradict them either by promoting the as-long-as-they-hate-the-Soviets idea and by supporting FRG’s role and importance in the Cold War or by blaming past and somewhat still-in-effect Allied (dismantling/decartelization) occupation

The same approach was applied also in the matter of German rearmament. Even though the newspaper and the New York Times correspondent in Germany Drew Middleton for whom it provided a forum, did acknowledge the fact that the West Germans were not willing to rearm, and lamented that the German army would have to be made “almost from scratch,” would consist of “labor service units,” and would not represent “merely a military class,” both not only acknowledged the inevitability of this action but also promoted it.\footnote{Polyzoides, “Dark Political Picture Rises in Germany,” Los Angeles Times, (1950, March 23), 15. See also: Cleaves Jones, “Germans Dislike Us, but Hate Reds More,” Los Angeles Times, (1950, March 12), B5; Polyzoides, “Industry Fate in Germany Vital to West,” Los Angeles Times, (1950, April 10), 7; Polyzoides, “Allies Facing Antagonism of Germans,” Los Angeles Times, (1950, April 28), 12; “The Hand of Friendship to Germany,” Los Angeles Times, (1950, August 20), B4; Waldo Drake, “Allies' Fumbling Over German Chemical Trust,” Los Angeles Times, (1950, September 15), A4; Waldo Drake, “Allies' Haggling Over I. G. Farben's Remnant Feeds German Unrest,” Los Angeles Times, (1950, November 23), A5.} Especially at the end of the year, namely in regard to both NATO meetings of the member states’ Foreign Ministers, the newspaper emphasized the significance of FRG’s rearmament for the safeguarding of Western democracy in Europe and the sake of saving money for the American taxpayers.\footnote{Drew Middleton, “Rearming Germany Presents Problem,” Los Angeles Times, (1950, December 31), 12. See also: Polyzoides, “Politics Clogs Weapon Flow to Europe,” Los Angeles Times, (1950, March 1), 22; Wes Gallagher, “Rearmig of Germany Seen as Necessary Step,” Los Angeles Times, (1950, August 7), 4; “Germans' Rearmig Decisively Rejected,” Los Angeles Times, (1950, November 28), 5.}

The newspaper also attacked the views of its syndicated columnist Walter Lippmann on the German problem, views which suggested the re-unification of Germany as a way to avoid a third world war caused by a civil war in Germany. The newspaper accused Lippmann of isolationism and “fatalism” and appeared sure that most Americans would “automatically” reject Mr. Lippmann's “demonic passion for unity.” In fact the newspaper appeared sure that when Americans looked at the history of Germany they would realize that what the Germans wanted more than anything was a tariff union. Therefore, what the US had to do was to strengthen its ties with FRG, attach it to the US through the Atlantic pact, “clear away the rubbish of the makeshift policies of the past,” and make West Germany an “ally, not a buffer.”\footnote{Polyzoides, “Germany Holds Key Position in Europe,” Los Angeles Times, (1950, September 14), 24. See also: “Tension Along the Elbe,” Los Angeles Times, (1950, September 21), A4; Waldo Drake, “Atlantic Countries Need 30 Mechanized Divisions and 1000 Planes to Stem a Russian Invasion,” Los Angeles Times, (1950, September 28), A5; Waldo Drake, “Ray of Hope Offered for European Defense,” Los Angeles Times, (1950, October 7), B4; Polyzoides, “US Faces Complex Europe Arms Deal,” Los Angeles Times, (1950, November 1), 12; Polyzoides, “Europe Takes New Interest in Rearmimg,” Los Angeles Times, (1950, December 10), 8; Polyzoides, “Germans Put in Position to Bargain,” Los Angeles Times, (1950, December 29), 10.}

\footnote{“Western Germany as an Ally,” Los Angeles Times, (1950, April 23), B4.}
The newspaper was, as expected from its stance in the previous years, supportive of the US policy in both years (1949 and 1950), even though it did not entirely fail to recognize some potential traps US policy might fall into in case the Soviets decided to withdraw from the Cold War. In both years the newspaper advocated the economic contribution of FRG to the West, its integration into the Western European community and its rearmament as the only resolution of the German problem and in both years the newspaper opposed the creation of a disarmed buffer zone between East and West.

*The New York Times*

As the months went by following the division of Germany *The New York Times* appeared even more satisfied with the job of the new High Commissioner, especially at a time when the “situation [was] still in flux.” According to the chief *NYT* foreign correspondent and nephew of the *NYT* publisher C.L. Sulzberger American policy in Europe had “matured surprisingly and speedily from its kindergarten status of 1939,” but it still bore the “ultimate responsibility” to protect Western Europe against Soviet expansionism. Therefore, after the definitive division of Germany the newspaper openly acknowledged Germany as the “central battlefield of the cold war,” urged that the country be “brought out of isolation and induced by degrees into the Western community” so that it developed a “sense of international responsibility.” Additionally, the newspaper recognized the importance of East-West trade for the sake of both Germanies and the success of the Marshall Plan. It wanted the economy of West Germany to be integrated into that of Western Europe, which could not be eternally supported by the “not-too-fat pocketbook” of the American taxpayer. Even though the newspaper did warn that the West should struggle “equally against the darkness of a revived naziism and the black depths of

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communisms,” it drew attention primarily to the ability of Germany to become a peaceful member of “an impregnable [European] community of freedom.” Nevertheless, *The NYT* accused Germans of following the pattern of “playing East and West off against one another” for their own benefit, and in fact very successfully. Nonetheless, it admitted that the West might have to “take further calculated risks in regard to Germany as the duel with Russia progress[ed]” in order to bring West Germany into “as many international organizations as possible.”

A “well-written, intelligent and valuable” book authored by the head of the *NYT* bureau in Berlin Drew Middleton, “a reporter far too honest and able [...] to sacrifice truth for simplification,” delivered, according to *The NYT*, “an honest, able and adult report on the most complex and dangerous problem in America's foreign relations.” Middleton openly stated the two “popular syllogisms” about the German problem: that Germany either would always be a militant, authoritarian nationalistic state and the world would face again a third world war since the West was too bankrupt to apply an effective policy to the country, or that Germany would be seen as “the inevitable enemy of Soviet Russia” and no matter whether Germany was democratized or not, it should be rearmed to serve as “the shield and buckler of Western civilization against Soviet communism.” At the end of the year Drew Middleton revisited the issue of German unity and its consequences. For the reporter the German division would make West Germany leverage its “internal authority and external importance” and demand more and more things. In such a case, the reporter urged the West to prioritize the establishment of democracy as the “dominant ideology” in Germany over the objective of keeping Germany outside of the Soviet empire. Additionally, he referred to the dilemma the allies would have to face in case of a Soviet

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withdrawal from Germany and how this could be exploited by the communists, who would “be pictured as saviors.”

Throughout the year 1950 the newspaper reported on: 1) the resurgence of a nationalistic Weltanschauung as a result of increasing unemployment and allied controls over exports in West Germany, 2) the hesitation of West Germans to rearm and the infiltration with neutrality as they appeared to be more afraid of another war rather than the Soviets, 3) German pressure for the revision of occupation policies in order to grant West Germany more freedom and equality in the Western community, 4) as well as Adenauer’s German agenda in reference to the country’s defense parity. Drew Middleton also stressed that the real test of Western policies would be whether FRG could be reliable as a democratic Western ally as opposed to a “nationalist, reactionary and rearmed Germany” and whether Germany would be the “least reliable friend” for the US, or fall for the Soviet campaign for German unification; this would define whether the rearming of the Germans would be an asset or a liability.

Before moving on with the representation of the US foreign policy by the newspaper let us observe how the newspaper perceived the statement of the US High Commissioner on this matter.

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John McCloy's speech at the 1950 opening of the Amerika Haus in Stuttgart was a “nice balance of warning and promise.”\textsuperscript{1820} His speech combined criticism against subversive nationalistic influences and a positive program for “German political recovery as a free nation and a key member of a free Europe.” The newspaper considered it his most “critical” and “significant” speech so far. It represented a new statement of US policy that would help to “clear the atmosphere and pave the way for positive work for German and European reconstruction.”\textsuperscript{1821}

The attitude of the newspaper was neither one of passionate support or criticism of US foreign policy decisions. Instead, it stated that it was the task of the Allies to determine whether and when FRG would have sufficiently demonstrated devotion to democracy and desire for peace and friendly association with the West in order to end the occupation statute in the country and be welcomed into the Western defense alliance. The newspaper gradually took a stand in reference to the main German dilemma of 1950, that of rearmament.\textsuperscript{1822} In the spring of 1950 the newspaper initially encouraged the US intention to “tie Western Germany to the West”\textsuperscript{1823} without debating the issue of rearmament, but as the months went by the newspaper started to examine not whether FRG would be rearmed, but when, since FRG was of no use if it was not a friend and an ally in the “struggle of the free world against totalitarianism.”\textsuperscript{1824}

In particular, The NYT supported US policies toward FRG and in fact during the NATO meeting of the Foreign Ministers in September the newspaper wondered whether it was wise for the Western powers to deny FRG “any role in either its own self-defense or the defense of Western Europe,”\textsuperscript{1825} while it did not endorse the “wishful thinking about the possibility of ‘neutrality’.”\textsuperscript{1826} This firm position was maintained during the second NATO meeting of 1950 in December when

the newspaper not only favored a rearmed FRG to deter Soviet aggression, but also rejected any debate with the Soviet Union on FRG’s rearming, without wanting, however, to employ a combative attitude against the Soviet Union, but encouraging a Soviet effort to ease the tension.1827 Acknowledging that the difficulty of the settlement of the German problem, as well as that the new balance of power, which derived from the Cold War, placed Germany “across the path of an aggressor,” the newspaper had to address “the very ticklish question of ‘priority’” of US foreign policy.1828“ “The paradox behind the debate of German rearment,”1829 namely that it came from the side of the Western powers and not from FRG, was commented upon by the newspaper. But it was mostly Drew Middleton’s voice that insisted until the end of the year that West Germany’s rearming was no panacea. Without objecting entirely to rearmament, the correspondent argued, alongside The NYT editor C.L. Sulzberger, that it would take a considerable amount of time until German units were equipped, trained and organized.1830 So over time even Middleton dropped his opposition to West Germany’s rearming; he just considered it a time-consuming process.

In 1950 The NYT readers offered various opinions about the management of FRG, with the newspaper presumably choosing a representative sample to publish to represent this diversity. Among these letters to the editor were readers who suggested strictness when dealing with the resurgence of nationalistic forces and education, but “leniency in the field of internal government policies,” such as economic policies.1831 Moreover, there were advocates of FRG’s rearmament and equal membership in the Western community. These included the former president of the

American Society of International Law, who acknowledged the dilemma of either rearming FRG and making it aggressive again or letting western Europe be defenseless and leaving FRG to the mercy of the Soviet promises of unification, but argued that the latter risk was greater. Additionally he attacked the idea of neutrality and argued that “any such double-faced policy would be [...] a serious blunder.”1832 Another reader believed that FRG could develop its “peace potential” as a member of an Atlantic Union which would use Germany’s resources for the benefit of all members, while the chief of the publication branch of the US military government declared that the US would be defeating its own purposes if it failed to make the West Germany its ally and “restore a country which irrevocably and by conviction line[d] up on the side of the democracies.”1833

On the other hand, there were readers who seriously questioned FRG’s rearming. Among them there were a French reader of the newspaper, whose memories of the last war were still fresh, fearful of the moment when the world would witness FRG playing its “monstrous, cunning game” again. A professor of Comparative Literature advocated that the unconditional surrender had taught “the Germans nothing” and believed that an armed Germany would “easily play East and West against each other,” while a staff member of Columbia University’s Russian Institute advised that it was not too late to reconsider FRG’s rearming and examine whether the Soviet Union was willing to make peace. Yet another reader criticized the denazification process for focusing on the punishment of Nazis rather than on “removing or correcting the causes of nazism.”1834

In summary, in 1950 The NYT understood and accepted the US decision in favor of FRG’s rearming and the German role in the developing Cold War, but the newspaper continued to express its hesitation about the level of democratization attained thus far and about the readiness of the West German state. The exact same attitude was reflected in the letters by The NYT readers. One can only speculate on whether the choice of these letters that aligned with the position of the

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newspaper was merely coincidental or if there were completely contradictory opinions, which never made it to press.

_The Wall Street Journal_

_The Wall Street Journal_ also focused on US polices on West Germany that, in its view, held back West German economic recovery. Until the end of 1949 the newspaper emphasized the “negative, destructionist attitude”\(^1\) of dismantling and excessive controls and limitations on German non-military production – “a glaring anomaly”\(^2\) which prolonged the country’s dependence on American doles as well as the integration of West Germany into a larger European federation.\(^3\) Additionally, in case of a Soviet attack on the Western world, _The WSJ_ argued that “the real shield of Western Europe” would be America’s “professed readiness, under the Atlantic Pact, to go to war.”\(^4\) Therefore, “the ending of the most striking paradox in the [Western allied] policy toward Western Germany,”\(^5\) that of plant dismantling and the ending of the state of war with Germany and of the maintenance of Western troops in the country “as part of a defense scheme” were considered by the newspaper as “essential conditions of a constructive policy.” For _The WSJ_ there was “no tenable halfway house” between treating West Germany as a colony or as an equal partner in the European community, and therefore the policy of “inertia and fear of the utterly unreal danger of a German military attack on Western Europe” had to be abandoned.\(^6\) The policy of unconditional surrender had definitely “gone down the drain” and the newspaper welcomed the positive position of the Secretary of State Acheson toward the West German Chancellor Adenauer.\(^7\) Nevertheless, for the newspaper the Atlantic Pact was a sufficient defense mechanism and not “a stepping-stone to the rearmament of western Europe at American expense.”\(^8\) It did not support the “conviction […] that western Europe [was] indefensible without some measure of German [military] cooperation.” Nevertheless, _WSJ_ correspondent William

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Henry Chamberlin suggested that West Germany be allowed to recruit “a contingent for a west European army, dependent on American or other outside sources of supply for key weapons.”

The vast majority of The Wall Street Journal’s articles on West Germany for the year 1950 were authored by Chamberlin. In his first article for the year Chamberlin stated that it would be an “irretrievable disaster” for Americans to continue to manage Germany as conquerors and instead advised that the US should take the “calculated risk” and “exploit” the political and economic opportunities that the new Adenauer regime could offer, rather than undermine it with “criticism and interference.” Additionally, Chamberlin reported that in his recent trip to West Germany he observed no nationalistic revival and easily differentiated the Nazis from the people, who joined the Nazi movement to keep their jobs or earn even better, and who in 1950 had returned to their posts. Even though he welcomed the ending of what he called the “obsolete state of war” with the country, as well as the mutual East-West withdrawal from Germany, he believed that any “dove of peace” should come from Moscow as the West had demonstrated patience in the efforts to arrive a satisfactory settlement all these years.

US High Commissioner McCloy's attempt to “shape a workable” US policy for Germany was welcomed by Chamberlin, who described at the same time the “enigma of Germany,” namely how the US could restrain militarism in the country, but allow enough freedom so that West Germany could be integrated into the Western European community. Nonetheless, Chamberlin believed that it was “all the more regrettable” to think that a German businessman was a “terrible villain” and a good German a Socialist if not a “near-Communist.” He wanted to make clear that even if FRG was rearmed, it could not become a “major piece on the European chessboard,” but a “pawn, although an important pawn in the struggle between East and West.” The newspaper also agreed with Chamberlin's opinion that FRG should not remain “politically and economically

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prostrate” or else Western Europe would be “too weak to counter Russia's westward-looking ambitions.”

*The WSJ* warned the US officials in FRG that by not creating a politically independent and economically viable Germany, the West would make the same mistakes it had after the First World War and would “drive the German mind in the direction of Moscow.” On the same page, Chamberlin insisted on the need for US support of the Adenauer administration and the Bonn constitution, which was “exposed to the gibes of the communists and of extreme nationalists on the ground that [would make] it [...] a mere puppet of the occupying powers.” Thus Chamberlin advocated for less foreign interference, more freedom and self-determination for the Adenauer regime when passing laws or fixing a new value for its currency. Additionally Chamberlin suggested peacemaking with FRG without, of course, neutralization of the country and military evacuation so that the country was not left defenseless to communism and the recruitment of German units for a common European defense force that would turn the “former enemy country into a sturdy ally.” In this way negotiations of a peace treaty would “raise the prestige” of FRG and would attract people from the “hungry, pillaged Soviet Zone.” For Chamberlin the German people needed to stop feeling and being treated as “second class citizens” and to be given more authority and responsibilities.

*The Wall Street Journal* responded to President Truman's message to the newspaper editors in April, rejecting the “collective guilt” of the press. The language of the editorial article was not harsh and the author did not seem offended by the President's message and in fact the ball was thrown back into the President’s court. Focusing on the privilege of freedom of speech an editor stated that the press could interpret the facts in its own way and deliver its truth to the readers. He

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more or less accused Truman of not trusting his own people to “find their way toward the truth through any maze if they [were] free to inspect all paths.”

*The WSJ* throughout 1950, mostly through William Henry Chamberlin’s words, advocated as viable Germany’s political and economic freedom and self-determination. A US policy toward FRG in that direction would not only raise the morale and lift the spirits of the West German people, but would also function as an extra protective shield. In both 1949 and 1950, *The WSJ* clearly urged the termination of policies that it felt crippled western Germany, like that of dismantling.

*LIFE*

As 1949 was coming to its end *LIFE* magazine reaffirmed its support for the Truman administration, declaring that Truman would “go down in the records as the shrewdest politician in his period, not even excluding that irresistible personal charmer and eloquent speechmaker, Franklin Roosevelt, [...] one of the smartest operators in his business.” Truman had always been “able to put his personal tastes aside and adapt himself very quickly.” However, he did not play political tricks, but he had risen to “considerable stature as a statesman” and especially in the field of foreign policy, where he inherited a “messy” situation with the Soviet Union and a foreign policy “geared to war” and yet had managed to make the US a “world power,” to distinguish between its friends and enemies, and to help or guard against them accordingly.\textsuperscript{1854} The magazine also applauded Senator Vandenberg, the “Republican architect of the bipartisan foreign policy which more than all else [had] preserved the US and its Western friends from Communist conquest in the postwar years.”\textsuperscript{1855}

In December 1949 *LIFE* commented on the possibility of German rearmament with an editorial that sought to put an end to all the double-talk about whether, when and under whose control a West German army would function, stating quite explicitly and emphatically that the only answer was “the re-creation of a German army under German command. Nothing else, and nothing less.” The editorial concluded that FRG could only be “healthily absorbed” in a “freely


\textsuperscript{1854} Ernest Havemann, “The Master Politician,” *LIFE*, (1949, October 24), 27(17), 96-110.

\textsuperscript{1855} “President Truman,” *LIFE*, (1949, October 17), 27(16), 46.
governed and freely trading” Western Europe.\textsuperscript{1856} Apart from this reference and the result of now having the first Chancellor in the post-war era elected by a democratically elected parliament, the magazine failed to report significant domestic developments in West Germany, such as the progress of US policies, the West German political state of mind etc. Instead, the magazine published a not-at-all flattering report about German women. With women outnumbering men 166 to 100 it was probable that German women would have trouble finding a companion. It accused West German women of replacing the “unreliable GIs” with weekends with a “wealthy businessman or high official” or unmarried gentlemen “in romantically situated weekend house near Frankfurt.” The statement that “few underfed German girls [could] resist the lure” offered the readership little explanation of the economic and social situation that women found themselves in or that men took advantage of.\textsuperscript{1857}

In the first 1950 issues of \textit{LIFE}, the magazine reinforced its favorable attitude toward West Germany by delivering the opinions of two important persons who had played roles in West Germany. It published a very interesting interview with the former US military governor in Germany, Lucius D. Clay, and his answers to “some tough questions.” About the failure of the US policy of denazification Clay straightforwardly declared that “only the naive could have believed that Germany would be democratized in less than five years.” Nonetheless, he was very optimistic due to the German will for democracy and found it reasonable that the occupied disliked their occupiers. According to his own observation, the German people were not racist and a proof of that was the result of the recent national elections. As such Clay did not object to Germany's rearming and participation in a Western European defense plan, in which all countries would contribute manpower, military production and technical skills. Clay also emphasized the need to “continue to increase the power of the elected government” in Germany.\textsuperscript{1858} In May the magazine also hosted an article by West Berlin's mayor, Ernst Reuter, written especially for \textit{LIFE}. Reuter described how the post-war “childish illusion” in the West of a four-power government transformed into an active participation against “Bolshevist barbarism.” With West Berlin 100 miles deep within the Soviet zone Reuter, after “pass[ing] over lightly the shortsighted resistance” of France against West Berlin being integrated into West Germany, wanted to assure the Western

\textsuperscript{1856} “The Rise of Western Germany,” \textit{LIFE}, (1949, December 12), 27(24), 40.
\textsuperscript{1857} “Billboard Love,” \textit{LIFE}, (1950, March 14), 26(11), 43.
Allies that they could count on West Berliners, and expressed his hope that West Berlin could count on the Western Allies.\textsuperscript{1859}

In reference to the magazine’s critique of the actual western foreign policy toward Germany and particularly regarding the fifth NATO meeting of the Foreign Ministers in September 1950 the magazine acknowledged the existence of “a show of decisiveness” to finally make true the defense of Europe; of course, referring mostly to the talks about FRG’s rearmament. \textit{LIFE} did recognize the importance of the “butter-not-guns program” of the US, which targeted the economic rehabilitation of Europe and definitely decreased the communist threat from within, but this policy did not cover outside threats. Therefore, the magazine urged alarmingly that the US should take the initiative and increase its divisions in Europe and of course rearm FRG. The editorial article took a strong stand against Secretary of State Dean Acheson, calling for his replacement or else Truman would have to do something drastically to move him “as he [had] never been moved before.”\textsuperscript{1860}

Last but not least were the usual human-interest \textit{LIFE} stories from Germany, like the story about Berliners who had lost their hair but earned 1,000 DM by participating in a movie about a man who thought he had found a new way to grow hair on hairless scalps. It also portrayed the story of an east German, who had had a leading position in the Soviet-controlled coal mines but had fled to Germany's western zones. This man described the awful conditions of these East German workers, who would eat every other day in order to sell their ration cards to get some money, who would not return to their homes and instead slept outdoors during summertime as their commuting alone took four hours per day, while the recruiting agents got double food and bonus for every recruit.\textsuperscript{1861} At the end of the year \textit{LIFE} magazine also published a photo reportage depicting life in West Berlin. Through the camera of Nina Leen \textit{LIFE} readers had the chance to see a man who could in 1950 afford “food, coal, clothes and even luxuries,” a queue of West Berliners, which did not mean anymore that people were queuing for some food or coal, but out of curiosity in front of a store window in a West Berlin street, where the city’s best shops were located, looking at a beauty treatment. The photographs also showed people laughing over

\textsuperscript{1859} Ernst Reuter, "West Berlin's Mayor Defies Reds", \textit{LIFE}, (1950, May 15), 28(), 44-45.
communist propaganda while enjoying their coffee and open-air markets where the average buyer could buy low-priced clothes, as well as the “booming” high-priced fashion and the rich cultural life of the city.\textsuperscript{1862} The 1949 \textit{LIFE} report about life in the countries under Soviet control moved one reader so much that he inquired whether he could trace a specific man depicted begging and send him CARE packages,\textsuperscript{1863} while another reader stated that if the \textit{LIFE} article about the life of the nine former residents of the Soviet zone failed to “rejuvenate the spark of Americanism [...]”, then perhaps the forced labor, the lack of freedom of speech and press and the nonexistence of a free vote should be impressed upon the lot of [the American people].\textsuperscript{1864} On the other hand, the 1950 letters to the editor by the readers painted a different picture of Germany and definitely interpreted the German problem through a lens of concern. The few letters that were published concerning FRG’s rearmament were not positive. In fact, a reader called it “a suicidal folly” as it would “provoke a Russian attack.” The editor rarely replied to the letters, but this time he thought that it had to be made clear that the magazine did not advocate the rearmament of Germany, but that it was of the opinion that such an action was inevitable.\textsuperscript{1865}

The German national anthem being heard again in Germany also provoked mixed reactions from the \textit{LIFE} readers. One reader was reminded of the dark year he spent in his country under the Nazi occupation and expressed his “deep shame” that Americas had allowed the Germans “to stand up again und challenge [the world] with their song,” while another reader recalled that the anthem had become a “song of oppression” under Hitler, but before that it had been a “song of freedom” created by liberal German students.\textsuperscript{1866} Regarding \textit{LIFE’s} sympathetic report about daily life in Berlin the magazine received letters whose authors mostly wondered how one could “forgive so easily.”\textsuperscript{1867}

\textit{LIFE} did not invest any effort in 1950 to convince its readers of the necessity of FRG’s rearmament. On the contrary, the whole attitude of the magazine thus far and the lack of any

\textsuperscript{1862} “This Is Berlin,” \textit{LIFE}, (1950, December 4), 29(23), 141-148.
\textsuperscript{1863} “Letters to The Editors. Iron Curtain Care,” \textit{LIFE}, (1949, December 26), 27(26), 3.
\textsuperscript{1864} “Letters to The Editors. Through Russian Eyes,” \textit{LIFE}, (1949, October 17), 27(16), 14.
\textsuperscript{1867} “Letters To The Editors. This Is Berlin,” \textit{LIFE}, (1950, December 25), 29(26), 5.
serious interpretation of the US relationship toward FRG this year might lead one to conclude that its view was that FRG’s rearmament was inevitable, if not self-evident and a bit delayed. Nonetheless, the readership of the magazine did not seem as relaxed or accepting toward the revival of West Germany. The publication of letters that contradicted the magazine’s perspective might be explained either by the lack of receipt of supportive readers’ letters or by LIFE’s attempt to provide a different point of view to counterbalance with the editor’s opinion.

TIME

Coming closer to the end of 1949 the attitude of the magazine changed and its anti-communist and pro-Truman position became more apparent compared to its attitude at the beginning of the year. In October TIME magazine criticized Walter Lippmann's opposition to the Truman administration and his attempt to mold US public opinion on foreign policy as well as his suggestion that the North Atlantic Pact should “be a shield as much against a revived Germany as against Russia.” Translating the “Lippmannese English” the magazine defined Lippmann's term the balance of power as a “hardheaded deal between the US and Russia.”1868 At the end of the year “the firm anti-Nazi and [...] equally firm anti-Communist” Adenauer was on the TIME cover with as background a ruined West Germany and a German flag fluttering and taking the shape of a bird and a caption reading “A place among the free nations?”1869 The article, which always accompanied the image of the person on the cover, referred to “the land which Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, with Western help, [would] lead to democratic order and freedom.” TIME presented Adenauer as a kind and balanced personality, who inspired respect in his political followers and “brought to his task an unshakable confidence and a profound faith,” while FRG was set to become a containment post. The possibility of FRG rearming was a “gamble” for TIME magazine: “But the only real alternative to what the US was doing in Germany would be to let the country stagnate and, eventually, fall to Communism. That would not be a gamble: it would be certain disaster.” The magazine maintained this position throughout 1950.1870

Especially after the Korean War broke out, the rearming of FRG was regarded by the magazine as “indispensable to [the] effective defense of Western Europe;” a position which was

1868 “International. As Lippmann Sees It,” TIME, (1949, October 31), 54(18), 20.
1869 TIME, (1949, December 5), 54(23), cover.
also shared by Adenauer. If Western Europe applied “drastic cuts in [its] countries’ standards of living” to rebuild its military strength the Western European communist parties would have “plenty of opportunity to make trouble.”

Even though the NATO Foreign Ministers were “afraid to tackle the vexed subject” of rearming FRG at their meetings thus far, the Korean War changed the situation and now the main, and for some Europeans “unwelcome,” concern of the US and the British Foreign Minister had to be “how, when and with what Germany would be strengthened to become the bastion of a free Europe.”

Apart from the reports on FRG’s rearmament the magazine published, as always, stories about the German people, their cities and their situations to paint its picture of the country for this year. The magazine’s stories in 1950 were about the “tourist-trap front and the glitter” of the city of Hamburg with its shop windows reminiscent of New York’s Fifth Avenue, behind which there were acres of postwar physical, economic and psychological rubble, the hard life of the West Berliner when they received their dismissal papers, about underground anti-Nazi groups that had now taken on the role of re-educator of former Nazis, about former Nazis now denazified, but only “skin-deep,” about Germans suffering under the Nazi regime and those who shortly after being freed from concentration camps were being captured by the Soviets and imprisoned and tortured again, about expelled ethnic Germans and DPs fleeing their homelands and seeking refuge and being admitted into FRG, some even kissing the soil of the Western zone, about East Berliners visiting West Berlin and not wanting to go back, and about how East Germans attempted to cross into FRG with forged documents to “stage ‘blitz rallies’ against the Western powers.”

Finally, the magazine also expressed its ‘change of heart’ about the US High Commissioner. John McCloy’s speech at the opening of the new Amerika Haus in Stuttgart was a “milestone in the development of the US attitude toward Germany” for TIME. The magazine

also praised Truman's transformation from a “humble […], exsoldier, minor Missouri politician” to a man who “no longer looked like an anonymous face in the crowd,” who “stood erect as a West Pointer, radiated confidence, and looked amazingly trim for a man of 65,” who exemplified authority, and who could “reward friends, punish enemies, [and] […] whip his opponents even when some of his own supporters were dragging their feet.”

After the division of Germany, the magazine changed its attitude and emphatically, if not passionately, supported the Truman administration and its initiatives and did so in fact without utilizing a foreign threat (the Soviet Union) to justify its position. The magazine’s articles on Germany for the year 1950 were few and far between, but did refer to the rearming of the country. TIME did express its support for FRG’s rearming, but it did not seem as if the magazine made any concerted effort to influence its readership about it. Once the Korean War had broken out the magazine probably did not feel it was necessary to convince Americans of the importance of having FRG rearm, because it fed its readerships tons of information and page-long reports about the War In Asia and the Background For War from the issue of July 10, 1950 until the end of the year, elaborating on Soviet military superiority in Europe and Asia, the necessity of the US draft and the numbers of US infantrymen in Korea.

Commentary

In contrast to the focus of the press outlets of wide circulation, Commentary was one of the few press outlets that did not solely report on the resurging nationalistic German tendencies, but also commented on them. Commentary could scarcely have expressed more emphatically its disappointment and frustration toward the Allied (and particularly the American) unsuccessful democratization process. No matter how much the US would like to portray the political advances of West Germany as proof of democratic evolution, the magazine refused to turn a blind eye to the power (re-)gained by religious and industrial elites and institutions, which had assisted in the establishment of the Nazi regime. The fact that the journalists usually put words such as denazified, decartelized, denazifiable in quotation marks was a clear indication of their disbelief or even mocking attitude toward the American “democratization” efforts. For the magazine and its

readership the US policy toward Germany neither delivered any positive omens before the end of 1949, nor was the US policy justified at any point by the imminent threat of Communism.

In 1950 the essays published in the magazine about FRG focused more on political developments in the country. Even though they were seldom, they offered the readership a variety of viewpoints through which a reader could analyze the German situation. David Williams, the London representative of Americans for Democratic Action, analyzed in his essay how Europe was turning politically to the Right and why the presence of a strong democratic and constitutional Left was “desirable” in Europe. Particularly for FRG Williams identified the successful combination of Liberals and Christian Democrats, in which the former provided their “fanatic devotion to economic principles” and ideas and the latter “higher principles” like “humanity” and votes. Despite the efficient nature of this coalition Williams warned that if the counterweight of a constitutional Left was not developed “in desperation the working class [would] turn to the Communists, and the lower middle classes to demagogues of the totalitarian Right.”

Norbert Muhlen, an anti-Nazi German refugee to the US and former doctoral student in political science and economics at the University of Munich, reported after a trip through Germany his observation of German youth, “who grew up under Hitler and [found] themselves turned loose upon a world they [were] ill equipped to understand.” During the first postwar years Muhlen stated that “Germans reacted to defeat and destruction with an attitude of romantic despair,” while in 1950 hunger was not a “daily experience” anymore but a “traumatic” memory. Muhlen felt the Germans had begun to face up to the need of making a life for themselves. The majority of German students, mostly members of middle- and upper-class families, were occupied in “part-time menial jobs” while studying at German universities. Despite the promising situation of the German state in 1950, for Muhlen the German youth still existed “in a vacuum.” The “educational inferiority,” deriving from German universities without entrance examinations, teachers either “retarded by long isolation from foreign learning [or] some still tainted by a Nazi past,” and political science as a discipline still stigmatized by “Hitlerian abuse” and charged with post-war occupational policies of reeducation, resulted in a general lack of interest in political life. However, what

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Muhlen found German youth to be interested in was religion. He thus concluded that “good will [might have] the chance to win this generation.”

Richard H. S. Crossman, a British Labor Member of Parliament and an editor of the Leftist magazines, the New Statesman and Nation posed and answered the question of whether nationalism was an ally or an enemy, and concluded in his essay that nationalism could be an ally for the US, since for West Germans nationalism could be associated with healthy patriotism and fight against German Communism. For Crossman the desire for German unity was a “healthy symptom of German recovery;” a symptom which the US should base their policy on in the Cold War to “insure that [the] democratic demand for nationhood and social justice [could] be fully satisfied inside the Western world.”

In her essay after a recent stay of several months in FRG the German-Jewish émigré political theorist Hannah Arendt, who fled Germany in 1933, reported on the postwar German escape from reality and responsibility as well as the German “nihilistic relativity about facts.” She described how the average German was not looking for the causes of the Second World War in the acts of the Nazi regime and how tempting it was to blame the occupation forces for everything in the postwar area. Even though Arendt did recognize a “kernel of truth” in their accusations, she still insisted that there was “a German stubborn unwillingness to make use of the many possibilities left to German initiatives.” Even the East-West tension was not enough to shake the foundations of German passivity and make them take sides. Lastly, Arendt commented on the western policies on Germany and particularly on the inadequate nature of the process of denazification to contend with “the moral and political situation at the end of the war” and how it contrasted with reconstruction and free enterprise. She felt that the old Nazi foundations, and centralization together destroyed “all authentic desire for local autonomy” and undermined “the political vitality of all provincial or municipal bodies.”

At the end of the year Commentary hosted another essay by Crossman, in which he commented on the issue of German rearmament. First, he made clear that Germany could neither be an “eternal enemy” nor a “decent, reliable fellow who [could] be rearmed without hesitation”

as its “national history” made it “both an asset and a danger to Europe.” In turn he advocated for the actual creation of the North Atlantic Union in the form of a defense organization and not just “a hierarchy of paper-producing committees” before rearming Germany. He advised Secretary of State Acheson that it would be an illusion to think that “German good will” could be won by doing the exact opposite. He felt the Germans would keep asking for nothing less than “complete equality of treatment” and in such a case Crossman stated that Germany should be allowed to form its own “militarized police force,” a police force which would remain a “strictly German affair.” Of course, Crossman did not omit the possibility of the continuation of the Cold War for many years, a situation that would probably make the integration of the West German military force into that of western Europe inevitable. Nevertheless, he insisted and concluded that this solution should be avoided or at least postponed since such an “irrevocable step” would not contribute significantly to Western Europe's military strength and would be a “risk of the gravest dissensions among allies.”

The magazine in 1950 mostly analyzed the political situation in West Germany and it did not paint a very optimistic picture, as it continued to comment and report on FRG’s unbreakable bond with former Nazi collaborators. For Commentary neither the German people nor the German institutions of the country were totally ready or reliable enough to lead the country back to democracy.

*The Nation*

After the division of Germany and the creation of the respective states, CAROLUS, the member of the German trade-union movement and The Nation's anonymous correspondent in the western zones, objected to FRG’s rearming and continued to write that FRG “aided by the occupation powers, [was] cunningly and ruthlessly pursuing a foreign and domestic policy designed to preserve its ‘class privileges and gratify its greed for profits,’” making the solution to the German problem impossible. Even though the magazine acknowledged positively US High Commissioner’s John J. McCloy’s revision of the dismantling process, it continued to accuse

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American foreign policymakers of responding to the Soviets rather than being proactive. It warned about the dangerous situation of permitting the return of former Nazi collaborators and the church to positions of major influence in the new government of West Germany. Social scientist Helen M. Booth, who was attached to the American Military Government in Berlin, declared “that the Church in the name of the C.D.U. [stood] virtually for Catholic.” Regarding the Pope's address to the German Catholic Worker’s Association, Booth concluded that peace would bring about a new Pax Romana if the church could accomplish “its aims in Germany;” to win the battle against Protestantism under the cover of the fight against communism and enjoy again the privileges it had during the Nazi regime.

Dr. Martin Gumpert, a New York physician who usually wrote for The Nation on new developments in medicine, reported in the December 10, 1949 issue on his trip to France, England, Italy, Switzerland and Germany. Dr. Gumpert explained Europe's “critical situation” and hatred toward the Americans, whom Europeans described as “ill-mannered, imperialistic materialists,” and “malicious and selfish.” Dr. Gumbert concluded that the “fight for Europe” would not be decided by dollars but by diplomacy, specifically “by technical and scientific advances, by the productivity of man, by social structures convincing and workable enough to defeat frightening authoritarian concepts, by new ideas applied to a new earth.” This opinion was also shared by Nation's Foreign Editor del Vayo, who furthermore criticized the American proposal to proceed with an even more “explosive” move, that of FRG’s rearmament. On the last day of 1949, del Vayo also expressed his belief that nothing would change in 1950, that FRG would move “more and more into the hands of the Nazis and the cartels” and the GDR would keep “capitalizing on its socialization policy and its slogan of German unity.”

Del Vayo’s prognosis for 1950 was confirmed by CAROLUS’ report on Adenauer’s request for FRG’s rearmament in order for it to participate in the defense of the West, which would bring with it the return of German steel and coal “barons” to “their old dominance.”

that same concern, the American historian and journalist Bruce Catton wrote that the true meaning of decartelization was not to split the old big industries into smaller ‘independent’ companies managed by their old trustees. Del Vayo reported that Hjalmar Schacht, the former President of the National Bank and Minister of Economics under the Nazi regime, had been working as a “somewhat clandestine adviser” for the American Occupation Government waiting for “a post which [might] satisfy his vanity and thirst for power.”

Regarding the influence of East-West tension on the political status of Western Europe and FRG del Vayo urged the application of diplomacy and pointed out that the “fundamental error” of the US in its relations with the USSR was its lack of understanding that “Russia would not abandon its uncompromising tactics until it had gained its ends or, like Hitler, smashed itself against a stone wall.” Furthermore, del Vayo stated that the “frank discussion of a concrete joint program” of the socialist and communist parties of the Left could be the missing political force which could resolve East-West differences, maintain peace, and contain the Soviets. Even six months after the establishment of FRG CAROLUS and del Vayo continued to deliver the same opinion about the situation in FRG, namely that the nationalists and the industrialists of FRG would “form an alliance with the devil tomorrow if it promised them an advantage,” They were both concerned that Adenauer, so soon after his election was already pursuing his own agenda and pressing the question of German rearmament, which was exacerbating tensions between East and West which made the gap between the East and West German states even deeper. Additionally, the German-American Marxist economist Fritz Sternberg warned that when the Marshall Plan was terminated, the US would no longer be “able to compel Germany to keep its exports to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe within narrow limits,” and this would in turn allow FRG to “form strong economic

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ties with the Soviet Union and its satellites, [and] important political repercussions [should] be expected.” 1894

When the Korean War broke out the geopolitical situation of FRG and the way West Germans might exploit this, including not hesitating to request a Western apology to the German soldier and industrialists was again pointed out by CAROLUS and del Vayo. They feared that Adenauer would request the return of the control of German industry to West German authorities, who would be backed by an army. 1895 For that reason del Vayo advocated that the US should still negotiate the German issue with the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the initiative for a negotiation could not come from Washington due to the US domestic political situation and the temper of the country at that moment. As such, both concluded that the US should accept a negotiation offer from the Soviet Union, in hopes this occurred, or the US would not only “risk a third world war […] in the heart of Europe; it would also risk fighting the war without dependable allies.” 1896

In reference to the Nation’s readers’ opinions on the developments in FRG, a section titled “No Comment” containing mostly information and commentary from readers on various subjects appeared in October 1949 in The Nation. 1897 News that appeared here without editorial comment or presumably verification included: that the German “denazification chief in Bad Seegenberg [had] been arrested for being a Nazi,” that “banned Nazi papers [were] reappearing,” that “Max Willmy, printer of the notorious anti-Semitic hate sheet, Der Stuermer, [was] planning to resume publication of a newspaper in Nuernberg,” and that “German workmen started digging up the graves of thousands who died in the Dachau concentration camp” exposing human bones, separating and throwing them into a wooden box. 1898 Of course, the title “No Comment” sent the message of dismay and a certain resignation. In 1950 The Nation continued to publish various reactions from its readers. A reader reacting to del Vayo's statements that the Left could offer Europe a “‘third way’ for both Europe and the world,” asked the magazine to either dismiss his articles or follow them up with examples and prove him right, while another reader was still

1897 According to a note by the editors the readers were invited to contribute to "No Comment" and were also paid two dollars for each item printed.
1898 “No Comment,” The Nation, (1949, October 22), 169(17), 394.
waiting to see how “removing the menace of Germany” was taking place, namely with “education for democracy and properly adjusted living.”

A German Nation reader and admitted former Nazi who lived in the British zone of western Germany shared with the magazine in multiple letters how The Nation’s articles and editorials had played “a far larger role in [his] democratization than [had] the German press, the German parties and parliaments, or any of the arrangements for that purpose known as denazification.” He furthermore confirmed CAROLUS’ report of 1947 about the ‘Persil coupons’. Additionally, he expressed his true belief that even the most ‘misled’ Nazi could be democratized and clearly stated that FRG’s rearming was backed by a huge number of unemployed people who relied on “dole that will keep them from starving” and on the realization that “ both East and West [would] rely on German assistance in the next war.” On the other hand, another Nation reader from Germany declared that the German public was “shocked by the news that America [planned] the remilitarization of Germany” as it was against the will of the majority of Germans.

Around the end of 1949 and in view of the possibility of West German rearmament the magazine openly disagreed with the use of the Cold War as the rationale behind advocating for FRG’s rearmament. The magazine maintained its position toward the German political state of mind in 1950, namely that nationalism had not been eliminated from the minds and hearts of the German people, but was resurging unabated. For this the magazine blamed the Adenauer government but also the continuing East-West tensions that gave German nationalism leverage. Lastly, the magazine promoted the establishment of a strong movement on the Left in Western Europe, and of course in FRG, for the restoration and safeguarding of political balance in West Germany and peace worldwide.

**Human Events**

In October 1949 after a three-month-trip to western Europe, which included West Germany, William Henry Chamberlin was still uncertain about the success of the Marshall Plan.

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1900 Sworn declarations that those defined by the term 'Nazi' gave help to Jews to members of the anti-Nazi resistance, which provided escape clauses from the denazification law.


1902 “Letters To The Editors, No Remilitarization!” The Nation, (1950, November 18), 171(21), 469.
Politically he did find “less fear of war and of Communist seizure of power from within,” but economically he reported that “American subsidies had been no panacea” and urged the discontinuation of dismantling of important German steel and chemical plants, and the “imposition of one-sided economic controls on many branches of German economic life.”

Germany was the main focus of *Human Events* during November 1949. The German reports began with the editor, Felix Morley's statement that Soviet diplomacy was “extremely skillful” compared to that of the US, which was “almost incredibly inept” and his conclusion that apart from the “American subventions” there was only “superficial evidence of recovery in West Germany and Western Europe,” since only the wealthy ones could shop from those stores filled with goods. It was high time, according to Morley, that the Americans realized that Germany might be divided, but it still had “the power of choice which [became] more apparent and more real,” because the US did not discuss FRG’s problems, such as the important issue of dismantling, and made the West German people regard the Bonn Government as “pure façade.” Morley articulated his concern about a German inclination toward the East.

The SPD-leaning political editor of the Hamburg-based West German weekly, *Die Zeit*, Marion Doenhoff, stemming from a pre-1945 prominent aristocratic East Prussian family and a member of the anti-Nazi movement that plotted to assassinate Hitler, offered her valuable insight into the German situation in the two last issues of *Human Events* for the year 1949. Doenhoff believed that the German people sought “moral recognition” from the US as well as the opportunity to be “wholeheartedly incorporated into Western Europe” and, in contrast to the editor, Morley, she supported a “truly European [and] not merely West-European” US policy on Germany if East and West Germany were to be united. Doenhoff also criticized the “overdone D” processes (of the 4 D’s) which aimed at positive results but so far had been negatively correlated with Germany's re-education. Doenhoff did not deny the existence of nationalistic tendencies in Germany but mentioned that they could be removed through the “reasoning power of the Germans themselves,

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and the strengthening of common sense in Germany” with the assistance of the policies of the occupation powers.1906

The first reference of *Human Events* to Germany in 1950 was Chamberlin’s urgent demand for a “realistic and consistent” US policy so that the Bonn Republic could succeed or else the US would lose FRG and the “chances of holding the rest of Western Europe [would] be dim.” He also blamed US press outlets for “irresponsible, prejudiced” and “superficial” reporting and “woeful breast beating about the alleged failure of ‘re-education’ and de-Nazification [and] about the supposed sinister influence of cartels,” which “gravely handicapped” the “framing of an intelligent policy toward Germany.” In fact, Chamberlin referred specifically to certain journalists and press outlets, such as *The Nation* and Drew Middleton of *The New York Times*. Lastly, against policymakers’ and journalists’ “curious fuzzy curtain of prejudice,” Chamberlin suggested that the whole “irritating apparatus” of foreign controls be dismantled in Germany, that the High Commissioners become ambassadors giving the West German government full sovereignty, and that all West German production be adjusted to the demands of the free market without one-sided restrictions.1907

Regarding FRG’s rearmament the former German Army Colonel Kurt Hesse, an expert on the psychological effects of warfare who had been hired by the Historical Division of the US Army in 1945 to interview all key members of the German command in Paris,1908 delivered a report about the German viewpoint. Hesse reported the hesitation of the German people toward their rearming as they had suffered enough from the two world wars, which they had caused and lost, as well as that the nightmare of the Soviet invasion of 1945 had “deeply imprinted on the minds of the German people, causing them to reject war much more strongly than perhaps assumed abroad.” However, this could be dealt with an intensified American re-education program, and even though Hesse did recognize that FRG’s rearming would “deepen the rift between East and West Germany” he pointed out the importance of a German position “on an equal footing” with every other European power. Lastly, Hesse made clear that if West Germany was rearmed its people

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would feel “reciprocal trust” and “conviction that the threat from the East [could] be averted only by standing shoulder to shoulder.”

In the last two months of 1949 the newspaper offered its readership an alternative point of view toward US foreign policy through the voice of the anti-Nazi West German political editor Marion Doenhoff, who believed that the US had to leave behind its unsuccessful policies and Germany had to take responsibility for its war crimes so that the Western world could move forward and Germany could be reunited. In a quite provocative and harsh way Human Events in 1950 painted a completely different picture of West Germany than the other press outlets of smaller circulation; a more romantic one, that of a country which had finally learnt from its mistakes and was ready to trust and be trusted in the Western European community.

Conclusion

Despite the temptation to cover the role of the rising specter of communism in the US press in 1950, the focus of this chapter, just as the focus of this dissertation, is on the interplay of US foreign policy with public opinion and press reaction toward postwar Germany, or in the case of this chapter, specifically FRG. Thus, the chapter begins with October 1949 and the transition from western and eastern zones of occupation to German division and two quasi-autonomous German states following the 1949 national elections and the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) on 14 August 1949 and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) on 7 October 1949. Even though the anti-communist campaign of the press outlets is not studied in this chapter, as already explained, it was there; and in fact, the Korean War did not just reinforce it but it literally barraged the press outlets with anti-communist reports. Nevertheless, this chapter focuses entirely on the US press articles and essays and public opinion toward US foreign policy and related developments in that part of Germany targeted by US foreign policy, West Germany.

For the year 1950 Truman’s message to ASNE did not differ much from the previous year. The US President continued his anti-communist stance and even straightforwardly accused some press outlets for partisanship and for not informing the American public properly. In 1950, as in 1949 as well, the communist threat and West Germany’s recovery were self-evident. Moving on

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to the press outlets and starting with the political analyst Walter Lippmann, whose opinion over the years deviated from that of the majority of press outlets of wide circulation even more regardless of whether his syndicated articles were hosted by them, he urged diplomacy to achieve Germany’s unification and neutrality, since feared that the Soviet Union would withdraw and provide Germany with that unity. He also pointed out Germany's new role; not that of a pawn anymore, but that of a country capable of shifting the balance of power.

Even though The Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, TIME, and LIFE promoted in 1949 the cooperation between East and West, this attitude changed after the official division of Germany and the establishment of the GDR. Nevertheless, except for LIFE, at the end of 1949 none of them regarded FRG’s rearming as necessary before its integration into the Western European community. In 1950, however, FRG’s integration into the Western European community -and inevitably its rearming- was a step out of isolation for both FRG and the US; for the former for wanting to be included and integrated and for the latter for being able to take credit for this integration and for leading the western community of nations. The only voice differentiating form those of the press outlets of wide circulation was the NYT correspondent Drew Middleton, whose description of FRG’s rearming seems most appropriate. Middleton noted that FRG’s rearming had been debated in the press outlets “with such fervor that it [had] come to represent a sort of philosopher's stone solving all problems of European defense and readjusting the terrible imbalance of Soviet and Western forces.”

Of course, they also continued to oppose the dismantling and decartelization processes in Germany and (c)overtly admitted that FRG’s rearming might be a gamble but there was no real alternative to it especially after the Korean War broke out and the fear of Germany becoming a European Korea was promoted. As such they all more or less intensively rejected Lippmann's idea of Germany’s reunification and neutralization. However, I am not quite sure if Lippmann qualified for a straw man in 1950. The press outlets, and especially The Post and the LA Times that carried his syndicated articles, did not even try to create a distorted version of Lippmann's opinion or refute it; they simply and overtly attacked him.

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Even though *The WSJ* did not entirely object to the 1950 US policy for FRG, namely its rearming, in 1950 as well as in 1949, *The WSJ*, after contending with almost two decades of Democratic administrations elected to deal with the Depression and the Second World War and its aftermath -administrations which had promoted more liberal socio-economic policies and government spending domestically and abroad than those pursued by Republican administrations before the Depression- was the only press outlet to overtly encourage the revival of an active Republican political opposition in the US. In fact, it did not hesitate to confront Truman’s message to the newspaper editors regarding his dissatisfaction with the non-bipartisan way a portion of press outlets handled foreign affairs.

On the other hand like in the previous year *Commentary* and *The Nation*, both known for their strong ethical stances and intellectual content, continued to advice diplomacy and not maintenance of the tension between US and USSR, blamed the failed denazification policy and the regaining of power of religious and industrial elites and institutions that supported the Nazi regime for FRG’s political situation and pointed out the need for the creation of a strong Left in FRG for the accomplishment of political balance in the state. Lastly, *Human Events* replaced its patriotic, if not isolationist, stance of the previous year and resorted to a more romantic one objecting to the continuation of dismantling in FRG and believing in FRG's democratization and ability to be trusted.

Even though there were common reports in all press outlets, the way these reports were handled varied significantly. For instance, all press outlets warned that Germany's political vacuum could be filled by the USSR in case the Soviets proposed withdrawal or German unification. However, this go-with-the-higher-bidder concern did not make the US attitude toward FRG more reluctant or forced the majority of the press outlets to openly express their concern about FRG’s loyalty. On the contrary, it made the US work even more intensely to bring West Germany into the Western fold, while the majority of the press outlets strengthened their anti-communis stance except for *The Nation, Commentary*, as always, which emphasized the need for German democratic education so that the German people could resist this threat. Additionally, all press outlets, except for *The Nation* and *Commentary* and Drew Middleton from *NYT*, reported on the unwillingness of the West German people to rearm, but failed to comment on it. It seemed as if it was a reality too strong to ignore, but too contradictory to US policy to draw too much attention.
to it. Lastly, all press outlets reported on FRG's resurgent nationalism, except for anti-communist William Henry Chamberlin, who denied it, and LIFE, that failed entirely to report on it. However, the majority of them, except for The Nation and Commentary, did not aim at alarming their readership or warn about FRG's unfitness for democracy. On the contrary, again they promoted the as-long-as-they-hate-the-Soviets idea or blamed old occupation policies (dismantling/decartlization) and the increasing unemployment for this tendency of the West German people.

In terms of US public opinion there is not much to be said, or at least there is not anything different to be said compared to previous years. Regarding US policies in FRG, the timing of when the Gallup organization asked the American people about FRG’s rearmament, namely just after the invasion of South Korea by North Korea and the decision of the US to get involved in this war and very close in time to the two NATO meetings, in which the Foreign Ministers of the NATO countries would discuss rearming FRG, does not allow me to identify a possible quick switch of opinion in 1950. Nevertheless, I can quite definitely conclude that the Korean War transformed FRG from a hypothetical Western European border to an actual one, a correlation that also the majority of press outlets made. Of course, the previous year (1949) the American people who participated in the surveys, had expressed the opinion that the NATO countries should be rearmed. Besides, as the majority of the American people stated in 1950, their main concern was preventing or if not preventable, winning a war, a war, however, in which the aggressor would be the Soviet Union and not Germany, communism and not Nazism.

Returning to the main question of this study and the triangular relationship between US official foreign policy on FRG between October 1949 and December 1950, the attitude of the press outlets under examination and the opinion of the American people participating in the polls toward it, I can quite definitely say, especially as my study has come chronologically to its end, that this triangular relationship was maintained as stable in 1950 as it has been in the majority of the years under examination. With the exception of the Republican WSJ, which mostly targeted Truman’s liberal socio-economic policies domestically and internationally, but did not oppose the actual US policy of 1950, FRG’s rearming, the pursued US policy for FRG, the attitude of the press outlets and the opinion of the American public absolutely aligned in 1950 especially after the launching of the Korean War.
Conclusion

This thesis has examined the triangular relationship between US foreign policy toward (western) Germany from the end of WWII in 1945 on through 1950, the representation and appraisal of that policy by key select US press outlets and its reception, both in terms of approval and disapproval, by US public opinion. By tracing and analyzing this triangular relationship in the body of this thesis, I have investigated the interaction over time between US foreign policy, the US press outlets and US public opinion. In this final chapter I am assessing whether these US press outlets under examination deliberately supported the changes in US foreign policy toward Germany in the early post-WWII years in order to mold and influence US public opinion in favor of the Truman administration’s policies.

My study of US foreign policy toward Germany and its representation and appraisal in the US press begins by portraying the generally punitive and distrustful 1944-45 attitudes toward Germany as reflected in the Morgenthau Plan for Germany’s deindustrialization and the US military occupation handbook that instructed US occupation forces that “Germany always be treated as a defeated country and not as a liberated country.”1911 Yet at this same time US official attitudes toward its wartime and immediate postwar ally, the Soviet Union were positive, as seen in Truman’s personal diary in mid-July 1945 during the first three days of the Potsdam Conference, in which the new US President described his “pleasant conference” with Stalin and expressed his confidence in having been able to “deal with Stalin” because he was “honest—but smart as hell.”1912 Moreover, a very friendly encounter of Truman and Stalin’s top delegate, Molotov, which took place on April 22, 1945 is reported by Charles Bohlen who was Truman’s interpreter. In particular, he reports that Truman “greeted Mr. Molotov warmly” and “said he stood squarely behind all commitments and agreements taken by our late great President.”1913 Similarly, Harry L. Hopkins,

as special emissary to the president, who was sent by Truman to Moscow to meet Stalin in May of 1945, “got along well” with Stalin and left Moscow “encouraged” with regard to the hardships of Soviet-American relationships.\textsuperscript{1914} Henry Wallace shared a similar view with Truman that common ground could be found with Soviet Union while they were both criticizing Britain, the traditional ally. As Wallace reports in his diary of October 15, 1945: “[Truman] said Stalin was a fine man who wanted to do the right thing. I said that apparently the purpose of Britain was to promote an unbreachable break between us and Russia. The President said he agreed. I said Britain’s game in international affairs has always been intrigue. The President said he agreed.”\textsuperscript{1915}

A few months later, an impressive shift in foreign policy, both with regard to Germany but also toward the Soviet Union began to occur. This shift can be traced starting with Truman’s January 5, 1946 letter to Sec. of State James Byrnes, in which Truman complained about being “tired [of] babying the Soviets,” and then progressing in February 1946, to Kennan’s long telegram explaining Soviet Union’s behavior, Byrnes’s official US statement of revision of its economic policy, at least in its zone in Germany, in Stuttgart in September 1946, and climaxing in 1950 with the decision to support West Germany’s rearmament.\textsuperscript{1916} The timing of Kennan’s long telegram has been described by R. Ovendale as strategic with regard to the shift for US foreign policy towards Soviet Union: “six months earlier the views would have met with disapproval; six months later they would have appeared as preaching to the converted.”\textsuperscript{1917} Although this was a huge shift for US foreign policy, it was a smaller step for the press outlets, which by the time the war ended in Europe on May 8, 1945, had already dismissed any whiff of Morgenthau Plan-related objectives that could deprive Germany, and consequently Europe, of its industrial power and hinder its reconstruction. This focus on German economic recovery was further strengthened by the growing belief in the need for a strong western Germany, politically and eventually militarily, that would act as a bulwark to the ever-growing political influence of the Soviet Union in eastern Europe (including the Soviet occupation zone that became East Germany). In fact, the specter of communist expansion in Europe was employed by the majority of press outlets in the US already

\textsuperscript{1915} Wallace (1973), p. 490.  
\textsuperscript{1916} William Hillman (1952), \textit{Mr. President: the First Publication From the Personal Diaries, Private Letters, Papers, and Revealing Interviews of Harry S. Truman, Thirty-second President of the United States of America}, New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, pp. 23, 123.  
months before Byrnes’ Stuttgart speech in September 1946 signaled an official change in US postwar policy toward Germany, a speech that also targeted, officially for the first time, the Soviet Union as an enemy of the US. As analyzed in the respective chapter the majority of the press outlets of wide circulation planted the seed of distrust toward the Soviet Union almost from the beginning of the year 1946 by blaming only the Soviets for lack of quadripartite cooperation or the fulfillment of their obligations toward the Potsdam Agreement.

With regard to the third part of the triangular relationship under examination, American public opinion, as early as at the end of the war, saw many American people differentiating the German people from the Nazis. Whether this was a matter of maturity or naiveté or because a large number of Americans had ethnic, familial or cultural connections with Germans who looked like them is debatable, but some Americans were even willing, long before the Truman administration took action, to aid the German people with humanitarian aid. However, what is even more striking is how receptive the US people were to the US government’s communist fear campaign and the containment policy, when both were introduced by the Truman administration and endorsed by the press. This anti-communist turn was also a turn against Soviets, former US allies, while at the same time the US people seemed to quickly let bygones be bygones with Germans, compartmentalizing at most a small number of them as former Nazis, presuming most could and would repent and be denazified. In other words, during almost the entire time period under examination the concern of the Truman Administration and the US press outlets was not with the danger of any and every anti-democratic regime and its past or potential disregard for the democratic rights of all people (as the Nazis and fascism or even Franco’s clerical authoritarianism had exhibited), but specifically with Communism, and in particular the Soviet Union. As demonstrated in this study, this message was also successfully delivered by most of the press and the Truman administration to the American people.

What is even more impressive than the shift of US foreign policy toward Germany is how abruptly, abundantly and uniformly this shift in favor of Germany and invariably against the Soviet Union was accepted by the press and the public opinion. Since most of the US press and public opinion were not as ‘hard’ on Germany to begin with, even in 1945, their transformation away from economic and political controls toward German recovery and from enemy to ally was less stark. Yet the turn of both the press and public opinion against the Soviet Union following the
wartime alliance did involve a significant shift, although old roots of American anti-communist ideology from the days of the aftermath of the Russian Revolution and the Russian Civil War already existed and were further influenced by eastern European immigrants and Displaced Persons, who helped to stoke the flames and conflate anti-Russian sentiment with anti-communism. After having provided pertinent evidence in the main part of the thesis about how this triangular relationship between the Administration’s foreign policy, press reaction and public opinion was manifest from 1945 to 1950, I will now interpret how this shift was received by the press and the public opinion.

As noted above, many press outlets seemed even more ready and willing for this policy transition toward Germany/West Germany than the US foreign policymakers themselves. It is hard to say why this happened, whether that was because they were more naïve about the dangers of a Nazi revival or more concerned with the costs of an extended military occupation and German and European reliance on US taxpayers for postwar recovery or more pragmatic in judging issues of foreign policy than the newly inherited presidency, or whether some were more influenced by both German émigré and European journalists and thinkers and kept in mind the mistakes of the post-WWI era with regard to both the treatment of Germany or US isolationism, or whether they were willing to downplay Germany’s aggressive past in favor of its economic and geopolitical future potential as an ally in the midst of the Cold War or simply identified the ‘new’ enemy as a bigger threat to US capitalism and its way of life. But no matter which constellation of reasons stood behind this attitude, and surely it was a constellation rather than one, the growth of a positive attitude toward postwar (western) Germany and the more abrupt change into a negative attitude toward the USSR were also critically influenced by the Truman administration, so much so that is hard to untangle them and predict what the attitudes of the press might have been if the Truman administration had not overtly worked to influence the press or at least a significant part of the press. Despite guarantees of freedom of the press and assumptions of the independence of the so-called Fourth Estate, in wartime, both in WWI and WWII, even democratic countries censored their press and directly or indirectly coerced propagandistic support for wartime policies. The transition from WWII to a full-fledged Cold War was a relatively short one, and it should not be that surprising that politicians wanted to continue to shape, if not control the press and in doing so, also public opinion. In fact, already in 1922, one of Truman’s contemporaries and a journalist and among the most prolific political analysts, Walter Lippmann, wrote that: “Where masses of people
must cooperate in an uncertain and eruptive environment, it is usually necessary to secure unity and flexibility without real consent;” and that is most likely what the Truman administration attempted in the time period under examination in this thesis.\(^{1918}\) Although Truman believed himself not to be a “propaganda artist,” he did believe that the facts that reached the people had to be “arranged so as to offset the propaganda of the opposition,” namely that of the Soviet Union, and more or less, knowingly or not, he did put Lippmann’s theory into practice.\(^{1919}\)

President Truman’s approach to offsetting the propaganda of the opposition is reflected in his various interactions with the press, and how they changed over time in the midst of growing concerns over both the spread of communism and Soviet expansion. For example, although in 1946 his annual April meeting with the press editors was a question-answer meeting like every other regular press conference, in 1947, after expressing his gratitude to the editors that the press conveyed the facts as truthfully as it could, he took the entire time to deliver his message but did not allow any time for questions from the editors. In 1948, his address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) was carried as a nationwide radio broadcast for the first and only time in the time period under examination in this thesis and drew the listening public’s attention to the benefits of the Marshall Plan on the US economy and in particular on the decline of the rate of domestic inflation, thus stressing the interdependence of foreign policy and domestic economy. Truman’s attempts to influence the press in favor of his foreign policy toward Germany (and against the Soviet Union) not only focused on the editors of the mainstream press but even expanded to target the editors of business and trade papers. Specifically, in 1948, in a meeting with the latter, he all but demanded their demonstration of unquestioned support toward his foreign policy, which, according to him translated to an economic benefit for the US. Finally, in 1950, Truman equated to the editors the quality of the opinions of the American people on his foreign policy toward Germany with the quality of the news they received because, for Truman, the press outlets served as a link between “the American people and world affairs” and were responsible for both “good foreign policy and good public support behind it.” At the same time he did not hesitate to charge any press outlets that did not support him with irresponsible partisanship and with


jeopardizing the “country's program abroad” by “twisting” the facts to “conform to one side or the other of a political dispute.”

Poll results provide impressive evidence that Truman’s attempts to influence the press were successful. They revealed that, up until December 1948, 46% of American people polled declared that they did not know at all what the term Cold War meant, while 7% did not know correctly what it meant, although thus far they had already accepted, if not overtly approved of significant decisions of US policy like Byrnes’ revision of US economic policy toward German reconstruction, the Truman Doctrine, and the Marshall Plan. In other words, they were consenting to a US foreign policy toward Germany and against the Soviet Union without necessarily having acquired or having understood all the context or possible repercussions prior to granting their support behind such policies.

Nevertheless, creating this kind of consent requires a skillful and complex procedure. To “manufacture” it, in Walter Lippmann’s term, the US administration had to, as the cultural theorist T.J. Jackson Lears argues, “define the boundaries of common-sense ‘reality’ either by ignoring views outside those boundaries or by labeling deviant opinions ‘tasteless or irresponsible.’” This is how the boundaries of the nation's character, interests, allies, and enemies are defined in the process of creating consent. Additionally, the US press outlets had to function “as the domestic arm” of the US international Cold War propaganda campaign, because the press served as what Lippmann called the “regular organ of popular government.” In particular, as observed in this study, the US government announced, and even preached that it was the American duty to protect the western world against communism, implying the inescapable change in US foreign policy with regard to (West) Germany’s role in this fight, on the side of the west. In

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turn, the press outlets of wide circulation under examination in this study (*The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *Los Angeles Times*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *TIME* and *LIFE* magazines) understood and immediately provided support behind the continuous shifts of US foreign policy toward Germany (and later West Germany). This beneficial shift toward (West) Germany inevitably turned them against the Soviet Union, except for *The Wall Street Journal* which disapproved of the communist expansion but recognized the importance of the trade between East and West so that the support of the American aid to the European countries would not be provided mostly by American taxpayers. As such, as early as September 1946, when Byrnes gave his Stuttgart speech, and at least until the end of 1950 the press outlets of wide circulation mostly endorsed US foreign policy move toward Germany. In direct correlation as the US position got tougher against the Soviet Union and more lenient toward Germany, the more warmly these policies were welcomed by the press outlets.

In order to look more critically at the interaction between the US Truman administration, the US press outlets and American public opinion and study Truman’s propaganda campaign against the Soviet Union and in favor of (West) Germany I will employ the “propaganda model” that was proposed by the prominent political theorists Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky in their 1988 book on manufacturing consent. Interestingly, they recognized Walter Lippmann’s contribution to the study of public opinion and even borrowed the phrase, ‘the manufacture of consent’ from his book, *Public Opinion*, which was published in 1922. According to their theory, the US mass communication media carry out a system-supportive propaganda campaign to manufacture consent. In this propaganda campaign the press outlets do not need to provide more credible evidence to back up their positions when their positions conform with the decisions of the administration, and the administration remains popular with the electorate. It suffices to simply support administration’s decisions because it satisfies people’s “overwhelming wish” to think well of their leaders and the institutions which they believe that “function in accordance with the same benevolent intent”.1925 In other words, as the people see themselves as good and decent, they also believed that the institutions that represent them function in the same way and express the same values. The five primary ingredients of the “propaganda model” and how they can be applied in this thesis will be discussed below.

The first ingredient of the Herman/Chomsky propaganda model is the “size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth, and profit orientation of the dominant mass-media firms” and the second ingredient is “advertising as the primary income source of the mass media.”

Regarding concentrated ownership in the media outlets I examine in this thesis, one is reminded of Henry Robinson Luce, who was the publisher of both *TIME* and *LIFE*, two press outlets that supported Truman's foreign policy in the early years of the Cold War. Furthermore, Luce as a Republican is a good example of the bi-partisanship that started in 1946, which might be considered as a positive form of reaching consensus on the one hand, but could also be seen as allowing for little questioning or dissent in the American two-party system. Moreover, concentrated ownership is further favored by the high cost of publishing a newspaper that only a few people could afford; for example, while in 1851 in New York City the start-up cost of a newspaper was $69,000, in the 1920s a city newspaper was sold for $6-$18 million dollars, and in 1945 the publishing business could not survive without a substantial amount of money. To gain profit from such an expensive enterprise, the press outlets relied heavily on advertising, which in turn potentially limited their freedom to express unbiased opinions. Yet when we examine the smaller circulation media that do not rely primarily on advertising for their funding, we see that, if a reader wished to have a more international and critical point of view about US foreign policy toward Germany and not receive mostly cliché interpretations of the evolving Cold War, one had to resort to the press outlets of smaller circulation. These press outlets of smaller circulation included little, if any, advertising, which allowed them in some ways more freedom, since they basically relied financially on their readership’s subscription or donation, which came mostly from people who believed in the press outlet’s significance and did not intend to influence them. Yet if small press outlets could not find some wealthy patrons, one might argue they would either go under financially or feel compelled to give their subscribers and donors what they had also paid for, and wanted to read. And yet, as long as they could find sufficient funds to pay their journalists and cover their expenses to keep publishing the independence of the press outlets of smaller circulation gave them the freedom to represent their own beliefs, irrespective of those of the US administration, although not always irrespective of their donors. A notable exemption to the dependence on donors in the time period under examination was *The Nation* that had created a non-profit organization, Nation Associates,

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1927 ibid. pp. 4.
which was responsible for operating the magazine on a non-profit basis, supporting the magazine’s journalism, promoting its message and advancing its progressive agenda in order to avoid exerting this kind of influence or creating this dependence.

The third ingredient of their propaganda model is “the reliance of the media on information.”\textsuperscript{1928} In other words, the under-representation of information or opinions articulated by experts in the respective field can obscure the access of the reader to more objective and higher quality information. Indeed, this was the case in my topic. Although expert opinions were published in the majority of the press outlets under examination, such opinions only appeared in a few columns of the press outlet and thus were easily missed by the reader. As in the first two criteria, this was again the case mostly in the wide circulation media. In contrast, the smaller circulation media relied on the expert opinions of specialists, whose articles covered a large part of every issue and were easily located and not easily overlooked. In turn, these media outlets offered more successfully a balance of views to their readership; of course, keeping in mind that they were not totally unbiased or independent of political affiliations or ideologies, but were at least interested in providing their readership with expert opinions on a regular basis, which went beyond the mainstream and wide-circulation press’s views, thus presumably allowing the reader to be more informed and thus be able to develop critical analyses.

The fourth ingredient was the “‘flak’ as a means of disciplining the media.”\textsuperscript{1929} In the case of this study, I can trace this ingredient in Truman’s strong belief in the role of bi-partisanship for the achievement of foreign policy throughout the time period under examination. In particular, Truman directly and openly expressed his dissatisfaction with a portion of press outlets in his 1950 meeting with the American Society of Newspaper Editors, when he charged them with (Republican) partisanship in the way they handled foreign affairs and accused them of not respecting the values of democracy. This accusation most likely targeted one of the press outlets under examination in this thesis, the Republican \textit{Wall Street Journal}. In 1949 \textit{The WSJ} openly criticized the Truman Administration and strongly called on the political opposition to act as opposition and breach bi-partisanship. As already explained in the introduction, the flak varied from complaints to government sanctions, as a means of disciplining media outlets that strayed too

\textsuperscript{1928} ibid. pp. 2, 18-25.
\textsuperscript{1929} ibid. pp. 2, 26-28.
far outside the consent. In the particular case of WSJ, the flak was verbal and took place in April 1950. Specifically, Truman complained and charged the press outlets with partisanship because they did not support US foreign policies.\textsuperscript{1930}

Lastly, the fifth ingredient of Herman’s and Chomsky’s propaganda model is “anticommunism” as a national religion and control mechanism.” Although the authors did not use the first post-WWII phase of the Cold War as one of the (many) examples in their book, in my opinion this is chronologically the first and perhaps the foremost example to which this ingredient applies. Specifically, a Red Scare was introduced in 1946 and repeatedly spanned the time period I examine; it was used by most of the press outlets to “dichotomize” the world into communist and anti-communist powers, making the support of any anti-communist power an “entirely legitimate news practice.”\textsuperscript{1931} The advantage of this tactic, as with any manichean one, is that it discards the details as useless information and demands blind obedience to the side ‘we support’ (in this case the anti-communist powers) while at the same time no good can come from the other side (the communist powers in this case). This gross oversimplification acts as a barrier to the readers’ critical thinking as they adhere to the side ‘we support,’ which is more of an emotional rather than a rational attitude. In the case of my study, the abrupt shift of US foreign policy toward Germany was largely justified by the press outlets of wide circulation by playing up the Red Scare. After Byrnes’ “speech of hope” in September 1946 the press outlets of wide circulation did not venture to camouflage the shift of US policy on Germany at all and instead, quite straightforwardly underlined Germany’s strategic role on the Cold War chessboard. In other words, the main issue was the Red Scare and the attitude toward Germany was viewed only through that lens. In turn, this replaced the fear of German aggression with the fear of communist/Soviet expansion. As was the case with the first, second and third “ingredients” of the propaganda theory mentioned above, the press outlets of wide circulation were the ones that took into consideration the messages and wishes of their President, as expressed in his meetings with ASNE, and in turn redirected the readership’s attention away from Germany by using the communist fear. From the end of 1946 the press outlets of wide circulation gradually and methodically played down Germany’s potential for

\textsuperscript{1930} The American Presidency Project, Harry S. Truman, Address on Foreign Policy at a Luncheon of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 20, 1950, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, Retrieved on 10/27/2020 from https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/230977

aggression while emphasizing the country’s need for economic recovery in order to stand strong against expansive communism, while from 1949 until at least through 1950, they also clearly disassociated Germany’s resurgent nationalistic feelings from the country’s significantly very recent Nazi past and allayed their readership’s potential reservations by offering as consolation that the German people were, at least, not turning communist.

Another example that shows how even semantics were used to trigger an emotional repulsion against the Soviet Union, and, conversely, enhance support for western Germany, concerns how the press outlets chose to use the terms Soviet Union and Russia. The Soviet Union was called Russia when congratulated on its successful advances against Germany during wartime, while not long after the end of the war and especially after Byrnes’ speech in September 1946, the term Soviet was used to define the government of the USSR. In my opinion, the term Soviet was used to describe a government beyond the boundaries of the USSR and to connotate the term Soviet Union with Russia’s expansive intention in Eastern Europe. Following the pattern we discussed above for the other “ingredients,” again the press outlets of smaller circulation, and particularly the Jewish affairs-oriented magazine Commentary and the progressive magazine The Nation, did not let the past of and potential for Nazi aggression and persecution be overshadowed by the Red Scare and buried by Cold War tensions. This was also true of Walter Lippmann’s syndicated columns, which urged the establishment of a balance of power between East and West and warned against initiatives toward the Soviet Union that could be regarded as hostile. Perhaps more importantly, these two particular small press outlets, especially in 1949 and 1950 did not stop reporting the German resurgent nationalistic feelings nor did they stop warning about the failed democratization process in Germany, while the rest of the press outlets simply reported this appearance of German nationalism, while implying that as long as the German people did not turn into communists then there was no particular reason for concern. Nonetheless, throughout all six years under examination in this thesis US public opinion aligned with the attitude represented by the majority of press outlets under examination, which had already aligned with the pursued US policies on Germany and inevitably against the Soviet Union and vice versa, making it appear that this tactic of “anticommunism” was successful.

Although the practical reasons associated with a Red Scare behind it have already been explained, it is still paradoxical that the free US press and public opinion would seem to tolerate
even quasi fascist attitudes from West Germany. In my opinion, there is something that can explain this attitude of the press and the public opinion and at the same time explain why the Red Scare was so effective. Between the two so-called authoritarian ideas of fascism and communism, the latter had almost always been regarded as a socio-economic and political threat and thus enemy of the United States. As such, the United States and its people were encouraged to engage in any type of battle against communism, whether physical or propagandistic. In fact, as revealed by the polls from 1946 on until through 1950, the idea of a possible war with the Soviet Union in the next 10-25 years was ingrained in the American mind and the majority of Americans had been favoring the continuation of conscription even though the US was geographically not threatened; they agreed to finance the reconstruction and rearming of countries neighboring the Soviet Union; they backed the creation of a military alliance against the Soviet Union and even the rearming of their former enemy. And yet they generally did not concern themselves with western German nationalistic nostalgia for a return to Germany’s 1938 borders or even take stands against Spain's dictator Francisco Franco, ostracizing those Americans who had fought in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade on behalf of the elected Spanish Republican government. On the contrary, in the same way the US had once made friends with its former enemy, the Soviet Union during the Second World War, it made friends with another former enemy, Germany, during the Cold War.\footnote{The United States supported the White Movement against the communist Bolsheviks (the Red Army) first indirectly by aiding supply their army through loans to the Allies and then by direct interference. Specifically, although President Wilson was unwilling to intervene, he gave in after being pressured by the allies and sent American troops. In August 1918 American troops at Archangelsk which were under the command of British General Poole, actively engaged Bolsheviks despite Wilson’s order to only guard the supplies and evade military action. Similar incidents occurred in 1919. David S. Fogle (2001), America’s Secret War against Bolshevism: U.S. Intervention in the Russian Civil War, 1917-1920, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press; Shane Hapner, "Woodrow Wilson’s Ideological War: American Intervention in Russia, 1918-1920," Best Integrated Writing, (2015, Fall), 2.}

Aside from ideological reasons and the deep schism between the two socio-economic and political systems under examination here (communism and capitalism), another reason that may explain the success of this “propaganda theory” in explaining this shifting public opinion in favor of a hostile attitude toward the Soviet Union and an ever increasingly positive attitude toward (West) Germany, relates to economic interests. Looking back at the end of the Second World War, the United States possessed nearly two-thirds of the world’s gold reserves and close to three-fourths of its invested capital, with these financial results greatly dependent upon the huge military
As expected, the steep reduction of US industrial war production as the profitable US war production had to be transformed into peacetime production after the end of the Second World War was followed by an increase in unemployment rates and strikes. For example, while in 1944 the unemployment rate was only 1.2%, the lowest in American history since 1929, and the inflation rate was only 2.3% and in 1945 the unemployment rate was still only 1.9% and the inflation rate 2.2%, in 1946 the unemployment rate reached 3.9% and inflation skyrocketed at 18.1%. However, by introducing the containment policy of the Truman Doctrine and the economic aid measures associated with the Marshall Plan in the fight against communist expansion, the inflation situation improved remarkably. In particular, in 1947 the inflation rate dropped down to 8.8%, in 1948 to 3.0%, and in 1949 to -2.1%. Analyzing economics is not the point of this study but the argument of domestic prosperity and the inextricable relationship between the reduction of domestic inflation and foreign policy decisions were also utilized by the US President in his 1948 meeting with ASNE, the only presidential message which was broadcast nationally in the time period under examination in this thesis, in order to set the theory of containment into practice, as seen in the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. In 1948 Truman called on the American people to support “a reasonable anti-inflation program and a reasonable defense program,” which would increase US production, lower US prices and at the same time work out the difficult international problems facing the US. In this way the US administration coupled the solution of a pressing problem of the average American, the rise of prices, with the country’s urgent foreign policy decisions, while at the same time the attention of the American public was deflected even more from Germany’s recent guilty past or from German nationalist resurgence.

Collectively, the US administration and most US press outlets successfully pursued a propaganda plan that did not directly need to manipulate public opinion on the matter of Germany,

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1935 ibid.
as it was already to an extent positive or at least not hostile, although it is hard to argue that it did not manipulate public opinion regarding the Soviet Union (even though this is not the topic of this thesis and the case of the Soviet Union is studied only in reference to Germany). A symbolic example of this struggle between remembering but also vindicating is that the almost same number of Holocaust museums and memorials (59) and memorialized fragments of the Berlin Wall (64) exist today all over the United States.\footnote{1937 In retrospect, one might say that this effective propaganda plan had positive results as it not only relieved Germany from any holdover accusations of “collective guilt” or a Morgenthau-Plan-like punishment but it also led to the economic and political revival of the nation, and of (western) Europe as a whole, without feeding again the German nationalism at least to the point of war. On the other hand, one might argue it extended in the US and the west (Germany and Europe) the isolation and demonization of the Soviet Union, what became known as the Eastern Bloc and communism, gave both east and west a justification for nuclearization and arms build-up and made the division of Europe for over 40 years a reality. Nonetheless, one has to question whether the means of having a government and the mass media attempt to influence public opinion by methods that closely resemble manipulation justifies the ends, ever. Later events in several corners of the world, such as in Vietnam or Latin America where the US government used the same anti-communist propaganda mechanisms to manipulate domestic public opinion and justify foreign policy decisions brought about not only negative results for the US government’s reputation at home, but also abroad, but also for those caught in the middle.}

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